Search results for 'Weak Ramsey Test' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  33
    Peter Gärdenfors, Sten Lindström, Michael Morreau & Wlodek Rabinowicz (1991). The Negative Ramsey Test. In André Fuhrmann & Michael Morreau (eds.), The Logic of Theory Change. Springer
    The so called Ramsey test is a semantic recipe for determining whether a conditional proposition is acceptable in a given state of belief. Informally, it can be formulated as follows: (RT) Accept a proposition of the form "if A, then C" in a state of belief K, if and only if the minimal change of K needed to accept A also requires accepting C. In Gärdenfors (1986) it was shown that the Ramsey test is, in the (...)
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  2.  44
    Sten Lindström & Wlodzimierz Rabinowicz (1992). Belief Revision, Epistemic Conditionals and the Ramsey Test. Synthese 91 (3):195-237.
    Epistemic conditionals have often been thought to satisfy the Ramsey test : If A, then B is acceptable in a belief state G if and only if B should be accepted upon revising G with A. But as Peter Gärdenfors has shown, RT conflicts with the intuitively plausible condition of Preservation on belief revision. We investigate what happens if RT is retained while Preservation is weakened, or vice versa. We also generalize Gärdenfors' approach by treating belief revision as (...)
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  3.  44
    Alexandru Baltag & Sonja Smets, A Semantic-Modal View on Ramsey's Test.
    We present a semantic analysis of the Ramsey test, pointing out its deep underlying flaw: the tension between the “static” nature of AGM revision (which was originally tailored for revision of only purely ontic beliefs, and can be applied to higher-order beliefs only if given a “backwards-looking” interpretation) and the fact that, semantically speaking, any Ramsey conditional must be a modal operator (more precisely, a dynamic-epistemic one). Thus, a belief about a Ramsey conditional is in fact (...)
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  4. Jonathan H. Pye & Ian T. Ramsey (1979). A Bibliography of the Published Works [of] Ian Thomas Ramsey.
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  5. John N. Williams (2012). Moore-Paradoxical Belief, Conscious Belief and the Epistemic Ramsey Test. Synthese 188 (2):231-246.
    Chalmers and Hájek argue that on an epistemic reading of Ramsey’s test for the rational acceptability of conditionals, it is faulty. They claim that applying the test to each of a certain pair of conditionals requires one to think that one is omniscient or infallible, unless one forms irrational Moore-paradoxical beliefs. I show that this claim is false. The epistemic Ramsey test is indeed faulty. Applying it requires that one think of anyone as all-believing and (...)
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  6. Malte Willer (2010). New Surprises for the Ramsey Test. Synthese 176 (2):291 - 309.
    In contemporary discussions of the Ramsey Test for conditionals, it is commonly held that (i) supposing the antecedent of a conditional is adopting a potential state of full belief, and (ii) Modus Ponens is a valid rule of inference. I argue on the basis of Thomason Conditionals (such as ' If Sally is deceiving, I do not believe it') and Moore's Paradox that both claims are wrong. I then develop a double-indexed Update Semantics for conditionals which takes these (...)
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  7.  78
    Hannes Leitgeb (2010). On the Ramsey Test Without Triviality. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 51 (1):21-54.
    We present a way of classifying the logically possible ways out of Gärdenfors' inconsistency or triviality result on belief revision with conditionals. For one of these ways—conditionals which are not descriptive but which only have an inferential role as being given by the Ramsey test—we determine which of the assumptions in three different versions of Gärdenfors' theorem turn out to be false. This is done by constructing ranked models in which such Ramsey-test conditionals are evaluated and (...)
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  8.  6
    Sven Ove Hansson (forthcoming). Iterated Descriptor Revision and the Logic of Ramsey Test Conditionals. Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-22.
    Two of the major problems in AGM-style belief revision, namely the difficulties in accounting for iterated change and for Ramsey test conditionals, have satisfactory solutions in descriptor revision. In descriptor revision, the input is a metalinguistic sentence specifying the success condition of the operation. The choice mechanism selects one of the potential outcomes in which the success condition is satisfied. Iteration of this operation is unproblematic. Ramsey test conditionals can be introduced without giving rise to the (...)
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  9.  5
    A. Morton (2004). Against the Ramsey Test. Analysis 64 (4):294-299.
    I argue against the Ramsey test connecting indicative conditionals with conditional probability, by means of examples in which conditional probability is high but the conditional is intuitively implausible. At the end of the paper, I connect these issues to patterns of belief revision.
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  10.  28
    Karolina Krzyżanowska (2013). Belief Ascription and the Ramsey Test. Synthese 190 (1):21-36.
    In this paper, I analyse a finding by Riggs and colleagues that there is a close connection between people’s ability to reason with counterfactual conditionals and their capacity to attribute false beliefs to others. The result indicates that both processes may be governed by one cognitive mechanism, though false belief attribution seems to be slightly more cognitively demanding. Given that the common denominator for both processes is suggested to be a form of the Ramsey test, I investigate whether (...)
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  11.  38
    Frank Plumpton Ramsey & D. H. Mellor (eds.) (1980). Prospects for Pragmatism: Essays in Memory of F. P. Ramsey. Cambridge University Press.
    Haack, S. Is truth flat or bumpy?--Chihara, C. S. Ramsey 's theory of types.--Loar, B. Ramsey 's theory of belief and truth.--Skorupski, J. Ramsey on Belief.--Hookway, C. Inference, partial belief, and psychological laws.--Skyrms, B. Higher order degrees of belief.--Mellor, D. H. Consciousness and degrees of belief.--Blackburn, S. Opinions and chances.--Grandy, R. E. Ramsey, reliability, and knowledge.--Cohen, L. J. The problem of natural laws.--Giedymin, J. Hamilton's method in geometrical optics and Ramsey 's view of theories.
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  12.  10
    Michael Morreau (1998). Review of Isaac Levi, For the Sake of the Argument: Ramsey Test Conditionals, Inductive Inference and Nonmonotonic Reasoning. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophy 95 (10):540-546.
  13. Jake Chandler (2013). Transmission Failure, AGM-Style. Erkenntnis 78 (2):383-398.
    This article provides a discussion of the principle of transmission of evidential support across entailment from the perspective of belief revision theory in the AGM tradition. After outlining and briefly defending a small number of basic principles of belief change, which include a number of belief contraction analogues of the Darwiche-Pearl postulates for iterated revision, a proposal is then made concerning the connection between evidential beliefs and belief change policies in rational agents. This proposal is found to be suffcient to (...)
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  14. F. P. Ramsey (1990). F.P. Ramsey: Philosophical Papers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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  15. Frank Plumpton Ramsey, Nicholas Rescher & Ulrich Majer (1995). On Truth; Original Manuscript Materials From the Ramsey Collection at the University of Pittsburgh. Studia Logica 54 (1):129-130.
     
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  16. John Locke & Ian T. Ramsey (1967). The Reasonableness of Christianity, with a Discourse of Miracles, and Part of a Third Letter Concerning Toleration. Edited, Abridged, and Introduced by I.T. Ramsey. [REVIEW] Stanford University Press.
  17. Ian T. Ramsey & Ruth Porter (1971). Personality and Science an Interdisciplinary Discussion. Edited by I.T. Ramsey and Ruth Porter. C. Livingstone.
     
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  18. Paul Ramsey (1987). Ramsey and McCormick, Revisited. Hastings Center Report 17 (1):39-39.
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  19.  66
    Richard Bradley (2007). A Defence of the Ramsey Test. Mind 116 (461):1-21.
    According to the Ramsey Test hypothesis the conditional claim that if A then B is credible just in case it is credible that B, on the supposition that A. If true the hypothesis helps explain the way in which we evaluate and use ordinary language conditionals. But impossibility results for the Ramsey Test hypothesis in its various forms suggest that it is untenable. In this paper, I argue that these results do not in fact have this (...)
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  20.  26
    Peter Gärdenfors (1987). Variations on the Ramsey Test: More Triviality Results. Studia Logica 46 (4):319-325.
