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  1. William S. Boardman, Austin and the Inferential Account of Perception.
    O SET THE STAGE for the discussion[1], I will rehearse and clarify a well-known dispute between A. J. Ayer and J. L. Austin concerning whether perceptual judgments are inferences. Both in his Sense and Sensibilia[2] and in his "Other Minds,"[3] Austin carefully distinguishes recognizing that p from inferring that p. For the purpose of comparing his position to Ayer's, we might put his basic claim in this way: given the way words such as "recognize" and "infer" are used outside philosophical (...)
     
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  2. William S. Boardman (1993). The Relativity of Perceptual Knowledge. Synthese 94 (2):145-169.
    Since the most promising path to a solution to the problem of skepticism regarding perceptual knowledge seems to rest on a sharp distinction between perceiving and inferring, I begin by clarifying and defending that distinction. Next, I discuss the chief obstacle to success by this path, the difficulty in making the required distinction between merely logical possibilities that one is mistaken and the real (Austin) or relevant (Dretske) possibilities which would exclude knowledge. I argue that this distinction cannot be drawn (...)
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  3. William S. Boardman (1987). Coordination and the Moral Obligation to Obey the Law. Ethics 97 (3):546-557.
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  4. William S. Boardman (1979). Dreams, Dramas, and Scepticism. Philosophical Quarterly 29 (116):220-228.
    Malcolm;[1] but the sharp attacks in the last decade on Malcolm's assumptions have led some philosophers to suppose that Descartes' dreaming problem is a cogent support for scepticism. [2] In this paper, I hope to dispose of the problem without using controversial assumptions of the sort used by Malcolm.
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  5. William S. Boardman (1978). Conclusive Reasons and Scepticism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 56 (1):32 – 40.
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