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William P. Alston [148]William Alston [19]
  1.  21
    William Alston (2005). Beyond Justification: Dimensions of Epistemic Evaluation. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
    " In a book that seeks to shift the ground of debate within theory of knowledge, William P. Alston finds that the century-lo.
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  2. William Alston (1989). Epistemic Justification. Cornell University Press.
    Introduction As the title indicates, the chief focus of this book is epistemic justification. But just what is epistemic justification and what is its place ...
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  3. William P. Alston (1991). Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience. Cornell University Press.
    Introduction i. Character of the Book The central thesis of this book is that experiential awareness of God, or as I shall be saying, the perception of God, ...
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  4.  99
    William P. Alston (1996). A Realist Conception of Truth. Cornell University Press.
    William P. Alston formulates and defends a realist conception of truth, which he calls alethic realism (from "aletheia", Greek for "truth").
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  5. William P. Alston (1988). The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification. Philosophical Perspectives 2:257-299.
  6. William P. Alston (1993). The Reliability of Sense Perception. Cornell University Press.
    Chapter INTRODUCTION i. The Problem Why suppose that sense perception is, by and large, an accurate source of information about the physical environment? ...
  7. William P. Alston (1985). Concepts of Epistemic Justification. The Monist 68 (1):57-89.
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  8. William P. Alston (1995). How to Think About Reliability. Philosophical Topics 23 (1):1-29.
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  9. William P. Alston (1988). An Internalist Externalism. Synthese 74 (3):265 - 283.
  10. William P. Alston (2005). Perception and Representation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):253-289.
    I oppose the popular view that the phenomenal character of perceptual experience consists in the subject's representing the (putative) perceived object as being so-and-so. The account of perceptual experience I favor instead is a version of the "Theory of Appearing" that takes it to be a matter of the perceived object's appearing to one as so-and-so, where this does not mean that the subject takes or believes it to be so-and-so. This plays no part in my criticisms of Representationalism. I (...)
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  11. William P. Alston (1999). Back to the Theory of Appearing. Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):181--203.
  12. William P. Alston (1986). Epistemic Circularity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (1):1-30.
  13.  5
    William P. Alston (2002). Illocutionary Acts and Sentence Meaning. Dialogue 41 (3):589-590.
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  14. William P. Alston (2002). Sellars and the "Myth of the Given". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):69-86.
    Sellars is well known for his critique of the “myth of the given” in his “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind”. That text does not make it unambiguous just how he understands the “myth”. Here I take it that whatever else may be involved, his critique is incompatible with the view that there is a nonconceptual mode of “presentation” or “givenness” of particulars that is the heart of sense perception and what is most distinctive of perception as a type of (...)
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  15. William P. Alston (1991). The Inductive Argument From Evil and the Human Cognitive Condition. Philosophical Perspectives 5:29-67.
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  16.  8
    William P. Alston (ed.) (1989). Divine Nature and Human Language: Essays in Philosophical Theology. Cornell University Press.
  17.  94
    William P. Alston & Alvin Plantinga (1990). Scotland Research Fellowships for the Academic Session 1991-92 Applications Are Invited for These Research Fellowships for the Academic Session 1991-92 The Fellowships Are Intended Primarily, Though Not Exclusively, for Philosophers and Political Theorists on Study Leave From Their Own Universities or Colleges. [REVIEW] Mind 99:396.
  18. William P. Alston (1980). Level-Confusions in Epistemology. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1):135-150.
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  19. William P. Alston (1976). Two Types of Foundationalism. Journal of Philosophy 73 (7):165-185.
  20. William P. Alston (1967). Problems of Philosophy of Religion. In Paul Edwards (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. New York, Macmillan 4.
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  21. William P. Alston (1986). Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology. Philosophical Topics 14 (1):179-221.
    Internalism restricts justifiers to what is "within" the subject. two main forms of internalism are (1) perspectival internalism (pi), which restricts justifiers to what the subject knows or justifiably believes, and (2) access internalism (ai), which restricts justifiers to what is directly accessible to the subject. the two forms are analyzed and interrelated, and the grounds for each are examined. it is concluded that although pi is both unacceptable and without adequate support, a modest form of ai might be defended.
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  22.  4
    William Alston (1992). Epistemic Justification. Essays in the Theory of Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1):228-232.
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  23. William P. Alston (1983). What's Wrong with Immediate Knowledge? Synthese 55 (April):73-96.
    Immediate knowledge is here construed as true belief that does not owe its status as knowledge to support by other knowledge (or justified belief) of the same subject. The bulk of the paper is devoted to a criticism of attempts to show the impossibility of immediate knowledge. I concentrate on attempts by Wilfrid Sellars and Laurence Bonjour to show that putative immediate knowledge really depends on higher-level knowledge or justified belief about the status of the beliefs involved in the putative (...)
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  24. William P. Alston (1993). Epistemic Desiderata. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (3):527-551.
  25. William P. Alston (1976). Has Foundationalism Been Refuted? Philosophical Studies 29 (5):295.
    It is no part of my purpose in this paper to advocate Minimal Foundationalism. In fact I believe there to be strong objections to any form of foundationalism, and I feel that some kind of coherence or contextualist theory will provide a more adequate general orientation in epistemology. Will and Lehrer are to be commended for providing, in their different ways, important insights into some possible ways of developing a nonfoundationalist epistemology. Nevertheless if foundationalism is to be successfully disposed of (...)
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  26. William P. Alston (1982). Religious Experience and Religious Belief. Noûs 16 (1):3-12.
