A basic introduction to the subject which addresses questions of truth and meaning, providing a basis for much of what is discussed elsewhere in philosophy. Up-to-date and comprehensive.
The most elementary way to think about Mathctrtati ca is as an enhance calculator ââ¬â a calculator that does not only numerical computation but also algebraic computation and graphics. Matltcmatica can function much like a standard calt".1a- tor. you type in a question, you get back an answer. But Mat/tctttadca ga's turthcr I ue an ordinary calculator. You can type in questions that require answers that arc longer than a calculator can handle. For example, Matltcmatictt can giv; you thc numerical (...) value of tr to a hundred decimal places, or the exact result for a numerical calculation as complicated as the result of 3)tI0, (m Fig. 1). (shrink)
Over a period of more than twenty years, Sybil Wolfram gave lectures at Oxford University on Philosophical Logic, a major component of most of the undergraduate degree programmes. She herself had been introduced to the subject by Peter Strawson, and saw herself as working very much within the Strawsonian tradition. Central to this tradition, which began with Strawson's seminal attack on Russell's theory of descriptions in ‘On Referring' (1950), is the distinction between a sentence and what is said by (...) a sentence − Strawson initially called the latter a use of a sentence, and sometimes a proposition , but his most frequent term for what is said , which Wolfram consistently adopts, is the statement expressed.1 The force of the distinction is clearly illustrated in ‘On Referring', which uses it to undermine the common assumption that any sentence must be either true, or false, or meaningless. Russell had argued on this basis that a sentence such as ‘The King of France is bald' (which is clearly neither true nor meaningless) must be false, but Strawson points out that if we distinguish between the sentence itself and the statement that it expresses (on some occasion of use), we can quite easily combine the admission that the sentence is meaningful − for it can in appropriate circumstances be used to express true and false statements − with the claim that nevertheless if the circumstances are ‘inappropriate' (in particular, when there is no current King of France), the sentence can fail to express a statement that is either true or false. On this picture, therefore, it is sentences that are meaningful, but statements that are the primary bearers of truth. (shrink)
An Ax-Kochen-Ershov principle for intermediate structures between valued groups and valued fields. We will consider structures that we call valued B-groups and which are of the form $\langle G, B, *, v\rangle$ where - G is an abelian group, - B is an ordered group, - v is a valuation defined on G taking its values in B, - * is an action of B on G satisfying: ∀ x ∈ G ∀ b ∈ B v(x * b) = v(x) (...) · b. The analysis of Kaplanski for valued fields can be adapted to our context and allows us to formulate an Ax-Kochen-Ershov principle for valued B-groups: we axiomatise those which are in some sense existentially closed and also obtain many of their model-theoretical properties. Let us mention some applications: 1. Assume that v(x) = v(nx) for every integer n ≠ 0 and x ∈ G, B is solvable and acts on G in such a way that, for the induced action, $\mathbb{Z}[B] \setminus \{0\}$ embeds in the automorphism group of G. Then $\langle G, B, *, v\rangle$ is decidable if and only if B is decidable as an ordered group. 2. Given a field k and an ordered group B, we consider the generalised power series field k((B)) endowed with its canonical valuation. We consider also the following structure: $\mathbf{M} = \langle k((B))_+, S, v, \times \upharpoonright_{k((B))\times S}\rangle,$ where k((B)) + is the additive group of k((B)), S is a unary predicate interpreting ${T^b| b \in B}$ , and $\times \upharpoonright_{k((B))\times S}$ is the multiplication restricted to k((B))× S, structure which is a reduct of the valued field k((B)) with its canonical cross section. Then our result implies that if B is solvable and decidable as an ordered group, then M is decidable. 3. A valued B-group has a residual group and our Ax-Kochen-Ershov principle remains valid in the context of expansions of residual group and value group. In particular, by adding a residual order we obtain new examples of solvable ordered groups having a decidable theory. (shrink)
Sir Roger Penrose, retired professor of mathematics at the University of Oxford and collaborator with Stephen Hawking on black hole theory, has written 'a complete guide to the laws of the universe' called The Road to Reality. His publisher calls it the most important and ambitious work of science for a generation. Penrose caused a furore in the world of consciousness studies with his 1989 book The Emperor's New Mind, which conjectured a new mechanism for consciousness and kept a faithful (...) band of researchers busy for a decade with models based on microtubules and the like. Sadly, the idea fizzled out. The title of the 2002 Tucson 'Toward a Science of Consciousness' conference poetry slam winner was: Microtubules - my ass! (shrink)
Most proponents of restorative justice admit to the need to find a well defined place for the use of traditional trial and punishment alongside restorative justice processes. Concrete answers have, however, been wanting more often than not. John Braithwaite is arguably the one who has come the closest, and here I systematically reconstruct and critically discuss the rules or principles suggested by him for referring cases back and forth between restorative justice and traditional trial and punishment. I show that we (...) should be sceptical about at least some of the answers provided by Braithwaite, and, thus, that the necessary use of traditional punishment continues to pose a serious challenge to restorative justice, even at its current theoretical best. (shrink)
