175 found
Sort by:
  1. William G. Lycan, Davidson's “Method of Truth” in Metaphysics.
    Davidson made a strikingly distinctive and valuable contribution to the practice of ontology. It was a species of argument for the existence of things of one kind or another. It was inspired by Quine’s doctrine that “To be is to be the value of a bound variable,” but it combined that with Davidson’s own apparently antiQuinean views on semantics and logical form in natural language. Roughly: Suppose truth-conditional analysis of certain English sentences assigns them logical forms containing characteristic quantifiers, and (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. William G. Lycan, A Simple Point About an Alleged Objection to Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness.
    For purposes of this paper, a conscious state is a mental state whose subject is directly or at least nonevidentially aware of being in it. (The state does not count as conscious if the subject has only been told about it by a cognitive scientist or psychologist; introspectively would be better, but no one should say that a state is conscious only if its subject actively introspects it.). N.b., this usage is only one among several quite different though of course (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. William G. Lycan, The Other Ways of Paradox.
    For Quine, a paradox is an apparently successful argument having as its conclusion a statement or proposition that seems obviously false or absurd. That conclusion he calls the proposition of the paradox in question. What is paradoxical is of course that if the argument is indeed successful as it seems to be, its conclusion must be true. On this view, to resolve the paradox is (1) to show either that (and why) despite appearances the conclusion is true after all, or (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. William G. Lycan & David M. Rosenthal (forthcoming). Editor's booknotes. Cogito.
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. William G. Lycan (2014). The Intentionality of Smell. Frontiers in Psychology 5.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Wesley Sauret & William G. Lycan (2014). Attention and Internal Monitoring A Farewell to HOP. Analysis 74 (3):363-370.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. William G. Lycan (2013). Is Property Dualism Better Off Than Substance Dualism? Philosophical Studies 164 (2):533-542.
    It is widely thought that mind–body substance dualism is implausible at best, though mere “property” dualism is defensible and even flourishing. This paper argues that substance dualism is no less plausible than property dualism and even has two advantages over it.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. William G. Lycan (2013). On Two Main Themes in Gutting's What Philosophers Know. Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (1):112-120.
    This paper addresses each of two of Gutting's three main contentions: that like anyone else, philosophers are entitled to begin with what they find obvious and that philosophy has produced a distinctive body of knowledge. I emphatically agree with the first contention and expand on it, defending a stronger claim. The second contention I dispute, in spirit if not in letter, on each of several grounds.
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. William G. Lycan (2013). Phenomenal Conservatism and the Principle of Credulity. In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. Oxford University Press. 293-305.
    Lycan (1985, 1988) defended a “Principle of Credulity”: “Accept at the outset each of those things that seem to be true” (1988, p. 165). Though that takes the form of a rule rather than a thesis, it does not seem very different from Huemer’s (2001, 2006, 2007) doctrine of phenomenal conservatism (PC): “If it seems to S that p , then, in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has at least some degree of justification for believing that p ” (2007, (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. William G. Lycan (2012). A Truth Predicate in the Object Language. In Gerhard Preyer (ed.), Donald Davidson on Truth, Meaning, and the Mental. Oxford University Press.
    The semantic paradoxes arise when the range of the quantifiers in the object language is too generous in certain ways. But it is not really clear how unfair to Urdu or to Hindi it would be to view the range of their quantifiers as insufficient to yield an explicit definition of ‗true-in-Urdu‘ or ‗true-in- Hindi‘. Or, to put the matter in another, if not more serious, way, there may in the nature of the case always be something we grasp in (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. William G. Lycan (2012). Desire Considered as a Propositional Attitude. Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):201-215.
    No categories
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. William G. Lycan (2012). Explanationist Rebuttals (Coherentism Defended Again). Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):5-20.
