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  1.  11
    Warren S. Brown & Kevin S. Reimer (2013). Embodied Cognition, Character Formation, and Virtue. Zygon 48 (3):832-845.
    The theory of embodied cognition makes the claim that our cognitive processes are, at their core, sensorimotor, situated, and action-relevant. Our mental system is built primarily to control action, and so mind is formed by the nature of the body and its interactions with the world. In this paper we will explore the nature of virtue and its formation from the perspective of embodied cognition. We specifically describe exemplars of the virtue of compassion (caregivers of individuals with developmental (...)
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  2.  18
    Warren S. Brown (1997). Mac Kay's View of Conscious Agents in Dialogue: Speculations on the Embodiment of Soul. Philosophical Psychology 10 (4):497 – 505.
    Donald MacKay's description of the embodiment of an efficacious conscious mind is reviewed as a version of non-reductive physicalism. Particular focus is given to MacKay's analysis of the emergence of consciousness in the capacity for self-evaluation which results from informational feedback regarding the results of action. Unique to MacKay's posthumously published Gifford Lectures is his analysis of agents in dialog as a particular form of an environmental feedback loop. His analysis of dialog is reviewed and expanded to encompass concepts of (...)
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  3. Warren S. Brown (2007). The Emergence of Causally Efficacious Mental Function. In Nancey C. Murphy & William R. Stoeger (eds.), Evolution and Emergence: Systems, Organisms, Persons. Oxford University Press 60--198.
     
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  4. Nancey Murphy & Warren S. Brown (2009). Did My Neurons Make Me Do It?: Philosophical and Neurobiological Perspectives on Moral Responsibility and Free Will. OUP Oxford.
    If humans are purely physical, then must all our thoughts and actions be determined by the laws of neurobiology? Free will, moral responsibility, and reason itself appear to be in jeopardy. But Murphy and Brown present a non-reductive version of physicalism which leaves room for us to be the authors of our own thoughts and actions.
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  5. Nancey Murphy & Warren S. Brown (2007). Did My Neurons Make Me Do It?: Philosophical and Neurobiological Perspectives on Moral Responsibility and Free Will. Clarendon Press.
    If humans are purely physical, and if it is the brain that does the work formerly assigned to the mind or soul, then how can it fail to be the case that all of our thoughts and actions are determined by the laws of neurobiology? If this is the case, then free will, moral responsibility, and, indeed, reason itself would appear to be in jeopardy. Murphy and Brown present an original defence of a non-reductive version of physicalism whereby humans are (...)
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