This paper continues the work begun by Crispin Wright of identifying, articulating, and explaining the relations between various realist-relevant axes that emerge when it is conceded that any predicate capable of satisfying a small range of platitudes is syntactically and semantically adequate to count as a truth predicate for a discourse. I argue that the fact that a given discourse satisfies the three realist-relevant axes that remain if evidence-transcendent truth and reference to evidence-transcendent facts are ruled out by Dummettian meaning-theoretic (...) considerations is not sufficient for what I have elsewhere called “modest metaphysical realism.” I conclude that mind-independence marks yet another realist-relevant axis and explore the relationships between the proposed mind-independence axis and the realist-relevant axes identified by Wright. (shrink)
As I write this, in November 1971, people are dying in East Bengal from lack of food, shelter, and medical caxc. The suffering and death that are occurring there now axe not inevitable, 1101; unavoidable in any fatalistic sense of the term. Constant poverty, a cyclone, and a civil war have turned at least nine million people into destitute refugees; nevertheless, it is not beyond Lhe capacity of the richer nations to give enough assistance to reduce any further suffering to (...) very small proportions. The decisions arid actions of human beings can prevent this kind of suffering. Unfortunately, human beings have not made the necessary decisions. At the individual level, people have, with very few exceptions, not responded to the situation in any signihczmt way. Generally speaking, people have not given large sums to relief funds; they have not written t0 their parliamentaxy representatives demanding increased government assistance; they have not demonstrated in the streets, held symbolic fasts, or done anything else directed toward providing thc refugees with the means to satisfy their essential needs. At thc government level, no govcrmmcnt has given the sort of massive aid that would enable the refugees to survive fm: more than a few days. Britain, for instance, has given rather more than most countries. It has, to date, given £14,750,000. For comparative purposes, B1~itain’s share of thc nonreccverabla development costs of the Anglo-French Concorde project is already in excess of £275,000,000, and on present estimates will reach £440,000,¤00. The implication is that the British government values a supersonic transport more than thirty times as.. (shrink)
Mind–body dualism has rarely been an issue in the generative study of mind; Chomsky himself has long claimed it to be incoherent and unformulable. We first present and defend this negative argument but then suggest that the generative enterprise may license a rather novel and internalist view of the mind and its place in nature, different from all of, (i) the commonly assumed functionalist metaphysics of generative linguistics, (ii) physicalism, and (iii) Chomsky’s negative stance. Our argument departs from the empirical (...) observation that the linguistic mind gives rise to hierarchies of semantic complexity that we argue (only) follow from constraints of an essentially mathematical kind. We assume that the faculty of language tightly correlates with the mathematical capacity both formally and in evolution, the latter plausibly arising as an abstraction from the former, as a kind of specialized output. On this basis, and since the semantic hierarchies in question are mirrored in the syntactic complexity of the expression involved, we posit the existence of a higher-dimensional syntax structured on the model of the hierarchy of numbers, in order to explain the semantic facts in question. If so, syntax does not have a physicalist interpretation any more than the hierarchy of number-theoretic spaces does. (shrink)
For over a decade I have taught an introductory, undergraduate class, "Einstein for Everyone," at the University of Pittsburgh to anyone interested enough to walk through door. The course is aimed at people who have a strong sense that what Einstein did changed everything. However they do not know enough physics to understand what he did and why it was so important. The course presents just enough of Einstein's physics to give students an independent sense of what he achieved and (...) what he did not achieve. The latter is almost as important as the former. For almost everyone with some foundational axe to grind finds a way to argue that what Einstein did vindicates their view. They certainly cannot all be right. Some independent understanding of Einstein's physics is needed to separate the real insights from the never-ending hogwash that seems to rain down on us all. (shrink)
A traditional view maintains that thought, while expressed in language, is non-linguistic in nature and occurs in non-linguistic beings as well. I assess this view against current theories of the evolutionary design of human grammar. I argue that even if some forms of human thought are shared with non-human animals, a residue remains that characterizes a unique way in which human thought is organized as a system. I explore the hypothesis that the cause of this difference is a grammatical way (...) of structuring semantic information, and I present evidence that the organization of grammar precisely reflects the organization of a specific mode of thought apparently distinctive of humans. Since there appears to be no known non-grammatical structuring principle for the relevant mode of thought, I suggest that grammar is that principle, with no independent ?Language of Thought? needed. (shrink)
