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  1.  40
    William G. Lycan (1988). Judgement and Justification. Cambridge University Press.
    Toward theory a homuncular of believing For years and years, philosophers took thoughts and beliefs to be modifications of incorporeal Cartesian egos. ...
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  2. William G. Lycan (1996). Consciousness and Experience. MIT Press.
    Lycan not only uses the numerous arguments against materialism, and functionalist theories of mind in particular, to gain a more detailed positive view of the ..
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  3. William G. Lycan (ed.) (1990). Mind and Cognition: A Reader. Basil Blackwell.
     
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  4. William G. Lycan (1981). Form, Function and Feel. Journal of Philosophy 78 (January):24-50.
  5.  19
    William G. Lycan (2001). Real Conditionals. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    This book contends that insufficient attention has been paid to the syntax of conditionals, as investigated by linguists.
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  6.  58
    William G. Lycan (2006). On the Gettier Problem Problem. In Stephen Cade Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology Futures. Oxford University Press 148--168.
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  7. William G. Lycan (1987). Consciousness. MIT Press.
    In this book, William Lycan reviews the diverse philosophical views on consciousness--including those of Kripke, Block, Campbell, Sellars, and Casteneda--and ..
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  8. William G. Lycan (2006). Enactive Intentionality. Psyche 12 (3).
    Though Noë is concerned to emphasize that perceptual experiences are not per se internal representations, he does not really say why, and he is fairly quiet about what he takes intentionality and representation themselves to be. Drawing on a subsequent paper (Noë (forthcoming)), I bring out and criticize his in fact radically negative view of those fundamental mental capacities.
     
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  9. William G. Lycan (2001). The Case for Phenomenal Externalism. Philosophical Perspectives 15 (s15):17-35.
    Since Twin Earth was discovered by American philosophical-space explorers in the 1970s, the domain of.
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  10. William G. Lycan (2001). A Simple Argument for a Higher-Order Representation Theory of Consciousness. Analysis 61 (269):3-4.
  11. William G. Lycan (2013). Is Property Dualism Better Off Than Substance Dualism? Philosophical Studies 164 (2):533-542.
    It is widely thought that mind–body substance dualism is implausible at best, though mere “property” dualism is defensible and even flourishing. This paper argues that substance dualism is no less plausible than property dualism and even has two advantages over it.
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  12. William G. Lycan (2001). Moore Against the New Skeptics. Philosophical Studies 103 (1):35 - 53.
  13. William G. Lycan (1999). Philosophy of Language: A Contemporary Introduction. Routledge.
    Philosophy of Language introduces the non-specialist to the main issues and theories in twentieth-century philosophy of language, focusing specifically on linguistic phenomena. Part I explores several theories of how proper names, descriptions, and other terms bear a referential relation to non-linguistic objects. Part II surveys competing theories of linguistic meaning and compares their various advantages and liabilities. Part III introduces the basic concepts of linguistic pragmatics, includes a detailed discussion of the problems of indirect force, and Part IV examines linguistic (...)
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  14. William G. Lycan (1990). What is the "Subjectivity" of the Mental? Philosophical Perspectives 11 (2):229-238.
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  15.  12
    William G. Lycan (1988). On the Plurality of Worlds by David Lewis. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophy 85 (1):42-47.
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  16.  82
    William G. Lycan (2001). Have We Neglected Phenomenal Consciousness? Psyche 7 (3).
    Charles Siewert's _The Significance of Consciousness_ contends that most philosophers and psychologists who have written about "consciousness" have neglected a crucial type or aspect that Siewert calls "phenomenal consciousness" and tries carefully to define. The present article argues that some philosophers, at least, have not neglected phenomenal consciousness and have offered tenable theories of it.
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  17. William G. Lycan (2005). A Particularly Compelling Refutation of Eliminative Materialism. In D. M. Johnson & C. E. Erneling (eds.), The Mind as a Scientific Object: Between Brain and Culture. OUP 197.
    The 1960s saw heated discussion of Eliminative Materialism in regard to sensations and their phenomenal features. Thus directed, Eliminative Materialism is materialism or physicalism plus the distinctive and truly radical thesis that there have never occurred any sensations; no one has ever experienced a sensation. This view attracted few adherents(!), though to this day some philosophers are Eliminativists with respect to various alleged phenomenal features of sensations.
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  18.  55
    William G. Lycan (2012). Explanationist Rebuttals (Coherentism Defended Again). Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):5-20.
    An explanatory coherence theory of justification is sketched and then defended against a number of recent objections: conservatism and relativism; wild and crazy beliefs; reliability; warranted necessary falsehoods; basing; distant, unknown coherences; Sosa's “self- and present-abstracts”; and Bayesian impossibility results.
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  19.  35
    William G. Lycan (2013). On Two Main Themes in Gutting's What Philosophers Know. Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (1):112-120.
    This paper addresses each of two of Gutting's three main contentions: that like anyone else, philosophers are entitled to begin with what they find obvious and that philosophy has produced a distinctive body of knowledge. I emphatically agree with the first contention and expand on it, defending a stronger claim. The second contention I dispute, in spirit if not in letter, on each of several grounds.
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  20.  61
    William G. Lycan (1986). Two Concepts of Reduction: Modal Realism at Risk. Journal of Philosophy 83 (11):693-694.
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  21. William G. Lycan (1979). The Trouble with Possible Worlds. In Michael J. Loux (ed.), The Possible and the Actual. Cornell University Press
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  22. William G. Lycan, Penelope Maddy, Gideon Rosen & Nathan Salmon (2001). Externalism, Naturalism, Nominalism, and Mathematics. Philosophical Perspectives 15:17-117.
     