    The purpose of this note is to formulate some weaker versions of the so called Ramsey test that do not entail the following unacceptable consequenceIf A and C are already accepted in K, then if A, then C is also accepted in K. and to show that these versions still lead to the same triviality result when combined with a preservation criterion.
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  21.  35
    B. Hill (2012). Defending the Ramsey Test: What is Wrong with Preservation? Mind 121 (481):131-146.
    In ‘A Defence of the Ramsey Test’, Richard Bradley makes a case for not concluding from the famous impossibility results regarding the Ramsey Test — the thesis that a rational agent believes a conditional if he would believe the consequent upon learning the antecedent — that the thesis is false. He lays the blame instead on one of the other premisses in these results, namely the Preservation condition. In this paper, we explore how this condition can (...)
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  22.  66
    Neil Tennant (2008). Belief-Revision, the Ramsey Test, Monotonicity, and the so-Called Impossibility Results. Review of Symbolic Logic 1 (4):402-423.
    Peter G¨ ardenfors proved a theorem purporting to show that it is impossible to adjoin to the AGM -postulates for belief-revision a principle of monotonicity for revisions. The principle of monotonicity in question is implied by the Ramsey test for conditionals. So G¨.
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  23.  36
    Simone Duca (2011). The Suppositional Ramsey Test and Decision-Instability. Topoi (1):53-57.
    Abstract I analyse the relationship between the Ramsey Test (RT) for the acceptance of indicative conditionals and the so-called problem of decision-instability. In particular, I argue that the situations which allegedly bring about this problem are troublesome just in case the relevant conditionals are evaluated by non-suppositional versions, e.g. causal/evidential, of the test. In contrast, a suppositional RT, by highlighting the metacognitive nature of the evaluation of indicative conditionals, allows an agent to run a simulation of such (...)
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  24.  34
    Frank Döring (1997). The Ramsey Test and Conditional Semantics. Journal of Philosophical Logic 26 (4):359-376.
    Proponents of the projection strategy take an epistemic rule for the evaluation of English conditionals, the Ramsey test, as clue to the truth-conditional semantics of conditionals. They also construe English conditionals as stronger than the material conditional. Given plausible assumptions, however, the Ramsey test induces the semantics of the material conditional. The alleged link between Ramsey test and truth conditions stronger than those of the material conditional can be saved by construing conditionals as ternary, (...)
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  25.  33
    André Fuhrmann & Isaac Levi (1994). Undercutting and the Ramsey Test for Conditionals. Synthese 101 (2):157-169.
    There is an important class of conditionals whose assertibility conditions are not given by the Ramsey test but by an inductive extension of that test. Such inductive Ramsey conditionals fail to satisfy some of the core properties of plain conditionals. Associated principles of nonmonotonic inference should not be assumed to hold generally if interpretations in terms of induction or appeals to total evidence are not to be ruled out.
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  26.  9
    John Pais & Peter Jackson (1992). Partial Monotonicity and a New Version of the Ramsey Test. Studia Logica 51 (1):21-47.
    We introduce two new belief revision axioms: partial monotonicity and consequence correctness. We show that partial monotonicity is consistent with but independent of the full set of axioms for a Gärdenfors belief revision sytem. In contrast to the Gärdenfors inconsistency results for certain monotonicity principles, we use partial monotonicity to inform a consistent formalization of the Ramsey test within a belief revision system extended by a conditional operator. We take this to be a technical dissolution of the well-known (...)
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  27.  28
    Isaac Levi (1996). For the Sake of the Argument: Ramsey Test Conditionals, Inductive Inference, and Nonmonotonic Reasoning. Cambridge University Press.
    This book by one of the world's foremost philosophers in the fields of epistemology and logic offers an account of suppositional reasoning relevant to practical deliberation, explanation, prediction and hypothesis testing. Suppositions made 'for the sake of argument' sometimes conflict with our beliefs, and when they do, some beliefs are rejected and others retained. Thanks to such belief contravention, adding content to a supposition can undermine conclusions reached without it. Subversion can also arise because suppositional reasoning is ampliative. These two (...)