1. Pohlers and The Problem. I first met Wolfram Pohlers at a workshop on proof theory organized by Walter Felscher that was held in Tübingen in early April, 1973. Among others at that workshop relevant to the work surveyed here were Kurt Schütte, Wolfram’s teacher in Munich, and Wolfram’s fellow student Wilfried Buchholz. This is not meant to slight in the least the many other fine logicians who participated there.2 In Tübingen I gave a couple of (...) survey lectures on results and problems in proof theory that had been occupying much of my attention during the previous decade. The following was the central problem that I emphasized there: The need for an ordinally informative, conceptually clear, proof-theoretic reduction of classical theories of iterated arithmetical inductive definitions to corresponding constructive systems. As will be explained below, meeting that need would be significant for the then ongoing efforts at establishing the constructive foundation for and proof-theoretic ordinal analysis of certain impredicative subsystems of classical analysis. I also spoke in Tübingen about.. (shrink)
Contemporary arguments for forms of psycho-physical dualism standardly depart from phenomenal aspects of consciousness ('what it is like' to have some particular conscious experience). Conceptual aspects of conscious experience, as opposed to phenomenal or visual/perceptual ones, are often taken to be within the scope of functionalist, reductionist, or physicalist theories. I argue that the particular conceptual structure of human consciousness makes this asymmetry unmotivated. The argument for a form of dualism defended here proceeds from the empirical premise that (...) conceptual structure in a linguistic creature like us is a combinatorial and compositional system that implicates a distinction between simple and complex, or 'atomic' and 'molecular' concepts. The argument is that conceptual atoms, qua atoms, are irreducible to anything else. If so, and if the atoms are essentially semantic, a form of dualism follows: though positively inviting naturalistic inquiry into the semantic and mental aspects of nature, it requires that we look at the mental as a primitive domain of nature. Schematically, then, the argument is as follows: (1) Human consciousness/thought is conceptually structured. (2) The human conceptual system is a 'particulate' system at a syntactic and semantic level of representation (the notion of a 'particulate' system is developed in Section 2). (3) This implies the existence of conceptual 'particles', concepts that have no further semantic decomposition ('atoms'). (4) A conceptual atom cannot be explained in terms of anything that does not involve its own intrinsic properties (Section 3). (5) Physicalism as normally conceived is inconsistent with (3) and (4) (Section 4). (shrink)
Computers today are not only the calculation tools - they are directly (inter)acting in the physical world which itself may be conceived of as the universal computer (Zuse, Fredkin, Wolfram, Chaitin, Lloyd). In expanding its domains from abstract logical symbol manipulation to physical embedded and networked devices, computing goes beyond Church-Turing limit (Copeland, Siegelman, Burgin, Schachter). Computational processes are distributed, reactive, interactive, agent-based and concurrent. The main criterion of success of computation is not its termination, but the adequacy of (...) its response, its speed, generality and flexibility; adaptability, and tolerance to noise, error,faults, and damage. Interactive computing is a generalization of Turing computing, and it calls for new conceptualizations (Goldin, Wegner). In the info-computationalist framework, with computation seen as information processing, natural computation appears as the most suitable paradigm of computation and information semantics requires logical pluralism. (shrink)
Traditionally, Ancient Mesopotamian epistemic practices resulting in the vast corpus of cuneiform ‘lexical lists’ and other, similarly formatted treatises have been conceptualized as “ Listenwissenschaft ” in Assyriology. Introduced by the German Assyriologist Wolfram v. Soden in 1936 , this concept has also been utilized in other disciplines of the Humanities as a terminological means to describe epistemic activity allegedly inferior to ‘Western’ modes of analytical and hypotactic scientific reasoning. Building on the exemplary evidence of a bilingual list of (...) cuneiform compound graphemes from the early 2nd millennium BCE as well as on recent conceptualizations of ‘epistemic cultures’ and the instrumental function of material ‘representations’ in the context of epistemic practices, the present paper attempts to replace the essentialistic and teleological concept of an Ancient Mesopotamian “ Listenwissenschaft ” with a new epistemological model describing the underlying epistemic practices as highly adaptive non-linear epistemic practices comparable to what has been described as ‘practices with »epistemic things«’ in recent epistemology and practice theory. (shrink)
This paper is an edited form of a letter written by the two authors (in the name of Tarski) to Wolfram Schwabhäuser around 1978. It contains extended remarks about Tarski's system of foundations for Euclidean geometry, in particular its distinctive features, its historical evolution, the history of specific axioms, the questions of independence of axioms and primitive notions, and versions of the system suitable for the development of 1-dimensional geometry.
Bayesians take “definite” or “single-case” probabilities to be basic. Definite probabilities attach to closed formulas or propositions. We write them here using small caps: PROB(P) and PROB(P/Q). Most objective probability theories begin instead with “indefinite” or “general” probabilities (sometimes called “statistical probabilities”). Indefinite probabilities attach to open formulas or propositions. We write indefinite probabilities using lower case “prob” and free variables: prob(Bx/Ax). The indefinite probability of an A being a B is not about any particular A, but rather about the (...) property of being an A. In this respect, its logical form is the same as that of relative frequencies. For instance, we might talk about the probability of a human baby being female. That probability is about human babies in general — not about individuals. If we examine a baby and determine conclusively that she is female, then the definite probability of her being female is 1, but that does not alter the indefinite probability of human babies in general being female. Most objective approaches to probability tie probabilities to relative frequencies in some way, and the resulting probabilities have the same logical form as the relative frequencies. That is, they are indefinite probabilities. The simplest theories identify indefinite probabilities with relative frequencies.3 It is often objected that such “finite frequency theories” are inadequate because our probability judgments often diverge from relative frequencies. For example, we can talk about a coin being fair (and so the indefinite probability of a flip landing heads is 0.5) even when it is flipped only once and then destroyed (in which case the relative frequency is either 1 or 0). For understanding such indefinite probabilities, it has been suggested that we need a notion of probability that talks about possible instances of properties as well as actual instances.. (shrink)
I argue that the implementation of theDummettian program of an ``anti-realist'' semanticsrequires quite different conceptions of the technicalmeaning-theoretic terms used than those presupposed byDummett. Starting from obvious incoherences in anattempt to conceive truth conditions as assertibilityconditions, I argue that for anti-realist purposesnon-epistemic semantic notions are more usefully kept apart from epistemic ones rather than beingreduced to them. Embedding an anti-realist theory ofmeaning in Martin-Löf's Intuitionistic Type Theory(ITT) takes care, however, of many notorious problemsthat have arisen in trying to specify suitableintuitionistic (...) notions of semantic value,truth-conditions, and validity, taking into accountthe so-called ``defeasibility of evidence'' forassertions in empirical discourses. (shrink)
The paper undertakes three interdisciplinary tasks. The first one consists in constructing a formal model of the basic arithmetic competence, that is, the competence sufficient for solving simple arithmetic story-tasks which do not require any mathematical mastery knowledge about laws, definitions and theorems. The second task is to present a generalized arithmetic theory, called the arithmetic of indexed numbers (INA). All models of the development of counting abilities presuppose the common assumption that our simple, folk arithmetic encoded linguistically in the (...) mind is based on the linear number representation. This classical conception is rejected and a competitive hypothesis is formulated according to which the basic mature representational system of cognitive arithmetic is a structure composed of many numerical axes which possess a common constituent, namely, the numeral zero. Arithmetic of indexed numbers is just a formal tool for modelling the basic mature arithmetic competence. The third task is to develop a standpoint called temporal pluralism, which is motivated by neo-Kantian philosophy of arithmetic. (shrink)
Greece is Hellas and Greeks are Hellenes. Azure is cobalt and everything (coloured) azure is (coloured) cobalt. Pre-Fregeans would call all these statements of identity. <span class='Hi'>Frege</span> taught us to distinguish between Conaming [Name] [Name]. Ngh: Greece is Hellas g=h. Nac: Azure is cobalt a=c Copredicating [Predicate] [Predicate]. PGH: Greeks are Hellenes (x)(Gx[identical with]Hx). PAC: Everything azure is cobalt (x)(Ax[identical with]Cx) Singular Predication [Name] [Predicate]. PcA: Como is azure Ac. PaC: Azure is a colour Ca. PaL: Azure is like indigo (...) Lai. PgD: Greece defeated Persia Dgp. With <span class='Hi'>Frege</span> the contrasts became marked but misconceived. (shrink)
Carnap took the content of a particular sentence or set of sentences to consist in the set ofthe consequences of the sentence or set. This claim equates meaning with inferential role, but it restricts the inferences to deductive or explicative ones. Here I reject a recent proposal by Rober Brandom, where inductive or ampliative inferences arealso meant to confer contents on expressions. I argue that if Brandom's inferentialist picture is upheld, and both explicative and ampliative inferences confer meaning, one consequence (...) of this is that the content of a sentence is to be read off from our ways of rationally altering our beliefs. Meaning and content then are largely concepts of pragmatics, with no clear theoretical interest. My critique affects certain aspects of Dummett's meaning-theoretic picture too,and the discussion also links up with the development of `dynamic semantics'. (shrink)
In this paper I consider one aspect of how student writing is supported in the university. I focus on the use of the 'writing frame', questioning its status as a vehicle for facilitating student voice, and in the process questioning how that notion is itself understood. I illustrate this by using examples from the story of the 1944 Hollywood film Gaslight and show that apparent means of facilitating voice can actually contribute to a state of voicelessness. The paper considers what (...) recovery of voice entails and the role of the 'voice coach' both in the film, and in the classroom. Drawing on the work of Stanley Cavell, his readings of Gaslight and of the American writers Thoreau and Emerson, I explore the themes of crisis and transformation in relation to the self and society. Thoreau's notion of the father tongue and his metaphor of the axe are considered in relation to the concept of voice and are shown to be suggestive of a mature relationship to language and of an Emersonian self-reliance that is denied by the mere technical skill and mastery learning of some current approaches to academic writing. (shrink)
, Pietroski and Rey ([1995]) suggested a reconstruction of ceteris paribus (CP)-laws, which — as they claim — saves CP-laws from vacuity. This discussion note is intended to show that, although Pietroski and Rey's reconstruction is an improvement in comparison to previous suggestions, it cannot avoid the result that CP-laws are almost vacuous. It is proved that if Cx is an arbitrary (nomological) event-type which has independently identifiable deterministic causes, then for every other (nomological) event-type Ax which is not strictly (...) connected with Cx or with ¬Cx, ‘CP if Ax then Cx’ satisfies the conditions of Pietroski and Rey for CP-laws. It is also shown that Pietroski and Rey's reconstruction presupposes the assumption of determinism. The conclusion points towards some alternatives to Piectroski and Rey's reconstruction. (shrink)
Internalism is an explanatory strategy that makes the internal structure and constitution of the organism a basis for the investigation of its external function and the ways in which it is embedded in an environment. It is opposed to an externalist explanatory strategy, which takes its departure from observations about external function and mind-environment interactions, and infers and rationalizes internal organismic structure from that. This paper addresses the origins of truth, a basic ingredient in the human conceptual scheme. I suggest (...) the necessity of pursuing an internalist line of explanation for it, as adopted in the biolinguistic program and generative grammar at large. According to this view, the concept of truth is a presupposition for the way language is used in relation to the world, rather than a function of that use or a consequence of language-world relations. (shrink)
The notion of a D-ring, generalizing that of a differential or a difference ring, is introduced. Quantifier elimination and a version of the Ax-Kochen-Eršov principle is proven for a theory of valued D-fields of residual characteristic zero.
What follows axe the provisional conclusions reached in my thoughts about a frequently encountered, established argument for perceptual relativism. Rather than attempting the misleading task of dcfming in a sentence this doctrine - for it is so widely espoused by philosophers and Iaymcn alike that it deserves to bc called a doctrine — I shall instead elucidate it by thc common argu— ment for it that I wish to deal with, which Ishall call thc argument from differing perceptual apparatus, or (...) ADP. Most people, myself included, encounter ADP in popular form, with the opening gambit: "Supposc a fly flew into the room objccts would appear to it totally different from the way they appear to us . . . "; or else: "Saiicnce is a function of 0nc’s environment — insects perceive sounds and colour-shades we would never pcrccivc, because they nccd this to suivivc." Generally, differences in environment and therefore in salicncc, manifest themselves in different or more or less finely-tuned sense organs. Some animals have sense organs quite different in type or rcccptivity from the traditional human "fivc SBl’1S6S”. (Other senses, such as the kinesthctic sense have, of course, been determined and added to thc traditional fivc.) The premise that can be distilled from these points is the basic empirical premise 0f ADP: different species have different perceptual apparatus, with the consequence that different classes of.. (shrink)
1. The Physical Church-Turing Thesis. Physicists often interpret the Church-Turing Thesis as saying something about the scope and limitations of physical computing machines. Although this was not the intention of Church or Turing, the Physical Church Turing thesis is interesting in its own right. Consider, for example, Wolfram’s formulation: One can expect in fact that universal computers are as powerful in their computational capabilities as any physically realizable system can be, that they can simulate any physical system . . (...) . No physically implementable procedure could then shortcut a computationally irreducible process. (Wolfram 1985) Wolfram’s thesis consists of two parts: (a) Any physical system can be simulated (to any degree of approximation) by a universal Turing machine (b) Complexity bounds on Turing machine simulations have physical significance. For example, suppose that the computation of the minimum energy of some system of n particles takes at least exponentially (in n) many steps. Then the relaxation time of the actual physical system to its minimum energy state will also take exponential time. (shrink)
