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Profile: Wayne Wright (California State University, Long Beach)
  1. Kent Johnson & Wayne Wright, Reply to Philipona and O'Regan.
    This paper responds to Philipona & O’Regan (2006), which attempts to account for certain color phenomena by appeal to singularities in the space of “accessible information” in the light striking the retina. Three points are discussed. First, it is unclear what the empirical significance/import is of the mathematical analysis of the data regarding the accessible information in the light. Second, the singularity index employed in the study is both mathematically and empirically faulty. Third, the connection drawn between their findings and (...)
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  2. Wayne Wright, Individualism, Behavior, and Marr's Theory of Vision.
     
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  3. Wayne Wright, Prime Colors and the Hues.
    This paper argues that the distinctiveness of the Hering primary hues – red, green, blue, and yellow – is already evident at the retina. Basic features of spectral sensitivity provide a foundation for the development of unique hue perceptions and the hue categories of which they are focal examples. Of particular importance are locations in color space at which points of minimal and maximal spectral sensitivity and extreme ratios of chromatic to achromatic response occur. This account builds on Jameson & (...)
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  4. Wayne Wright, Tye, Tree-Rings, and Representation.
    In a recent book, [1] Michael Tye has offered a representational theory of phenomenal consciousness. As Tye himself admits, part of his account involves arguing for a position which has traditionally received little support; he contends that _all_ experiences and feelings have representational.
     
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  5. Wayne Wright & Kent Johnson, Reply to Philipona and O'Regan.
    This paper responds to Philipona & O’Regan (2006), which attempts to account for certain color phenomena by appeal to singularities in the space of “accessible information” in the light striking the retina. Three points are discussed. First, it is unclear what the empirical significance/import is of the mathematical analysis of the data regarding the accessible information in the light. Second, the singularity index employed in the study is both mathematically and empirically faulty. Third, the connection drawn between their findings and (...)
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  6. Wayne Wright (2013). Color Constancy Reconsidered. Acta Analytica 28 (4):435-455.
    This article proposes an account of color constancy based on an examination of the relevant scientific literature. Differences in experimental settings and task instructions that lead to variation in subject performance are given particular attention. Based on the evidence discussed, the core of the proposal made is that there are two different forms of color constancy, one phenomenal and the other projective. This follows the hypothesis of Reeves et al. (Perception & Psychophysics 70:219–228, 2008). Unlike Reeves et al. (Perception & (...)
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  7. Wayne Wright (2011). More on the Origins of the Hues: A Reply to Broackes. [REVIEW] Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (4):629-641.
    This paper responds to Justin Broackes’ reply to my paper, “On the retinal origins of the Hering primaries.” This paper aims to clarify and further develop the ideas presented in that article. I take up several of the points Broackes raises regarding the connection between my work and that of William Thornton (Journal of the Optical Society of America 61:1155–1163, 1971 ) and (Color Research and Application 24:139–156, 1999 ) on the “prime” and “anti-prime” colors of the human visual system, (...)
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  8. Wayne Wright (2011). On the Retinal Origins of the Hering Primaries. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (1):1-17.
    This paper argues that the distinctiveness of the Hering primary hues—red, green, blue, and yellow—is already evident at the retina. Basic features of spectral sensitivity provide a foundation for the development of unique hue perceptions and the hue categories of which they are focal examples. Of particular importance are locations in color space at which points of minimal and maximal spectral sensitivity and extreme ratios of chromatic to achromatic response occur. This account builds on Jameson and D’Andrade’s (1997) insight about (...)
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  9. Wayne Wright (2010). Perception, Color, and Realism. Erkenntnis 73 (1):19 - 40.
    One reason philosophers have addressed the metaphysics of color is its apparent relevance to the sciences concerned with color phenomena. In the light of such thinking, this paper examines a pairing of views that has received much attention: color physicalism and externalism about the content of perceptual experience. It is argued that the latter is a dubious conception of the workings of our perceptual systems. Together with flawed appeals to the empirical literature, it has led some philosophers to grant color (...)
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  10. Wayne Wright (2009). Discussion: The Physical Unnaturalness of Churchland's Ellipses. Philosophy of Science 76 (3):391-403.
    This article addresses Paul Churchland’s attempt to identify colors with surface reflectance spectra. Of particular concern is Churchland’s novel method of approximating surface reflectance spectra. While those approximations are generated by objective means and yield a striking match with human phenomenological color space, they are not physically meaningful. The reason for this is that the method used to produce the approximations induces equivalence classes on surface reflectances that are not invariant under physically appropriate changes of measurement convention. This result undermines (...)
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  11. Wayne Wright (2007). Explanation and the Hard Problem. Philosophical Studies 132 (2):301 - 330.
    This paper argues that the form of explanation at issue in the hard problem of consciousness is scientifically irrelevant, despite appearances to the contrary. In particular, it is argued that the 'sense of understanding' that plays a critical role in the form of explanation implicated in the hard problem provides neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition on satisfactory scientific explanation. Considerations of the actual tools and methods available to scientists are used to make the case against it being a (...)
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  12. Wayne Wright (2007). Erratum: Explanation and the Hard Problem. Philosophical Studies 134 (3):467 -.
    No categories
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  13. Wayne Wright (2007). Why Naturalize Consciousness? Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (4):583-607.
    This paper examines the relevance of philosophical work on consciousness to its scientific study. Of particular concern is the debate over whether consciousness can be naturalized, which is typically taken to have consequences for the prospects for its scientific investigation. It is not at all clear that philosophers of consciousness have properly identified and evaluated the assumptions about scientific activity made by both naturalization and anti- naturalization projects. I argue that there is good reason to think that some of the (...)
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  14. Kent Johnson & Wayne Wright (2006). Colors as Properties of the Special Sciences. Erkenntnis 64 (2):139 - 168.
    We examine the pros and cons of color realism, exposing some desiderata on a theory of color: the theory should render colors as scientifically legitimate and correctly individuated, and it should explain how we have veridical color experiences. We then show that these desiderata can by met by treating colors as properties of the special sciences. According to our view, some of the major as properties of the special sciences. According to our view, some of the major disputes in the (...)
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  15. Wayne Wright (2006). Visual Stuff and Active Vision. Philosophical Psychology 19 (2):129-149.
    This paper examines the status of unattended visual stimuli in the light of recent work on the role of attention in visual perception. Although the question of whether attention is required for visual experience seems very interesting, this paper argues that there currently is no good reason to take a stand on the issue. Moreover, it is argued that much of the allure of that question stems from a continued attachment to the defective ‘inner picture view’ of experience and a (...)
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  16. Wayne Wright (2005). Distracted Drivers and Unattended Experience. Synthese 144 (1):41-68.
    Consider the much-discussed case of the distracted driver, who is alleged to successfully navigate his car for miles despite being completely oblivious to his visual states. Perhaps he is deeply engrossed in the music playing over the radio or in philosophical reflection, and as a result he goes about unaware of the scene unfolding before him on the road. That the distracted driver has visual experiences of which he is not aware is a possibility that first-order representationalists (FOR) happily accept, (...)
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  17. Wayne Wright, Transparency and Aspects.
    Strong Representationalism (SR) claims that the phenomenal character of experience is a certain kind of representational content. Furthermore, SR theorists often maintain that the phenomenal qualities of experience just are properties of the objects of experience, represented in experience.1 Another claim held by SR theorists, often cited as a reason for embracing their view, is that experience is transparent. Transparency is the phenomenon of introspection of your experience revealing nothing but the objects, properties, and relations that your experience is an (...)
     
