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  1. William Robinson, “Doubts About Receptivity”, Commentary on G. Rosenberg's a Place for Consciousness (Oxford U. P., 2004).
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  2. William Robinson, Dictionary Entry, “Consciousness”, Polimetrica. Posted March, 2007.
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  3. William Robinson, Searle and Subjectivity.
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  4. William Robinson, Subj: Re: QM and Consciousness.
    >Henry Stapp (4:53am, 8/24/97) gave some very helpful clarification on >some questions I had asked. As clarifications should, his post leads to >some further questions. Some of them probably import classical ways of >thinking into QM contexts in an inappropriate way; but I think others >will be like me in not knowing *how* we are to avoid such >inappropriateness, so I am going to ask the questions that *seem* to me >to be important.
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  5. William S. Robinson, Phenomenal Consciousness and Intentionality: Vive la Difference!
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  6. William E. W. Robinson (forthcoming). Book Review: Jesus and the Eyewitnesses: The Gospels as Eyewitness Testimony. [REVIEW] Interpretation 62 (4):446-446.
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  7. William E. W. Robinson (forthcoming). Book Review: Seeing the Word: Refocusing New Testament Study. [REVIEW] Interpretation 61 (4):450-451.
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  8. William S. Robinson (forthcoming). Hidden Nature Physicalism. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-19.
    Hidden nature physicalists hold that an experiential quality and its hidden nature are the same property – even though they agree that our experiences are of experiential qualities but are not, in the same sense, experiences of their hidden natures. This paper argues that physicalists must be committed to ultimately giving accounts that involve no non-extensional relations, and that this commitment leads to an inability to explain how our experiences could be of experiential qualities, but not of their hidden natures.
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  9. William S. Robinson (forthcoming). James’s Evolutionary Argument. Disputatio.
  10. William S. Robinson (forthcoming). Red is the Hardest Problem. Topoi:1-12.
    Philip Pettit has advocated a “looks as powers” theory (LAPT) as an alternative to theories that rely on instances of qualia in their account of looking red. Andy Clark has offered a similar view. If these accounts are successful, the Hard Problem (HP) is moribund. This paper asks how red (assumed to be typical of sensory qualities) comes into cases of something’s looking red to someone. A likely suggestion leads to a conundrum for LAPT: the physical complexity that it attributes (...)
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  11. William S. Robinson (2014). Concept Acquisition and Experiential Change. Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 9 (1).
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  12. William S. Robinson (2013). Experiencing is Not Observing: A Response to Dwayne Moore on Epiphenomenalism and Self-Stultification. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (2):185-192.
    This article defends epiphenomenalism against criticisms raised in Dwayne Moore’s “On Robinson’s Response to the Self-Stultifying Objection”.
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  13. William Robinson (2012). Phenomenal Realist Physicalism Implies Coherency of Epiphenomenalist Meaning. Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (3-4):3-4.
    Recent criticisms of epiphenomenalism include a meaning objection. This is a self-stultification objection according to which epiphenomenalism is incoherent, because phenomenal terms could not mean what epiphenomenalists say they mean if epiphenomenalism were true. This paper seeks to remove the sting of this objection by showing that one can construct a coherent epiphenomenalist theory of meaning from any coherent account that may be offered by a phenomenal realist physicalist. This argument bears adversely on an important argument offered by Balog , (...)
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  14. William S. Robinson (2011). A Frugal View of Cognitive Phenomenology. In Tim Bayne and Michelle Montague (ed.), Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford University Press. 197.
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  15. William S. Robinson (2008). 3 Experience and Representation. In Edmond Wright (ed.), The Case for Qualia. The Mit Press. 73.
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  16. William S. Robinson (2008). Le dualisme conceptuel et l'intuition de la distinction chez David Papineau. Synthesis Philosophica 22 (2):319-333.
    Défendant le point de vue physicaliste de l’expérience, David Papineau propose une explication à l’intuition que les propriétés contenues dans les expériences se distinguent des propriétés nerveuses. Après avoir présenté quelques éléments de contexte, je soutiens que l’hypothèse de Papineau n’est pas la meilleure pour expliquer l’intuition de la distinction. Il existe une explication alternative, compatible avec le dualisme. A la différence de celle de Papineau, cette explication ne demande pas de supposer que l’intuition de la distinction soit fondée sur (...)
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  17. William S. Robinson (2008). Papineau's Conceptual Dualism and the Distinctness Intuition. Synthesis Philosophica 22 (2):319-333.
    As part of a defense of a physicalist view of experiences, David Papineau has offered an explanation for the intuition that properties found in experiences are distinct from neural properties. After providing some necessary background, I argue that Papineau’s explanation is not the best explanation of the distinctness intuition. An alternative explanation that is compatible with dualism is offered. Unlike Papineau’s explanation, this alternative does not require us to suppose that the distinctness intuition rests on fallacious reasoning. Relations of the (...)
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  18. William S. Robinson (2008). Papineaus konzeptualer Dualismus und die Intuition der Gewissheit. Synthesis Philosophica 22 (2):319-333.
    Im Rahmen seiner Verteidigung der physikalistischen Sichtweise der Erfahrung bot David Papineau 2002 die Erklärung an, dass bei der Intuition die erfahrungsmäßigen Eigenschaften anders geartet seien als neuronale Eigenschaften. Nach einer Schilderung des notwendigen Kontextes vertritt der Autor die These, dass Papineaus Erklärung zur Intuition der Gewissheit nicht die beste sei. Angeboten wird eine alternative, mit dem Dualismus kompatible Erklärung. Im Unterschied zu Papineaus Standpunkt setzt diese Alternative nicht die Annahme voraus, dass die Intuition der Gewissheit auf trugschlüssigen Gedankengängen beruhe. (...)
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  19. William Robinson (2007). Evolution and Epiphenomenalism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (11):27-42.
    This paper addresses the question whether evolutionary principles are compatible with epiphenomenalism, and argues for an affirmative answer. A general summary of epiphenomenalism is provided, along with certain specifications relevant to the issues of this paper. The central argument against compatibility is stated and rebutted. A specially powerful version of the argument, due to William James (1890), is stated. The apparent power of this argument is explained as resulting from a problem about our understanding of pleasure and an equivocation on (...)
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  20. William Robinson (2007). The Pitfalls of Realist Analysis of Global Capitalism: A Critique of Ellen Meiksins Wood's Empire of Capital. Historical Materialism 15 (3):71-93.
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  21. William S. Robinson (2006). Knowing Epiphenomena. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):85-100.
    This paper begins with a summary of an argument for epiphenomenalism and a review of the author's previous work on the self-stultification objection to that view. The heart of the paper considers an objection to this previous work and provides a new response to it. Questions for this new response are considered and a view is developed in which knowledge of our own mentality is seen to differ from our knowledge of external things.
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  22. William S. Robinson (2006). What is It Like to Like? Philosophical Psychology 19 (6):743-765.
    The liking of a sensation, e.g., a taste, is a conscious occurrent but does not consist in having the liked sensation accompanied by a "pleasure sensation" - for there is no such sensation. Several alternative accounts of liking, including Aydede's "feeling episode" theory and Schroeder's representationalist theory are considered. The proposal that liking a sensation is having the non-sensory experience of liking directed upon it is explained and defended. The pleasure provided by thoughts, conversations, walks, etc., is analyzed and brought (...)
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  23. William I. Robinson (2005). Global Capitalism: The New Transnationalism and the Folly of Conventional Thinking. Science and Society 69 (3):316 - 328.
    The current moment must be seen from a stadial perspective on capitalist development. A new transnational stage is marked by the rise of transnational capital, a transnational capitalist class and state, and novel relations of power and inequality in global society. Recent events do not represent a new U. S. bid for hegemony amidst heightened inter-imperialist rivalry. Faced with increasingly dim prospects for a viable transnational hegemony, transnational elites have mustered up fragmented and incoherent responses involving heightened military coercion, the (...)
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  24. William I. Robinson (2005). Gramsci and Globalisation: From Nation‐State to Transnational Hegemony. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 8 (4):559-574.
    Abstract This essay explores the matter of hegemony in the global system from the standpoint of global capitalism theory, in contrast to extant approaches that analyse this phenomenon from the standpoint of the nation?state and the inter?state system. It advances a conception of global hegemony in transnational social terms, linking the process of globalisation to the construction of hegemonies and counter?hegemonies in the twenty?first century. An emergent global capitalist historical bloc, lead by a transnational capitalist class, rather than a particular (...)