In a recent paper, Kit Fine offers a reconstruction of Cantor's theory of ordinals. It avoids certain mentalistic overtones in it through both a non-standard ontology and a non-standard notion of abstraction. I argue that this reconstruction misses an essential constructive and computational content of Cantor's theory, which I in turn reconstruct using Martin-Löf's theory of types. Throughout, I emphasize Kantian themes in Cantor's epistemology, and I also argue, as against Michael Hallett's interpretation, for the need for a constructive understanding (...) of Cantorian ?existence principles? (shrink)
It is well known that most is not first-order definable, and that the proof is in Barwise and Cooper’s 1981 paper. Actually, Barwise and Cooper present two theorems that bear on the issue. Their theorem C12 says that, for any pair of one-place predicates A and B, there is no sentence of classical predicate logic that is true iff ‘Most A are B’ is. (I assume that ‘Most A are B’ means that more than half of the A’s are B, (...) but the only thing that matters is that most is proportional.) Barwise and Cooper’s C13 states that the foregoing result remains valid when classical logic is enriched with a unary quantifier Q so defined that Qx(Ax) is true iff more than half of the entities in the domain of quantification are A’s. (shrink)
The modern times proclaimed ‘God’s death’ and the post‐modern times did ‘the death of Man/Subject. And recently our society suffers from ‘the death of the humanities’. The death appearing along with is ‘the death of philosophy’. What on earth does the notice of death of philosophy mean by in the life of human beings living in the modern times? This writer is groping for the point to revive the modern significance of philosophy facing the tragic situations called ‘Death’ through the (...) inquiry of the rendezvous between philosophy and therapy. This writer will study the features of the philosophical therapy in philosophizing in the ancient times, firstly in the relation of philosophy and therapy, secondly the soul as the subject and object of mind‐therapy, thirdly the self‐awareness (gnôthiseautón) as the way of mind‐therapy, fourth the self‐care (epimeleia heautou) as the goal of mind‐therapy, and finally the dialogue as the method of mind‐ therapy, during which I am going to form a solid foundation instead to study the spirit of philosophical therapy dwelling in philosophizing. (shrink)
From Clouds to Corsair: Kierkegaard, Aristophanes, and Socrates -- The pure fool and the knight of faith: Wolfram's Parzival and the stages of existence -- From romantic aesthete to Christian analogue: Don Quixote's sallies in Kierkegaard's authorship -- Saying not quite "everything just as it is": Shakespeare on life's way -- "Sorrow's changeling": irony, humor, and laughter in Kierkegaard and Carlyle.
Fluid-phase endocytosis (pinocytosis) kinetics were studied inDictyostelium discoideum amoebae from the axenic strain Ax-2 that exhibits high rates of fluid-phase endocytosis when cultured in liquid nutrient media. Fluorescein-labelled dextran (FITC-dextran) was used as a marker in continuous uptake- and in pulse-chase exocytosis experiments. In the latter case, efflux of the marker was monitored on cells loaded for short periods of time and resuspended in marker-free medium. A multicompartmental model was developed which describes satisfactorily fluid-phase endocytosis kinetics. In particular, it accounts (...) correctly for the extended latency period before exocytosis in pulse-chase experiments and it suggests the existence of some sorts of maturation stages in the pathway. (shrink)
Taste-aversion learning has been a popular paradigm for examining associative processes because it often produces outcomes that are different from those observed in other classical conditioning paradigms. One such outcome is taste-mediated odor potentiation in which aversion conditioning with a weak odor and a strong taste results in increased or synergistic conditioning to the odor. Because this strengthened odor aversion was not anticipated by formal models of learning, investigation of taste-mediated odor potentiation was a hot topic in (...) the 1980s. The present manuscript reviews the history of potentiation research with particular focus given to the stimuli that produce potentiation, the conditions that produce potentiation, the possible mechanism of this phenomenon, and possible reasons for the decline of research in this area. Although the number of published reports of potentiation has decreased since the 1980s, recent physiological and behavioral assessments have advanced the field considerably, and the opportunities for future research are bountiful. Recent physiological experiments, for example, have identified the basolateral nucleus of the amygdala as the key brain region to produce taste-mediated odor potentiation (e.g., Hatfield andGallagher, 1995). Also, recent behavioral experiments have extended the generality of synergistic conditioning effects. Studies have shown that odor can potentiate responding to taste (Slotnick, Westbrook and Darling, 1997) and that augmented responding can be produced in the A+/AX+blocking design (e.g., Batsell and Batson, 1999). With the current understanding of where synergistic conditioning may occur in the brain and the new tools to explore synergistic conditioning, we propose various directions for future research to determine whether taste-aversion learning and synergistic conditioning require unique explanations. (shrink)
