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  1. Ron Mallon, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Tom McCoy & Jay G. Hull, Intention, Temporal Order, and Moral Judgment Forthcoming in Mind and Language.
    The traditional philosophical doctrine of double effect claims that agents’ intentions affect whether acts are morally wrong. Our behavioral study reveals that agents’ intentions affect whether acts are judged morally wrong but not whether acts are classified as killings, whereas the temporal order of good and bad effects affects whether acts are classified as killings but not whether acts are judged morally wrong. These findings suggest that the moral judgments are not based on the classifications. Our results also undermine recent (...)
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  2. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (forthcoming). Consequentialism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  3. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.) (forthcoming). Moral Psychology: Freedom and Responsibility. MIT Press.
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  4. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.) (forthcoming). Moral Psychology, Vol. 4. MIT Press.
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  5. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (forthcoming). O que é um dilema moral? Critica.
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  6. Jesse S. Summers & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (forthcoming). Scrupulous Agents. Philosophical Psychology:1-20.
    Scrupulosity (a form of OCD involving obsession with morality) raises fascinating issues about the nature of moral judgment and about moral responsibility. After defining scrupulosity, describing its common features, and discussing concrete case studies, we discuss three peculiar aspects of moral judgments made by scrupulous patients: perfectionism, intolerance of uncertainty, and moral thought-action fusion. We then consider whether mesh and reasons-responsiveness accounts of responsibility explain whether the scrupulous are morally responsible.
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  7. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.) (2014). Moral Psychology: Free Will and Moral Responsibility. A Bradford Book.
  8. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Thalia Wheatley (2014). Are Moral Judgments Unified? Philosophical Psychology 27 (4):451-474.
  9. Thomas Nadelhoffer, Dena Gromet, Geoffrey Goodwin, Eddy Nahmias, Chandra Sripada & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2013). The Mind, the Brain, and the Law. In Thomas A. Nadelhoffer (ed.), The Future of Punishment. Oup Usa.
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  10. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2013). The Disunity of Morality and Why It Matters to Philosophy. The Monist 95 (3):355-377.
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  11. Lynn Nadel & Walter P. Sinnott-Armstrong (eds.) (2012). Memory and Law. Oup Usa.
    How well does memory work, how accurate is it, and can we tell when someone is reporting an accurate memory? Can we distinguish a true memory from a false one? Can memories be selectively enhanced, or erased? Are memories altered by emotion, by stress, by drugs? These questions and more are addressed by Memory and Law, which aims to present the current state of knowledge among cognitive and neural scientists about memory as applied to legal settings.
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  12. Thomas Nadelhoffer, Stephanos Bibas, Scott Grafton, Kent Kiehl, Andrew Mansfield, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Michael Gazzaniga (2012). Neuroprediction, Violence, and the Law: Setting the Stage. [REVIEW] Neuroethics 5 (1):67-99.
    In this paper, our goal is to (a) survey some of the legal contexts within which violence risk assessment already plays a prominent role, (b) explore whether developments in neuroscience could potentially be used to improve our ability to predict violence, and (c) discuss whether neuropredictive models of violence create any unique legal or moral problems above and beyond the well worn problems already associated with prediction more generally. In Violence Risk Assessment and the Law , we briefly examine the (...)
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  13. Thomas Nadelhoffer & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2012). Neurolaw and Neuroprediction: Potential Promises and Perils. Philosophy Compass 7 (9):631-642.
    Neuroscience has been proposed for use in the legal system for purposes of mind reading, assessment of responsibility, and prediction of misconduct. Each of these uses has both promises and perils, and each raises issues regarding the admissibility of neuroscientific evidence.
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  14. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2012). Free Contrastivism. In Martijn Blaauw (ed.), Contrastivism in Philosophy: New Perspectives. Routledge.
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  15. Thomas Nadelhoffer & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2011). Experimental Ethics. In Christian Miller (ed.), Continuum Companion to Ethics. Continuum. 261.
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  16. Carolyn Parkinson, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Philipp E. Koralus, Angela Mendelovici, Victoria McGeer & Thalia Wheatley (2011). Is Morality Unified? Evidence That Distinct Neural Systems Underlie Moral Judgments of Harm, Dishonesty, and Disgust. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 23 (10):3162-3180.
