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William Jaworski [21]William Edward Jaworski [1]
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Profile: William Jaworski (Fordham University)
  1.  64
    William Jaworski (2011). Philosophy of Mind: A Comprehensive Introduction. Wiley-Blackwell.
    “Philosophy of mind is an incredibly active field thanks in part to the recent explosion of work in the sciences of the mind. ...
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  2.  33
    William Jaworski (2014). Hylomorphism and the Metaphysics of Structure. Res Philosophica 91 (2):179-201.
    Hylomorphism claims that structure is a basic ontological and explanatory principle; it accounts for what things are and what they can do. My goal is to articulate a metaphysic of hylomorphic structure different from those currently on offer. It is based on a substance-attribute ontology that takes properties to be powers and tropes. Hylomorphic structures emerge, on this account, as powers to configure the materials that compose individuals.
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  3. William Jaworski (2009). The Logic of How-Questions. Synthese 166 (1):133 - 155.
    Philosophers and scientists are concerned with the why and the how of things. Questions like the following are so much grist for the philosopher’s and scientist’s mill: How can we be free and yet live in a deterministic universe?, How do neural processes give rise to conscious experience?, Why does conscious experience accompany certain physiological events at all?, How is a three-dimensional perception of depth generated by a pair of two-dimensional retinal images?. Since Belnap and Steel’s pioneering work on the (...)
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  4.  42
    William Jaworski (2011). Hylomorphism. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 85:173-187.
    “Hylomorphism” has recently become a buzzword in metaphysics. Kit Fine, Kathryn Koslicki, and Mark Johnston, among others, have argued that hylomorphism provides an account of parthood and material constitution that has certain advantages over its competitors. But what exactly is it, and what are its implications for an account of what we are? Hylomorphism, I argue, is fundamentally a claim about structure. It says that structure is a basic ontological and explanatory principle. I argue that hylomorphism is compatible with physicalism, (...)
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  5.  77
    William Jaworski (2004). Hylomorphism and the Mind-Body Problem. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 78:178-192.
    The dualist-materialist dichotomy can be understood in terms of an apparently inconsistent triad of claims: materialism, mental realism, and antireductionism.At one time, functionalism seemed capable of resolving the apparent inconsistency, but recent work in the philosophy of mind suggests it cannot. Functionalism’sfailure invites exploration into alternative strategies for resolution, one of which is suggested by Aristotle’s hylomorphism. The latter rejects PostulationalRealism, a semantic model for psychological discourse endorsed by regnant forms of dualism and materialism, as well as by functionalism. Several (...)
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  6.  71
    William Jaworski (2006). Hylomorphism and Post-Cartesian Philosophy of Mind. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 80:209-224.
    Descartes developed a compelling characterization of mental and physical phenomena which has remained more or less canonical for Western philosophy ever since. The greatest testament to the power of Cartesian thinking is its ubiquity. Even philosophers who are critical of post-Cartesian anthropology (philosophers,for instance, who are self-professed exponents of one or another form of hylomorphism) nevertheless tacitly endorse Cartesian assumptions. Part of what leads to this strange inconsistency is that by and large philosophers no longer know what a non-Cartesian anthropology (...)
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  7.  52
    William Jaworski (2002). Multiple-Realizability, Explanation and the Disjunctive Move. Philosophical Studies 108 (3):289 - 308.
    The multiple-realizability argument has been the mainstay ofanti-reductionist consensus in philosophy of mind for the past thirty years. Reductionist opposition to it has sometimes taken the form of the Disjunctive Move: If mental types are multiply-realizable, they are not coextensive with physical types; they might nevertheless be coextensive with disjunctionsof physical types, and those disjunctions could still underwrite psychophysical reduction. Among anti-reductionists, confidence is high that the Disjunctive Move fails; arguments to this effect, however, often leave something to be desired. (...)
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  8.  46
    William Jaworski (2005). Hylomorphism and Mental Causation. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 79:201-216.
    Mind-body problems are predicated on two things: a distinction between the mental and the physical, and premises that make it difficult to see how the two are related. Before Descartes there were no mind-body problems of the sort now forming the stock in trade of philosophy of mind. One possible explanation for this is that pre-Cartesian philosophers working in the Aristotelian tradition had a different way of understanding the mental-physical distinction, the nature of causation, and the character of psychological discourse, (...)
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  9.  81
    William Jaworski (2006). Mental Causation From the Top-Down. Erkenntnis 65 (2):277-299.
    Dual-attribute theories are alleged to face a problem with mental causation which commits them to either epiphenomenalism or overdetermination – neither of which is attractive. The problem, however, is predicated on assumptions about psychophysical relations that dual-attribute theorists are not obliged to accept. I explore one way they can solve the problem by rejecting those assumptions.
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  10.  22
    William Jaworski (2014). Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly False, by Thomas Nagel. Faith and Philosophy 31 (2):236-240.
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  11.  31
    William Jaworski (2005). A Physicalist Manifesto. International Philosophical Quarterly 45 (1):136-138.
