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William S. Larkin [14]William Shelley Larkin [1]
  1. William S. Larkin (2004). Persons, Animals, and Bodies. Southwest Philosophy Review 20 (2):95-116.
    The philosophical problem of personal identity starts with something like Descartes’ famous question—“But what then am I?”—construed as an inquiry into the most fundamental nature of creatures like us. Let us stipulate that creatures like us are most fundamentally persons. That is, ‘person’ is the name of our..
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  2.  38
    William S. Larkin (1999). Shoemaker on Moore's Paradox and Self-Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 96 (3):239-52.
    Shoemaker argues that a satisfactory resolution of Moore's paradox requires a _self-intimation thesis that posits a "constitutive relation between belief and believing that one believes." He claims that such a thesis is needed to explain the crucial fact that the assent conditions for '_P' entail those for '_I believe that P'. This paper argues for an alternative resolution of Moore's paradox that provides for an adequate explanation of the crucial fact without relying on the kind of necessary connection between first (...)
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  3.  59
    William S. Larkin, A Broad Perceptual Model of Privileged Introspective Judgments.
  4. William S. Larkin (2006). Res Corporealis: Persons, Bodies, and Zombies. In Richard Greene & K. Silem Mohammed (eds.), The Undead and Philosophy. Open Court 15--26.
     
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  5.  50
    William S. Larkin (2000). Content Skepticism. Southwest Philosophy Review 18 (1):33-43.
    Skeptical theses in general claim that we cannot know what we think we know. Content skepticism in particular claims that we cannot know the contents of our own occurrent thoughtsat least not in the way we think we can. I argue that an externalist account of content does engender a mild form of content skepticism but that the condition is no real cause for concern. Content externalism forces us to reevaluate some of our assumptions about introspective knowledge, but it is (...)
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  6.  34
    William S. Larkin, Concepts and Introspection: An Externalist Defense of Inner Sense.
  7.  26
    William S. Larkin, Content Skepticism and Reliable Self-Knowledge.
    Sub-Thesis 1: We should be contingent reliabilists to avoid the threat of an unacceptably strong content skeptical thesis posed by content externalism and the possibility of twin thoughts. The predominant strategy for resisting this threat has been to rely on the claim that introspective self-attributions are immune to brute error; but this claim is problematic from a naturalistic standpoint.
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  8.  25
    William S. Larkin (1999). Brute Error with Respect to Content. Philosophical Studies 94 (1-2):159-71.
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  9.  19
    William S. Larkin, Twin Earth, Dry Earth, and Brains in Vats.
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  10.  16
    William S. Larkin, Content and Metacognition.
    C. Theses: 1. Content Externalism strictly implies the possibility of acquiring a new concept as the result of an unwitting switch of environments. 2. This intuitively compels us to accept the possibility of someone possessing a concept without being aware that she does. 3. This possibility strictly favors causal models of meta-cognition over constitution models. 4. The possibility of possessing a concept unawares suggests that the contents of metacognitive.
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  11.  14
    William S. Larkin, Comments on Pryor's “Externalism About Content and McKinsey-Style Reasoning”.
    I. Pryor on McKinsey: " A. Pryor’s Version of McKinsey-style Reasoning 1. Given authoritative self-knowledge, I can usually tell the contents of my own thoughts just by introspection. So I can know the following claim on the basis of reflection alone: " McK-1: I am thinking a thought with the content _water puts out fires_.
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  12.  7
    William S. Larkin (2002). Content Scepticism. Southwest Philosophy Review 18 (1):33-43.
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  13.  13
    William S. Larkin, Burge on Our Privileged Access to the External World.
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  14.  7
    William S. Larkin, Twin Earth, Dry Earth, and Knowing the Width of Water.
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