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Wayne A. Davis [67]Wayne Alan Davis [1]
  1.  36
    Wayne A. Davis (2003). Meaning, Expression, and Thought. Cambridge University Press.
    This philosophical treatise on the foundations of semantics is a systematic effort to clarify, deepen, and defend the classical doctrine that words are conventional signs of mental states, principally thoughts and ideas, and that meaning consists in their expression. This expression theory of meaning is developed by carrying out the Gricean program, explaining what it is for words to have meaning in terms of speaker meaning, and what it is for a speaker to mean something in terms of intention. But (...)
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  2.  99
    Wayne A. Davis (2007). Knowledge Claims and Context: Loose Use. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 132 (3):395 - 438.
    There is abundant evidence of contextual variation in the use of “S knows p.” Contextualist theories explain this variation in terms of semantic hypotheses that refer to standards of justification determined by “practical” features of either the subject’s context (Hawthorne & Stanley) or the ascriber’s context (Lewis, Cohen, & DeRose). There is extensive linguistic counterevidence to both forms. I maintain that the contextual variation of knowledge claims is better explained by common pragmatic factors. I show here that one is variable (...)
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  3.  96
    Wayne A. Davis (1998). Implicature: Intention, Convention, and Principle in the Failure of Gricean Theory. Cambridge University Press.
    H. P. Grice virtually discovered the phenomenon of implicature (to denote the implications of an utterance that are not strictly implied by its content). Gricean theory claims that conversational implicatures can be explained and predicted using general psycho-social principles. This theory has established itself as one of the orthodoxes in the philosophy of language. Wayne Davis argues controversially that Gricean theory does not work. He shows that any principle-based theory understates both the intentionality of what a speaker implicates and the (...)
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  4.  49
    Wayne A. Davis (2005). Nondescriptive Meaning and Reference: An Ideational Semantics. Oxford University Press.
    Wayne Davis presents a highly original approach to the foundations of semantics, showing how the so-called "expression" theory of meaning can handle names and other problematic cases of nondescriptive meaning. The fact that thoughts have parts ("ideas" or "concepts") is fundamental: Davis argues that like other unstructured words, names mean what they do because they are conventionally used to express atomic or basic ideas. In the process he shows that many pillars of contemporary philosophical semantics, from twin earth arguments to (...)
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  5.  68
    Wayne A. Davis (2004). Are Knowledge Claims Indexical? Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):257 - 281.
    David Lewis, Stewart Cohen, and Keith DeRose have proposed that sentences of the form S knows P are indexical, and therefore differ in truth value from one context to another.1 On their indexical contextualism, the truth value of S knows P is determined by whether S meets the epistemic standards of the speakers context. I will not be concerned with relational forms of contextualism, according to which the truth value of S knows P is determined by the standards of the (...)
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  6. Wayne A. Davis (2004). Meaning, Expression and Thought. Cambridge University Press.
    This philosophical treatise on the foundations of semantics is a systematic effort to clarify, deepen and defend the classical doctrine that words are conventional signs of mental states, principally thoughts and ideas, and that meaning consists in their expression. This expression theory of meaning is developed by carrying out the Gricean programme, explaining what it is for words to have meaning in terms of speaker meaning, and what it is for a speaker to mean something in terms of intention. But (...)
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  7.  87
    Wayne A. Davis (2013). On Nonindexical Contextualism. Philosophical Studies 163 (2):561-574.
    Abstract MacFarlane distinguishes “context sensitivity” from “indexicality,” and argues that “nonindexical contextualism” has significant advantages over the standard indexical form. MacFarlane’s substantive thesis is that the extension of an expression may depend on an epistemic standard variable even though its content does not. Focusing on ‘knows,’ I will argue against the possibility of extension dependence without content dependence when factors such as meaning, time, and world are held constant, and show that MacFarlane’s nonindexical contextualism provides no advantages over indexical contextualism. (...)
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  8. Wayne A. Davis (2011). Implicature: Intention, Convention, and Principle in the Failure of Gricean Theory. Cambridge University Press.
    H. P. Grice virtually discovered the phenomenon of implicature. Gricean theory claims that conversational implicatures can be explained and predicted using general psycho-social principles. This theory has established itself as one of the orthodoxes in the philosophy of language. Wayne Davis argues controversially that Gricean theory does not work. He shows that any principle-based theory understates both the intentionality of what a speaker implicates and the conventionality of what a sentence implicates. In developing his argument the author explains that the (...)
