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Wayne D. Riggs [13]Wayne Donovan Riggs [1]
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Profile: Wayne Riggs (University of Oklahoma)
  1. Wayne D. Riggs (2009). Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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  2.  75
    Wayne D. Riggs (2002). Reliability and the Value of Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1):79-96.
    Reliabilism has come under recent attack for its alleged inability to account for the value we typically ascribe to knowledge. It is charged that a reliably-produced true belief has no more value than does the true belief alone. I reply to these charges on behalf of reliabilism; not because I think reliabilism is the correct theory of knowledge, but rather because being reliably-produced does add value of a sort to true beliefs. The added value stems from the fact that a (...)
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  3. Wayne D. Riggs (2009). ``Understanding, Knowledge, and the M Eno Requirement&Quot. In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press
     
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  4.  62
    Wayne D. Riggs (2003). Balancing Our Epistemic Goals. Noûs 37 (2):342–352.
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  5.  41
    Wayne D. Riggs (1998). What Are the “Chances” of Being Justified? The Monist 81 (3):452-472.
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  6.  53
    Jonathan L. Kvanvig & Wayne D. Riggs (1992). Can a Coherence Theory Appeal to Appearance States? Philosophical Studies 67 (3):197-217.
    Coherence theorists have universally defined justification as a relation only among (the contents of) belief states, in contradistinction to other theories, such as some versions of founda­tionalism, which define justification as a relation on belief states and appearance states.
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  7.  37
    Wayne D. Riggs (2008). Epistemic Risk and Relativism. Acta Analytica 23 (1):1-8.
    It is generally assumed that there are (at least) two fundamental epistemic goals: believing truths, and avoiding the acceptance of falsehoods. As has been often noted, these goals are in conflict with one another. Moreover, the norms governing rational belief that we should derive from these two goals depend on how we weight them relative to one another. However, it is not obvious that there is one objectively correct weighting for everyone in all circumstances. Indeed, as I shall argue, it (...)
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  8. Wayne D. Riggs (2007). Understanding 'Virtue' and the Virtue of Understanding. In Michael DePaul & Linda Zagzebski (eds.), Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives From Ethics and Epistemology. Clarendon Press
     
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  9. Wayne D. Riggs (2003). ``Understanding `Virtue' and the Virtue of Understanding&Quot. In Michael DePaul & Linda Zagzebski (eds.), Intellectual Virtue: Persepectives From Ethics and Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press 203-227.
     
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  10.  40
    Wayne D. Riggs (2002). Beyond Truth and Falsehood: The Real Value of Knowing That P. Philosophical Studies 107 (1):87--108.
    Current epistemological dogma has it that the twin goalsof believing truths and avoiding errors exhaust our cognitive aspirations.On such a view, (call it the TG view) the only evaluationsthat count as genuinely epistemological are those that evaluatesomething (a belief, believer, set of beliefs, a cognitivetrait or process, etc.) in terms of its connection to thesetwo goods. In particular, this view implies that all theepistemic value of knowledge must be derived from thevalue of the two goals cited in TG. I argue (...)
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  11.  20
    Wayne D. Riggs (2014). Luck, Knowledge, and “Mere” Coincidence. Metaphilosophy 45 (4-5):627-639.
    There are good reasons for pursuing a theory of knowledge by way of understanding the connection between knowledge and luck. Not surprisingly, then, there has been a burgeoning of interest in “luck theories” of knowledge as well as in theories of luck in general. Unfortunately, “luck” proves to be as recalcitrant an analysandum as “knows.” While it is well worth pursuing a general theory of luck despite these difficulties, our theory of knowledge might be made more manageable if we could (...)
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    Wayne D. Riggs (1997). The Weakness of Strong Justification. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (2):179 – 189.
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  13.  2
    Wayne D. Riggs (2000). Beyond Truth and Falsehood: The. Philosophical Studies:87-108.
    Current epistemological dogma has it that the twin goalsof believing truths and avoiding errors exhaust our cognitive aspirations. On such a view, (call it the "TG view") the only evaluations that count as genuinely epistemological are those that evaluate something (a belief, believer, set of beliefs, a cognitive trait or process, etc.) in terms of its connection to these two goods. In particular, this view implies that all the epistemic value of knowledge must be derived from the value of the (...)
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