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Wes Morriston [36]Wesley Morriston [11]
  1. Wes Morriston, A Critique of the Kalam Cosmological Argument.
    The kalam[1] cosmological argument has two parts. The first part attempts to show that there is a First Cause of the universe. It can be conveniently summarized as follows.
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  2. Wes Morriston, Faith and Philosophy.
    A person has the first-order volition she has because of the second-order volition she has. A deeply divided person lacks a single, integrated second-order..
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  3. Wes Morriston, Education.
    Selected by graduating philosophy majors for a $1000 departmental teaching award, 2005 Boulder Faculty Assembly Teaching Excellence Award, University of Colorado, 2001 resident’s eaching cholar, niversity of olorado, 1992-94 Boulder Faculty Assembly Teaching Excellence Award, University of Colorado, 1981..
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  4. Wes Morriston, Theology Forum Seminar Philosophy 4600 Fall 2005.
    A one-credit seminar devoted to theological issues. Can be taken three times for credit. This semester, we'll be discussing Thomas Morris's highly readable book on Pascal and the meaning of life. To give you a quick sense of what this book is about, here are the chapter titles, followed by a few paragraphs from the first chapter.
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  5. Wes Morriston (2013). Is Faith in the Ultimate Rationally Required? Taking Issue with Some Arguments in The Will to Imagine. Religious Studies 49 (2):209-220.
    According to J. L. Schellenberg, sceptical faith in the Ultimate is not merely permitted, but is rationally required. It is, all things considered, the response that we should make. In this article, I assess just three of Schellenberg's arguments for this bold conclusion. I explain why I find each of them unpersuasive.
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  6. Wes Morriston (2012). Beginningless Past and Endless Future. Faith and Philosophy 29 (4):444-450.
    In a recent paper, I claimed that if a familiar line of argument against the possibility of a beginningless series of events worked as advertised, it would work just as well against the possibility of an endless series of pre-determined events. The present paper is my response to objections by William Lane Craig. It argues that neither Craig’s claim that an endless series of events is a merely potential infinite nor his claim that future events don’t exist is successful in (...)
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  7. Wes Morriston (2012). Ethical Criticism of the Bible: The Case of Divinely Mandated Genocide. Sophia 51 (1):117-135.
    Taking as a test case biblical texts in which the God of Israel commands the destruction other nations, the present paper defends the legitimacy and the necessity of ethical criticism of the Bible. It takes issue with the suggestions of several contemporary Christian philosophers who have recently defended the view that (in Israel’s early history) God had good and morally sufficient reasons for commanding genocide.
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  8. Wes Morriston (2012). God and the Ontological Foundation of Morality. Religious Studies 48 (1):15 - 34.
    In recent years, William Lane Craig has vigorously championed a moral argument for God's existence. The backbone of Craig's argument is the claim that only God can provide a ' sound foundation in reality' for morality. The present article has three principal aims. The first is to interpret and clarify the account of the ontological foundation of morality proposed by Craig. The second is to press home an important objection to that account. The third is to expose the weakness of (...)
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  9. Wes Morriston (2011). Is Goodness Without God Good Enough? A Debate on Faith, Secularism, and Ethics. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 70 (1):85-89.
    Is goodness without god good enough? A debate on faith, secularism, and ethics Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11153-010-9243-8 Authors Wes Morriston, University of Colorado, Boulder Department of Philosophy Boulder CO 80309-0232 USA Journal International Journal for Philosophy of Religion Online ISSN 1572-8684 Print ISSN 0020-7047.
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  10. Wes Morriston (2010). Beginningless Past, Endless Future, and the Actual Infinite. Faith and Philosophy 27 (4):439-450.
    One of the principal lines of argument deployed by the friends of the kalām cosmological argument against the possibility of a beginningless series of events is a quite general argument against the possibility of an actual infinite. The principal thesis of the present paper is that if this argument worked as advertised, parallel considerations would force us to conclude, not merely that a series of discrete, successive events must have a first member, but also that such a series must have (...)