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  9.  65
    Wayne A. Davis (1984). A Causal Theory of Intending. American Philosophical Quarterly 21 (1):43-54.
    My goal is to define intending. I defend the view that believing and desiring something are necessary for intending it. They are not sufficient, however, for some things we both expect and want (e.g., the sun to rise tomorrow) are unintendable. Restricting the objects of intention to our own future actions is unwarranted and unhelpful. Rather, the belief involved in intending must be based on the desire in a certain way. En route, I argue that expected but unwanted consequences are (...)
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  10. Wayne A. Davis (2005). Reasons and Psychological Causes. Philosophical Studies 122 (1):51 - 101.
    The causal theory of reasons holds that acting for a reason entails that the agents action was caused by his or her beliefs and desires. While Donald Davidson (1963) and others effectively silenced the first objections to the theory, a new round has emerged. The most important recent attack is presented by Jonathan Dancy in Practical Reality (2000) and subsequent work. This paper will defend the causal theory against Dancy and others, including Schueler (1995), Stoutland (1999, 2001), and Ginet (2002).Dancy (...)
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  11.  33
    Wayne A. Davis (2013). Grice's Razor and Epistemic Invariantism. Journal of Philosophical Research 38:147-176.
    Grice’s Razor is a methodological principle that many philosophers and linguists have used to help justify pragmatic explanations of linguistic phenomena over semantic explanations. A number of authors in the debate over contextualism argue that an invariant semantics together with Grice’s (1975) conversational principles can account for the contextual variability of knowledge claims. I show here that the defense of Grice’s Razor found in these “Gricean invariantists,” and its use against epistemic contextualism, display all the problems pointed out earlier in (...)
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  12.  18
    Wayne A. Davis (2013). Minimizing Indexicality. Philosophical Studies 168 (1):1-20.
    I critically examine Cappelen and Lepore’s definition of and tests for indexicality, and refine them to improve their adequacy. Indexicals cannot be defined as expressions with different referents in different contexts unless linguistic meaning and circumstances of evaluation are held constant. I show that despite Cappelen and Lepore’s claim that there are only a handful of indexical expressions, their “basic set” includes a number of large and open classes, and generates an infinity of indexical phrases. And while the tests can (...)
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  13. Wayne A. Davis (2005). Concept Individuation, Possession Conditions, and Propositional Attitudes. Noûs 39 (1):140-66.
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  14.  80
    Wayne A. Davis (2005). Contextualist Theories of Knowledge. Acta Analytica 20 (1):29-42.
    Contextualist theories of knowledge offer a semantic hypothesis to explain the observed contextual variation in what people say they know, and the difficulty people have resolving skeptical paradoxes. Subject or speaker relative versions make the truth conditions of “S knows that p” depend on the standards of either the knower’s context (Hawthorne and Stanley) or those of the speaker’s context (Cohen and DeRose). Speaker contextualism avoids objections to subject contextualism, but is implausible in light of evidence that “know” does not (...)
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  15.  31
    Wayne A. Davis (2015). Knowledge Claims and Context: Belief. Philosophical Studies 172 (2):399-432.
    The use of ‘S knows p’ varies from context to context. The contextualist theories of Cohen, Lewis, and DeRose explain this variation in terms of semantic hypotheses: ‘S knows p’ is indexical in meaning, referring to features of the ascriber’s context like salience, interests, and stakes. The linguistic evidence against contextualism is extensive. I maintain that the contextual variation of knowledge claims results from pragmatic factors. One is variable strictness :395–438, 2007). In addition to its strict use, ‘S knows p’ (...)
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  16.  41
    Wayne A. Davis (2003). Psychologism and Humeanism: Review of Dancy's Practical Reality. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):452 - 459.
  17.  29
    Wayne A. Davis (2013). Meaning, Expression, and Indication: Reply to Buchanan. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):62-66.
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  18.  60
    Wayne A. Davis (1988). Expression of Emotion. American Philosophical Quarterly 25 (October):279-291.
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  19.  8
    Wayne A. Davis (forthcoming). Berg’s Answer to Frege’s Puzzle. Philosophia:1-16.
    Berg seeks to defend the theory that the meaning of a proper name in a belief report is its reference against Frege’s puzzle by hypothesizing that when substituting coreferential names in belief reports results in reports that seem to have different truth values, the appearance is due to the fact that the reports have different metalinguistic implicatures. I review evidence that implicatures cannot be calculated in the way Grice or Berg imagine, and give reasons to believe that belief reports do (...)
