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  1. Wayne A. Davis, Irregular Negations.
    Horn (1989) identified a number of irregular or marked negations that are not used in accordance with the standard rule of propositional logic. He concluded that negation was pragmatically ambiguous. Van der Sandt (1991) disputed Horn’s ambiguity claim, and proposed a uniform semantics for all negations. I will provide an informal explanation of van der Sandt’s theory, and develop a number of objections. I show that irregular negations are not anaphoric, as Van der Sandt believes, but compositional. I argue for (...)
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  2. Wayne A. Davis (forthcoming). Knowledge Claims and Context: Belief. Philosophical Studies.
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  3. Wayne A. Davis (2013). Grice's Razor and Epistemic Invariantism. Journal of Philosophical Research 38:147-176.
    Grice’s Razor is a methodological principle that many philosophers and linguists have used to help justify pragmatic explanations of linguistic phenomena over semantic explanations. A number of authors in the debate over contextualism argue that an invariant semantics together with Grice’s (1975) conversational principles can account for the contextual variability of knowledge claims. I show here that the defense of Grice’s Razor found in these “Gricean invariantists,” and its use against epistemic contextualism, display all the problems pointed out earlier in (...)
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  4. Wayne A. Davis (2013). Meaning, Expression, and Indication: Reply to Buchanan. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):62-66.
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  5. Wayne A. Davis (2013). Minimizing Indexicality. Philosophical Studies 168 (1):1-20.
    I critically examine Cappelen and Lepore’s definition of and tests for indexicality, and refine them to improve their adequacy. Indexicals cannot be defined as expressions with different referents in different contexts unless linguistic meaning and circumstances of evaluation are held constant. I show that despite Cappelen and Lepore’s claim that there are only a handful of indexical expressions, their “basic set” includes a number of large and open classes, and generates an infinity of indexical phrases. And while the tests can (...)
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  6. Wayne A. Davis (2013). On Nonindexical Contextualism. Philosophical Studies 163 (2):561-574.
    Abstract MacFarlane distinguishes “context sensitivity” from “indexicality,” and argues that “nonindexical contextualism” has significant advantages over the standard indexical form. MacFarlane’s substantive thesis is that the extension of an expression may depend on an epistemic standard variable even though its content does not. Focusing on ‘knows,’ I will argue against the possibility of extension dependence without content dependence when factors such as meaning, time, and world are held constant, and show that MacFarlane’s nonindexical contextualism provides no advantages over indexical contextualism. (...)
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  7. Wayne A. Davis (2013). On Occurrences of Types in Types. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (2):1-15.
    The different occurrences of a word in a sentence cannot be identified with the one word type, nor with its many tokens. What then are occurrences of a word? How can one type occur more than once in another type? Is the conception of ?structural universals? that leads to these questions incoherent, as Lewis maintained? I argue against the answer Wetzel suggested, which identifies sentences with functions from numbers to expressions, and propose instead that occurrences of one type in another (...)
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  8. Wayne A. Davis (2013). The Semantics of Actuality Terms: Indexical Vs. Descriptive Theories. Noûs 48 (4).
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  9. Wayne A. Davis (2008). Précis of Meaning, Expression, and Thought. Philosophical Studies 137 (3):383 - 387.
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  10. Wayne A. Davis (2008). Review: Replies to Green, Szabó, Jeshion, and Siebel. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 137 (3):427 - 445.
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  11. Wayne A. Davis (2008). Replies to Green, Szabó, Jeshion, and Siebel. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 137 (3):427 - 445.
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  12. Wayne A. Davis (2008). Thought Structure, Belief Content, and Possession Conditions. Acta Analytica 23 (3):207-231.
    According to Peacocke, concepts are individuated by their possession conditions, which are specified in terms of conditions in which certain propositions containing those concepts are believed. In support, Peacocke tries to explain what it is for a thought to have a structure and what it is for a belief to have a propositional content. I show that the possession condition theory cannot answer such fundamental questions. Peacocke’s theory founders because concepts are metaphysically fundamental. They individuate the propositions and thoughts containing (...)
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  13. Wayne A. Davis (2007). Grice's Meaning Project. Teorema 26 (2):41-58.
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  14. Wayne A. Davis (2007). Intentionalism, Descriptivism, and Proper Names. In Savas L. Tsohatzidis (ed.), John Searle's Philosophy of Language: Force, Meaning, and Mind. Cambridge University Press. 102.
  15. Wayne A. Davis (2007). Knowledge Claims and Context: Loose Use. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 132 (3):395 - 438.
    There is abundant evidence of contextual variation in the use of “S knows p.” Contextualist theories explain this variation in terms of semantic hypotheses that refer to standards of justification determined by “practical” features of either the subject’s context (Hawthorne & Stanley) or the ascriber’s context (Lewis, Cohen, & DeRose). There is extensive linguistic counterevidence to both forms. I maintain that the contextual variation of knowledge claims is better explained by common pragmatic factors. I show here that one is variable (...)
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  16. Wayne A. Davis (2006). Review of Gerhard Preyer, Georg Peter (Eds.), Contextualism in Philosophy: Knowledge, Meaning, and Truth. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (7).
