99 found
Order:
See also:
Profile: Wlodek Rabinowicz (Lund University)
  1. Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow‐Rasmussen (2004). The Strike of the Demon: On Fitting Pro‐Attitudes and Value. Ethics 114 (3):391-423.
    The paper presents and discusses the so-called Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem (WKR problem) that arises for the fitting-attitudes analysis of value. This format of analysis is exemplified for example by Scanlon's buck-passing account, on which an object's value consists in the existence of reasons to favour the object- to respond to it in a positive way. The WKR problem can be put as follows: It appears that in some situations we might well have reasons to have pro-attitudes toward objects (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   90 citations  
  2. Wlodek Rabinowicz (2008). Value Relations. Theoria 74 (1):18-49.
    Abstract: The paper provides a general account of value relations. It takes its departure in a special type of value relation, parity, which according to Ruth Chang is a form of evaluative comparability that differs from the three standard forms of comparability: betterness, worseness and equal goodness. Recently, Joshua Gert has suggested that the notion of parity can be accounted for if value comparisons are interpreted as normative assessments of preference. While Gert's basic idea is attractive, the way he (...)
    Direct download (12 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   18 citations  
  3.  25
    Wlodek Rabinowicz (2016). Derek Parfit's Contributions to Philosophy. Theoria 82 (2):104-109.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4.  94
    Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (2006). Buck-Passing and the Right Kind of Reasons. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (222):114–120.
    The ‘buck-passing’ account equates the value of an object with the existence of reasons to favour it. As we argued in an earlier paper, this analysis faces the ‘wrong kind of reasons’ problem: there may be reasons for pro-attitudes towards worthless objects, in particular if it is the pro-attitudes, rather than their objects, that are valuable. Jonas Olson has recently suggested how to resolve this difficulty: a reason to favour an object is of the right kind only (...)
    Direct download (14 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   17 citations  
  5.  89
    Luc Bovens & Wlodek Rabinowicz (2006). Democratic Answers to Complex Questions – an Epistemic Perspective. Synthese 150 (1):131-153.
    This paper addresses a problem for theories of epistemic democracy. In a decision on a complex issue which can be decomposed into several parts, a collective can use different voting procedures: Either its members vote on each sub-question and the answers that gain majority support are used as premises for the conclusion on the main issue (premise based-procedure, pbp), or the vote is conducted on the main issue itself (conclusion-based procedure, cbp). The two procedures can lead to different results. We (...)
    Direct download (12 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   17 citations  
  6. Wlodek Rabinowicz (2009). Incommensurability and Vagueness. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):71-94.
    This paper casts doubts on John Broome's view that vagueness in value comparisons crowds out incommensurability in value. It shows how vagueness can be imposed on a formal model of value relations that has room for different types of incommensurability. The model implements some basic insights of the 'fitting attitudes' analysis of value.
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  7.  15
    Wlodek Rabinowicz & Gustaf Arrhenius, The Value of Existence.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8.  4
    Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni R.?Nnow-Rasmussen (2000). A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and for Its Own Sake. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (1):33 - 51.
    The paper argues that the final value of an object-i.e., its value for its own sake-need not be intrinsic. Extrinsic final value, which accrues to things (or persons) in virtue of their relational rather than internal features, cannot be traced back to the intrinsic value of states that involve these things together with their relations. On the contrary, such states, insofar as they are valuable at all, derive their value from the things involved. The endeavour to reduce thing-values to state-values (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   21 citations  
  9. Wlodek Rabinowicz, Toni Rønnow‐Rasmussen, Douglas Lavin, Rachana Kamtekar, Joshua Gert, Elijah Millgram, David Copp & Stephen M. Gardiner (2004). 10. Peter Singer, One World: The Ethics of Globalization Peter Singer, One World: The Ethics of Globalization (Pp. 634-638). [REVIEW] Ethics 114 (3).
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   15 citations  
  10. Wlodek Rabinowicz (2002). Prioritarianism for Prospects. Utilitas 14 (1):2-21.
    The Interpersonal Addition Theorem, due to John Broome, states that, given certain seemingly innocuous assumptions, the overall utility of an uncertain prospect can be represented as the sum of its individual utilities. Given ‘Bernoulli's hypothesis’ according to which individual utility coincides with individual welfare, this result appears to be incompatible with the Priority View. On that view, due to Derek Parfit, the benefits to the worse off should count for more, in the overall evaluation, than the comparable benefits to the (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   13 citations  
  11.  46
    Wlodek Rabinowicz (2012). Value Relations Revisited. Economics and Philosophy 28 (2):133-164.
    In Rabinowicz, I considered how value relations can best be analysed in terms of fitting pro-attitudes. In the formal model of that paper, fitting pro-attitudes are represented by the class of permissible preference orderings on a domain of items that are being compared. As it turns out, this approach opens up for a multiplicity of different types of value relationships, along with the standard relations of,, and. Unfortunately, the approach is vulnerable to a number of objections. I believe (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  12. Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (2000). A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and for its Own Sake. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (1):33–51.
    The paper argues that the final value of an object-i.e., its value for its own sake-need not be intrinsic. Extrinsic final value, which accrues to things (or persons) in virtue of their relational rather than internal features, cannot be traced back to the intrinsic value of states that involve these things together with their relations. On the contrary, such states, insofar as they are valuable at all, derive their value from the things involved. The endeavour to reduce thing-values to state-values (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   14 citations  
  13.  34
    Sten Lindström & Wlodek Rabinowicz (1999). DDL Unlimited: Dynamic Doxastic Logic for Introspective Agents. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 50 (2-3):353-385.
  14.  30
    Wlodek Rabinowicz (2002). Does Practical Deliberation Crowd Out Self-Prediction? Erkenntnis 57 (1):91-122.
    It is a popular view thatpractical deliberation excludes foreknowledge of one's choice. Wolfgang Spohn and Isaac Levi have argued that not even a purely probabilistic self-predictionis available to thedeliberator, if one takes subjective probabilities to be conceptually linked to betting rates. It makes no sense to have a betting rate for an option, for one's willingness to bet on the option depends on the net gain from the bet, in combination with the option's antecedent utility, rather than on the offered (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   14 citations  
  15.  33
    Lina Eriksson & Wlodek Rabinowicz (2013). The Interference Problem for the Betting Interpretation of Degrees of Belief. Synthese 190 (5):809-830.
    The paper’s target is the historically influential betting interpretation of subjective probabilities due to Ramsey and de Finetti. While there are several classical and well-known objections to this interpretation, the paper focuses on just one fundamental problem: There is a sense in which degrees of belief cannot be interpreted as betting rates. The reasons differ in different cases, but there’s one crucial feature that all these cases have in common: The agent’s degree of belief in a proposition A does not (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  16.  56
    Wlodek Rabinowicz (2009). Broome and the Intuition of Neutrality. Philosophical Issues 19 (1):389-411.
    In “Weighing Lives” (2004) John Broome criticizes a view common to many population axiologists. On that view, population increases with extra people leading decent lives are axiologically neutral: they make the world neither better nor worse, ceteris paribus. Broome argues that this intuition, however, attractive, cannot be sustained, for several independent reasons. I respond to his criticisms and suggest that the neutrality intuition, if correctly interpreted, can after all be defended.On the version I defend,the world with added extra people at (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  17.  52
    Wlodek Rabinowicz & Krister Segerberg (1994). Actual Truth, Possible Knowledge. Topoi 13 (2):101-115.
    The well-known argument of Frederick Fitch, purporting to show that verificationism (= Truth implies knowability) entails the absurd conclusion that all the truths are known, has been disarmed by Dorothy Edgington''s suggestion that the proper formulation of verificationism presupposes that we make use of anactuality operator along with the standardly invoked epistemic and modal operators. According to her interpretation of verificationism, the actual truth of a proposition implies that it could be known in some possible situation that the proposition holds (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   13 citations  
  18.  10
    Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (2005). A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and for its Own Sake. In Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.), Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. Springer 115--129.
    The paper argues that the final value of an object-i.e., its value for its own sake-need not be intrinsic. Extrinsic final value, which accrues to things in virtue of their relational rather than internal features, cannot be traced back to the intrinsic value of states that involve these things together with their relations. On the contrary, such states, insofar as they are valuable at all, derive their value from the things involved. The endeavour to reduce thing-values to state-values is largely (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  19.  54
    Wlodek Rabinowicz & Jan Österberg (1996). Value Based on Preferences. Economics and Philosophy 12 (1):1.
    What distinguishes preference utilitarianism from other utilitarian positions is the axiological component: the view concerning what is intrinsically valuable. According to PU, intrinsic value is based on preferences. Intrinsically valuable states are connected to our preferences being satisfied.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  20.  15
    Sten Lindström & Wlodek Rabinowicz (1991). Epistemic Entrenchment with Incomparabilities and Relational Belief Revision. In André Fuhrmann & Michael Morreau (eds.), The Logic of Theory Change. Springer
    In earlier papers (Lindstrrm & Rabinowicz, 1989. 1990), we proposed a generalization of the AGM approach to belief revision. Our proposal was to view belief revision as a relation rather thanas a function on theories (or belief sets). The idea was to allow for there being several equally reasonable revisions of a theory with a given proposition. In the present paper, we show that the relational approach is the natural result of generalizing in a certain way an approach to belief (...)
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   12 citations  
  21.  65
    Gustaf Arrhenius & Wlodek Rabinowicz (2005). Value and Unacceptable Risk. Economics and Philosophy 21 (2):177-197.
    Consider a transitive value ordering of outcomes and lotteries on outcomes, which satisfies substitutivity of equivalents and obeys “continuity for easy cases,” i.e., allows compensating risks of small losses by chances of small improvements. Temkin (2001) has argued that such an ordering must also – rather counter-intuitively – allow chances of small improvements to compensate risks of huge losses. In this paper, we show that Temkin's argument is flawed but that a better proof is possible. However, it is more difficult (...)
    Direct download (13 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  22.  26
    Wlodek Rabinowicz (2013). Value, Fitting‐Attitude Account Of. In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  23.  48
    Wlodek Rabinowicz (1995). To Have One's Cake and Eat It, Too: Sequential Choice and Expected-Utility Violations. Journal of Philosophy 92 (11):586-620.
    An agent whose preferences violate the Independence Axiom or for some other reason are not representable by an expected utility function, can avoid 'dynamic inconsistency' either by foresight ('sophisticated choice') or by subsequent adjustment of preferences to the chosen plan of action ('resolute choice'). Contrary to McClennen and Machina, among others, it is argued these two seemingly conflicting approaches to 'dynamic rationality' need not be incompatible. 'Wise choice' reconciles foresight with a possibility of preference adjustment by rejecting the two assumptions (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  24.  8
    Wlodek Rabinowicz, Letters From Long Ago: On Causal Decision Theory and Centered Chances.
    This paper argues that expected utility theory for actions in chancy environments should be formulated in terms of centered chances. The subjective expected utility of an option A may be seen as a weighted sum of the utilities of A in different possible worlds, with weights being the credences that the agent assigns to these worlds. The utility of A in a given world is then definable as a weighted sum of the values of A’s different possible outcomes, with weights (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  25. Wlodek Rabinowicz & Christian List (2014). Two Intuitions About Free Will: Alternative Possibilities and Intentional Endorsement. Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):155-172.
    Free will is widely thought to require (i) the possibility of acting otherwise and (ii) the intentional endorsement of one’s actions (“indeterministic picking is not enough”). According to (i), a necessary condition for free will is agential-level indeterminism: at some points in time, an agent’s prior history admits more than one possible continuation. According to (ii), however, a free action must be intentionally endorsed, and indeterminism may threaten freedom: if several alternative actions could each have been actualized, then none of (...)
    Direct download (12 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26.  58
    Gustaf Arrhenius & Wlodek Rabinowicz (2005). Millian Superiorities. Utilitas 17 (2):127-146.
    Suppose one sets up a sequence of less and less valuable objects such that each object in the sequence is only marginally worse than its immediate predecessor. Could one in this way arrive at something that is dramatically inferior to the point of departure? It has been claimed that if there is a radical value difference between the objects at each end of the sequence, then at some point there must be a corresponding radical difference between the adjacent elements. The (...)
    Direct download (12 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  27. Hallvard Lillehammer, Moral Realism, Normative Reasons, Rational Intelligibility, Wlodek Rabinowicz, Does Practical Deliberation, Crowd Out Self-Prediction & Peter McLaughlin (2002). (Hard Ernst) Corrigendum Van Brakel, J., Philosophy of Chemistry (U. Klein). Erkenntnis 57 (1).
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  28.  20
    Wlodek Rabinowicz (1998). Grappling With the Centipede: Defence of Backward Induction for BI-Terminating Games. Economics and Philosophy 14 (1):95.
    According to a standard objection to the use of backward induction in extensive-form games with perfect information, backward induction can only work if the players are confident that each player is resiliently rational - disposed to act rationally at each possible node that the game can reach, even at the nodes that will certainly never be reached in actual play - and also confident that these beliefs in the players’ future resilient rationality are robust, i.e. that they would be kept (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  29.  19
    Wlodek Rabinowicz (2001). Prioritarianism and Uncertainty: On the Interpersonal Addition Theorem and the Priority View. In Dan Egonsson (ed.), Exploring Practical Philosophy: From Action to Values. Ashgate 139-165.