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  18. Wayne Wright (2003). A Dilemma for Jackson and Pargetter's Account of Color. Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (1):125-42.
    Frank Jackson and Robert Pargetter (1987)2 have argued for a version of reductive physicalism about color which they claim can accommodate the basic intuitions that have led others to embrace dispositionalism or subjectivism about color. Jackson (1996) has further developed the view and provided responses to some objections to its original statement. While Jackson and Pargetter do not have much company in endorsing their specific form of color physicalism, elements of their view have shown up in other realist accounts, including (...)
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  19. Wayne Wright (2003). McDowell, Demonstrative Concepts, and Nonconceptual Representational Content. Disputation 14:1 - 16.
    In giving an account of the content of perceptual experience, several authors, including Fred Dretske, Gareth Evans, Christopher Peacocke, and Michael Tye, have employed the notion of nonconceptual representational content.[1].
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  20. Wayne Wright (2003). Projectivist Representationalism and Color. Philosophical Psychology 16 (4):515-529.
    This paper proposes a subjectivist approach to color within the framework of an externalist form of representationalism about phenomenal consciousness. Motivations are presented for accepting both representationalism and color subjectivism, and an argument is offered against the case made by Michael Tye on behalf of the claim that colors are objective, physical properties of objects. In the face of the considerable difficulties associated with finding a workable realist theory of color, the alternative account of color experience set out, projectivist representationalism, (...)
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  21. Wayne Wright (2002). Fodor's Epistemic Intuitions of Analyticity. Sorites 14 (October):110-116.
    Semantic holism has it that the semantic properties of an individual expression are determined by that expression.
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