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  17. Wayne A. Davis (2005). Concepts and Epistemic Individuation (Christopher Peacocke). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):290-325.
    Christopher Peacocke has presented an original version of the perennial philosophical thesis that we can gain substantive metaphysical and epistemological insight from an analysis of our concepts. Peacocke's innovation is to look at how concepts are individuated by their possession conditions, which he believes can be specified in terms of conditions in which certain propositions containing those concepts are accepted. The ability to provide such insight is one of Peacocke's major arguments for his theory of concepts. I will critically examine (...)
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  18. Wayne A. Davis (2005). Concepts and Epistemic Individuation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):290-325.
    Christopher Peacocke has presented an original version of the perennial philosophical thesis that we can gain substantive metaphysical and epistemological insight from an analysis of our concepts. Peacocke's innovation is to look at how concepts are individuated by their possession conditions, which he believes can be specified in terms of conditions in which certain propositions containing those concepts are accepted. The ability to provide such insight is one of Peacocke's major arguments for his theory of concepts. I will critically examine (...)
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  19. Wayne A. Davis (2005). Concept Individuation, Possession Conditions, and Propositional Attitudes. Noûs 39 (1):140-66.
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  20. Wayne A. Davis (2005). Contextualist Theories of Knowledge. Acta Analytica 20 (1):29-42.
    Contextualist theories of knowledge offer a semantic hypothesis to explain the observed contextual variation in what people say they know, and the difficulty people have resolving skeptical paradoxes. Subject or speaker relative versions make the truth conditions of “S knows that p” depend on the standards of either the knower’s context (Hawthorne and Stanley) or those of the speaker’s context (Cohen and DeRose). Speaker contextualism avoids objections to subject contextualism, but is implausible in light of evidence that “know” does not (...)
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  21. Wayne A. Davis (2005). Nondescriptive Meaning and Reference: An Ideational Semantics. Oxford University Press.
    Wayne Davis presents a highly original approach to the foundations of semantics, showing how the so-called "expression" theory of meaning can handle names and other problematic cases of nondescriptive meaning. The fact that thoughts have parts ("ideas" or "concepts") is fundamental: Davis argues that like other unstructured words, names mean what they do because they are conventionally used to express atomic or basic ideas. In the process he shows that many pillars of contemporary philosophical semantics, from twin earth arguments to (...)
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  22. Wayne A. Davis (2005). On Begging the Systematicity Question. Journal of Philosophical Research 30:399-404.
    Robert Cummins has argued that Jerry Fodor’s well-known systematicity argument begs the question. I show that the systematicity argument for thought structure does not beg the question, nor run in either explanatory nor inferential circles, nor illegitimately project sentence structure onto thoughts. Because the evidence does not presuppose that thought has structure, connectionist explanations of the same interconnections between thoughts are at least possibilities. Butthey are likely to be ad hoc.
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  23. Wayne A. Davis (2005). Reasons and Psychological Causes. Philosophical Studies 122 (1):51 - 101.
    The causal theory of reasons holds that acting for a reason entails that the agents action was caused by his or her beliefs and desires. While Donald Davidson (1963) and others effectively silenced the first objections to the theory, a new round has emerged. The most important recent attack is presented by Jonathan Dancy in Practical Reality (2000) and subsequent work. This paper will defend the causal theory against Dancy and others, including Schueler (1995), Stoutland (1999, 2001), and Ginet (2002).Dancy (...)
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  24. Wayne A. Davis (2005). Review: The Antecedent Motivation Theory: Discussion. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 123 (3):249 - 260.
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  25. Wayne A. Davis (2005). The Antecedent Motivation Theory – Discussion. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 123 (3):249 - 260.
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  26. Wayne A. Davis (2004). Are Knowledge Claims Indexical? Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):257 - 281.
    David Lewis, Stewart Cohen, and Keith DeRose have proposed that sentences of the form S knows P are indexical, and therefore differ in truth value from one context to another.1 On their indexical contextualism, the truth value of S knows P is determined by whether S meets the epistemic standards of the speakers context. I will not be concerned with relational forms of contextualism, according to which the truth value of S knows P is determined by the standards of the (...)
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  27. Wayne A. Davis (2003). Meaning, Expression, and Thought. Cambridge University Press.
    This philosophical treatise on the foundations of semantics is a systematic effort to clarify, deepen, and defend the classical doctrine that words are conventional signs of mental states, principally thoughts and ideas, and that meaning consists in their expression. This expression theory of meaning is developed by carrying out the Gricean program, explaining what it is for words to have meaning in terms of speaker meaning, and what it is for a speaker to mean something in terms of intention. But (...)
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  28. Wayne A. Davis (2003). Psychologism and Humeanism: Review of Dancy's Practical Reality. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):452 - 459.
  29. Wayne A. Davis (2002). Reason, Emotion, and the Importance of Philosophy. Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 4 (1):1 - 23.
    Wayne A. Davis uses his theory of happiness to clarify and deepen Rand's theory of emotion. He distinguishes belief from knowledge, volitive from appetitive desire, and occurrent thinking from believing. He suggests that values in Rand's sense are things we volitively desire. Happiness is defined in terms of the sum of the products of the degree of belief and (volitive) desire functions over all thoughts. Davis then evaluates such Randian maxims as that happiness cannot be achieved by the (...)
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  30. Wayne A. Davis (1999). Communicating, Telling, and Informing. Philosophical Inquiry 21 (1):21-43.
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  31. Wayne A. Davis (1998). Implicature: Intention, Convention, and Principle in the Failure of Gricean Theory. Cambridge University Press.
    H. P. Grice virtually discovered the phenomenon of implicature (to denote the implications of an utterance that are not strictly implied by its content). Gricean theory claims that conversational implicatures can be explained and predicted using general psycho-social principles. This theory has established itself as one of the orthodoxes in the philosophy of language. Wayne Davis argues controversially that Gricean theory does not work. He shows that any principle-based theory understates both the intentionality of what a speaker implicates and the (...)
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  32. Wayne A. Davis (1997). Davidson's Conceptual Argument for Rational Cognition. Legal Theory 3 (2):205-210.
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  33. Wayne A. Davis (1993). Reply to Blum. Philosophia 22 (1-2):211-218.
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  34. Wayne A. Davis (1992). Cogitative and Cognitive Speaker Meaning. Philosophical Studies 67 (1):71 - 88.
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  35. Wayne A. Davis (1991). The World-Shift Theory of Free Choice. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (2):206-211.
  36. Wayne A. Davis & John W. Bender (1989). Technical Flaws in the Coherence Theory. Synthese 79 (2):257 - 278.
    We have argued that Lehrer's definitions of coherence and justification have serious technical defects. As a result, the definition of justification is both too weak and too strong. We have suggested solutions for some of the problems, but others seem irremediable. We would also argue more generally that if coherence is anything like what Lehrer's theory says it is, then coherence is neither necessary nor sufficient for justification. While our current objections are directed at the ‘letter’ of Lehrer's theory, other (...)
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  37. Wayne A. Davis (1988). Expression of Emotion. American Philosophical Quarterly 25 (October):279-291.
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  38. Wayne A. Davis (1988). Knowledge, Acceptance, and Belief. Southern Journal of Philosophy 26 (2):169-178.
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  39. Wayne A. Davis (1987). Scientific Knowledge. Review of Metaphysics 41 (1):136-137.
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  40. Wayne A. Davis (1987). The Varieties of Fear. Philosophical Studies 51 (3):287 - 310.
    I shall conclude with a methodological moral. I have tried to show that there are several fundamentally different kinds of fear. One is a pure propositional attitude, one is partially a bodily state, and one is a relation between a person and a nonpropositional object. Other emotions come in similar varieties, such as hope and happiness, but with significant differences. The state of happiness, for example, does not entail any particular bodily state or feeling. So one lesson is this: it (...)
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  41. Wayne A. Davis (1986). Risk. Review of Metaphysics 39 (3):579-580.
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  42. Wayne A. Davis (1986). Two Senses of Desire. In J. Marks (ed.), The Ways of Desire. Precedent. 181-196.
  43. Wayne A. Davis (1986). Warner on Enjoyment. Philosophy Research Archives 12:553-555.
    In ‘Davis on Enjoyment: A Reply’, Richard Warner replies to three objections against his ‘Enjoyment’ that I raised in my ‘A Causal Theory of Enjoyment’, and concludes that one of my examples in fact demonstrates a serious deficiency of my own account. I argue that Warner’s replies to my objections are unsatisfactory, and that his objection to my account had a ready solution.
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  44. Wayne A. Davis (1984). A Causal Theory of Intending. American Philosophical Quarterly 21 (1):43-54.
    My goal is to define intending. I defend the view that believing and desiring something are necessary for intending it. They are not sufficient, however, for some things we both expect and want (e.g., the sun to rise tomorrow) are unintendable. Restricting the objects of intention to our own future actions is unwarranted and unhelpful. Rather, the belief involved in intending must be based on the desire in a certain way. En route, I argue that expected but unwanted consequences are (...)
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  45. Wayne A. Davis (1984). The Two Senses of Desire. Philosophical Studies 45 (2):181-195.
    It has often been said that 'desire' is ambiguous. I do not believe the case for this has been made thoroughly enough, however. The claim typically occurs in the course of defending controversial philosophical theses, such as that intention entails desire, where it tends to look ad hoc. There is need, therefore, for a thorough and single-minded exploration of the ambiguity. I believe the results will be more profound than might be suspected.
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  46. Wayne A. Davis (1983). The Science of Philosophy. Review of Metaphysics 36 (4):929-930.
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  47. Wayne A. Davis (1982). A Causal Theory of Enjoyment. Mind 91 (April):240-256.
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  48. Wayne A. Davis (1982). Miller on Wanting, Intending, and Being Willing. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 43 (1):107-110.
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  49. Wayne A. Davis (1982). Weirich on Conditional and Expected Utility. Journal of Philosophy 79 (6):342-350.
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  50. Wayne A. Davis (1981). A Theory of Happiness. American Philosophical Quarterly 18 (April):111-20.
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