    Can beliefs to the effect that god is manifesting himself in a certain way to the believer ("m-beliefs") be justified by its seeming to the believer that he experiences god doing that? the issue is discussed in the context of several concepts of justification. on a "normative" concept of justification the answer will depend on what one's intellectual obligations are vis-a-vis practices of belief formation. on a rigorous view of such obligations one is justified in forming a m-belief on the (...)
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  27.  85
    William P. Alston (1971). Varieties of Priveleged Access. American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (July):223-41.
    This paper distinguishes and interrelates a number of respects in which persons have been thought to be in a specially favorable epistemic position vis-A-Vis their own mental states. The most important distinction is a six-Fold one between infallibility, Omniscience, Indubitability, Incorrigibility, Truth-Sufficiency, And self-Warrant. Each of these varieties can then be sub-Divided as the kind of modality, If any, Involved. It is also argued that discussions of self-Knowledge have been hampered by a failure to recognize these distinctions.
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  28. William P. Alston (1964). Philosophy of Language. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,Prentice-Hall.
  29. William P. Alston (1958). Ontological Commitments. Philosophical Studies 9 (1-2):8 - 17.
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  30.  17
    William Alston (1999). Illocutionary Acts and Sentence Meaning. Cornell University Press.
    William P. Alston. difference in the scope of the rule reflects the fact that I-rules exist for the sake of making communication possible. Whereas their cousins are enacted and enforced for other reasons. We could distinguish I-rules just by this ...
  31. William P. Alston, Roderick M. Chisholm, Donald Davidson, Gilbert Harman, Richard Rorty & John R. Searle (1997). Realism/Antirealism and Epistemology. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
    This landmark collection of essays by six renowned philosophers explores the implications of the contentious realism/antirealism debate for epistemology. The essays examine issues such as whether epistemology needs to be realist, the bearing of a realist conception of truth on epistemology, and realism and antirealism in terms of a pragmatist conception of epistemic justification. Richard Rorty's essay provides a critical commentary on the other five.
     
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  32. William P. Alston (1986). Perceiving God. Journal of Philosophy 83 (11):655-665.
  33. William P. Alston (1998). Perception and Conception. In Pragmatism, Reason, and Norms: A Realistic Assessment. New York: Fordham University Press
  34. William P. Alston (1985). Divine Foreknowledge and Alternative Conceptions of Human Freedom. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 18 (1-2):19-32.
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  35. William P. Alston (1963). Meaning and Use. Philosophical Quarterly 13 (51):107-124.
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  36.  5
    William P. Alston (1985). Concepts of Epistemic Justification. The Monist 68 (2):57-89.
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  37.  97
    William P. Alston & Jonathan Bennett (1988). Locke on People and Substances. Philosophical Review 97 (1):25-46.
  38.  5
    William P. Alston (1996). Some (Temporarily) Final Thoughts on Evidential. In Daniel Howard-Snyder (ed.), The Evidential Argument From Evil. Indiana University Press 311.
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  39. William Alston (1999). Perceptual Knowledge. In John Greco & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology. Blackwell 223--42.
  40.  69
    William P. Alston (2001). Doing Epistemology Without Justification. Philosophical Topics 29 (1/2):1-18.
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  41.  56
    William P. Alston (1990). Externalist Theories of Perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50:73-97.
    The title refers to theories that require a certain sort of relation between X and an experience of S in order that S perceive X. The relation might be causal, counterfactual, doxastic, or otherwise. It is argued against such theories that there are possible cases in which X stands in the required relation to an experience of S and S does not perceive X and cases in which X is perceived though it does not stand in the required relation.
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  42.  60
    William P. Alston (1988). Religious Diversity and Perceptual Knowledge of God. Faith and Philosophy 5 (4):433-448.
  43.  14
    William P. Alston (2000). Virtue and Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):185-189.
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  44.  49
    William P. Alston (1986). Does God Have Beliefs? Religious Studies 22 (3/4):287 - 306.
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  45. William P. Alston (1992). The Autonomy of Religious Experience. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 31 (2/3):67 - 87.
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  46. William P. Alston (1980). Some Remarks on Chisholm's Epistemology. Noûs 14 (4):565-586.
  47. William P. Alston (1995). Realism and the Christian Faith. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 38 (1/3):37 - 60.
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  48. William P. Alston (1998). Pragmatism, Reason, and Norms: A Realistic Assessment. New York: Fordham University Press.
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  49.  77
    William P. Alston & Jonathan Bennett (1984). Identity and Cardinality: Geach and Frege. Philosophical Review 93 (4):553-567.
    P. T. Geach, notoriously, holds the Relative Identity Thesis, according to which a meaningful judgment of identity is always, implicitly or explicitly, relative to some general term. ‘The same’ is a fragmentary expression, and has no significance unless we say or mean ‘the same X’, where ‘X’ represents a general term (what Frege calls a Begriffswort or Begriffsausdruck). (P. T. Geach, Mental Acts (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957), p. 69. I maintain that it makes no sense to judge whether (...)
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  50.  26
    William P. Alston (1997). Response to Hick. Faith and Philosophy 14 (3):287-288.
    This is a response to Hick’s comments on my approach to the problem of religious diversity in Perceiving God. Before unearthing the bones I have to pick with him, let me fully acknowledge that I have not provided a fully satisfactory solution to the problem. At most I have done the best that can be done given the constraints within which I was working. But this best, if such it be, is not as bad as Hick makes it appear. To (...)
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