    I begin, in section 1, with a presentation of the Interpersonal Addition Theorem. The theorem, due to John Broome (1991), is a re-formulation of the classical result by Harsanyi (1955). It implies that, given some seemingly mild assumptions, the overall utility of an uncertain prospect can be seen as the sum of its individual utilities. In sections 1 and 2, I discuss the theorem's connection with utilitarianism and in particular consider its implications for the Priority View, according to which benefits (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  30. Wlodek Rabinowicz (2010). Analyticity and Possible-World Semantics. Erkenntnis 72 (3):295 - 314.
    Standard approaches to possible-world semantics allow us to define necessity and logical truth, but analyticity is considerably more difficult to account for. The source of this difficulty lies in the received model-theoretical conception of a language interpretation. In intuitive terms, analyticity amounts to truth in virtue of meaning alone, i.e. solely in virtue of the interpretation of linguistic expressions. In other words, an analytic sentence should remain true under all variations of ‘extralinguistic reality’ as long as the interpretation is kept (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31.  68
    Luc Bovens & Wlodek Rabinowicz (2010). The Puzzle of the Hats. Synthese 172 (1):57 - 78.
    The Puzzle of the Hats is a betting arrangement which seems to show that a Dutch book can be made against a group of rational players with common priors who act in the common interest and have full trust in the other players’ rationality. But we show that appearances are misleading—no such Dutch book can be made. There are four morals. First, what can be learned from the puzzle is that there is a class of situations in which credences and (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  32. Wlodek Rabinowicz (2006). Levi on Money Pumps and Diachronic Dutch Books. In Erik J. Olsson (ed.), Knowledge and Inquiry: Essays on the Pragmatism of Isaac Levi. Cambridge University Press
    The paper's focus is on pragmatic arguments for various ‘rationality constraints’ on a decision maker’s state of mind: on his beliefs or preferences. An argument of this kind purports to show that a violator of a given constraint can be exposed to a decision problem in which he will act to his guaranteed disadvantage. Dramatically put, he can be exploited by a clever bookie who doesn’t know more than the agent himself. Examples of pragmatic arguments of this kind are synchronic (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  33.  16
    Wlodek Rabinowicz (forthcoming). From Values to Probabilities. Synthese:1-29.
    According to the fitting-attitude analysis of value , to be valuable is to be a fitting object of a pro-attitude. In earlier publications, setting off from this format of analysis, I proposed a modelling of value relations which makes room for incommensurability in value. In this paper, I first recapitulate the value modelling and then move on to suggest adopting a structurally similar analysis of probability. Indeed, many probability theorists from Poisson onwards did adopt an analysis of this kind. This (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34.  19
    Luc Bovens & Wlodek Rabinowicz, A Dutch Book for Group Decision-Making?
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  35.  35
    Luc Bovens & Wlodek Rabinowicz (2004). Voting Procedures for Complex Collective Decisions. An Epistemic Perspective. Ratio Juris 17 (2):241-258.
    Suppose a committee or a jury confronts a complex question, the answer to which requires attending to several sub-questions. Two different voting procedures can be used. On one, the committee members vote on each sub-question and the voting results are used as premises for the committee’s conclusion on the main issue. This premise-based procedure can be contrasted with the conclusion-based approach, which requires the members to directly vote on the conclusion, with the vote of each member being guided by her (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  36.  18
    Sten Lindström & Wlodek Rabinowicz (1998). Conditionals and the Ramsey Test. In D. Gabbay & P. Smets (eds.), Handbook of Defeasible Reasoning and Uncertainty Management Systems, Vol 3.
  37.  4
    Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen, Value Taxonomy.
    The paper presents main conceptual distinctions underlying much of modern philosophical thinking about value. The introductory Section 1 is followed in Section 2 by an outline of the contrast between non-relational value and relational value. In Section 3, the focus is on the distinction between final and non-final value as well as on different kinds of final value. In Section 4, we consider value relations, such as being better/worse/equally good/on a par. Recent discussions suggest that we might need to considerably (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38.  73
    Wlodek Rabinowicz & Bertil Strömberg (1996). What If I Were in His Shoes? On Hare's Argument for Preference Utilitarianism. Theoria 62 (1-2):95-123.
    This paper discusses the argument for preference utilitarianism proposed by Richard Hare in Moral Thinking(Hare, 1981). G. F. Schueler (1984) and Ingmar Persson (1989) identified a serious gap in Hare’s reasoning, which might be called the No-Conflict Problem. The paper first tries to fill the gap. Then, however, starting with an idea of Zeno Vendler, the question is raised whether the gap is there to begin with. Unfortunately, this Vendlerian move does not save Hare from criticism. Paradoxically, it instead endangers (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  39.  24
    Sten Lindström & Wlodek Rabinowicz (1995). The Ramsey Test Revisited. In G. Crocco, L. Fariñas del Cerro & A. Herzig (eds.), Theoria. Oxford University Press 131-182.
