Gillian Brock attempts to reconcile cosmopolitanism with nationalism in Global Justice: A Cosmopolitan Account . She claims that her cosmopolitanism leaves room for legitimate nationalism. I argue that her cosmopolitanism is not only a theory of global justice, but also a general theory of justice, according to which what justice may demand of us is fundamentally global in nature. As such, Brock's cosmopolitanism cannot accommodate nationalism in the overall structure of what justice may demand of us, but has to relegate (...) it to the discretionary space left open after what justice may demand of us globally has been met. This does not amount to much of a reconciliation or a particularly moderate cosmopolitanism, contrary to Brock's claim. More important, I argue, Brock's cosmopolitan theory of justice need not follow from the more fundamental view of moral cosmopolitanism. (shrink)

This work offers a timely philosophical analysis of interrelated normative questions concerning immigration and citizenship in relation to the global context of multiple nation states. In it, philosophers and scholars from the social sciences address both fundamental questions in moral and political philosophy as well as specific issues concerning policy. Topics covered in this volume include: the concept and the role of citizenship, the equal rights and representation of citizens, general moral frameworks for addressing immigration issues, the duty to obey (...) immigration law, the use of ethnic, cultural, or linguistic criteria for selective immigration, domestic violence as grounds for political asylum, and our duty to refugees in general. The urgency of the need to discuss these matters is clear. Several humanitarian crises involving human migration across national boundaries stemming from war, economic devastations, gang violence, and violence in ethnic or religious conflicts have unfolded. Political debates concerning immigration and immigrant communities are continuing in many countries, especially during election years. While there have always been migrating human beings, they raise distinctive issues in the modern era because of the political context under which the migrations take place, namely, that of a system of sovereign nation states with rights to control their borders and determine their memberships. This collection provides readers the opportunity to parse these complex issues with the help of diverse philosophical, moral, and political perspectives. (shrink)

In this paper I examine the counterfactual test for legislative intention as used in Riggs v. Palmer. The distinction between the speaker's meaning approach and the constructive interpretation approach to statutory interpretation, as made by Dworkin in Law's Empire, is explained. I argue that Dworkin underestimates the potential of the counterfactual test in making the speaker's meaning approach more plausible. I also argue that Dworkin's reasons for rejecting the counterfactual test, as proposed in Law's Empire, are either too weak or (...) unsound. A deeper reason for rejecting the counterfactual test as a method for the speaker's meaning approach is proposed in this paper. The difference between the counterfactual test and other tests for legislative intention which seem also to make use of counterfactual conditions in explained. (shrink)

This article gives an account of what Ronald Dworkin calls ‘the protestant attitude’ towards law. Dworkin’s protestantist claim that the interpretive attitude towards law is to be taken not only by judges, but also by ordinary citizens is explained and defended. The account of Dworkin’s protestantism about law in this article is not based on his more general protestantist view about the interpretation of social practices, but, rather, on the nature of authoritative statements of the law in Dworkin’s theory of (...) law as integrity. Protestantism is thus shown to be an integral part of the theory of law as integrity. It is also argued in this article that protestantism about law can accommodate the idea that legal deliberation is an authoritative and public process while leaving room for a significant role for citizens in the development of law. Indeed, any plausible theory of law should incorporate protestantism. (shrink)