Online research in philosophy

Kitcher's philosophical approach has moved from the reflection on the nature of mathematical knowledge to an explicit social concern about science, because he considers seriously the relevance of democratic values to scientific activity. Focal issues in this trajectory - from the internal perspective to the external - have been naturalism and scientific progress, which includes studies of the uses of scientific findings in the social milieu. Within this intellectual context, the chapter pays particular attention to his epistemological and methodological evolution. (...) The analysis of Philip Kitcher's contents on progress begins with mathematics, a conception that follows a naturalist perspective. Thereafter, the growth of science comes to the front line, an advancement that he views according to realism and cognitive naturalism. Later, the social concern about science receives a visible consideration, when his vision of scientific undertaking is characterized following modest realism and social naturalism. After these four steps (philosophical context, progress in mathematics, the growth in science, and the social concern about science), there is an analysis of his philosophical-methodological framework in retrospective. This is continued by the presentation of the origins of this book and the bibliography related to this thinker. (shrink)

Universalism in science, when conceived in methodological terms, leads to the problem of the limits of science. On the one hand, there is “methodological imperialism“ which in principle involves a form of universalism. On the other hand, there is the multivariate complexity - structural and dynamic, as well as epistemological and ontological - which represents a huge problem for methodological universalism, as may be seen with the obstacles for scientific prediction. Within the context of the limits of science, there is (...) a better understanding of the issues of expansionism and imperialism. 1. Varieties of Methodological Universalism 1.1. Levels of Methodological Analysis 1.2. The Historical Dimension 2. The Limits for Methodological Universalism: The Problem of Complexity 2.1. Obstacles to Methodological Universalism Due to Complexity 2.2. Methodological Universalism and the Obstacles to Predictors from the Angle of Complexity 3. Coda: Limits of Science, Expansionism and Imperialism. (shrink)

The axiological question of the role of economic values in the configuration of science is analyzed here following several steps: 1) the acceptance of the presence of values in science (among them, economic values in connection with scientific progress); 2) the clarification of the realms of values in science, which gives room for an "economics of science"; 3) the analysis of economic values in the internal perspective (cognitive and methodological), which is called "economy of research"; 4) the examination of external (...) economic values of science as social activity and in the uses and applications of science; and 5) the assessment of the possibility of an "economic axiology of science" (i.e., the articulation of economic values as a system where economic dimension of rationality should have an important task). The paper seeks an alternative vision to those already available, insofar as it is looking for new aspects of economic values, such as those involved in scientific results or outcomes, in addition to those considered in scientific aims and processes. (shrink)

Novelty and Continuity in Philosophy and Methodology of Science Wenceslao J. Gonzalez Nowadays, philosophy and methodology of science appear as a ...

The Philosophical Approach to Science, Technology and Society Wenceslao J. Gonzalez1 There is nowadays, through the "social turn" in philosophy of science ...

Lakatos’s approach to prediction and novel facts is of considerable interest. Prediction appears in his conception in at least three different levels: a) as an important aim of the research programs; b) as a procedure -a key method- for increasing our scientific knowledge both theoretically and empirically; and c) as the way to assess the scientific character of knowledge claims -means for evaluating results-. At all these levels he envisions a close connection between prediction and novel facts. The paper has (...) four aims. First, to examine his concept of “prediction” in Lakatos’s MSRP, taking into account different aspects (semantical, logical, epistemological, methodological and axiological). Second, to clarify the notion of “novel facts”, which requires the consideration of the various ways in which new facts can be understood. Third, to examine the prediction of novel facts as criterion of appraisal (theoretical, empirical and heuristical). Fourth, to explore Lakatos’s approach (i.e., the concept of prediction linked to novel facts) in connection with the field of economics, in order to shed new light on issues that have been discussed in recent years. (shrink)

“Prediction” and “prescription” are crucial notions for economics. This paper offers a philosophical and methodological approach and takes into account the connection with the problem of science and values. To do this, two steps are followed: firstly, prediction in economics -its characteristics and limits- will be examined and, secondly, the role of prescription in economics (and its relations with internal and external values) will be studied. Thus; the underlying aims of this paper are to make explicit the characters of economic (...) prediction, to show its nexus with the economic prescription and to point out the links of both -especially, the latter- with the specific values of “economic activity” and the values of “economics as activity” (i. e., values of economic undertaking as an activity interconnected with others in the social context). (shrink)

Reichenbach emphasizes the central importance of prediction, which is—for him—the principal aim of science. This paper offers a critical reconstruction of his concept of prediction, taking into account the different periods of his thought. First, prediction is studied as a key factor in rejecting the positivism of the Vienna Circle. This part of the discussion concentres on the general features of prediction before Experience and Prediction (EP) (section 1). Second, prediction is considered in the context of Reichenbach's disagreements with his (...) contemporaries—Carnap and Popper—(section 2). Pointing out these differences gives an additional basis for understanding how Reichenbach saw “prediction” in the period when EP was written. Third, Reichenbach's theoretical framework of prediction is analysed following EP. This analysis studies the semantical, logical, epistemological and methodological bases of his concept of prediction (section 3). Fourth, Reichenbach's conception of prediction, based on an objectivist interpretation of probabilities, is compared with the perspective on prediction of subjective Bayesians (the present personalists). This comparison (section 4) illustrates Reichenbach's views regarding the links of prediction with probability. Fifth, innovations and elements of continuity after EP are noted which give a more complete picture of Reichenbach's thought on prediction (section 5). This contributes to a comprehensive characterization of his concept of prediction. Finally, there is an assessment of his whole view of the matter and a presentation of the ingredients for a satisfactory alternative (section 6). (shrink)

The relation between Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics and mathematical Intuitionism has raised a considerable debate. My attempt is to analyse if there is a commitment in Wittgenstein to themes characteristic of the intuitionist movement in Mathematics and if that commitment is one important strain that runs through his Remarks on the foundations of mathematics. The intuitionistic themes to analyse in his philosophy of mathematics are: firstly, his attacks on the unrestricted use of the Law of Excluded Middle; secondly, his distrust (...) of non-constructive proofs; and thirdly, his impatience with the idea that mathematics stands in need of a foundation. These elements are Fogelin's starting point for the systematic reconstruction of Wittgenstein's conception of mathematics. (shrink)

Among the philosophical problems recently discussed, the question on the anti-realist semantic is outstanding. Its origin arises when M. Dummett tries a Wittgenstenian interpretation of the Intuitionistic Mathematics. He uses the concept of justification as the key concept - understood as proof or verification -, and it faces up to a realistic view centred in the notion of truth. But, carefully analized, it shows a clear vulnerability, while the realistic position has got serious eIements on its favour, and so it (...) is recognized by the supporter of the opposite point of view. Thus, the notion of truth cannot be disregarded. (shrink)