    An explanatory coherence theory of justification is sketched and then defended against a number of recent objections: conservatism and relativism; wild and crazy beliefs; reliability; warranted necessary falsehoods; basing; distant, unknown coherences; Sosa's “self- and present-abstracts”; and Bayesian impossibility results.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. William G. Lycan (2010). And the Role of Intuitions. In Sven Bernecker & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Routledge Companion to Epistemology. New York: Routledge.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. William G. Lycan (2010). Direct Arguments for the Truth-Condition Theory of Meaning. Topoi 29 (2):99-108.
    The truth-condition theory of meaning is, naturally, thought of an as explanatory theory whose explananda are the meaning facts. But there are at least two deductive arguments that purport to establish the truth of the theory irrespective of its explanatory virtues. This paper examines those arguments and concludes that they succeed.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. William G. Lycan (2009). Serious Metaphysics: Frank Jackson's Defense of Conceptual Analysis. In Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes From the Philosophy of Frank Jackson. Oxford University Press.
  16. William G. Lycan (2008). Jay Frank Rosenberg, 1942-2008. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 82 (2):164 - 166.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. William G. Lycan & Jesse J. Prinz (eds.) (2008). Mind and Cognition: An Anthology. Blackwell Pub. Ltd.
    First published in 1990, Mind and Cognition: An Anthology is now firmly established as a popular teaching apparatus for upper level undergraduate and graduate courses in the philosophy of mind.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. William G. Lycan (2007). Moore's Antiskeptical Strategies. In Susana Nuccetelli & Gary Seay (eds.), Themes From G. E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics. Clarendon Press.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. William G. Lycan (2007). Phenomenality Without Access? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):515-516.
    Block holds that there can be and even awareness of the phenomenology, without cognitive access by the subject. The subject may have an experience and be aware of the experience, yet neither notice it nor attend to it. How that is possible is far from clear. I invite Block to explain this very fine distinction.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. William G. Lycan (2007). Recent Naturalistic Dualisms. In E. Meyers, R. Styers & A. Lange (eds.), Light Against Darkness: Dualism in Ancient Mediterranean Religion and the Contemporary World. Brill Academic Publishers.
    This paper is about a certain family of philosophical positions on the mind-body problem. The positions are dualist, but only in a minimal sense of that term employed by philosophers: according to the positions in question, mental entities are immaterial and distinct from all physical things.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. William G. Lycan (2007). Review: Stalnaker on Zombies. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 133 (3):473 - 479.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. William G. Lycan (2007). Stalnaker on Zombies. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 133 (3):473-479.
  23. William G. Lycan (2006). Consciousness and Qualia Can Be Reduced. In Robert J. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science (Contemporary Debates in Philosophy). Blackwell. 189-201.
  24. William G. Lycan (2006). Enactive Intentionality. Psyche 12 (3).
    Though Noë is concerned to emphasize that perceptual experiences are not per se internal representations, he does not really say why, and he is fairly quiet about what he takes intentionality and representation themselves to be. Drawing on a subsequent paper (Noë (forthcoming)), I bring out and criticize his in fact radically negative view of those fundamental mental capacities.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. William G. Lycan (2006). Names. In Michael Devitt & Richard Hanley (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Language. Blackwell Pub.. 255--273.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. William G. Lycan (2006). On the Gettier Problem Problem. In Stephen Cade Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology Futures. Oxford University Press. 148--168.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. William G. Lycan (2006). Berger on Fictional Names. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (3):650 - 655.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. William G. Lycan (2005). A Particularly Compelling Refutation of Eliminative Materialism. In D. M. Johnson & C. E. Erneling (eds.), The Mind as a Scientific Object: Between Brain and Culture. Oup. 197.
    The 1960s saw heated discussion of Eliminative Materialism in regard to sensations and their phenomenal features. Thus directed, Eliminative Materialism is materialism or physicalism plus the distinctive and truly radical thesis that there have never occurred any sensations; no one has ever experienced a sensation. This view attracted few adherents(!), though to this day some philosophers are Eliminativists with respect to various alleged phenomenal features of sensations.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. William G. Lycan (2005). Critical Study: Joseph Levine's Purple Haze. Inquiry 48 (5):448 – 463.
