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Profile: Wayne Riggs (University of Oklahoma)
  1. Wayne D. Riggs (2009). Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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  2. Wayne D. Riggs (2009). ``Understanding, Knowledge, and the M Eno Requirement&Quot. In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
     
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  3. Wayne D. Riggs (2008). Epistemic Risk and Relativism. Acta Analytica 23 (1):1-8.
    It is generally assumed that there are (at least) two fundamental epistemic goals: believing truths, and avoiding the acceptance of falsehoods. As has been often noted, these goals are in conflict with one another. Moreover, the norms governing rational belief that we should derive from these two goals depend on how we weight them relative to one another. However, it is not obvious that there is one objectively correct weighting for everyone in all circumstances. Indeed, as I shall argue, it (...)
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  4. Wayne D. Riggs (2007). Understanding 'Virtue' and the Virtue of Understanding. In Michael DePaul & Linda Zagzebski (eds.), Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives From Ethics and Epistemology. Clarendon Press.
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  5. Wayne D. Riggs (2003). Balancing Our Epistemic Goals. Noûs 37 (2):342–352.
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  6. Wayne D. Riggs (2003). ``Understanding `Virtue' and the Virtue of Understanding&Quot. In Michael DePaul & Linda Zagzebski (eds.), Intellectual Virtue: Persepectives From Ethics and Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 203-227.
     
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  7. Wayne D. Riggs (2002). Beyond Truth and Falsehood: The Real Value of Knowing That P. Philosophical Studies 107 (1):87--108.
    Current epistemological dogma has it that the twin goalsof believing truths and avoiding errors exhaust our cognitive aspirations.On such a view, (call it the TG view) the only evaluationsthat count as genuinely epistemological are those that evaluatesomething (a belief, believer, set of beliefs, a cognitivetrait or process, etc.) in terms of its connection to thesetwo goods. In particular, this view implies that all theepistemic value of knowledge must be derived from thevalue of the two goals cited in TG. I argue (...)
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  8. Wayne D. Riggs (2002). Reliability and the Value of Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1):79-96.
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  9. Wayne D. Riggs (2000). Beyond Truth and Falsehood: The. Philosophical Studies:87-108.
    Current epistemological dogma has it that the twin goalsof believing truths and avoiding errors exhaust our cognitive aspirations. On such a view, (call it the "TG view") the only evaluations that count as genuinely epistemological are those that evaluate something (a belief, believer, set of beliefs, a cognitive trait or process, etc.) in terms of its connection to these two goods. In particular, this view implies that all the epistemic value of knowledge must be derived from the value of the (...)
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  10. Wayne D. Riggs (1998). What Are the “Chances” of Being Justified? The Monist 81 (3):452-472.
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  11. Wayne D. Riggs (1997). The Weakness of Strong Justification. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (2):179 – 189.
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  12. Jonathan L. Kvanvig & Wayne D. Riggs (1992). Can a Coherence Theory Appeal to Appearance States? Philosophical Studies 67 (3):197-217.
    Coherence theorists have universally defined justification as a relation only among (the contents of) belief states, in contradistinction to other theories, such as some versions of founda­tionalism, which define justification as a relation on belief states and appearance states.
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