Taste-aversion learning has been a popular paradigm for examining associative processes because it often produces outcomes that are different from those observed in other classical conditioning paradigms. One such outcome is taste-mediated odor potentiation in which aversion conditioning with a weak odor and a strong taste results in increased or synergistic conditioning to the odor. Because this strengthened odor aversion was not anticipated by formal models of learning, investigation of taste-mediated odor potentiation was a hot topic in the 1980s. The (...) present manuscript reviews the history of potentiation research with particular focus given to the stimuli that produce potentiation, the conditions that produce potentiation, the possible mechanism of this phenomenon, and possible reasons for the decline of research in this area. Although the number of published reports of potentiation has decreased since the 1980s, recent physiological and behavioral assessments have advanced the field considerably, and the opportunities for future research are bountiful. Recent physiological experiments, for example, have identified the basolateral nucleus of the amygdala as the key brain region to produce taste-mediated odor potentiation (e.g., Hatfield andGallagher, 1995). Also, recent behavioral experiments have extended the generality of synergistic conditioning effects. Studies have shown that odor can potentiate responding to taste (Slotnick, Westbrook and Darling, 1997) and that augmented responding can be produced in the A+/AX+blocking design (e.g., Batsell and Batson, 1999). With the current understanding of where synergistic conditioning may occur in the brain and the new tools to explore synergistic conditioning, we propose various directions for future research to determine whether taste-aversion learning and synergistic conditioning require unique explanations. (shrink)
Of course I have an axe to grind. I am one of the old school of tutors, generally regarded as outmoded and amateurish by our more up-to-date successors, who are anxious to introduce more professionalism into Oxford's academic life. I probably shan't be replaced, but if I am, it will be by somebody competent, capable of looking the twenty-first century in the face, who knows what he is about, and adopts effective means to bringing it about.
In this book leading scholars from every relevant field report on all aspects of compositionality, the notion that the meaning of an expression can be derived from its parts. Understanding how compositionality works is a central element of syntactic and semantic analysis and a challenge for models of cognition. It is a key concept in linguistics and philosophy and in the cognitive sciences more generally, and is without question one of the most exciting fields in the study of language and (...) mind. The authors of this book report critically on lines of research in different disciplines, revealing the connections between them and highlighting current problems and opportunities. -/- The force and justification of compositionality have long been contentious. First proposed by Frege as the notion that the meaning of an expression is generally determined by the meaning and syntax of its components, it has since been deployed as a constraint on the relation between theories of syntax and semantics, as a means of analysis, and more recently as underlying the structures of representational systems, such as computer programs and neural architectures. The Oxford Handbook of Compositionality explores these and many other dimensions of this challenging field. It will appeal to researchers and advanced students in linguistics and philosophy and to everyone concerned with the study of language and cognition including those working in neuroscience, computational science, and bio-informatics. (shrink)
In this quite modestly ambitious essay, I'll generally just assume that, for the most part, our "scientifically informed" commonsense view of the world is true. Just as it is with such unthinking things as planets, plates and, I suppose, plants, too, so it also is with all earthly thinking beings, from people to pigs and pigeons; each occupies a region of space, however large or small, in which all are spatially related to each other. Or, at least, so it is (...) with the bodies of these beings. And, even as each of these ordinary entities extends through some space, so, also, each endures through some time. In line with that, each ordinary entity is at least very largely, and is perhaps entirely, an enduring physical entity (which allows that many might have certain properties that aren't purely physical properties.) Further, each ordinary enduring entity is a physically complex entity: Not only is each composed of parts, but many of these parts, whether or not absolutely all of them, are themselves enduring physical entities, and many of them also are such physically complex continuing entities. When an ordinary entity undergoes a significant change, then, at least generally, this change will involve changes concerning that entity's constituting physical parts, whether it be a rearrangement of (some of) these parts, or a loss of parts, or a gain of parts, or whatever. Often, the entity will still exist even after the change occurs. As we may well suppose, this happens when, from two strokes of an ax, an ordinary log loses just a chip of wood. As we may then say, such a change conforms with the log's "persistence conditions." Somewhat less often, such an ordinary entity undergoes a change that means an end to it: When a bomb's explosion makes our log become just so many widely scattered motes of dust, the log will no longer exist. Such a momentous change doesn't conform with the log's persistence conditions. (shrink)
