24 found
Sort by:
Disambiguations:
Wayne D. Riggs [12]Wayne Riggs [12]
See also:
Profile: Wayne Riggs (University of Oklahoma)
  1. Wayne Riggs, Insight, Open−Mindedness and Understanding.
    I am interested in epistemic virtues for reasons rather different than most. I do not offer a virtue theory of anything, I don't argue that we can solve various long−standing problems in epistemology by appeal to epistemic virtues, nor am I an opponent of any of these things (though I certainly find some of these projects more plausible than others.) Rather, my interest in the epistemic virtues stems from a long−standing commitment to epistemic value pluralism, and a belief that, until (...)
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Wayne Riggs, Prelude.
    As a proponent and practitioner of value−driven epistemology1, I am very gratified that this collection of essays on epistemic value has been put together. I believe that the recent emphasis on epistemic value within epistemology has already borne fruit, with the promise of much more to come. One reason for this promise is that a value−driven approach to epistemology invites one to ask kinds of questions that, while certainly not prohibited by more traditional epistemological method, do not naturally arise. Twentieth (...)
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Wayne Riggs, Reliability and the Value of Knowledge1 1. Introduction.
    Is knowledge more valuable than mere true belief? Few question the value of having true beliefs, and insofar as having knowledge entails (at least) having a true belief, we value knowledge. But traditionally it has been assumed that whatever it takes to turn true belief into knowledge has some additional value. Traditionally, then, philosophers have been committed to what I will call the ‘Value Principle'.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Wayne Riggs, Understanding, Knowledge, and the Meno Requirement Wayne D. Riggs.
    Jonathan Kvanvig's book, The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding (Kvanvig, 2003), is a wonderful example of doing epistemology in a style that Kvanvig himself has termed "value−driven epistemology." On this approach, one takes questions about epistemic value to be central to theoretical concerns, including the concern to provide an adequate account of knowledge. This approach yields the demand that theories of knowledge must provide, not just an adequate account of the nature of knowledge, but also an account (...)
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Wayne Riggs (2012). Culpability for Epistemic Injustice: Deontic or Aretetic? Social Epistemology 26 (2):149-162.
    This paper focuses on several issues that arise in Miranda Fricker?s book Epistemic injustice surrounding her claims about our (moral) culpability for perpetrating acts of testimonial injustice. While she makes frequent claims about moral culpability with respect to specific examples, she never addresses the issue in its full generality, and we are left to extrapolate her general view about moral culpability for acts of testimonial injustice from these more restricted and particular claims. Although Fricker never describes testimonial injustice in such (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Wayne Riggs (2010). Open-Mindedness. Metaphilosophy 41 (1):172-188.
    Abstract: Open-mindedness is typically at the top of any list of the intellectual or "epistemic" virtues. Yet, providing an account that simultaneously explains why open-mindedness is an epistemically valuable trait to have and how such a trait is compatible with full-blooded belief turns out to be a challenge. Building on the work of William Hare and Jonathan Adler, I defend a view of open-mindedness that meets this challenge. On this view, open-mindedness is primarily an attitude toward oneself as a believer, (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Wayne Riggs (2009). Getting the Meno Requirement Right. In Pritchard, Haddock & MIllar (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 331--38.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Wayne Riggs (2009). Luck, Knowledge, and Control. In Pritchard, Haddock & MIllar (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 204--221.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Wayne Riggs (2009). Two Problems of Easy Credit. Synthese 169 (1):201 - 216.
    This paper defends the theory that knowledge is credit-worthy true belief against a family of objections, two instances of which were leveled against it in a recent paper by Jennifer Lackey. Lackey argues that both innate knowledge (if there is any) and testimonial knowledge are too easily come by for it to be plausible that the knower deserves credit for it. If this is correct, then knowledge would appear not to be a matter of credit for true belief. I will (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Wayne D. Riggs (2009). Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    No categories
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Wayne D. Riggs (2009). ``Understanding, Knowledge, and the M Eno Requirement&Quot. In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Wayne Riggs (2008). The Value Turn in Epistemology. In Vincent Hendricks (ed.), New Waves in Epistemology. Palgrave Macmillan. 300--23.
    forthcoming 2007 in New Waves in Epistemology, Vincent Hendricks & Duncan Pritchard, eds.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Wayne D. Riggs (2008). Epistemic Risk and Relativism. Acta Analytica 23 (1):1-8.
    It is generally assumed that there are (at least) two fundamental epistemic goals: believing truths, and avoiding the acceptance of falsehoods. As has been often noted, these goals are in conflict with one another. Moreover, the norms governing rational belief that we should derive from these two goals depend on how we weight them relative to one another. However, it is not obvious that there is one objectively correct weighting for everyone in all circumstances. Indeed, as I shall argue, it (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Wayne Riggs (2007). Why Epistemologists Are so Down on Their Luck. Synthese 158 (3):329 - 344.
    It is nearly universally acknowledged among epistemologists that a belief, even if true, cannot count as knowledge if it is somehow largely a matter of luck that the person so arrived at the truth. A striking feature of this literature, however, is that while many epistemologists are busy arguing about which particular technical condition most effectively rules out the offensive presence of luck in true believing, almost no one is asking why it matters so much that knowledge be immune from (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Wayne D. Riggs (2007). Understanding 'Virtue' and the Virtue of Understanding. In Michael DePaul & Linda Zagzebski (eds.), Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives From Ethics and Epistemology. Clarendon Press.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Wayne Riggs (2004). Review of Jonathan Kvanvig, The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2004 (3).
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Wayne D. Riggs (2003). Balancing Our Epistemic Goals. Noûs 37 (2):342–352.
    No categories
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Wayne D. Riggs (2003). ``Understanding `Virtue' and the Virtue of Understanding&Quot. In Michael DePaul & Linda Zagzebski (eds.), Intellectual Virtue: Persepectives From Ethics and Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 203-227.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Wayne D. Riggs (2002). Beyond Truth and Falsehood: The Real Value of Knowing That P. Philosophical Studies 107 (1):87--108.
    Current epistemological dogma has it that the twin goalsof believing truths and avoiding errors exhaust our cognitive aspirations.On such a view, (call it the TG view) the only evaluationsthat count as genuinely epistemological are those that evaluatesomething (a belief, believer, set of beliefs, a cognitivetrait or process, etc.) in terms of its connection to thesetwo goods. In particular, this view implies that all theepistemic value of knowledge must be derived from thevalue of the two goals cited in TG. I argue (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Wayne D. Riggs (2002). Reliability and the Value of Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1):79-96.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Wayne D. Riggs (2000). Beyond Truth and Falsehood: The. Philosophical Studies:87-108.
    Current epistemological dogma has it that the twin goalsof believing truths and avoiding errors exhaust our cognitive aspirations. On such a view, (call it the "TG view") the only evaluations that count as genuinely epistemological are those that evaluate something (a belief, believer, set of beliefs, a cognitive trait or process, etc.) in terms of its connection to these two goods. In particular, this view implies that all the epistemic value of knowledge must be derived from the value of the (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Wayne D. Riggs (1998). What Are the “Chances” of Being Justified? The Monist 81 (3):452-472.
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Wayne D. Riggs (1997). The Weakness of Strong Justification. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (2):179 – 189.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Jonathan L. Kvanvig & Wayne D. Riggs (1992). Can a Coherence Theory Appeal to Appearance States? Philosophical Studies 67 (3):197-217.
    Coherence theorists have universally defined justification as a relation only among (the contents of) belief states, in contradistinction to other theories, such as some versions of founda­tionalism, which define justification as a relation on belief states and appearance states.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation