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William H. Hanson [28]William Herbert Hanson [1]
  1.  84
    William H. Hanson (2006). Actuality, Necessity, and Logical Truth. Philosophical Studies 130 (3):437 - 459.
    The traditional view that all logical truths are metaphysically necessary has come under attack in recent years. The contrary claim is prominent in David Kaplan’s work on demonstratives, and Edward Zalta has argued that logical truths that are not necessary appear in modal languages supplemented only with some device for making reference to the actual world (and thus independently of whether demonstratives like ‘I’, ‘here’, and ‘now’ are present). If this latter claim can be sustained, it strikes close to the (...)
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  2.  56
    William H. Hanson (1997). The Concept of Logical Consequence. Philosophical Review 106 (3):365-409.
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  3.  65
    William H. Hanson (1991). Indicative Conditionals Are Truth-Functional. Mind 100 (1):53-72.
  4.  60
    William H. Hanson (2003). Logic, the a Priori, and the Empirical. Theoria 18 (2):171-177.
    The time-honored view that logic is a non-empirical enterprise is still widely accepted, but it is not always recognized that there are (at least) two distinct ways in which this view can be made precise. One way focuses on the knowledge we can have of logical matters, the other on the nature of the logical consequence relation itself. More specifically; the first way embodies the claim that knowledge of whether the logical consequence relation holds in a particular case is knowledge (...)
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  5.  62
    William H. Hanson (1999). Ray on Tarski on Logical Consequence. Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (6):605-616.
    In "Logical consequence: A defense of Tarski" (Journal of Philosophical Logic, vol. 25, 1996, pp. 617-677), Greg Ray defends Tarski's account of logical consequence against the criticisms of John Etchemendy. While Ray's defense of Tarski is largely successful, his attempt to give a general proof that Tarskian consequence preserves truth fails. Analysis of this failure shows that de facto truth preservation is a very weak criterion of adequacy for a theory of logical consequence and should be replaced by a stronger (...)
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  6.  12
    William H. Hanson (2002). The Formal-Structural View of Logical Consequence: A Reply to Gila Sher. Philosophical Review 111 (2):243-258.
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  7.  80
    William H. Hanson (1971). Mechanism and Godel's Theorem. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 22 (February):9-16.
  8.  21
    William H. Hanson (2002). The Formal-Structural View of Logical Consequence. Philosophical Review 111 (2):243 - 258.
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  9.  31
    William H. Hanson (2014). Logical Truth in Modal Languages: Reply to Nelson and Zalta. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 167 (2):327-339.
    Does general validity or real world validity better represent the intuitive notion of logical truth for sentential modal languages with an actuality connective? In (Philosophical Studies 130:436–459, 2006) I argued in favor of general validity, and I criticized the arguments of Zalta (Journal of Philosophy 85:57–74, 1988) for real world validity. But in Nelson and Zalta (Philosophical Studies 157:153–162, 2012) Michael Nelson and Edward Zalta criticize my arguments and claim to have established the superiority of real world validity. Section 1 (...)
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  10.  43
    William H. Hanson & James Hawthorne (1985). Validity in Intensional Languages: A New Approach. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 26 (1):9-35.
    Although the use of possible worlds in semantics has been very fruitful and is now widely accepted, there is a puzzle about the standard definition of validity in possible-worlds semantics that has received little notice and virtually no comment. A sentence of an intensional language is typically said to be valid just in case it is true at every world under every model on every model structure of the language. Each model structure contains a set of possible worlds, and models (...)
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  11.  5
    William H. Hanson (1980). First-Degree Entailments and Information. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 21 (4):659-671.
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  12.  36
    William H. Hanson (1990). Second-Order Logic and Logicism. Mind 99 (393):91-99.
    Some widely accepted arguments in the philosophy of mathematics are fallacious because they rest on results that are provable only by using assumptions that the con- clusions of these arguments seek to undercut. These results take the form of bicon- ditionals linking statements of logic with statements of mathematics. George Boolos has given an argument of this kind in support of the claim that certain facts about second-order logic support logicism, the view that mathematics—or at least part of it—reduces to (...)
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  13. William H. Hanson (1965). Semantics for Deontic Logic. Logique Et Analyse 8:177-190.
     
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  14.  20
    William H. Hanson (2006). The Paradox of Nonbeing. Grazer Philosophische Studien 73 (1):205-219.
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  15.  13
    William H. Hanson (1989). Two Kinds of Deviance. History and Philosophy of Logic 10 (1):15-28.
    In this paper I argue that there can be genuine (as opposed to merely verbal) disputes about whether a sentence form is logically true or an argument form is valid. I call such disputes ?cases of deviance?, of which I distinguish a weak and a strong form. Weak deviance holds if one disputant is right and the other wrong, but the available evidence is insufficient to determine which is which. Strong deviance holds if there is no fact of the matter. (...)
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  16.  20
    William H. Hanson, Gilbert Harman, N. L. Wilson, M. J. Cresswell, Storrs McCall & Margaret D. Wilson (1973). Reviews. [REVIEW] Synthese 26 (1):146-178.
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  17.  1
    William H. Hanson (2006). Actuality, Necessity, and Logical Truth. Philosophical Studies 130 (3):437-459.
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  18.  13
    William H. Hanson (1966). On Formalizing the Distinction Between Logical and Factual Truth. Journal of Symbolic Logic 31 (3):460-477.
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  19.  2
    William H. Hanson (2003). Philosophy of Logic, An Anthology, Edited by Jacquette Dale, Blackwell Philosophy Anthologies, No. 14. Blackwell Publishers, Malden, Mass. And Oxford, 2002, Xi+ 372 Pp. [REVIEW] Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 9 (4):511-515.
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  20. William H. Hanson (1966). A Logic of Commands. Logique Et Analyse 9:329-343.
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  21.  1
    William H. Hanson (1982). Review: Raymond D. Gumb, Hughes Leblanc, Evolving Theories. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 47 (2):454-456.
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  22.  5
    William H. Hanson (1966). On Some Alleged Decision Procedures for S. Journal of Symbolic Logic 31 (4):641-643.
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  23. William H. Hanson (1968). Review: Frederic B. Fitch, Natural Deduction Rules for Obligation. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 33 (1):136-137.
     
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  24.  1
    William H. Hanson (1971). Review: Lennart Aqvist, A Binary Primitive in Deontic Logic. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 36 (3):519-519.
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  25. William H. Hanson (1977). Review: Alan R. White, Modal Thinking. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 42 (3):428-430.
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  26. William H. Hanson (1970). Review: G. H. von Wright, Deontic Logics. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 35 (3):462-463.
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  27. William H. Hanson (1971). Review: Jan Berg, A Note on Deontic Logic. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 36 (1):182-182.
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  28. D. Jacquette & William H. Hanson (2003). REVIEWS-Philosophy of Logic, An Anthology. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 9 (4):511-514.
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