    Much recent research has sought to uncover the neural basis of moral judgment. However, it has remained unclear whether "moral judgments" are sufficiently homogenous to be studied scientifically as a unified category. We tested this assumption by using fMRI to examine the neural correlates of moral judgments within three moral areas: (physical) harm, dishonesty, and (sexual) disgust. We found that the judgment ofmoral wrongness was subserved by distinct neural systems for each of the different moral areas and that these differences (...)
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  17. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2011). An Empirical Challenge to Moral Intuitionism. In Jill Graper Hernandez (ed.), The New Intuitionism. 11--28.
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  18. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2011). Emotion and Reliability in Moral Psychology. Emotion Review 3 (3):288-289.
    Instead of arguing about whether moral judgments are based on emotion or reason, moral psychologists should investigate the reliability of moral judgments by checking rates of framing effects in different kinds of moral judgments under different conditions by different people.
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  19. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2011). Personality Disorders and Responsibility: Learning From Peay. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 18 (3):245-248.
    People with personality disorders should be treated fairly. Potential crime victims should be protected. That much is uncontroversial. The hard questions ask what is fair, when is protection adequate, and how should we achieve fairness and protection together. Peay outlines five main hurdles that the law must jump to reach these goals. All five raise serious challenges. To begin to address these challenges, we must first clarify what a personality disorder is. The notion of a personality disorder is defined very (...)
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  20. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Ken Levy (2011). Insanity Defense. In John Deigh & David Dolinko (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of the Criminal Law. Oxford University Press. 299--334.
     
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  21. Gilbert Harman, Kelby Mason & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2010). Moral Reasoning. In John Michael Doris (ed.), The Moral Psychology Handbook. Oxford University Press.
    What is moral reasoning? For that matter, what is any sort of reasoning? Let me begin by making a few distinctions. First, there is a distinction between reasoning as something that that people do and the abstract structures of proof or “argument” that are the subject matter of formal logic. I will be mainly concerned with reasoning in the first sense, reasoning that people do. Second, there is a distinction between moral reasoning with other people and moral reasoning by and (...)
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  22. Benjamin Libet, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Lynn Nadel (eds.) (2010). Conscious Will and Responsibility: A Tribute to Benjamin Libet. Oxford University Press.
    Benjamin Libet, Do we have free will? -- Adina L. Roskies, Why Libet's studies don't pose a threat to free will? -- Alfred r. mele, libet on free will : readiness potentials, decisions, and awareness? -- Susan Pockett and Suzanne Purdy, Are voluntary movements initiated preconsciously? : the relationships between readiness potentials, urges, and decisions? -- William P. Banks and Eve A. Isham, Do we really know what we are doing? : implications of reported time of decision for theories of (...)
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  23. Joshua May, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Jay G. Hull & Aaron Zimmerman (2010). Practical Interests, Relevant Alternatives, and Knowledge Attributions: An Empirical Study. [REVIEW] Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2):265–273.
    In defending his interest-relative account of knowledge in Knowledge and Practical Interests (2005), Jason Stanley relies heavily on intuitions about several bank cases. We experimentally test the empirical claims that Stanley seems to make concerning our common-sense intuitions about these bank cases. Additionally, we test the empirical claims that Jonathan Schaffer seems to make in his critique of Stanley. We argue that our data impugn what both Stanley and Schaffer claim our intuitions about such cases are. To account for these (...)
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  24. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2010). Alternatives and Defaults: Knobe's Two Explanations of How Moral Judgments Influence Intuitions About Intentionality and Causation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):349-350.
    Knobe cites both relevant alternatives and defaults on a continuum to explain how moral judgments influence intuitions about certain apparently non-moral notions. I ask (1) how these two accounts are related, (2) whether they exclude or supplement supposedly competing theories, and (3) how to get positive evidence that people consider relevant alternatives when applying such notions.
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  25. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Lynn Nadel (eds.) (2010). Conscious Will and Responsibility: A Tribute to Benjamin Libet. OUP USA.