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  25. William S. Robinson (2005). Thoughts Without Distinctive Non-Imagistic Phenomenology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3):534-561.
    Silent thinking is often accompanied by subvocal sayings to ourselves, imagery, emotional feelings, and non-sensory experiences such as familiarity, rightness, and confidence that we can go on in certain ways. Phenomenological materials of these kinds, along with our dispositions to give explanations or draw inferences, provide resources that are sufficient to account for our knowledge of what we think, desire, and so on. We do not need to suppose that there is a distinctive, non-imagistic 'what it is like' to think (...)
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  26. William S. Robinson (2005). Zooming in on Downward Causation. Biology and Philosophy 20 (1):117-136.
    . An attempt is made to identify a concept of ‘downward causation’ that will fit the claims of some recent writers and apply to interesting cases in biology and cognitive theory, but not to trivial cases. After noting some difficulties in achieving this task, it is proposed that in interesting cases commonly used to illustrate ‘downward causation’, (a) regularities hold between multiply realizable properties and (b) the explanation of the parallel regularity at the level of the realizing properties is non-trivial. (...)
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  27. William S. Robinson (2004). A Few Thoughts Too Many? In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.
  28. William S. Robinson (2004). Colors, Arousal, Functionalism, and Individual Differences. Psyche 10 (2).
    Some philosophers have regarded the connection between hues and certain arousal or affective qualities as so intimate as to make them inseparable, and this “necessary concomitance view” has been invoked to defend functionalism against arguments based on inverted spectra. Support for the necessary concomitance view has sometimes been thought to accrue from experiments in psychology. This paper examines three experiments, two of which apparently offer support for the view. It argues that careful consideration of these experiments undermines this appearance of (...)
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  29. William S. Robinson (2004). Perception, Affect and Epiphenomenalism: Commentary on Mangan's. Psyche 10 (1).
    This commentary begins by explaining how Mangan's important work leads to a question about the relation between non-sensory experiences and perception. Reflection on affect then suggests an addition to Mangan's view that may be helpful on this and perhaps some other questions. Finally, it is argued that acceptance of non-sensory experiences is fully compatible with epiphenomenalism.
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  30. William S. Robinson (2004). Understanding Phenomenal Consciousness. Cambridge University Press.
    William S. Robinson has for many years written insightfully about the mind-body problem. In Understanding Phenomenal Consciousness he focuses on sensory experience and perception qualities such as colors, sounds and odors to present a dualistic view of the mind, called Qualitative Event Realism, that goes against the dominant materialist views. This theory is relevant to the development of a science of consciousness which is now being pursued not only by philosophers but by researchers in psychology and the brain sciences. This (...)
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  31. William I. Robinson (2003). Review: The Debate on Globalization. [REVIEW] Science and Society 67 (3):353 - 360.
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  32. William S. Robinson, Epiphenomenalism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Epiphenomenalism is the view that mental events are caused by physical events in the brain, but have no effects upon any physical events. Behavior is caused by muscles that contract upon receiving neural impulses, and neural impulses are generated by input from other neurons or from sense organs. On the epiphenomenalist view, mental events play no causal role in this process. Huxley (1874), who held the view, compared mental events to a steam whistle that contributes nothing to the work of (...)
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  33. William S. Robinson (2002). Jackson's Apostasy. Philosophical Studies 111 (3):277-293.
    Frank Jackson has abandoned his famous knowledge argument, and has explained why in a brief "Postscript on Qualia" . This explanation consists of a direct argument, and an attempt to explain away the intuition that lies at the heart of the knowledge argument. The direct argument is clarified and found to be subtly question-begging. The attempt to explain away the key intuition is reviewed and found to be inadequate. False memory traces, which Jackson mentions at the beginning of the direct (...)
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  34. Michael Mann, Giovanni Arrighi, Jason W. Moore, Robert Went, Kees Van Der Pijl, William I. Robinson, Guglielmo Carchedi, Fred Moseley & David Laibman (2001). Communications: The Transnational Ruling Class Formation Thesis: A Symposium. Science and Society 65 (4):464-533.
