9 found
Sort by:
  1. William Jaworski (2011). Hylomorphism. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 85:173-187.
    “Hylomorphism” has recently become a buzzword in metaphysics. Kit Fine, Kathryn Koslicki, and Mark Johnston, among others, have argued that hylomorphism provides an account of parthood and material constitution that has certain advantages over its competitors. But what exactly is it, and what are its implications for an account of what we are? Hylomorphism, I argue, is fundamentally a claim about structure. It says that structure is a basic ontological and explanatory principle. I argue that hylomorphism is compatible with physicalism, (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. William Jaworski (2011). Philosophy of Mind: A Comprehensive Introduction. Wiley-Blackwell.
    “Philosophy of mind is an incredibly active field thanks in part to the recent explosion of work in the sciences of the mind. ...
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. William Jaworski (2009). The Logic of How-Questions. Synthese 166 (1):133 - 155.
    Philosophers and scientists are concerned with the why and the how of things. Questions like the following are so much grist for the philosopher’s and scientist’s mill: How can we be free and yet live in a deterministic universe?, How do neural processes give rise to conscious experience?, Why does conscious experience accompany certain physiological events at all?, How is a three-dimensional perception of depth generated by a pair of two-dimensional retinal images?. Since Belnap and Steel’s pioneering work on the (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. William Jaworski (2006). Hylomorphism and Post-Cartesian Philosophy of Mind. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 80:209-224.
    Descartes developed a compelling characterization of mental and physical phenomena which has remained more or less canonical for Western philosophy ever since. The greatest testament to the power of Cartesian thinking is its ubiquity. Even philosophers who are critical of post-Cartesian anthropology (philosophers,for instance, who are self-professed exponents of one or another form of hylomorphism) nevertheless tacitly endorse Cartesian assumptions. Part of what leads to this strange inconsistency is that by and large philosophers no longer know what a non-Cartesian anthropology (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. William Jaworski (2006). Mental Causation From the Top-Down. Erkenntnis 65 (2):277-299.
    Dual-attribute theories are alleged to face a problem with mental causation which commits them to either epiphenomenalism or overdetermination – neither of which is attractive. The problem, however, is predicated on assumptions about psychophysical relations that dual-attribute theorists are not obliged to accept. I explore one way they can solve the problem by rejecting those assumptions.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. William Jaworski (2005). A Physicalist Manifesto. International Philosophical Quarterly 45 (1):136-138.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. William Jaworski (2005). Hylomorphism and Mental Causation. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 79:201-216.
    Mind-body problems are predicated on two things: a distinction between the mental and the physical, and premises that make it difficult to see how the two are related. Before Descartes there were no mind-body problems of the sort now forming the stock in trade of philosophy of mind. One possible explanation for this is that pre-Cartesian philosophers working in the Aristotelian tradition had a different way of understanding the mental-physical distinction, the nature of causation, and the character of psychological discourse, (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. William Jaworski (2004). Hylomorphism and the Mind-Body Problem. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 78:178-192.
    The dualist-materialist dichotomy can be understood in terms of an apparently inconsistent triad of claims: materialism, mental realism, and antireductionism.At one time, functionalism seemed capable of resolving the apparent inconsistency, but recent work in the philosophy of mind suggests it cannot. Functionalism’sfailure invites exploration into alternative strategies for resolution, one of which is suggested by Aristotle’s hylomorphism. The latter rejects PostulationalRealism, a semantic model for psychological discourse endorsed by regnant forms of dualism and materialism, as well as by functionalism. Several (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. William Jaworski (2002). Multiple-Realizability, Explanation and the Disjunctive Move. Philosophical Studies 108 (3):289 - 308.
    The multiple-realizability argument has been the mainstay ofanti-reductionist consensus in philosophy of mind for the past thirty years. Reductionist opposition to it has sometimes taken the form of the Disjunctive Move: If mental types are multiply-realizable, they are not coextensive with physical types; they might nevertheless be coextensive with disjunctionsof physical types, and those disjunctions could still underwrite psychophysical reduction. Among anti-reductionists, confidence is high that the Disjunctive Move fails; arguments to this effect, however, often leave something to be desired. (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation