Search results for 'Winona Barker' (try it on Scholar)

688 found
Sort by:
  1. Darren A. Natale, Cecilia N. Arighi, Winona Barker, Judith Blake, Ti-Cheng Chang, Zhangzhi Hu, Hongfang Liu, Barry Smith & Cathy H. Wu (2007). Framework for a Protein Ontology. BMC Bioinformatics, Nov. 2007, 8(Suppl. 9) 8 (9):S1.score: 240.0
    Biomedical ontologies are emerging as critical tools in genomic and proteomic research where complex data in disparate resources need to be integrated. A number of ontologies exist that describe the properties that can be attributed to proteins; for example, protein functions are described by Gene Ontology, while human diseases are described by Disease Ontology. There is, however, a gap in the current set of ontologies—one that describes the protein entities themselves and their relationships. We have designed a PRotein Ontology (PRO) (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Winona C. Barker & Margaret O. Dayhoff (1980). Evolutionary and Functional Relationships of Homologous Physiological Mechanisms. BioScience 30 (9):593-600.score: 240.0
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Stephen Barker & Phil Dowe (2005). Endurance is Paradoxical. Analysis 65 (285):69-74.score: 90.0
    No categories
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Stephen J. Barker (2004). Renewing Meaning: A Speech-Act Theoretic Approach. Clarendon Press.score: 60.0
    Stephen Barker presents his first, ambitious book in the philosophy of language, setting out a radical alternative to standard theories of meaning.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Chris Barker (2009). Clarity and the Grammar of Skepticism. Mind and Language 24 (3):253-273.score: 60.0
    Why ever assert clarity? If It is clear that p is true, then saying so should be at best superfluous. Barker and Taranto (2003) and Taranto (2006) suggest that asserting clarity reveals information about the beliefs of the discourse participants, specifically, that they both believe that p . However, mutual belief is not sufficient to guarantee clarity ( It is clear that God exists ). I propose instead that It is clear that p means instead (roughly) 'the publicly available (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Sue Barker (2013). The Road to Eternal Life: Reflections on the Prologue of Benedict's Rule [Book Review]. Australasian Catholic Record, The 90 (1):122.score: 60.0
    Barker, Sue Review(s) of: The road to eternal life: Reflections on the prologue of Benedict's rule, by Michael Casey OCSO, (Mulgrave VIC: John Garratt Publishing, 2011), pp.182, $29.95.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Chung-Chieh Shan & Chris Barker (2006). Explaining Crossover and Superiority as Left-to-Right Evaluation. Linguistics and Philosophy 29 (1):91 - 134.score: 60.0
    We present a general theory of scope and binding in which both crossover and superiority violations are ruled out by one key assumption: that natural language expressions are normally evaluated (processed) from left to right. Our theory is an extension of Shan’s (2002) account of multiple-wh questions, combining continuations (Barker, 2002) and dynamic type-shifting. Like other continuation-based analyses, but unlike most other treatments of crossover or superiority, our analysis is directly compositional (in the sense of, e.g., Jacobson, 1999). In (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Ken Barker (2012). The Missionaries of God's Love: A New Expression of Consecrated Life in a New Ecclesial Context. Australasian Catholic Record, The 89 (2):208.score: 60.0
    Barker, Ken One of the lasting fruits of the wide-spread experience of the renewal in the Catholic Church since the Second Vatican Council has been the surprising emergence of new expressions of consecrated life. The Missionaries of God's Love (MGL) is an Australian example of this renaissance. Founded in Canberra in 1986 as a small fraternity of young men around a priest, the MGL brothers have now grown to more than twenty in final vows and more than thirty in (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. John Barker (2009). Disquotation, Conditionals, and the Liar. Polish Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):5-21.score: 60.0
    In this paper I respond to Jacquette’s criticisms, in (Jacquette, 2008), of my (Barker, 2008). In so doing, I argue that the Liar paradox is in fact a problem about the disquotational schema, and that nothing in Jacquette’s paper undermines this diagnosis.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Renae Barker (2014). Explainer: What the Law Says About Religious Instruction in Schools. Australian Humanist, The 114:14.score: 60.0
    Barker, Renae In recent weeks the issue of the religious content of Australian education has been hotly debated. In February The Age reported the latest development: principals in several Victorian state schools had ceased to offer special religious instruction (SRI) in their schools.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Rodney S. Barker (2007). Making Enemies. Palgrave Macmillan.score: 60.0
    Whom a prime minister or president will not shake hands with is still more noticed than with whom they will. Public identity can afford to be ambiguous about friends, but not about enemies. Rodney Barker examines the available accounts of how enmity functions in the cultivation of identity, how essential or avoidable it is, and what the consequences are for the contemporary world.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Philip Barker (1993). Michel Foucault: Subversions of the Subject. St. Martin's Press.score: 60.0
    This unique and original study analyzes Foucault's interaction with the history of ideas, undertaking a genealogy of the subject that subverts conventional philosophical history to develop a distinctly Foucauldian intellectual history. Through a detailed account of Foucault's work and its relation to the history of ideas, Philip Barker shows how that history can be usefully reconceptualised using Foucault's concepts of genealogy and archaeology. Locating the emergence of self-reflexive consciousness in twelfth century philosophy, and elaborating upon autobiography as a philosophical (...)
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Stephen Barker (2011). Can Counterfactuals Really Be About Possible Worlds? Noûs 45 (3):557-576.score: 30.0
    The standard view about counterfactuals is that a counterfactual (A > C) is true if and only if the A-worlds most similar to the actual world @ are C-worlds. I argue that the worlds conception of counterfactuals is wrong. I assume that counterfactuals have non-trivial truth-values under physical determinism. I show that the possible-worlds approach cannot explain many embeddings of the form (P > (Q > R)), which intuitively are perfectly assertable, and which must be true if the contingent falsity (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Mark Jago & Stephen Barker (2012). Being Positive About Negative Facts. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (1):117-138.score: 30.0
    Negative facts get a bad press. One reason for this is that it is not clear what negative facts are. We provide a theory of negative facts on which they are no stranger than positive atomic facts. We show that none of the usual arguments hold water against this account. Negative facts exist in the usual sense of existence and conform to an acceptable Eleatic principle. Furthermore, there are good reasons to want them around, including their roles in causation, chance-making (...)
    Direct download (13 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Stephen J. Barker (2010). Cognitive Expressivism, Faultless Disagreement, and Absolute but Non-Objective Truth. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (2pt2):183-199.score: 30.0
    I offer a new theory of faultless disagreement, according to which truth is absolute (non-relative) but can still be non-objective. What's relative is truth-aptness: a sentence like ‘Vegemite is tasty’ (V) can be truth-accessible and bivalent in one context but not in another. Within a context in which V fails to be bivalent, we can affirm that there is no issue of truth or falsity about V, still disputants, affirming and denying V, were not at fault, since, in their context (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Stephen Barker (2013). The Emperor's New Metaphysics of Powers. Mind (487):fzt082.score: 30.0
    This paper argues that the new metaphysics of powers, also known as dispositional essentialism or causal structuralism, is an illusory metaphysics. I argue for this in the following way. I begin by distinguishing three fundamental ways of seeing how facts of physical modality — facts about physical necessitation and possibility, causation, disposition, and chance — are grounded in the world. The first way, call it the first degree, is that the actual world or all worlds, in their entirety, are the (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Benjamin Smart & Stephen Barker (2012). The Ultimate Argument Against Dispositional Monist Accounts of Laws. Analysis 72 (4):714-723.score: 30.0
    Alexander Bird argues that David Armstrong’s necessitarian conception of physical modality and laws of nature generates a vicious regress with respect to necessitation. We show that precisely the same regress afflicts Bird’s dispositional-monist theory, and indeed, related views, such as that of Mumford and Anjum. We argue that dispositional monism is basically Armstrongian necessitarianism modified to allow for a thesis about property identity.
