1. Willard V. O. Quine (1986). Philosophy of Logic. Philosophy 17 (3):392-393.
    With his customary incisiveness, W. V. Quine presents logic as the product of two factors, truth and grammar-but argues against the doctrine that the logical truths are true because of grammar or language. Rather, in presenting a general theory of grammar and discussing the boundaries and possible extensions of logic, Quine argues that logic is not a mere matter of words.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Willard V. O. Quine (1953). On a So-Called Paradox. Mind 62 (245):65-67.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Willard V. O. Quine (1951). Two Dogmas of Empiricism. Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.
    Modern empiricism has been conditioned in large part by two dogmas. One is a belief in some fundamental cleavage between truths which are analytic, or grounded in meanings independently of matters of fact, and truth which are synthetic, or grounded in fact. The other dogma is reductionism: the belief that each meaningful statement is equivalent to some logical construct upon terms which refer to immediate experience. Both dogmas, I shall argue, are ill founded. One effect of abandoning them is, as (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation