92 found
Sort by:
Disambiguations:
William E. Seager [47]William Seager [45]
See also:
Profile: William Seager (University of Toronto)
  1. William Seager, Are Zombies Logically Possible?
    A philosophical zombie is a being physically indistinguishable from an actual or possible human being, inhabiting a possible world where the physical laws are identical to the laws of the actual world, but which completely lacks consciousness. For zombies, all is dark within, and hence they are, at the most fundamental level, utterly different from us. But, given their definition, this singular fact has no direct implications about the kind of motion, or other physical processes, the zombie will undergo within (...)
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. William Seager, I. The Representational Theory of Consciousness.
    It would be hard to deny that the experience of emotion is one of the most significant aspects of consciousness. While it is possible to imagine a being who enjoyed some forms of consciousness while lacking any awareness of its emotional states, such a being’s conscious life would be radically different from human consciousness. Yet, I believe that in fact we are surrounded by such beings and, most of the time, we ourselves are such. This is not to say that (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. William Seager, The Reality of Now Mickey Mantle: What Time is It? Yogi Berra: Do You Mean Right Now?
    Though there are many analogies between time and space, there appear to be three commonplace yet deeply perplexing features of time that reveal it to be quite unlike space. These can be called ‘orientation’, ‘flow’ and ‘presence’. By orientation I mean that there is a direction to time, a temporal order between events which is not merely a reflection of how they are observed (what McTaggart 1908/1968 labelled the B-series time). Assertions that objects stand in spatial relations, such as to (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. William Seager, Uncertain Knowledge and Reflective Epistemology.
    Our knowledge forms a highly interconnected and dynamically changing body of propositions. One obviously important way that knowledge changes is via rational inference, based either upon new insight into the content of what we already know or upon new knowledge provided by the senses. The most obvious codification of the acceptability of inference driven knowledge growth is the so-called known entailment closure principle, the principle that if S knows that p and knows that p implies q then S knows that (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. William E. Seager, Are Zombies Logically Possible? -- And Why It Matters.
    A philosophical zombie is a being physically indistinguishable from an actual or possible human being, inhabiting a possible world where the _physical_ laws are identical to the laws of the actual world, but which completely lacks consciousness. For zombies, all is dark within, and hence they are, at the most fundamental level, utterly different from us. But, given their definition, this singular fact has no direct implications about the kind of motion, or other physical processes, the zombie will undergo within (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. William E. Seager, Emergence and Supervenience.
    The metaphysical relation of supervenience has seen most of its service in the fields of the philosophy of mind and ethics. Although not repaying all of the hopes some initially invested in it – the mind-body problem remains stubbornly unsolved, ethics not satisfactorily naturalized – the use of the notion of supervenience has certainly clarified the nature and the commitments of so- called non-reductive materialism, especially with regard to the questions of whether explanations of supervenience relations are required and whether (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. William E. Seager, Generalized Epiphenomenalism.
    I want to show that a common and plausible interpretation of what science tells us about the fundamental structure of the world – the ‘scientific picture of the world’ or SPW for short – leads to what I’ll call ‘generalized epiphenomenalism’, which is the view that the only features of the world that possess causal efficacy are fundamental physical features. I think that generalized epiphenomenalism follows pretty straightforwardly from the SPW as I’ll present it, but it might seem that, once (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. William E. Seager, Whitehead and the Revival (?) Of Panpsychism.
    Whitehead’s philosophy is of perennial scholarly interest as one of the relatively few really serious attempts at a systematic metaphysics. But unlike almost all major ‘philosophical systems’ it is not merely an historical curiosity, but retains contemporary supporters actively deploying Whitehead’s viewpoint in discussion of a variety of live philosophical problems. Furthermore, Whitehead’s metaphysics is the sole example of a comprehensive philosophical system which aims to take into account the radical transformation of science which occurred at the beginning of the (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. William Seager (forthcoming). The Worm in the Cheese Leibniz, Consciousness and Matter. Studia Leibnitiana.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. William Seager (2013). Classical Levels, Russellian Monism and the Implicate Order. Foundations of Physics 43 (4):548-567.
    Reception of the Bohm-Hiley interpretation of quantum mechanics has a curiously Janus faced quality. On the one hand, it is frequently derided as a conservative throwback to outdated classical patterns of thought. On the other hand, it is equally often taken to task for encouraging a wild quantum mysticism, often regarded as anti-scientific. I will argue that there are reasons for this reception, but that a proper appreciation of the dual scientific and philosophical aspects of the view reveals a powerful (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. William Seager (2012). Beyond Theories: Cartwright and Hacking. In James R. Brown (ed.), Philosophy of Science: The Key Thinkers. Continuum Books. 213.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. William Seager (2012). Emergentist Panpsychism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (9-10):9-10.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. William Seager (2010). Concessionary Dualism and Physicalism. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 85 (67):217-237.
    The doctrine of physicalism can be roughly spelled out simply as the claim that the physical state of the world determines the total state of the world. However, since there are many forms of determination, a somewhat more precise characterization is needed. One obvious problem with the simple formulation is that the traditional doctrine of epiphenomenalism holds that the mental is determined by the physical (and epiphenomenalists need not assert that there are any properties except mental and physical ones, so (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. William Seager (2010). Panpsychism, Aggregation and Combinatorial Infusion. Mind and Matter 8 (2):167-184.
  15. William Seager (2010). Review of Robert W. Lurz (Ed.), The Philosophy of Animal Minds. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (7).
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. William Seager (2010). The Reflexive Nature of Consciousness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):563-566.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. William Seager (2009). Review of John Foster, A World for Us: The Case for Phenomenalistic Idealism. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (4).
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. William Seager, Jamie Tappenden & Achille C. Varzi (eds.) (2008/2011). Truth and Values: Essays for Hans Herzberger. University of Calgary Press.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. William E. Seager (2007). A Brief History of the Philosophical Problem of Consciousness. In P. D. Zelazo, Morris Moscovitch & Evan Thompson (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge University Press. 9--33.
  20. William E. Seager & David Bourget (2007). Representationalism About Consciousness. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. 261-276.
    A representationalist-friendly introduction to representationalism which covers a number of central problems and objections.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. William Seager (2006). Is Self-Representation Necessary for Consciousness? Psyche 12 (2).
    Brook and Raymont do not assert that self-representing representations are sufficient to generate consciousness, but they do assert that they are necessary, at least in the sense that self-representation provides the most plausible mechanism for generating conscious mental states. I argue that a first-order approach to consciousness is equally capable of accounting for the putative features of consciousness which are supposed to favor the self-representational account. If nothing is gained the simplicity of the first-order theory counts in its favor. I (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. William Seager (2006). Review of Alexander Batthyany, Avshalom Elitzur (Eds.), Mind and its Place in the World: Non-Reductionist Approaches to the Ontology of Consciousness. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (9).
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. William Seager (2006). The Emergence of Consciousness. Philosophic Exchange 36:5-23.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. William E. Seager (2006). Emergence, Epiphenomenalism and Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):21-38.
    Causation can be regarded from either an explanatory/epistemic or an ontological viewpoint. From the former, emergent features enter into a host of causal relationships which form a hierarchical structure subject to scientific investigation. From the latter, the paramount issue is whether emergent features provide any novel causal powers, or whether the 'go' of the world is exhausted by the fundamental physical features which underlie emergent phenomena. I argue here that the 'Scientific Picture of the World' (SPW) strongly supports the claim (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. William E. Seager (2006). Rosenberg, Reducibility and Consciousness. Psyche.
    Rosenberg’s general argumentative strategy in favour of panpsychism is an extension of a traditional pattern. Although his argument is complex and intricate, I think a model that is historically significant and fundamentally similar to the position Rosenberg advances might help us understand the case for panpsychism. Thus I want to begin by considering a Leibnizian argument for panpsychism.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. William E. Seager (2006). The 'Intrinsic Nature' Argument for Panpsychism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):129-145.
    Strawson’s case in favor of panpsychism is at heart an updated version of a venerable form of argument I’ll call the ‘intrinsic nature’ argument. It is an extremely interesting argument which deploys all sorts of high caliber metaphysical weaponry (despite the ‘down home’ appeals to common sense which Strawson frequently makes). The argument is also subtle and intricate. So let’s spend some time trying to articulate its general form.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. William Seager (2005). William Hirstein, Brain Fiction: Self-Deception and the Riddle of Confabulation Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 25 (4):262-264.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. William Seager (2004). Thomas W. Polger, Natural Minds Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 24 (5):354-356.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. William E. Seager (2004). A Cold Look at HOT Theory. In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.
  30. William E. Seager (2004). Emergence and Efficacy. In Christina E. Erneling & David Martel Johnson (eds.), Mind As a Scientific Object. Oxford University Press. 176.
    Imagine the day when physics is complete. A theory is in place which unifies all the forces of nature in one self-consistent and empirically verified set of absolutely basic principles. There are some who see this day as perhaps not too distant (e.g. Hawking 1988, Weinberg 1992, Horgan 1996). Of course, the mere possession of this _theory_ of everything will not give us the ability to provide a complete _explanation_ of everything: every event, process, occurrence and structure. Most things will (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. William Seager (2003). Yesterday's Algorithm. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 3 (3):265-273.