    Direct download (13 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Stephen Barker, Expressivism About Truth-Making.score: 30.0
    My goal is to illuminate truth-making by way of illuminating the relation of making. My strategy is not to ask what making is, in the hope of a metaphysical theory about is nature. It's rather to look first to the language of making. The metaphor behind making refers to agency. It would be absurd to suggest that claims about making are claims about agency. It is not absurd, however, to propose that the concept of making somehow emerges from some feature (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Robert A. Wilson, Matthew J. Barker & Ingo Brigandt (2007). When Traditional Essentialism Fails. Philosophical Topics 35 (1-2):189-215.score: 30.0
    Essentialism is widely regarded as a mistaken view of biological kinds, such as species. After recounting why (sections 2-3), we provide a brief survey of the chief responses to the “death of essentialism” in the philosophy of biology (section 4). We then develop one of these responses, the claim that biological kinds are homeostatic property clusters (sections 5-6) illustrating this view with several novel examples (section 7). Although this view was first expressed 20 years ago, and has received recent discussion (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. S. F. Barker & Peter Achinstein (1960). On the New Riddle of Induction. Philosophical Review 69 (4):511-522.score: 30.0
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Stephen Barker (2003). Truth and Conventional Implicature. Mind 112 (445):1-34.score: 30.0
    Are all instances of the T-schema assertable? I argue that they are not. The reason is the presence of conventional implicature in a language. Conventional implicature is meant to be a component of the rule-based content that a sentence can have, but it makes no contribution to the sentence's truth-conditions. One might think that a conventional implicature is like a force operator. But it is not, since it can enter into the scope of logical operators. It follows that the semantic (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Stephen Barker & Mark Jago (2014). Monism and Material Constitution. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (1):189-204.score: 30.0
    Are the sculpture and the mass of gold which permanently makes it up one object or two? In this article, we argue that the monist, who answers ‘one object’, cannot accommodate the asymmetry of material constitution. To say ‘the mass of gold materially constitutes the sculpture, whereas the sculpture does not materially constitute the mass of gold’, the monist must treat ‘materially constitutes’ as an Abelardian predicate, whose denotation is sensitive to the linguistic context in which it appears. We motivate (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Stephen Barker (2011). Truth-Bearers and the Unsaid. In Ken Turner (ed.), Making Semantics Pragmatic. CUP.score: 30.0
    I argue that conventional implicatures embed in logical compounds, and are non-truth-conditional contributors to sentence meaning. This, I argue has significant implications for how we understand truth, truth-conditional content, and truth-bearers.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. S. Barker (2003). A Dilemma for the Counterfactual Analysis of Causation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):62 – 77.score: 30.0
    If we seek to analyse causation in terms of counterfactual conditionals then we must assume that there is a class of counterfactuals whose members (i) are all and only those we need to support our judgements of causation, (ii) have truth-conditions specifiable without any irreducible appeal to causation. I argue that (i) and (ii) are unlikely to be met by any counterfactual analysis of causation. I demonstrate this by isolating a class of counterfactuals called non-projective counterfactuals, or NP-counterfactuals, and indicate (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Matthew J. Barker (2013). Essentialism. In Byron Kaldis (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Social Sciences.score: 30.0
  26. Matthew J. Barker & Robert A. Wilson (2010). Cohesion, Gene Flow, and the Nature of Species. Journal of Philosophy 107 (2):59-77.score: 30.0
    A far-reaching and influential view in evolutionary biology claims that species are cohesive units held together by gene flow. Biologists have recognized empirical problems facing this view; after sharpening the expression of the view, we present novel conceptual problems for it. At the heart of these problems is a distinction between two importantly different concepts of cohesion, what we call integrative and response cohesion. Acknowledging the distinction problematizes both the explanandum of species cohesion and the explanans of gene flow that (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Stephen J. Barker, Global Expressivism.score: 30.0
    There is a wide-spread belief amongst theorists of mind and language. This is that in order to understand the relation between language, thought, and reality we need a theory of meaning and content, that is, a normative, formal science of meaning, which is an extension and theoretical deepening of folk ideas about meaning. This book argues that this is false, offering an alternative idea: The form of a theory that illuminates the relation of language, thought, and reality is a theory (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Hanne Andersen, Peter Barker & Xiang Chen (1996). Kuhn's Mature Philosophy of Science and Cognitive Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 9 (3):347 – 363.score: 30.0
