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  1. William Newton-Smith (1988). Modest Realism. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:179 - 189.
    Realism as an explanatory theory of science (faded realism) is not convincing. However, neither "internal realism" nor instrumentalism are plausible. Assuming common sense realism a non-explanatory form of scientific realism (modest realism) can be defended. Modest realism has affinities with Fine's NOA. To NOA it adds a descriptive thesis about scientific progress towards truth or verisimilitude. In addition it adds a concern with purely philosophical issues which arise in reflections on the nature of science. However, there is little to say (...)
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  2. William Newton-Smith (1982). Relativism and the Possibility of Interpretation. In Martin Hollis & Steven Lukes (eds.), Rationality and Relativism. Mit Press. 106--122.
     
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  3. William H. Newton-Smith (1981). On the Rational Explanation of the Scientific Chance. Grazer Philosophische Studien 12:47-77.
    On a rational model of science (cf. Lakatos or Laudan), to decide on the appropriate type of explanation of a given scientific change requires a normative assessment made by reference to the model. Showing that a transition fits the model, displays it to be rational and thereby explains it. On the strong programme in the sociology of scientific knowledge (cf. Bloor and Barnes), normative assessment is irrelevant to explanation. All changes require the same type of explanation (the symmetry thesis); namely, (...)
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  4. William Newton-Smith (1978). DAVIES, P. C. W.: "Space and Time in the Modern Universe". [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 29:289.
     
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