    No categories
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. William G. Lycan (2005). The Nature of Consciousness. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3):745-748.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. William G. Lycan (2004). The Superiority of Hop to HOT. In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins. 93–114.
    What is consciousness?—to coin a question. According to “higher-order representation” (HOR) theories of consciousness, a mental state or event is a conscious state or event just in case it (itself) is the intentional object of one of the subject’s mental representations. That may sound odd, perhaps crazy. In fact, because of the richly diverse uses of the word “conscious” in contemporary philosophy of mind, it is bound to sound odd to many people. So I must begin by specifying what I (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. William G. Lycan (2003). Chomsky and His Critics. Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing.
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. William G. Lycan (2003). Chomsky on the Mind - Body Problem. In Louise M. Antony (ed.), Chomsky and His Critics. Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing. 11--28.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. William G. Lycan (2003). David Papineau, Thinking About Consciousness , Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002, Pp. 280, £25 (Cloth). [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):587 – 596.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. William G. Lycan (2003). Free Will and the Burden of Proof. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Minds and Persons. Cambridge University Press. 107-122.
    (3) A compatibilist needs to explain how free will can co-exist with determinism, paradigmatically by offering an analysis of ‘free’ action that is demonstrably compatible with determinism. (Here is the late Roderick Chisholm, in defense of irreducible or libertarian agent-causation: ‘Now if you can analyze such statements as “Jones killed his uncle” into event-causation statements, then you may have earned the right to make jokes about the agent as cause. But if you haven’t done this, and if all the same (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. William G. Lycan (2003). Perspectival Representation and the Knowledge Argument. In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press. 384.
    Someday there will be no more articles written about the.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. William G. Lycan (2003). The Mind-Body Problem. In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. 47--64.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. William G. Lycan (2003). Vs. A New a Priorist Argument for Dualism. Philosophical Issues 13 (1):130-47.
    Back in the late 1950s, a wonderful thing happened to metaphysics.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. William G. Lycan & Z. Ryder (2003). The Loneliness of the Long-Distance Truck-Driver. Analysis 63 (2):132-36.
  40. William G. Lycan (2002). Dretske's Ways of Introspecting. In Brie Gertler (ed.), Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate.
    ‘[I]ntrospection’ is just a convenient word to describe our way of knowing what is going on in our own mind, and anyone convinced that we know—at least sometimes—what is going on in our own mind and therefore, that we have a mind and, therefore, that we are not zombies, must believe that introspection is the answer we are looking for. I, too, believe in introspection.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. William G. Lycan (2002). Explanation and Epistemology. In Paul K. Moser (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology. Oxford University Press. 413.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. William G. Lycan (2002). Materialism. In Lynn Nadel (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Macmillan.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. William G. Lycan (ed.) (2002). Mind and Cognition: An Anthology, 2nd Edition. Blackwell.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. William G. Lycan (2002). Mind/Body Problem II. In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. William G. Lycan (2002). The Metaphysics of Possibilia. In Richard M. Gale (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Metaphysics. Blackwell Publishers. 303.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. William G. Lycan (2001). A Simple Argument for a Higher-Order Representation Theory of Consciousness. Analysis 61 (269):3-4.
  47. William G. Lycan (2001). Goldman on Consciousness. Philosophical Topics 29 (1/2):333-344.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. William G. Lycan (2001). Have We Neglected Phenomenal Consciousness? Psyche 7 (3).
    Charles Siewert's _The Significance of Consciousness_ contends that most philosophers and psychologists who have written about "consciousness" have neglected a crucial type or aspect that Siewert calls "phenomenal consciousness" and tries carefully to define. The present article argues that some philosophers, at least, have not neglected phenomenal consciousness and have offered tenable theories of it.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. William G. Lycan (2001). Moore Against the New Skeptics. Philosophical Studies 103 (1):35 - 53.
  50. William G. Lycan (2001). Perception and Reason. Bill Brewer. Mind 110 (439):725-729.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 175