    Drawing on the results of modem psychology and cognitive science we suggest that the traditional theory of concepts is no longer tenable, and that the alternative account proposed by Kuhn may now be seen to have independent empirical support quite apart from its success as part of an account of scientific change. We suggest that these mechanisms can also be understood as special cases of general cognitive structures revealed by cognitive science. Against this background, incommensurability is not an insurmountable obstacle (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Peter Barker (2001). Kuhn, Incommensurability, and Cognitive Science. Perspectives on Science 9 (4):433-462.score: 30.0
    : This paper continues my application of theories of concepts developed in cognitive psychology to clarify issues in Kuhn's mature account of scientific change. I argue that incommensurability is typically neither global nor total, and that the corresponding form of scientific change occurs incrementally. Incommensurability can now be seen as a local phenomenon restricted to particular points in a conceptual framework represented by a set of nodes. The unaffected parts in the framework constitute the basis for continued communication between the (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Michael Barker (2001). The Proof Structure of Kant's A-Deduction. Kant-Studien 92 (3):259-282.score: 30.0
    Kant wrote two versions of the Transcendental Deduction, the first, “A-”Deduction in 1781, and the second, “B-”Deduction in 1787. Since Henrich's “The Proof Structure of Kant's Transcendental Deduction”, most work on the Transcendental Deduction attempts to make sense of the B-Deduction's two-step argument structure. Though the A-Deduction has suffered comparative neglect, it has received some attention from interpreters who take its extended treatment of the “subjective” side of cognition to amount to a brand of proto-functionalism. Whatever the merits and demerits (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Xiang Chen, Hanne Andersen & Peter Barker (1998). Kuhn's Theory of Scientific Revolutions and Cognitive Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 11 (1):5 – 28.score: 30.0
    In a previous article we have shown that Kuhn's theory of concepts is independently supported by recent research in cognitive psychology. In this paper we propose a cognitive re-reading of Kuhn's cyclical model of scientific revolutions: all of the important features of the model may now be seen as consequences of a more fundamental account of the nature of concepts and their dynamics. We begin by examining incommensurability, the central theme of Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions, according to two different (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Stephen J. Barker (2000). Is Value Content a Component of Conventional Implicature? Analysis 60 (267):268–279.score: 30.0
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Xiang Chen & Peter Barker (2000). Continuity Through Revolutions: A Frame-Based Account of Conceptual Change During Scientific Revolutions. Philosophy of Science 67 (3):223.score: 30.0
    In this paper we examine the pattern of conceptual change during scientific revolutions by using methods from cognitive psychology. We show that the changes characteristic of scientific revolutions, especially taxonomic changes, can occur in a continuous manner. Using the frame model of concept representation to capture structural relations within concepts and the direct links between concept and taxonomy, we develop an account of conceptual change in science that more adequately reflects the current understanding that episodes like the Copernican revolution are (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Stephen Barker (2009). Dispositional Monism, Relational Constitution and Quiddities. Analysis 69 (2):242-250.score: 30.0
    No categories
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. S. Barker (1999). Counterfactuals, Probabilistic Counterfactuals and Causation. Mind 108 (431):427-469.score: 30.0
    It seems to be generally accepted that (a) counterfactual conditionals are to be analysed in terms of possible worlds and inter-world relations of similarity and (b) causation is conceptually prior to counterfactuals. I argue here that both (a) and (b) are false. The argument against (a) is not a general metaphysical or epistemological one but simply that, structurally speaking, possible worlds theories are wrong: this is revealed when we try to extend them to cover the case of probabilistic counterfactuals. Indeed (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Philip J. Barker (2005). The Tidal Model: A Guide for Mental Health Professionals. Brunner-Routledge.score: 30.0
    The Tidal Model represents a significant alternative to mainstream mental health theories, emphasizing how those suffering from mental health problems can benefit from taking a more active role in their own treatment. Based on extensive research, The Tidal Model charts the development of this approach, outlining the theoretical basis of the model to illustrate the benefits of a holistic model of care which promotes self-management and recovery. Clinical examples are also employed to show how, by exploring rather than ignoring a (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Matthew J. Barker (2010). Specious intrinsicalism. Philosophy of Science 77 (1):73-91.score: 30.0
    Over the last 2,300 years or so, many philosophers have believed that species are individuated by essences that are at least in part intrinsic. Psychologists tell us most folks also believe this view. But most philosophers of biology have abandoned the view, in light of evolutionary conceptions of species. In defiance, Michael Devitt has attempted in this journal to resurrect a version of the view, which he calls Intrinsic Biological Essentialism. I show that his arguments for the resurrection fail, and (...)