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  11. Wes Morriston (2010). J. L. Schellenberg: The Will to Imagine: A Justification of Skeptical Religion. [REVIEW] International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 67 (2):107-111.
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  12. Wes Morriston (2009). A Critical Examination of the Kalam Cos Mo Logical Argument. In Kevin Timpe (ed.), Arguing About Religion. Routledge. 132.
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  13. Wes Morriston (2009). J. L. Schellenberg, Prolegomena to a Philosophy of Religion. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 66 (2):113-117.
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  14. Wes Morriston (2009). J. L. Schellenberg, the Wisdom to Doubt: A Justification of Religious Skepticism. [REVIEW] International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 66 (3):179-183.
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  15. Wes Morriston (2009). The Moral Obligations of Reasonable Non-Believers. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 65 (1):1 - 10.
    People who do not believe that there is a God constitute an obvious problem for divine command metaethics. They have moral obligations, and are often enough aware of having them. Yet it is not easy to think of such persons as “hearing” divine commands. This makes it hard to see how a divine command theory can offer a completely general account of the nature of moral obligation. The present paper takes a close look at this issue as it emerges in (...)
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  16. Wes Morriston (2009). What If God Commanded Something Terrible? A Worry for Divine-Command Meta-Ethics. Religious Studies 45 (3):249-267.
    If God commanded something that was obviously evil, would we have a moral obligation to do it? I critically examine three radically different approaches divine-command theorists may take to the problem posed by this question: (1) reject the possibility of such a command by appealing to God's essential goodness; (2) avoid the implication that we should obey such a command by modifying the divine-command theory; and (3) accept the implication that we should obey such a command by appealing to divine (...)
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  17. Wesley Morriston (2009). Did God Command Genocide? A Challenge to the Biblical Inerrantist. Philosophia Christi 11 (1):7-26.
     
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  18. Wes Morriston (2008). Must an 'Origins Agnostic' Be Skeptical About Everything? Philo 11 (2):165-176.
    Plantinga claims to give a person who is agnostic about the ultimate source of his cognitive faculties an undefeatable defeater for all his beliefs. This argument of Plantinga’s bears a family resemblance to his much better known argument for saying that naturalism is self-defeating, but it has a much more ambitious conclusion. In the present paper, I try to show both that Plantinga’s argument for this conclusion fails, and that even if an “origins agnostic” were to succumb to it, a (...)
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  19. Wes Morriston (2006). Is God Free? Reply to Wierenga. Faith and Philosophy 23 (1):93-98.
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  20. Wes Morriston (2005). Paul Copan and William Lane Craig Creation Out of Nothing: A Biblical, Philosophical, and Scientific Exploration. (Grand Rapids MI: Baker Academic, 2004). Pp. 280. £14.99 (Pbk). ISBN 0 8010 2733. [REVIEW] Religious Studies 41 (3):352-357.
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  21. Wes Morriston (2005). Power, Liability, and the Free-Will Defence: Reply to Mawson. Religious Studies 41 (1):71-80.
    Tim Mawson argues that the ability to choose what one knows to be morally wrong is a power for some persons in some circumstances, but that it would be a mere liability for God. The lynchpin of Mawson's argument is his claim that a power is an ability that it is good to have. In this rejoinder, I challenge this claim of Mawson's, arguing that choosing a course of action is always an exercise of power, whether or (...)
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  22. Wes Morriston (2004). The Evidential Argument From Goodness. Southern Journal of Philosophy 42 (1):87-101.
    severe and prolonged pain, in heartbreak and destruction, in disloyalty and betrayal, in the suffering of the innocent, in unjust punishment. He has, in short, an intense dislike for anything that you or I might approve of or enjoy. If he had his druthers we'd all be utterly miserable and come to a bad end. Now I' ve certainly never met a demonist, and I suppose we can agree that demonism would be an extraordinarily implausible view. Still, it is worth (...)