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  28. Richard Dietz & Igor Douven (2010). Ramsey’s Test, Adams’ Thesis, and Left-Nested Conditionals. Review of Symbolic Logic 3 (3):467-484.
    Adams famously suggested that the acceptability of any indicative conditional whose antecedent and consequent are both factive sentences amounts to the subjective conditional probability of the consequent given the antecedent. The received view has it that this thesis offers an adequate partial explication of Ramsey’s test, which characterizes graded acceptability for conditionals in terms of hypothetical updates on the antecedent. Some results in van Fraassen may raise hope that this explicatory approach to Ramsey’s test is (...)
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  29.  31
    Simone Duca (2011). Introduction to the Special Issue: Ramsey Test, Conditionals and Choices. Topoi.
    Test for the rational acceptance of conditionals and it still incites much of the interest in conditional reasoning. For instance, the test has been considered as a good starting point for several formal semantics for conditionals. Furthermore, its ramifications have important implications for several disciplines, from logic and artificial intelligence to decision theory and psychology. This volume presents a small but fine sample of the state of the art of such multifarious area of research.
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  30.  23
    Charles B. Cross (1990). Belief Revision, Non-Monotonic Reasoning, and the Ramsey Test. In Kyburg Henry E., Loui Ronald P. & Carlson Greg N. (eds.), Knowledge Representation and Defeasible Reasoning. Kluwer 223--244.
    Peter Gärdenfors has proved (Philosophical Review, 1986) that the Ramsey rule and the methodologically conservative Preservation principle are incompatible given innocuous-looking background assumptions about belief revision. Gärdenfors gives up the Ramsey rule; I argue for preserving the Ramsey rule and interpret Gärdenfors's theorem as showing that no rational belief-reviser can avoid reasoning nonmonotonically. I argue against the Preservation principle and show that counterexamples to it always involve nonmonotonic reasoning. I then construct a new formal model of belief (...)
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  31. Peter Gärdenfors (1986). Belief Revisions and the Ramsey Test for Conditionals. Philosophical Review 95 (1):81-93.
  32.  41
    Isaac Levi (1988). Iteration of Conditionals and the Ramsey Test. Synthese 76 (1):49 - 81.
  33. Sven Ove Hansson (1992). In Defense of the Ramsey Test. Journal of Philosophy 89 (10):522-540.
  34. Adam Morton (2004). Against the Ramsey Test. Analysis 64 (4):294–299.
  35. Sten Lindström (1996). The Ramsey Test and the Indexicality of Conditionals: A Proposed Resolution of Gärdenfors' Paradox. In André Fuhrmann & Hans Rott (eds.), Logic, Action and Information. De Gruyter
  36. Isaac Levi (2011). For the Sake of the Argument: Ramsey Test Conditionals, Inductive Inference and Nonmonotonic Reasoning. Cambridge University Press.
    This book by one of the world's foremost philosophers in the fields of epistemology and logic offers an account of suppositional reasoning relevant to practical deliberation, explanation, prediction and hypothesis testing. Suppositions made 'for the sake of argument' sometimes conflict with our beliefs, and when they do, some beliefs are rejected and others retained. Thanks to such belief contravention, adding content to a supposition can undermine conclusions reached without it. Subversion can also arise because suppositional reasoning is ampliative. These two (...)
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  37.  18
    Sten Lindström & Wlodek Rabinowicz (1998). Conditionals and the Ramsey Test. In D. Gabbay & P. Smets (eds.), Handbook of Defeasible Reasoning and Uncertainty Management Systems, Vol 3.
  38.  25
    Sten Lindström & Wlodek Rabinowicz (1995). The Ramsey Test Revisited. In G. Crocco, L. Fariñas del Cerro & A. Herzig (eds.), Theoria. Oxford University Press 131-182.
  39.  23
    Stephen Read & Dorothy Edgington (1995). Conditionals and the Ramsey Test. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 69:47 - 86.