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Stephen Barker (2014). Semantic Paradox and Alethic Undecidability. Analysis 74 (2):201-209.score: 30.0
    I use the principle of truth-maker maximalism to provide a new solution to the semantic paradoxes. According to the solution, AUS, its undecidable whether paradoxical sentences are grounded or ungrounded. From this it follows that their alethic status is undecidable. We cannot assert, in principle, whether paradoxical sentences are true, false, either true or false, neither true nor false, both true and false, and so on. AUS involves no ad hoc modification of logic, denial of the T-schema's validity, or obvious (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Gillian Barker (2008). Biological Levers and Extended Adaptationism. Biology and Philosophy 23 (1):1-25.score: 30.0
    Two critiques of simple adaptationism are distinguished: anti-adaptationism and extended adaptationism. Adaptationists and anti-adaptationists share the presumption that an evolutionary explanation should identify the dominant simple cause of the evolutionary outcome to be explained. A consideration of extended-adaptationist models such as coevolution, niche construction and extended phenotypes reveals the inappropriateness of this presumption in explaining the evolution of certain important kinds of features—those that play particular roles in the regulation of organic processes, especially behavior. These biological or behavioral ‘levers’ are (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. S. Barker & B. Smart (2012). The Ultimate Argument Against Dispositional Monist Accounts of Laws. Analysis 72 (4):714-722.score: 30.0
    Alexander Bird argues that David Armstrong’s necessitarian conception of physical modality and laws of nature generates a vicious regress with respect to necessitation. We show that precisely the same regress afflicts Bird’s dispositional-monist theory, and indeed, related views, such as that of Mumford and Anjum. We argue that dispositional monism is basically Armstrongian necessitarianism modified to allow for a thesis about property identity.
    Direct download (12 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Stephen J. Barker (2007). Semantics Without the Distinction Between Sense and Force. In Savas L. Tsohatzidis (ed.), John Searle's Philosophy of Language: Force, Meaning, and Mind. Cambridge University Press.score: 30.0
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Larry Laudan, Arthur Donovan, Rachel Laudan, Peter Barker, Harold Brown, Jarrett Leplin, Paul Thagard & Steve Wykstra (1986). Scientific Change: Philosophical Models and Historical Research. Synthese 69 (2):141 - 223.score: 30.0
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. John A. Barker (2002). Computer Modeling and the Fate of Folk Psychology. Metaphilosophy 33 (1-2):30-48.score: 30.0
  44. Stephen J. Barker (2002). Troubles with Horgan and Timmons' Nondescriptivist Cognitivism. Grazer Philosophische Studien 63 (1):235-255.score: 30.0
    Emotivist, or non-descriptivist metaethical theories hold that value-statements do not function by describing special value-facts, but are the mere expressions of naturalistically describable motivational states of (valuing) agents. Non-descriptivism has typically been combined with the claim that value-statements are non-cognitive: they are not the manifestations of genuine belief states. However, all the linguistic, logical and phenomenological evidence indicates that value-statements are cognitive. Non-descriptivism then has a problem. Horgan and Timmons propose to solve it by boldly combining a non-descriptivist thesis about (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Matthew J. Barker (2007). The Empirical Inadequacy of Species Cohesion by Gene Flow. Philosophy of Science 74 (5):654-665.score: 30.0
    This paper brings needed clarity to the influential view that species are cohesive entities held together by gene flow, and then develops an empirical argument against that view: Neglected data suggest gene flow is neither necessary nor sufficient for species cohesion. Implications are discussed. ‡I'm grateful to Rob Wilson, Alex Rueger and Lindley Darden for important comments on earlier drafts, and to Joseph Nagel, Heather Proctor, Ken Bond, members of the DC History and Philosophy of Biology reading group, and audience (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Stephen F. Barker (1984). How Wrong Was Kant About Geometry? Topoi 3 (2):133-142.score: 30.0
  47. Stephen Barker & Phil Dowe (2003). Paradoxes of Multi-Location. Analysis 63 (2):106–114.score: 30.0
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. M. T. Alkire, R. J. Haier, J. H. Fallon & S. J. Barker (1996). PET Imaging of Conscious and Unconscious Verbal Memory. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (5-6):448-62.score: 30.0
  49. Stephen Barker (2002). Review: Illocutionary Acts and Sentence Meaning. [REVIEW] Mind 111 (443):633-639.score: 30.0
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. S. J. Barker (1997). E-Type Pronouns, DRT, Dynamic Semantics and the Quantifier/Variable-Binding Model. Linguistics and Philosophy 20 (2):195-228.score: 30.0
1 — 50 / 688