    We all seem to think that we do the acts we do because we consciously choose to do them. This commonsense view is thrown into dispute by Benjamin Libet's eyebrow-raising experiments, which seem to suggest that conscious will occurs not before but after the start of brain activity that produces physical action. Libet's striking results are often claimed to undermine traditional views of free will and moral responsibility and to have practical implications for criminal justice. His work has also stimulated (...)
     
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  26. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Adina Roskies (2010). Mele's Effective Intentions: The Power of Conscious Will. [REVIEW] Philosophical Books 51 (3):127-143.
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  27. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Liane Young (2010). And Fiery Cushman. In John Doris (ed.), Moral Psychology Handbook. Oxford University Press.
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  28. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Liane Young & Fiery Cushman (2010). Moral Intuitions. In John Michael Doris (ed.), The Moral Psychology Handbook. Oxford University Press. 246--272.
    Moral intuitions are strong, stable, immediate moral beliefs. Moral philosophers ask when they are justified. This question cannot be answered separately from a psychological question: How do moral intuitions arise? Their reliability depends upon their source. This chapter develops and argues for a new theory of how moral intuitions arise—that they arise through heuristic processes best understood as unconscious attribute substitutions. That is, when asked whether something has the attribute of moral wrongness, people unconsciously substitute a different question about a (...)
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  29. Louise Antony, William Lane Craig, John Hare, Donald C. Hubin, Paul Kurtz, C. Stephen Layman, Mark C. Murphy, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Richard Swinburne (2009). Is Goodness Without God Good Enough?: A Debate on Faith, Secularism, and Ethics. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
  30. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2009). How Strong is This Obligation? An Argument for Consequentialism From Concomitant Variation. Analysis 69 (3):438-442.
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  31. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2009). Mixed-Up Meta-Ethics. Philosophical Issues 19 (1):235-256.
    My topic is the old debate between moral realists and moral expressivists. Although I will eventually adopt a Pyrrhonian position, as usual, my main goal is neither to argue for this position nor to resolve this debate but only to explore some new options that mix together realism and expressivism in various ways. Nothing that I say will be conclusive, but I hope that some of it will be suggestive.
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  32. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2009). Moral Perception and Heuristics. Modern Schoolman 86 (3-4):327-347.
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  33. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2009). Morality Without God? Oxford University Press.
    This book should fit well with the debates raging over issues like evolution and intelligent design, atheism, and religion and public life as an example of a ...
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  34. Fiery Cushman, Joshua Knobe & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2008). Moral Appraisals Affect Doing/Allowing Judgments. Cognition 108 (2):353-380.
    An extensive body of research suggests that the distinction between doing and allowing plays a critical role in shaping moral appraisals. Here, we report evidence from a pair of experiments suggesting that the converse is also true: moral appraisals affect doing/allowing judgments. Specifically, morally bad behavior is more likely to be construed as actively ‘doing’ than as passively ‘allowing’. This finding adds to a growing list of folk concepts influenced by moral appraisal, including causation and intentional action. We therefore suggest (...)
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  35. Diana Meyers, Joel Kupperman, Margaret Gilbert, Sonia Michel & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2008). Paul Bloomfield. In Paul Bloomfield (ed.), Morality and Self-Interest. Oxford University Press.
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  36. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2008). A Contrastivist Manifesto. Social Epistemology 22 (3):257 – 270.
    General contrastivism holds that all claims of reasons are relative to contrast classes. This approach applies to explanation (reasons why things happen), moral philosophy (reasons for action), and epistemology (reasons for belief), and it illuminates moral dilemmas, free will, and the grue paradox. In epistemology, contrast classes point toward an account of justified belief that is compatible with reliabilism and other externalisms. Contrast classes also provide a model for Pyrrhonian scepticism based on suspending belief about which contrast class is relevant. (...)
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  37. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2008). Is Moral Phenomenology Unified? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):85-97.
    In this short paper, I argue that the phenomenology of moral judgment is not unified across different areas of morality (involving harm, hierarchy, reciprocity, and impurity) or even across different relations to harm. Common responses, such as that moral obligations are experienced as felt demands based on a sense of what is fitting, are either too narrow to cover all moral obligations or too broad to capture anything important and peculiar to morality. The disunity of moral phenomenology is, nonetheless, compatible (...)
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  38. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2008). Moderate Classy Pyrrhonian Moral Scepticism. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):448–456.
