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Profile: William F Brewer (University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign)
  1. William F. Brewer (1996). What is Recollective Memory? In David C. Rubin (ed.), Remembering Our Past: Studies in Autobiographical Memory. Cambridge University Press
    The goal of this chapter is to describe recollective memory and give an account of some of the characteristics of this form of human memory. I take recollective memory to be the type of memory that occurs when an individual recalls a specific episode from their past experience. I start with this very loose definition because a large part of this chapter consists of an attempt to work out a more detailed and analytic description of this form of memory.
     
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  2. Kim J. Vicente & William F. Brewer (1993). Reconstructive Remembering of the Scientific Literature. Cognition 46 (2):101-128.
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  3. William F. Brewer & Bruce L. Lambert (2001). The Theory-Ladenness of Observation and the Theory-Ladenness of the Rest of the Scientific Process. Philosophy of Science 3 (September):S176-S186.
    We use evidence from cognitive psychology and the history of science to examine the issue of the theory-ladenness of perceptual observation. This evidence shows that perception is theory-laden, but that it is only strongly theory-laden when the perceptual evidence is ambiguous or degraded, or when it requires a difficult perceptual judgment. We argue that debates about the theory-ladenness issue have focused too narrowly on the issue of perceptual experience, and that a full account of the scientific process requires an examination (...)
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  4. William F. Brewer & Cristina Sampaio (2012). The Metamemory Approach to Confidence: A Test Using Semantic Memory. Journal of Memory and Language:59-77.
    The metamemory approach to memory confidence was extended and elaborated to deal with semantic memory tasks. The metamemory approach assumes that memory confidence is based on the products and processes of a completed memory task, as well as metamemory beliefs that individuals have about how their memory products and processes relate to memory accuracy. In two experiments participants were asked deceptive and nondeceptive questions involving geographical information. In both experiments, as predicted by the metamemory approach to memory confidence, there was (...)
     