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  23. Wes Morriston (2003). Are Omnipotence and Necessary Moral Perfection Compatible? Reply to Mawson. Religious Studies 39 (4):441-449.
    In response to an earlier paper of mine, T. J. Mawson has argued that omnipotence is logically incompatible with wrong-doing, ‘whilst accepting that there is “a genuine, active power knowingly to choose evil” and thus leaving room for a free-will defence to the problem of evil’. Here, I attempt to show that Mawson is mistaken on both counts – that his argument for the incompatibility of omnipotence and wrong-doing is defective, and that the free-will defence cannot be sustained on the (...)
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  24. Wes Morriston (2003). Does Plantinga's God Have Freedom Canceling Control Over His Creatures? Philo 6 (1):67-77.
    According to Alvin Plantinga and his followers, there is a complete set of truths about what any possible person would freely do in anypossible situation. Richard Gale offers two arguments for saying that this doctrine entails that God exercises “freedom-canceling” control over his creatures. Gale’s first argument claims that Plantinga’s God controls our behavior by determining our psychological makeup. The second claims that God causes (in the “forensic” sense) all of our behavior. The present paper critically examines and rejects both (...)
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  25. Wes Morriston (2003). Must Metaphysical Time Have a Beginning? Faith and Philosophy 20 (3):288-306.
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  26. Wes Morriston (2002). Causes and Beginnings in the Kalam Argument. Faith and Philosophy 19 (2):233-244.
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  27. Wes Morriston (2002). Creation Ex Nihilo and the Big Bang. Philo 5 (1):23-33.
    William Lane Craig claims that the doctrine of creation ex nihilo is strongly supported by the Big Bang theory of the origin of the universe. In the present paper, I critically examine Craig’s arguments for this claim. I conclude that they are unsuccessful, and that the Big Bang theory provides no support for the doctrine of creation ex nihilo. Even if it is granted that the universe had a “first cause,” there is no reason to think that this cause created (...)
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  28. Wes Morriston (2002). Craig on the Actual Infinite. Religious Studies 38 (2):147-166.
    In a series of much discussed articles and books, William Lane Craig defends the view that the past could not consist in a beginningless series of events. In the present paper, I cast a critical eye on just one part of Craig's case for the finitude of the past – viz. his philosophical argument against the possibility of actually infinite sets of objects in the ‘real world’. I shall try to show that this argument is unsuccessful. I shall also take (...)
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  29. Wes Morriston (2002). Omnipotence and the Power to Choose. Faith and Philosophy 19 (3):358-367.
  30. Wes Morriston (2001). Explanatory Priority and the Counterfactuals of Freedom. Faith and Philosophy 18 (1):21-35.
    On a Molinist account of creation and providence, not only is there is a complete set of truths about what every possible person would freely do in any possible set of circumstances, but these conditional truths are part of the very explanation of our existence. Robert Adams has recently argued that the explanatory priority of these conditionals undermines libertarian freedom. In the present essay, I take at close look at Adams’ argument and at the Molinist response of Thomas Flint. After (...)
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  31. Wes Morriston (2001). Must There Be a Standard of Moral Goodness Apart From God? Philosophia Christi 2:127-138.
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  32. Wes Morriston (2001). Omnipotence and Necessary Moral Perfection: Are They Compatible? Religious Studies 37 (2):143-160.
    This paper elaborates and defends an argument for saying that if God is necessarily good (morally perfect in all possible worlds), then He does not have the maximum conceivable amount of power and so is not all-powerful. It considers and rejects several of the best-known attempts to show that necessary moral perfection is consistent with the requirements of omnipotence, and concludes by suggesting that a less than all-powerful person might still be the greatest possible being. Great is your power, and (...)
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  33. Wes Morriston (2001). Omnipotence and the Anselmian God. Philo 4 (1):7-20.