    This précis summarizes my book Moral Skepticisms, with emphasis on my contrastivist analysis of justified moral belief and my Pyrrhonian moral scepticism based on meta-scepticism about relevance. This complex moral epistemology escapes a common paradox facing moral philosophers.
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  39. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.) (2008). Moral Psychology, 3 Vols. MIT Press.
    For much of the twentieth century, philosophy and science went their separate ways. In moral philosophy, fear of the so-called naturalistic fallacy kept moral philosophers from incorporating developments in biology and psychology. Since the 1990s, however, many philosophers have drawn on recent advances in cognitive psychology, brain science, and evolutionary psychology to inform their work. This collaborative trend is especially strong in moral philosophy, and these three volumes bring together some of the most innovative work by both philosophers and psychologists (...)
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  40. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.) (2008). Moral Philosophy Vol. 3: The Neuroscience of Morality. MIT Press.
    For much of the twentieth century, philosophy and science went their separate ways. In moral philosophy, fear of the so-called naturalistic fallacy kept moral philosophers from incorporating developments in biology and psychology. Since the 1990s, however, many philosophers have drawn on recent advances in cognitive psychology, brain science, and evolutionary psychology to inform their work. This collaborative trend is especially strong in moral philosophy, and these three volumes bring together some of the most innovative work by both philosophers and psychologists (...)
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  41. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.) (2008). Moral Psychology Volume 3. MIT Press.
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  42. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.) (2008). Moral Psychology Volume 1. MIT Press.
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  43. Walter Sinnott-armstrong (2008). Précis of Moral Scepticisms. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (3):789-793.
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  44. Walter Sinnott-armstrong (2008). Replies to Copp, Timmons, and Railton. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (3):820-836.
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  45. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2008). Replies to Dreier and McNaughton. Philosophical Books 49 (3):218-228.
    I very much appreciate the time and care that Jamie Dreier and David McNaughton put into my book, Moral Skepticisms. Their comments raise profound and challenging issues that I cannot treat adequately here. All I can hope to do is point to some directions in which further discussion should proceed.
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  46. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2008). Replies to Hough, Baumann and Blaauw. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):478-488.
    I reply to comments by Gerry Hough, Peter Baumann and Martijn Blaauw on my book Moral Skepticisms. The main issues concern whether modest justifiedness is epistemic and how it is related to extreme justifiedness; how contrastivists can handle crazy contrast classes, indeterminacy and common language; whether Pyrrhonian scepticism leads to paralysis in decision-making or satisfies our desires to evaluate beliefs as justified or not; and how contextualists can respond to my arguments against relevance of contrast classes.
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  47. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2008). Summary of Moral Sketicisms. Philosophical Books 49 (3):193-196.
    My book, Moral Skepticisms, is intended to serve as an introduction to moral epistemology as well as a development of my own moral epistemology. Hence, my opening chapter surveys the field of moral epistemology and the varieties of moral scepticism. The main lesson is that we should stop arguing about moral scepticism in general, because there are too many kinds that differ in too many important details.
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  48. Walter Sinnott-armstrong, Ron Mallon, Tom Mccoy & Jay G. Hull (2008). Intention, Temporal Order, and Moral Judgments. Mind and Language 23 (1):90–106.
    The traditional philosophical doctrine of double effect claims that agents’ intentions affect whether acts are morally wrong. Our behavioral study reveals that agents’ intentions do affect whether acts are judged morally wrong, whereas the temporal order of good and bad effects affects whether acts are classified as killings. This finding suggests that the moral judgments are not based on the classifications. Our results also undermine recent claims that prior moral judgments determine whether agents are seen as causing effects intentionally rather (...)
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  49. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Adina Roskies, Teneille Brown & Emily Murphy (2008). Brain Images as Legal Evidence. Episteme 5 (3):359-373.
    This paper explores whether brain images may be admitted as evidence in criminal trials under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which weighs probative value against the danger of being prejudicial, confusing, or misleading to fact finders. The paper summarizes and evaluates recent empirical research relevant to these issues. We argue that currently the probative value of neuroimages for criminal responsibility is minimal, and there is some evidence of their potential to be prejudicial or misleading. We also propose experiments that will (...)
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