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  35. William I. Robinson (2001). Global Capitalism and Nation-State-Centric Thinking — What We Dont See When We Do See Nation-States: Response to Critics. Science and Society 65 (4):500 - 508.
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  36. William I. Robinson (2001). Response to McMichael, Block, and Goldfrank. Theory and Society 30 (2):223-236.
  37. William I. Robinson (2001). Social Theory and Globalization: The Rise of a Transnational State. [REVIEW] Theory and Society 30 (2):157-200.
  38. William I. Robinson & Jerry Harris (2000). Towards a Global Ruling Class? Globalization and the Transnational Capitalist Class. Science and Society 64 (1):11 - 54.
    A transnational capitalist class (TCC) has emerged as that segment of the world bourgeoisie that represents transnational capital, the owners of the leading worldwide means of production as embodied in the transnational corporations and private financial institutions. The spread of TNCs, the sharp increase in foreign direct investment, the proliferation of mergers and acquisitions across national borders, the rise of a global financial system, and the increased interlocking of positions within the global corporate structure, are some empirical indicators of the (...)
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  39. William S. Robinson, Qualia Realism. A Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind.
  40. Roger Burbach & William I. Robinson (1999). The Fin De Siede Debate: Globalization as Epochal Shift. Science and Society 63 (1):10 - 39.
    Behind the economic turbulence and political transformations of recent decades is the transition from the nationstate phase of world capitalism to a new transnational phase. While many detractors of globalization focus on global trade, the process is driven by the transnationalization of capital ownership, which in turn leads to the rise of a transnational bourgeoisie that sits at the apex of the global order. Parallel to the transatlantic and transpacific integration of capital there has been an integration of Southern capitalists (...)
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  41. William S. Robinson (1999). A Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness? Psyche 5 (4).
    Peter Carruthers offers a model that embraces first order representations and higher order representations or higher order thoughts . His model stipulates certain features of FORs and HOTs. Carruthers agrees with qualia realists that the FORs of his model are not adequate for phenomenal consciousness, and invokes HOTs to supply the required addition. It is argued that Carruthers' HOTs fail to provide anything that will enable him to account for phenomenal consciousness, i.e., that his model fails to include phenomenal consciousness (...)
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  42. William S. Robinson (1999). 8 Evolution and Self-Evidence. In Philip R. Loockvane (ed.), The Nature of Concepts: Evolution, Structure, and Representation. Routledge. 168.
     
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  43. William S. Robinson (1999). Philosophy's Second Revolution. Teaching Philosophy 22 (1):88-91.
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  44. William S. Robinson (1999). Qualia Realism and Neural Activation Patterns. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (10):65-80.
    A thought experiment focuses attention on the kinds of commonalities and differences to be found in two small parts of visual cortical areas during responses to stimuli that are either identical in quality, but different in location, or identical in location and different only in the one visible property of colour. Reflection on this thought experiment leads to the view that patterns of neural activation are the best candidates for causes of qualitatively conscious events . This view faces a strong (...)
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  45. William S. Robinson (1999). Representation and Cognitive Explanation. In Understanding Representation in the Cognitive Sciences: Does Representation Need Reality, Riegler. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Pub.
     
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  46. William S. Robinson (1999). Understanding Representation in the Cognitive Sciences: Does Representation Need Reality, Riegler. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Pub.
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  47. William Robinson (1998). Animal Cognition: Theory and Evidence: Review of Species of Mind: The Philosophy and Biology of Cognitive Ethology by Colin Allen and Marc Bekoff. [REVIEW] Psyche 4.
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  48. William S. Robinson (1998). A Gap Not Bridged. Consciousness and Cognition 7 (2):210-211.
  49. William S. Robinson (1998). Could a Robot Be Qualitatively Conscious? Aisb 99:13-18.
     
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  50. William S. Robinson (1998). Intrinsic Qualities of Experience: Surviving Harman's Critique. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 47 (3):285-309.
    Gilbert Harman (1990) seeks to defend psychophysical functionalism by articulating a representationalist view of the qualities of experience. The negative side of the present paper argues that the resources of this representationalist view are insufficient to ground the evident distinction between perception and (mere) thought. This failure makes the view unable to support the uses to which Harman wishes to put it. Several rescuing moves by other representationalists are considered, but none is found successful. Part of the difficulty in Harman's (...)
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