    Can God be both omnipotent and essentially good? Working with the Anselmian conception of God as the greatest possible being, a number of philosophers have tried to show that omnipotence should be understood in such a way that these properties are compatible. In the present paper, I argue that we can, without inconsistency or other obvious absurdity, conceive of a being more powerful than the Anselmian God. I conclude that contemporary Anselmian philosophers have conflated two logically distinct questions: (1) How (...)
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  34. Wes Morriston (2000). Must the Beginning of the Universe Have a Personal Cause? Faith and Philosophy 17 (2):149-169.
    The aim of this paper is to take a close look at some little discussed aspects of the kalam cosmological argument, with a view to deciding whether there is any reason to believe the causal principle on which it rests (“Whatever begins to exist must have a cause”), and also with a view to determining what conclusions can be drawn about the nature of the First Cause of the universe (supposing thatthere is one). I am particularly concerned with the problems (...)
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  35. Wes Morriston (2000). What is so Good About Moral Freedom? Philosophical Quarterly 50 (200):344-358.
    Many Christian philosophers believe that it is a great good that human beings are free to choose between good and evil – so good, indeed, that God is justified in putting up with a great many evil choices for the sake of it. But many of the same Christian philosophers also believe that God is essentially good – good in every possible world. Unlike his sinful human creatures, God cannot choose between good and evil. In that sense, he is not (...)
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  36. Wes Morriston (1999). Must the Past Have a Beginning? Philo 2 (1):5-19.
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  37. Wes Morriston (1996). God's Answer to Job. Religious Studies 32 (3):339 - 356.
    At the dramatic climax of the book of Job, God answers Job from a whirlwind; but it is notoriously difficult to see how this answer addresses the problem posed by Job's suffering. In this paper, I am especially concerned with the following questions. What underlying problem is the poet wrestling with? How is God's answer to Job supposed to be relevant to this problem? And why is Job satisfied by it? I critically consider what seem to me to be two (...)
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  38. Wesley Morriston (1985). Is God “Significantly Free?”. Faith and Philosophy 2 (3):257-264.
    In an impressive series of books and articles, Alvin Plantinga has developed challenging new versions of two much discussed pieces of philosophical theology: the free will defense and the ontological argument.' His treatment of both subjects has provoked a tremendous amount of critical comment. What has not been generally noticed', however, is that when taken together, Plantinga's views on these two subjects lead to a very serious problem in philosophical theology. The premises of his version of the ontological argument, when (...)
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  39. Wesley Morriston (1984). Is Plantinga's God Omnipotent? Sophia 23 (3):45-57.
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  40. Wesley Morriston (1982). Gladness, Regret, God, and Evil a Reply to Hasker. Southern Journal of Philosophy 20 (3):401-407.
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  41. Wesley Morriston (1982). Gladness, Regret, God, and Evil. Southern Journal of Philosophy 20 (3):401-407.
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  42. Wesley Morriston (1982). Pike and Hoffman on Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom. Philosophy Research Archives 8:521-529.
    In an article published several years ago, Nelson Pike recast his well known argument for the incompatibility of divine omniscience and human freedom in terms of a “possible worlds” analysis of human power. In this version, the argument is based on the assumption that past circumstances in the actual world “help to determine present powers.” If I am able to do something at the present time, Pike claims, there must be a possible world with a past just like the past (...)
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  43. Wesley Morriston (1979). Experience and Causality in the Philosophy of Merleau-Ponty. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 39 (4):561-574.
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  44. Wesley Morriston (1979). Kenny on Compatibilism. Mind 88 (April):266-269.
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  45. Wesley Morriston (1979). "Two Perspectives" Compatibilism. Journal of Critical Analysis 7 (4):119-123.
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  46. Wesley Morriston (1976). Intentionality and Phenomenological Method-Critique of Husserls Transcendental Idealism. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 7 (1):33-43.
  47. Wesley Morriston (1972). Heidegger on the World. Man and World 5 (4):452-467.
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