    Roger Penrose is infamous for defending aversion of John Lucas’s argument that Gödel’s incompleteness results show that the mind cannot be mechanistically (or, today, computationally) explained. Penrose’s argument has been subjected to a number of criticisms which, though correct as far as they go, leave open some peculiar and troubling features of the appeal to Gödel’s theorem. I try to reveal these peculiarities and develop a new criticism of the Penrose argument.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. William E. Seager (2003). Review: Tye on Consciousness: Time to Panic? [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 113 (3):237 - 247.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. William E. Seager, Some Awkwardness in Poised Content?
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. William E. Seager (2003). Tye on Consciousness: Time to Panic? [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 113 (3):237-247.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. William E. Seager (2003). Yesterday's Algorithm: Penrose and the Godel Argument. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 3 (9):265-273.
    Roger Penrose is justly famous for his work in physics and mathematics but he is _notorious_ for his endorsement of the Gödel argument (see his 1989, 1994, 1997). This argument, first advanced by J. R. Lucas (in 1961), attempts to show that Gödel’s (first) incompleteness theorem can be seen to reveal that the human mind transcends all algorithmic models of it1. Penrose's version of the argument has been seen to fall victim to the original objections raised against Lucas (see Boolos (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Michael Tye, William E. Seager, Barry Maund & Alex Byrne (2003). Ten Problems of Consciousness. Discussions. Author's Reply. Philosophical Studies 113 (3):233 - 290.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. William Seager (2002). Review: Science and the Riddle of Consciousness: A Solution. [REVIEW] Mind 111 (442):406-410.
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. William E. Seager (2002). Emotional Introspection. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (4):666-687.
  39. William E. Seager, Panpsychism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    1 Non-reductive physicalists deny that there is any explanation of mentality in purely physical terms, but do not deny that the mental is entirely determined by and constituted out of underlying physical structures. There are important issues about the stability of such a view which teeters on the edge of explanatory reductionism on the one side and dualism on the other (see Kim 1998). 2 Save perhaps for eliminative materialism (see Churchland 1981 for a classic exposition). In fact, however, while.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. William E. Seager (2001). Consciousness, Value and Functionalism. Psyche 7 (20).
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. William E. Seager, Dispositions and Consciousness.
  42. William E. Seager, On Dispositional HOT Theories of Consciousness.
    Higher Order Thought (HOT) theories of consciousness contend that consciousness can be explicated in terms of a relation between mental states of different.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. William E. Seager (2001). The Constructed and the Secret Self. In Andrew Brook & R. DeVidi (eds.), Self-Reference and Self-Awareness. John Benjamins.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. William Seager (2000). Jeremy Butterfield and Constantine Pagonis, Eds., From Physics to Philosophy Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 20 (5):318-319.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. William E. Seager (2000). Introspection and the Elementary Acts of Mind. Dialogue 39 (1):53-76.
  46. William E. Seager (2000). Real Patterns and Surface Metaphysics. In Andrew Brook, Don Ross & David L. Thompson (eds.), Dennett's Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment. MIT Press. 95--129.
    Naturalism is supposed to be a Good Thing. So good in fact that everybody wants to be a naturalist, no matter what their views might be1. Thus there is some confusion about what, exactly, naturalism is. In what follows, I am going to be pretty much, though not exclusively, concerned with the topics of intentionality and consciousness, which only deepens the confusion for these are two areas.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. William Seager (1999). Conscious Intentionality. In. In Denis Fisette (ed.), Consciousness and Intentionality: Models and Modalities of Attribution. Springer. 33--49.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. William Seager (1999). Theories of Consciousness: An Introduction. Routledge.
    The most remarkable fact about the universe is that certain parts of it are conscious. Somehow nature has managed to pull the rabbit of experience out of a hat made of mere matter. Making its own contribution to the current, lively debate about the nature of consciousness, Theories of Consciousness introduces variety of approaches to consciousness and explores to what extent scientific understanding of consciousness is possible. Including discussion of key figures, such as Descartes, Foder, Dennett and Chalmers, the book (...)
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. William Seager (1999). The Reality of Now. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 13 (1):69 – 82.
    The apparent 'flow' of time is one of its most mysterious features, and one which discomforts both scientists and philosophers. One of the most striking assaults upon it is McTaggart's argument that the idea of temporal flow is demonstratively incoherent. In this paper I first urge that the idea of temporal flow is an important part of our intuitive understanding of time, underpinning several of our notions about rationality and time. Second, I try to undercut McTaggart's argument by showing that (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. William E. Seager (1999). Conscious Intentionality and the Anti-Cartesian Catastrophe. In , Theories of Consciousness: An Introduction and Assessment. Routledge.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 92