Jean-Daniel Causse | : La compréhension paulinienne de la loi a fait l’objet d’une réception dans la théorie psychanalytique de Jacques Lacan, en particulier le chapitre 7 de l’Épître aux Romains. Sur ce thème, plusieurs travaux récents en psychanalyse défendent la thèse selon laquelle Paul n’a pas su distinguer la loi symbolique du surmoi et, prenant l’un pour l’autre, a organisé tout un monde de la culpabilité, de la haine et de la persécution. Lacan adopte un point de vue assez (...) différent. Sans ignorer la part du surmoi, il attribue une dimension plus structurelle à la loi paulinienne. Dans la compréhension de la loi chez Paul, il voit une dialectique, centrale en psychanalyse, où le désir se porte vers ce qu’il ne doit pas obtenir. De ce fait, l’originalité de Paul est d’avoir indiqué que le péché se découvre paradoxalement sur l’axe d’un Bien et dans le mouvement de la fidélité à la loi. C’est ce que cette contribution met en lumière pour reconsidérer, à partir de là, le sens de l’amour et de la grâce. | : Paul’s understanding of the Law, especially in chapter 7 of the Epistle to the Romans, was taken into account by Jacques Lacan in his psychoanalytical theory. On this issue, recent studies in psychoanalysis defend a thesis according to which Paul did not distinguish between the symbolic law and the superego and, taking one for the other, organized a whole world of guilt, hatred and persecution. Lacan’s point of view is quite different. Without ignoring the share of the superego, he attributes a more structural role to the Law as understood by Paul. In Paul’s understanding of the Law, Lacan sees a dialectic stance, one central to psychoanalysis, where desire is aimed at what it must not get. Thus, Paul’s originality was to show that sin is paradoxically discovered on the axis of Good, in the movement of faithfulness to the Law. This contribution aims at bringing this to light, so as to reconsider the meaning of Love and of Grace. (shrink)
In this paper we probe the limits of the computational method in economics. This method involves modeling individual behavior and economic processes in terms of constrained optimization. In neoclassical economics human behavior is explained entirely computationally. Alternative paradigms include the evolutionary and the complexity?based approaches that model behavior and processes as non?optimizing or boundedly rational. But many of the models used in ?complex?evolutionary economics? are cellular automata or their equivalents. This means that neoclassical economics and complex?evolutionary economics are both committed (...) to a computational vision of the economy. A highly complex computational economy can evolve and self?organize but it also displays computational universality that means that many problems are not decidable. The inherent limits of computability become evident. This paper proposes incorporating a particular (constructive) non?computability into our view of economic behavior and processes. The paper defines constructively non?computational behavior, discusses its origins in Roger Penrose's writings, and provides an application of this concept to the question of realistic counterfactuals in economic models. (shrink)
We consider the problem of recognizing important properties of logical calculi and find complexity bounds for some decidable properties. For a given logical system L, a property P of logical calculi is called decidable over L if there is an algorithm which for any finite set Ax of new axiom schemes decides whether the calculus L + Ax has the property P or not. In [11] the complexity of tabularity, pre-tabularity, and interpolation problems over the intuitionistic logic Int and over (...) modal logic S4 was studied, also we found the complexity of amalgamation problems in varieties of Heyting algebras and closure algebras. In the present paper we deal with positive calculi. We prove NP-completeness of tabularity, DP-hardness of pretabularity and PSPACE-completeness of interpolation problem over Int + . In addition to above-mentioned properties, we consider Beth's definability properties. Also we improve some complexity bounds for properties of superintuitionistic calculi. (shrink)
Renaud Barbaras, La vie lacunaire [Thomas Vercruysse, p. 324] • Wolfram Hogrebe, Der implizite Mensch [Federica Ceranovi, p. 334] • Emmanuel Alloa, Das durchscheinende Bild [Maria Teresa Costa, p. 344] • Alexander R. Galloway, The Interface Effect [Angela Maiello, p. 346] • Francisco José Ramos, La significación del lenguaje poético [Michele Gardini, p. 348] • Alessandro Arbo, Entendre comme. Wittgenstein et l’esthétique musicale [Leonardo V. Distaso, p. 351.