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  5.  26
    William F. Brewer (2015). Perception is Theory Laden: The Naturalized Evidence and Philosophical Implications. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 46 (1):121-138.
    This paper proposes a set of criteria for an appropriate experiment on the issue of the theory ladenness of perception. These criteria are used to select a number of experiments that use: belief-based ambiguous figures, fragmented figures, or memory color. Crucially, the data in experiments of this type are based on the participant’s qualitative visual experience. Across many different types of experimental designs, different types of stimuli, and different types of belief manipulation, these experiments show the impact of belief/theory on (...)
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    Stella Vosniadou & William F. Brewer (1994). Mental Models of the Day/Night Cycle. Cognitive Science 18 (1):123-183.
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  7.  5
    Woo-Kyoung Ahn, William F. Brewer & Raymond J. Mooney (1988). Schema Acquisition From a Single Example. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 26 (6):509-509.
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  8.  23
    William F. Brewer, Clark A. Chinn & Ala Samarapungavan (1998). Explanation in Scientists and Children. Minds and Machines 8 (1):119-136.
    In this paper we provide a psychological account of the nature and development of explanation. We propose that an explanation is an account that provides a conceptual framework for a phenomenon that leads to a feeling of understanding in the reader/hearer. The explanatory conceptual framework goes beyond the original phenomenon, integrates diverse aspects of the world, and shows how the original phenomenon follows from the framework. We propose that explanations in everyday life are judged on the criteria of empirical accuracy, (...)
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  9.  6
    William F. Brewer & John R. Pani (1996). Reports of Mental Imagery in Retrieval From Long-Term Memory. Consciousness and Cognition 5 (3):265-287.
    Phenomenal reports were obtained immediately after participants retrieved information from long-term memory. Data were gathered for six basic forms of memory and for three forms of memory that asked for declarative information about procedural tasks . The data show consistent reports of mental imagery during retrieval of information from the generic perceptual, recollective, motor—declarative, rote—declarative, and cognitive—declarative categories; much less imagery was reported for the semantic, motor, rote, and cognitive categories. Overall, the data provide support for the theoretical framework outlined (...)
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  10.  20
    William F. Brewer (2001). Models in Science and Mental Models in Scientists and Nonscientists. Mind and Society 2 (2):33-48.
    This paper examines the form of mental representation of scientific theories in scientists and nonscientists. It concludes that images and schemas are not the appropriate form of mental representation for scientific theories but that mental models and perceptual symbols do seem appropriate for representing physical/mechanical phenomena. These forms of mental representation are postulated to have an analogical relation with the world and it is this relationship that gives them strong explanatory power. It is argued that the construct of naïve theories (...)
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  11.  25
    William F. Brewer (1999). Perceptual Symbols: The Power and Limitations of a Theory of Dynamic Imagery and Structured Frames. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (4):611-612.
    The perceptual symbol approach to knowledge representation combines structured frames and dynamic imagery. The perceptual symbol approach provides a good account of the representation of scientific models, of some types of naive theories held by children and adults, and of certain reconstructive memory phenomena. The ontological status of perceptual symbols is unclear and this form of representation does not succeed in accounting for all forms of human knowledge.
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  12.  3
    William F. Brewer (1999). Scientific Theories and Naive Theories as Forms of Mental Representation: Psychologism Revived. Science and Education 8 (5):489-505.
    This paper analyzes recent work in psychology on the nature of the representation of complex forms of knowledge with the goal of understanding how theories are represented. The analysis suggests that, as a psychological form of representation, theories are mental structures that include theoretical entities (usually nonobservable), relationships among the theoretical entities, and relationships of the theoretical entities to the phenomena of some domain. A theory explains the phenomena in its domain by providing a conceptual framework for the phenomena that (...)
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  13.  19
    William F. Brewer & Clark A. Chinn (1994). Scientists' Responses to Anomalous Data: Evidence From Psychology, History, and Philosophy of Science. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:304 - 313.
    This paper presents an analysis of the forms of response that scientists make when confronted with anomalous data. We postulate that there are seven ways in which an individual who currently holds a theory can respond to anomalous data: (1) ignore the data; (2) reject the data; (3) exclude the data from the domain of the current theory; (4) hold the data in abeyance; (5) reinterpret the data; (6) make peripheral changes to the current theory; or (7) change the theory. (...)
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  14.  2
    William F. Brewer (1992). Phenomenal Experience in Laboratory and Autobiographical Memory. In Martin A. Conway, David C. Rubin, H. Spinnler & W. Wagenaar (eds.), Theoretical Perspectives on Autobiographical Memory. Kluwer 31--51.
  15. William F. Brewer (1983). Form, Content, and Affect in the Theory of Stories. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (4):595.
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  16.  1
    J. Kathryn Bock & William F. Brewer (1974). Reconstructive Recall in Sentences with Alternative Surface Structures. Journal of Experimental Psychology 103 (5):837.
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  17.  1
    William F. Brewer (2003). Mental Models. In L. Nadel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Nature Publishing Group
  18.  12
    Clark A. Chinn & William F. Brewer (1996). Mental Models in Data Interpretation. Philosophy of Science 63 (3):219.
    This paper presents a cognitive account of the process of evaluating scientific data. Our account assumes that when individuals evaluate data, they construct a mental model of a data-interpretation package, in which the data and theoretical interpretations of the data are integrated. We propose that individuals attempt to discount data by seeking alternative explanations for events within the mental model; data-interpretation packages are accepted when the individual cannot find alternative accounts for these events. Our analysis indicates that there are many (...)
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  19. William F. Brewer, Laura A. Carlson-Radvansky, G. Cossu, Catharine H. Echols, Karen Emmorey, Jonathan St B. T. Evans, Alan Garnham, David E. Irwin, John J. Kim & Stephen M. Kosslyn (1993). Bellugi, Ursula, 139 Berent, Iris, 203. Cognition 46:299.
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  20. William F. Brewer & Marlene Schommer-Aikins (2006). Scientists Are Not Deficient in Mental Imagery: Galton Revised. Review of General Psychology 10:130-146.
    In 1880, Galton carried out an investigation of imagery in a sample of distinguished men and a sample of nonscientists (adolescent male students). He concluded that scientists were either totally lacking in visual imagery or had “feeble” powers of mental imagery. This finding has been widely accepted in the secondary literature in psychology. A replication of Galton’s study with modern scientists and modern university undergraduates found no scientists totally lacking in visual imagery and very few with feeble visual (...)
     
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  21. William F. Brewer & Lester Loschky (eds.) (2004). Top-Down and Bottom-Up Influences on Observation: Evidence From Cognitive Psychology and the History of Science. In A. Raftopoulos (Ed.), Cognitive Penetrability of Perception: Attention, Action, Strategies, and Bottom-Up Constraints.(Pp. 31-47). Nova Science Publishers.
     
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  22. William F. Brewer (ed.) (2012). The Theory Ladenness of the Mental Processes Used in the Scientific Enterprise: Evidence From Cognitive Psychology and the History of Science. In R. W. Proctor & E. J. Capaldi (Eds.). Psychology of Science: Implicit and Explicit Processes (289-334). New York: Oxford University Press. Oxford.
    This chapter takes a naturalized approach to the philosophy of science using evidence from cognitive psychology and from the history of science. It first describes the problem of the theory ladenness of perception. Then it provides a general top-down/bottom-up framework from cognitive psychology that is used to organize and evaluate the evidence for theory ladenness throughout the process of carrying out science (perception, attention, thinking, experimenting, memory, and communication). The chapter highlights both the facilitatory and inhibitory role of theory in (...)
     
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  23. Gary F. Marcus, Jane Oakhill, Alan Garnham, Stephen E. Newstead, Jonathan St Bt Evans, Kimj Vicente, William F. Brewer, Jc Marshall, Karen Emmorey & Stephen M. Kosslyn (1993). Janet Cohen Sherman (Massachusetts General Hospital) and Barbara Lust (Cornell University) Children Are in Control. Cognition 46:297.
     
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