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  23. William G. Lycan (1995). Consciousness as Internal Monitoring. Philosophical Perspectives 9:1-14.
    Locke put forward the theory of consciousness as "internal Sense" or "reflection"; Kant made it inner sense, by means of which the mind intuits itself or its inner state." On that theory, consciousness is a perception-like second-order representing of our own psychological states events. The term "consciousness," of course, has many distinct uses.
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  24. William G. Lycan (1989). Ideas of Representation. In David Weissbord (ed.), Mind, Value and Culture: Essays in Honor of E. M. Adams. Ridgeview
     
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  25.  73
    Steven E. Boër & William G. Lycan (1975). Knowing Who. Philosophical Studies 28 (5):299 - 344.
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  26. William G. Lycan (2004). The Superiority of Hop to HOT. In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins 93–114.
  27. William G. Lycan (2010). Direct Arguments for the Truth-Condition Theory of Meaning. Topoi 29 (2):99-108.
    The truth-condition theory of meaning is, naturally, thought of an as explanatory theory whose explananda are the meaning facts. But there are at least two deductive arguments that purport to establish the truth of the theory irrespective of its explanatory virtues. This paper examines those arguments and concludes that they succeed.
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  28. Claire Horisk, Dorit Bar-On & William G. Lycan (2000). Deflationism, Meaning and Truth-Conditions. Philosophical Studies 101 (1):1 - 28.
  29. William G. Lycan, Representational Theories of Consciousness. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    The idea of representation has been central in discussions of intentionality for many years. But only more recently has it begun playing a wider role in the philosophy of mind, particularly in theories of consciousness. Indeed, there are now multiple representational theories of consciousness, corresponding to different uses of the term "conscious," each attempting to explain the corresponding phenomenon in terms of representation. More cautiously, each theory attempts to explain its target phenomenon in terms of _intentionality_, and assumes that intentionality (...)
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  30.  80
    William G. Lycan (2012). Desire Considered as a Propositional Attitude. Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):201-215.
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  31. William G. Lycan, Block and the Representation Theory of Sensory Qualities.
    In the nearly half a century since its modern inception (Anscombe (1965), Hintikka (1969)), the Representation theory has faced no more implacable enemy than Ned Block. He has offered objection after objection, usually in the form of apparent counterexamples, and as I write this he shows no sign of flagging.
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  32.  89
    Dorit Bar-On, Claire Horisk & William G. Lycan (2000). Deflationism, Meaning and Truth-Conditions. Philosophical Studies 101 (1):1-28.
  33. William G. Lycan (2009). Serious Metaphysics: Frank Jackson's Defense of Conceptual Analysis. In Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes From the Philosophy of Frank Jackson. Oxford University Press
  34. William G. Lycan (2003). Chomsky on the Mind - Body Problem. In Louise M. Antony (ed.), Chomsky and His Critics. Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing 11--28.
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  35.  35
    William G. Lycan (1985). Epistemic Value. Synthese 64 (2):137 - 164.
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  36. William G. Lycan (1987). Sellars' "Grain" Argument. In W.G. Lycan (ed.), Consciousness. MIT Press
  37.  27
    William G. Lycan (2005). The Nature of Consciousness. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3):745-748.
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  38. William G. Lycan (2007). Recent Naturalistic Dualisms. In E. Meyers, R. Styers & A. Lange (eds.), Light Against Darkness: Dualism in Ancient Mediterranean Religion and the Contemporary World. Brill Academic Publishers
    This paper is about a certain family of philosophical positions on the mind-body problem. The positions are dualist, but only in a minimal sense of that term employed by philosophers: according to the positions in question, mental entities are immaterial and distinct from all physical things.
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  39.  71
    William G. Lycan (2013). Phenomenal Conservatism and the Principle of Credulity. In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. Oxford University Press 293-305.
    Lycan (1985, 1988) defended a “Principle of Credulity”: “Accept at the outset each of those things that seem to be true” (1988, p. 165). Though that takes the form of a rule rather than a thesis, it does not seem very different from Huemer’s (2001, 2006, 2007) doctrine of phenomenal conservatism (PC): “If it seems to S that p , then, in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has at least some degree of justification for believing that p ” (2007, (...)
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  40. William G. Lycan & George S. Pappas (1972). What is Eliminative Materialism? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (August):149-59.
    In 19651 Richard Rorty defended a theory of mind which has since come to be called' eliminative materialism'. The theory has attained some status as a distinct, autonomous brand of materialism; and it has been criticized at length in the literature, ... \n.
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  41. William G. Lycan (1977). Evidence One Does Not Possess. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 55 (2):114 – 126.
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  42.  5
    William G. Lycan (1981). “Is” and “Ought” in Cognitive Science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):344.
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  43. William G. Lycan (1990). The Continuity of Levels of Nature. In Mind and Cognition: A Reader. Basil Blackwell 77--96.
     
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  44.  50
    William G. Lycan (1986). Moral Facts and Moral Knowledge. Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (S1):79-94.
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  45.  73
    William G. Lycan (1993). MPP, Rip. Philosophical Perspectives 7:411-428.
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  46. William G. Lycan (1986). Tacit Belief. In R. Bogdan (ed.), Belief: Form, Content, and Function. Oxford University Press
     
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  47. William G. Lycan (1991). Homuncular Functionalism Meets PDP. In William Ramsey, Stephen P. Stich & D. Rumelhart (eds.), Philosophy and Connectionist Theory. Lawrence Erlbaum
  48. William G. Lycan (1996). Replies to Tomberlin, Tye, Stalnaker and Block. Philosophical Issues 7:127-142.
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  49. William G. Lycan (1974). Kripke and the Materialists. Journal of Philosophy 71 (October):677-89.
  50. William G. Lycan & Z. Ryder (2003). The Loneliness of the Long-Distance Truck-Driver. Analysis 63 (2):132-36.
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