  40.  6
    Sten Lindström & Wlodzimierz Rabinowicz (1992). The Ramsey Test Revisited. Theoria 58 (2‐3):131-182.
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  41.  8
    Scott Sturgeon (2002). Conditional Belief and the Ramsey Test. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 51:215-232.
    Consider the frame S believes that—. Fill it with a conditional, say If you eat an Apple, you'll drink a Coke. what makes the result true? More generally, what facts are marked by instances of S believes ? In a sense the answer is obious: beliefs are so marked. Yet that bromide leads directly to competing schools of thought. And the reason is simple. Common-sense thinks of belief two ways. Sometimes it sees it as a three-part affair. When so viewed (...)
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  42.  2
    John N. Williams, The Failure of the Ramsey Test.
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  43.  5
    No Problem far Actualism (1986). A State of Belief K If and Only If the Minimal Change of K Needed to Accept A Also Requires Accepting C. The Preservation Criterion Says That If a Prop-Osition B is Accepted in a Given State of Belief K and A is Consistent with the Beliefs in K, Then B is Still Accepted in the Minimal Change of K Needed to Accept A. It is Proved That, on Pain of Triviality, the Ramsey Test And. Philosophy 61 (235).
  44. William Seager (1997). Isaac Levi, For the Sake of the Argument: Ramsey Test Conditionals, Inductive Inference, and Nonmonotonic Reasoning Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 17 (3):181-183.
     
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  45.  3
    Joseph Mendola (1998). Book Review:For the Sake of the Argument: Ramsey Test Conditionals, Inductive Inference, and Nonmonotonic Reasoning Isaac Levi. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 65 (4):725-.
  46. H. E. Kyburg Jr (1990). Belief Revision, Non-Monotonic Reasoning, and the Ramsey Test. In Kyburg Henry E., Loui Ronald P. & Carlson Greg N. (eds.), Knowledge Representation and Defeasible Reasoning. Kluwer 223.
     
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  47. Isaac Levi (2010). For the Sake of the Argument: Ramsey Test Conditionals, Inductive Inference and Nonmonotonic Reasoning. Cambridge University Press.
    This book by one of the world's foremost philosophers in the fields of epistemology and logic offers an account of suppositional reasoning relevant to practical deliberation, explanation, prediction and hypothesis testing. Suppositions made 'for the sake of argument' sometimes conflict with our beliefs, and when they do, some beliefs are rejected and others retained. Thanks to such belief contravention, adding content to a supposition can undermine conclusions reached without it. Subversion can also arise because suppositional reasoning is ampliative. These two (...)
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  48. Isaac Levi (2007). For the Sake of the Argument: Ramsey Test Conditionals, Inductive Inference and Nonmonotonic Reasoning. Cambridge University Press.
    This book by one of the world's foremost philosophers in the fields of epistemology and logic offers an account of suppositional reasoning relevant to practical deliberation, explanation, prediction and hypothesis testing. Suppositions made 'for the sake of argument' sometimes conflict with our beliefs, and when they do, some beliefs are rejected and others retained. Thanks to such belief contravention, adding content to a supposition can undermine conclusions reached without it. Subversion can also arise because suppositional reasoning is ampliative. These two (...)
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  49. Isaac Levi (1996). For the Sake of the Argument: Ramsey Test Conditionals, Inductive Inference and Nonmonotonic Reasoning. Cambridge University Press.
    This book by one of the world's foremost philosophers in the fields of epistemology and logic offers an account of suppositional reasoning relevant to practical deliberation, explanation, prediction and hypothesis testing. Suppositions made 'for the sake of argument' sometimes conflict with our beliefs, and when they do, some beliefs are rejected and others retained. Thanks to such belief contravention, adding content to a supposition can undermine conclusions reached without it. Subversion can also arise because suppositional reasoning is ampliative. These two (...)
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  50. R. D. Rosenkrantz (1997). Review: Isaac Levi, For the Sake of the Argument. Ramsey Test Conditionals, Inductive Inference, and Nonmonotic Reasoning. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 62 (3):1041-1043.
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