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  20.  49
    Wayne A. Davis (1981). A Theory of Happiness. American Philosophical Quarterly 18 (April):111-20.
  21.  54
    Wayne A. Davis (1984). The Two Senses of Desire. Philosophical Studies 45 (2):181-195.
    It has often been said that 'desire' is ambiguous. I do not believe the case for this has been made thoroughly enough, however. The claim typically occurs in the course of defending controversial philosophical theses, such as that intention entails desire, where it tends to look ad hoc. There is need, therefore, for a thorough and single-minded exploration of the ambiguity. I believe the results will be more profound than might be suspected.
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  22.  78
    Wayne A. Davis (2005). Concepts and Epistemic Individuation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):290-325.
    Christopher Peacocke has presented an original version of the perennial philosophical thesis that we can gain substantive metaphysical and epistemological insight from an analysis of our concepts. Peacocke's innovation is to look at how concepts are individuated by their possession conditions, which he believes can be specified in terms of conditions in which certain propositions containing those concepts are accepted. The ability to provide such insight is one of Peacocke's major arguments for his theory of concepts. I will critically examine (...)
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  23.  21
    Wayne A. Davis (1999). Communicating, Telling, and Informing. Philosophical Inquiry 21 (1):21-43.
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  24.  29
    Wayne A. Davis (2008). Replies to Green, Szabó, Jeshion, and Siebel. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 137 (3):427 - 445.
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  25.  2
    Wayne A. Davis (2004). Are Knowledge Claims Indexical? Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):257-281.
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  26.  78
    Wayne A. Davis (1980). Lowe on Indicative and Counterfactual Conditionals. Analysis 40 (4):184 - 186.
    Lowe claims that "if oswald did not kill kennedy, someone else did" is a material conditional. he also claims that the difference in truth-value between this indicative conditional and the subjunctive "if oswald had not killed kennedy, someone else would have" does not support the conclusion of lewis and others that corresponding indicative and subjunctive conditionals are not always equivalent. i dispute both claims.
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  27.  69
    Wayne A. Davis (1979). Indicative and Subjunctive Conditionals. Philosophical Review 88 (4):544-564.
    The idea that english has more than one declarative "mood" has been dismissed as superstitious by empirically-minded grammarians of english for centuries--with such spectacular unsuccess, however, that the indicative/subjunctive dichotomy stands today as a cornerstone for philosophical and logical speculation about "conditionals." let me be next into the breach. i shall urge that there is no grammatical basis for any such distinction. and as for the particular adjudications of mood logicians and philosophers actually propose, there is neither rhyme nor reason (...)
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  28. Wayne A. Davis (2009). Meaning, Expression and Thought. Cambridge University Press.
    This philosophical treatise on the foundations of semantics is a systematic effort to clarify, deepen and defend the classical doctrine that words are conventional signs of mental states, principally thoughts and ideas, and that meaning consists in their expression. This expression theory of meaning is developed by carrying out the Gricean programme, explaining what it is for words to have meaning in terms of speaker meaning, and what it is for a speaker to mean something in terms of intention. But (...)
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  29.  38
    Wayne A. Davis (2015). The Semantics of Actuality Terms: Indexical Vs. Descriptive Theories. Noûs 49 (3):470-503.
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  30.  37
    Wayne A. Davis (1992). Cogitative and Cognitive Speaker Meaning. Philosophical Studies 67 (1):71 - 88.
  31.  85
    Wayne A. Davis (1986). Two Senses of Desire. In J. Marks (ed.), The Ways of Desire. Precedent 181-196.
  32.  35
    Wayne A. Davis (2005). Concepts and Epistemic Individuation (Christopher Peacocke). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):290-325.
    Christopher Peacocke has presented an original version of the perennial philosophical thesis that we can gain substantive metaphysical and epistemological insight from an analysis of our concepts. Peacocke's innovation is to look at how concepts are individuated by their possession conditions, which he believes can be specified in terms of conditions in which certain propositions containing those concepts are accepted. The ability to provide such insight is one of Peacocke's major arguments for his theory of concepts. I will critically examine (...)
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  33.  15
    Wayne A. Davis (1982). A Causal Theory of Enjoyment. Mind 91 (April):240-256.
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  34.  71
    Wayne A. Davis (2008). Thought Structure, Belief Content, and Possession Conditions. Acta Analytica 23 (3):207-231.