  40.  87
    John Broome & Wlodek Rabinowicz (1999). Backwards Induction in the Centipede Game. Analysis 59 (264):237–242.
    The standard backward-induction reasoning in a game like the centipede assumes that the players maintain a common belief in rationality throughout the game. But that is a dubious assumption. Suppose the first player X didn't terminate the game in the first round; what would the second player Y think then? Since the backwards-induction argument says X should terminate the game, and it is supposed to be a sound argument, Y might be entitled to doubt X's rationality. Alternatively, Y might doubt (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  41.  4
    Wlodek Rabinowicz, Value Relations: Old Wine in New Barrels.
    In Rabinowicz 2008, I considered how value relations can best be analyzed in terms of fitting pro-­‐attitudes. In the formal model presented in that paper fitting pro-­‐attitudes are represented by the class of permissible preference orderings on a domain of items that are being compared. As it turns out, this approach opens up for a multiplicity of different types of value relationships, along with the standard relations of "better", "worse", "equally as good as" and "incomparable in value". Unfortunately, though, the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  42.  29
    Sten Lindström & Wlodek Rabinowicz, Belief Change for Introspective Agents. Spinning Ideas, Electronic Essays Dedicated to Peter Gärdenfors on His Fiftieth Birthday.
  43.  2
    Wlodek Rabinowicz & Gustaf Arrhenius, On Millian Discontinuities.
    Suppose one sets up a sequence of less-and-less valuable objects such that each object in the sequence is only marginally worse than its immediate predecessor. Could one in this way arrive at something that is dramatically inferior to the point of departure? It has been claimed that if there is a radical value difference between the objects at each end of the sequence, then at some point there must be a corresponding radical difference between the adjacent elements. The underlying picture (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  44.  5
    Wlodek Rabinowicz (2003). Ryberg's Doubts About Higher and Lower Pleasures: Put to Rest? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6 (2):231 - 237.
  45.  19
    Wlodek Rabinowicz (1997). On Seidenfeld‘s Criticism of Sophisticated Violations of the Independence Axiom. Theory and Decision 43 (3):279-292.
    An agent who violates independence can avoid dynamic inconsistency in sequential choice if he is sophisticated enough to make use of backward induction in planning. However, Seidenfeld has demonstrated that such a sophisticated agent with dependent preferences is bound to violate the principle of dynamic substitution, according to which admissibility of a plan is preserved under substitution of indifferent options at various choice nodes in the decision tree. Since Seidenfeld considers dynamic substitution to be a coherence condition on dynamic choice, (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  46.  42
    Wlodek Rabinowicz (2001). A Centipede for Intransitive Preferrers. Studia Logica 67 (2):167-178.
    In the standard money pump, an agent with cyclical preferences can avoid exploitation if he shows foresight and solves his sequential decision problem using backward induction (BI). This way out is foreclosed in a modified money pump, which has been presented in Rabinowicz (2000). There, BI will lead the agent to behave in a self-defeating way. The present paper describes another sequential decision problem of this kind, the Centipede for an Intransitive Preferrer, which in some respects is even more striking (...)
    Direct download (15 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  47.  33
    Peter Gärdenfors, Sten Lindström, Michael Morreau & Wlodek Rabinowicz (1991). The Negative Ramsey Test. In André Fuhrmann & Michael Morreau (eds.), The Logic of Theory Change. Springer
    The so called Ramsey test is a semantic recipe for determining whether a conditional proposition is acceptable in a given state of belief. Informally, it can be formulated as follows: (RT) Accept a proposition of the form "if A, then C" in a state of belief K, if and only if the minimal change of K needed to accept A also requires accepting C. In Gärdenfors (1986) it was shown that the Ramsey test is, in the context of some other (...)
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  48.  20
    Wlodek Rabinowicz (2014). Safeguards of a Disunified Mind. Inquiry 57 (3):356-383.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  49.  9
    Wlodek Rabinowicz, Money Pump with Foresight.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  50.  21
    Wlodek Rabinowicz (2003). Remarks on the Absentminded Driver. Studia Logica 73 (2):241 - 256.
    Piccione and Rubinstein (1997) present and analyse the sequential decision problem of an “absentminded driver”. The driver's absentmindedness (imperfect recall) leads him to time-inconsistent strategy evaluations. His original evaluation gets replaced by a new one under impact of the information that the circumstances have changed, notwithstanding the fact that this change in circumstances has been expected by him all along. The time inconsistency in strategy evaluation suggests that such an agent might have reason to renege on his adopted strategy. As (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
1 — 50 / 99