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  12.  1
    William Jaworski (2008). The Logic of How-Questions. Synthese 166 (1):133-155.
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  13. William Jaworski (2013). Hylomorphism and Resurrection. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 5:197-224.
    Hylomorphism provides an attractive framework for addressing issues in philosophical anthropology. After describing a hylomorphic theory that dovetails with current work in philosophy of mind and in scientific disciplines such as biology and neuroscience, I discuss how this theory meshes with Christian eschatology, the doctrine of resurrection in particular.
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  14. William Jaworski (2011). Philosophy of Mind: A Comprehensive Introduction. Wiley-Blackwell.
    _Philosophy of Mind_ introduces readers to one of the liveliest fields in contemporary philosophy by discussing mind-body problems and the various solutions to them. It provides a detailed yet balanced overview of the entire field that enables readers to jump immediately into current debates. Treats a wide range of mind-body theories and arguments in a fair and balanced way Shows how developments in neuroscience, biology, psychology, and cognitive science have impacted mind-body debates Premise-by-premise arguments for and against each position enable (...)
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  15. William Jaworski (2011). Philosophy of Mind: A Comprehensive Introduction. Wiley-Blackwell.
    _Philosophy of Mind_ introduces readers to one of the liveliest fields in contemporary philosophy by discussing mind-body problems and the various solutions to them. It provides a detailed yet balanced overview of the entire field that enables readers to jump immediately into current debates. Treats a wide range of mind-body theories and arguments in a fair and balanced way Shows how developments in neuroscience, biology, psychology, and cognitive science have impacted mind-body debates Premise-by-premise arguments for and against each position enable (...)
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  16. William Jaworski (2011). Philosophy of Mind: A Comprehensive Introduction. Wiley-Blackwell.
    _Philosophy of Mind_ introduces readers to one of the liveliest fields in contemporary philosophy by discussing mind-body problems and the various solutions to them. It provides a detailed yet balanced overview of the entire field that enables readers to jump immediately into current debates. Treats a wide range of mind-body theories and arguments in a fair and balanced way Shows how developments in neuroscience, biology, psychology, and cognitive science have impacted mind-body debates Premise-by-premise arguments for and against each position enable (...)
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  17. William Jaworski (2011). Philosophy of Mind: A Comprehensive Introduction. Wiley-Blackwell.
    _Philosophy of Mind_ introduces readers to one of the liveliest fields in contemporary philosophy by discussing mind-body problems and the various solutions to them. It provides a detailed yet balanced overview of the entire field that enables readers to jump immediately into current debates. Treats a wide range of mind-body theories and arguments in a fair and balanced way Shows how developments in neuroscience, biology, psychology, and cognitive science have impacted mind-body debates Premise-by-premise arguments for and against each position enable (...)
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  18. William Jaworski (2011). Philosophy of Mind: A Comprehensive Introduction. Wiley-Blackwell.
    _Philosophy of Mind_ introduces readers to one of the liveliest fields in contemporary philosophy by discussing mind-body problems and the various solutions to them. It provides a detailed yet balanced overview of the entire field that enables readers to jump immediately into current debates. Treats a wide range of mind-body theories and arguments in a fair and balanced way Shows how developments in neuroscience, biology, psychology, and cognitive science have impacted mind-body debates Premise-by-premise arguments for and against each position enable (...)
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  19. William Jaworski (2012). Powers, Structures, and Minds. In Ruth Groff & John Greco (eds.), Powers and Capacities in Philosophy: The New Aristotelianism. Routledge 145-171.
    Powers often depend on structures. It is because of the eye’s structure that it confers the power of sight; destroy that structure, and you destroy the power. I sketch an antireductive yet broadly naturalistic account of the relation between powers and structures. Powers, it says, are embodied in structures. When applied to philosophy of mind, this view resembles classic emergentist theories. I nevertheless argue that it differs from them in crucial respects that insulate it from the problems that beset them (...)
     
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  20. William Jaworski (2016). Structure and the Metaphysics of Mind: How Hylomorphism Solves the Mind-Body Problem. Oxford University Press Uk.
    William Jaworski shows how hylomorphism can be used to solve mind-body problems--the question of how thought, feeling, perception, and other mental phenomena fit into the physical world. Hylomorphism claims that structure is a basic ontological and explanatory principle, and is responsible for individuals being the kinds of things they are, and having the powers or capacities they have. From a hylomorphic perspective, mind-body problems are byproducts of a worldview that rejects structure, and which lacks a basic principle which distinguishes the (...)
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  21. William Jaworski (2014). Swinburne on Substances, Properties, and Structures. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6:17-28.
    Mind, Brain, and Free Will, Richard Swinburne’s stimulating new book, covers a great deal of territory. I’ll focus on some of the positions Swinburne defends in the philosophy of mind. Many philosophers are likely to have reservations about the arguments he uses to defend them, and others will think his basic position is unmotivated. My goal in this brief discussion is to articulate some of the reasons why.
     
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