    According to Peacocke, concepts are individuated by their possession conditions, which are specified in terms of conditions in which certain propositions containing those concepts are believed. In support, Peacocke tries to explain what it is for a thought to have a structure and what it is for a belief to have a propositional content. I show that the possession condition theory cannot answer such fundamental questions. Peacocke’s theory founders because concepts are metaphysically fundamental. They individuate the propositions and thoughts containing (...)
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  35. Wayne A. Davis (1986). An Introduction to Logic.
     
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  36.  35
    Wayne A. Davis (1987). The Varieties of Fear. Philosophical Studies 51 (3):287 - 310.
    I shall conclude with a methodological moral. I have tried to show that there are several fundamentally different kinds of fear. One is a pure propositional attitude, one is partially a bodily state, and one is a relation between a person and a nonpropositional object. Other emotions come in similar varieties, such as hope and happiness, but with significant differences. The state of happiness, for example, does not entail any particular bodily state or feeling. So one lesson is this: it (...)
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  37.  55
    Wayne A. Davis (2008). Précis of Meaning, Expression, and Thought. Philosophical Studies 137 (3):383 - 387.
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  38.  17
    Wayne A. Davis (2007). Grice's Meaning Project. Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 26 (2):41-58.
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  39.  11
    Wayne A. Davis (1987). Scientific Knowledge. Review of Metaphysics 41 (1):136-137.
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  40.  31
    Wayne A. Davis (2005). On Begging the Systematicity Question. Journal of Philosophical Research 30:399-404.
    Robert Cummins has argued that Jerry Fodor’s well-known systematicity argument begs the question. I show that the systematicity argument for thought structure does not beg the question, nor run in either explanatory nor inferential circles, nor illegitimately project sentence structure onto thoughts. Because the evidence does not presuppose that thought has structure, connectionist explanations of the same interconnections between thoughts are at least possibilities. Butthey are likely to be ad hoc.
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  41.  13
    Wayne A. Davis (1997). Davidson's Conceptual Argument for Rational Cognition. Legal Theory 3 (2):205-210.
    According to Jules Coleman, Rational Choice Theory holds that human action is both intentional and rational. “The rationality of intentional action is evaluated along the two dimensions corresponding to the two elements of the belief-desire model.” On the belief-dimension, RC Theory assumes that people are “able to draw appropriate inferences from the information they possess.”.
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  42.  13
    Wayne A. Davis (1986). Warner on Enjoyment. Philosophy Research Archives 12:553-555.
    In ‘Davis on Enjoyment: A Reply’, Richard Warner replies to three objections against his ‘Enjoyment’ that I raised in my ‘A Causal Theory of Enjoyment’, and concludes that one of my examples in fact demonstrates a serious deficiency of my own account. I argue that Warner’s replies to my objections are unsatisfactory, and that his objection to my account had a ready solution.
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  43.  12
    Wayne A. Davis (1986). Risk. Review of Metaphysics 39 (3):579-580.
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  44.  26
    Wayne A. Davis (2008). Review: Replies to Green, Szabó, Jeshion, and Siebel. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 137 (3):427 - 445.
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  45.  23
    Wayne A. Davis (1983). The Science of Philosophy. Review of Metaphysics 36 (4):929-930.
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  46. Wayne A. Davis (1983). Weak and Strong Conditionals. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 (1):57.
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  47.  36
    Wayne A. Davis (1991). The World-Shift Theory of Free Choice. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (2):206-211.
  48.  27
    Wayne A. Davis & John W. Bender (1989). Technical Flaws in the Coherence Theory. Synthese 79 (2):257 - 278.
    We have argued that Lehrer's definitions of coherence and justification have serious technical defects. As a result, the definition of justification is both too weak and too strong. We have suggested solutions for some of the problems, but others seem irremediable. We would also argue more generally that if coherence is anything like what Lehrer's theory says it is, then coherence is neither necessary nor sufficient for justification. While our current objections are directed at the ‘letter’ of Lehrer's theory, other (...)
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  49.  12
    Wayne A. Davis (2007). Intentionalism, Descriptivism, and Proper Names. In Savas L. Tsohatzidis (ed.), John Searle's Philosophy of Language: Force, Meaning, and Mind. Cambridge University Press 102.
  50.  22
    Wayne A. Davis (1980). Swain's Counterfactual Analysis of Causation. Philosophical Studies 38 (2):169 - 176.
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