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Crispin Wright [196]Cory D. Wright [29]C. J. G. Wright [21]C. J. Wright [15]
Colin Wright [9]Craig Wright [7]Charles E. Wright [7]C. Wright [6]

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See also:
Profile: Cory D. Wright (California State University, Long Beach)
Profile: Carl Wright
Profile: Carly Wright (University of Notre Dame Australia)
Profile: Charity Wright (Eastern Kentucky University)
Profile: Cameron Wright
Profile: Charles, Chuck Wright
  1. Crispin Wright (1992). Truth and Objectivity. Harvard University Press.
    Recasting important questions about truth and objectivity in new and helpful terms, his book will become a focus in the contemporary debates over realism, and ...
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  2. Crispin Wright (2004). Warrant for Nothing (and Foundations for Free)? Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78 (1):167–212.
  3. Crispin Wright (2002). (Anti-)Sceptics Simple and Subtle: G. E. Moore and John McDowell. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):330-348.
  4.  96
    C. J. G. Wright (2003). Some Reflections on the Acquisition of Warrant by Inference. In Susana Nuccetelli (ed.), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press 57--78.
  5. C. Macdonald, Barry C. Smith & C. J. G. Wright (1998). Knowing Our Own Minds: Essays in Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
    Self-knowledge is the focus of considerable attention from philosophers: Knowing Our Own Minds gives a much-needed overview of current work on the subject, bringing together new essays by leading figures. Knowledge of one's own sensations, desires, intentions, thoughts, beliefs, and other attitudes is characteristically different from other kinds of knowledge: it has greater immediacy, authority, and salience. The contributors examine philosophical questions raised by the distinctive character of self-knowledge, relating it to knowledge of other minds, to rationality and agency, externalist (...)
     
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  6.  24
    Crispin Wright (2002). (Anti-)Sceptics Simple and Subtle. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):330-348.
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  7.  39
    Crispin Wright (1993). Realism, Meaning, and Truth. Blackwell.
  8. C. J. G. Wright (2000). Cogency and Question-Begging: Some Reflections on McKinsey's Paradox and Putnam's Proof. Philosophical Issues 10 (s1):140-63.
  9. Cory D. Wright (2012). Mechanistic Explanation Without the Ontic Conception. European Journal of Philosophy of Science 2 (3):375-394.
    The ontic conception of scientific explanation has been constructed and motivated on the basis of a putative lexical ambiguity in the term explanation. I raise a puzzle for this ambiguity claim, and then give a deflationary solution under which all ontically-rendered talk of explanation is merely elliptical; what it is elliptical for is a view of scientific explanation that altogether avoids the ontic conception. This result has revisionary consequences for New Mechanists and other philosophers of science, many of whom have (...)
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  10. Crispin Wright (1983). Frege's Conception of Numbers as Objects. Aberdeen University Press.
  11. William Bechtel & Cory D. Wright (2009). What is Psychological Explanation? In P. Calvo & J. Symons (eds.), Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Psychology. Routledge 113--130.
    Due to the wide array of phenomena that are of interest to them, psychologists offer highly diverse and heterogeneous types of explanations. Initially, this suggests that the question "What is psychological explanation?" has no single answer. To provide appreciation of this diversity, we begin by noting some of the more common types of explanations that psychologists provide, with particular focus on classical examples of explanations advanced in three different areas of psychology: psychophysics, physiological psychology, and information-processing psychology. To analyze what (...)
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  12.  47
    C. J. G. Wright (2001). On Being in a Quandary. Relativism Vagueness Logical Revisionism. Mind 110 (437):45--97.
    This paper addresses three problems: the problem of formulating a coherent relativism, the Sorites paradox and a seldom noticed difficulty in the best intuitionistic case for the revision of classical logic. A response to the latter is proposed which, generalised, contributes towards the solution of the other two. The key to this response is a generalised conception of indeterminacy as a specific kind of intellectual bafflement - Quandary. Intuitionistic revisions of classical logic are merited wherever a subject matter is conceived (...)
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  13. Bob Hale & Crispin Wright (1989). Necessity, Caution and Scepticism. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 63 (1):175 - 238.
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  14. Crispin Wright (2008). Fear of Relativism? [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 141 (3):379 - 390.
    §1 To many in or on the edges of the Academy, ”Relativism” is a word with overtones of sinister iconoclasm, representing a kind of intellectual and ethical free-for-all in which the traditional investigative virtues of clarity, rigour, objectivity, consistency and the unbiased pursuit of truth are dismissed as illusory and the great scientific constructions of the last two hundred years, together with our deepest moral convictions, rated merely as ‘our way of seeing’ the world, more elaborate and organised but otherwise (...)
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  15. Cory D. Wright & William P. Bechtel (2007). Mechanisms and Psychological Explanation. In Paul Thagard (ed.), Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science. Elsevier
    As much as assumptions about mechanisms and mechanistic explanation have deeply affected psychology, they have received disproportionately little analysis in philosophy. After a historical survey of the influences of mechanistic approaches to explanation of psychological phenomena, we specify the nature of mechanisms and mechanistic explanation. Contrary to some treatments of mechanistic explanation, we maintain that explanation is an epistemic activity that involves representing and reasoning about mechanisms. We discuss the manner in which mechanistic approaches serve to bridge levels rather than (...)
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  16. Crispin Wright (2007). The Perils of Dogmatism. In Nuccetelli & Seay (eds.), Themes from G. E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology. Oxford University Press
    "Dogmatism" is a term renovated by James Pryor [2000] to stand for a certain kind of neo-Moorean response to Scepticism and an associated conception of the architecture of basic perceptual warrant. Pryor runs the response only for (some kinds of) perceptual knowledge but here I will be concerned with its general structure and potential as a possible global anti-sceptical strategy. Something like it is arguably also present in recent writings of Burge 1 and Peacocke.2 If the global strategy could succeed, (...)
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  17.  40
    Crispin Wright (ed.) (2001). Rails to Infinity. Harvard University Press.
    This volume, published on the fiftieth anniversary of Wittgenstein's death, brings together thirteen of Crispin Wright's most influential essays on Wittgenstein ...
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  18. C. J. G. Wright & Bob Hale (eds.) (1997). A Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Wiley-Blackwell.
    This volume provides a survey of contemporary philosophy of language. As well as providing a synoptic view of the key issues, figures, concepts and debates, each essay makes new and original contributions to ongoing debate.
     
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  19.  69
    Crispin Wright (1991). Scepticism and Dreaming: Imploding the Demon. Mind 100 (1):87-116.
  20. Crispin Wright (1986). Facts and Certainty. Proceedings of the British Academy 71:429-472.
  21.  1
    Crispin Wright (2008). Internal—External. Journal of Philosophy 105 (9):501-517.
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  22.  53
    Crispin Wright (2006). Intuitionism, Realism, Relativism and Rhubarb. In Patrick Greenough & Michael Lynch (eds.), Truth and Realism. Clarendon Press 38--60.
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  23. Crispin Wright (2007). Rule-Following Without Reasons: Wittgenstein's Quietism and the Constitutive Question. Ratio 20 (4):481–502.
    This is a short, and therefore necessarily very incomplete discussion of one of the great questions of modern philosophy. I return to a station at which an interpretative train of thought of mine came to a halt in a paper written almost 20 years ago, about Wittgenstein and Chomsky,[1] hoping to advance a little bit further down the track. The rule-following passages in the Investigations and Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics in fact raise a number of distinct issues about (...)
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  24.  17
    Crispin Wright (1980). Wittgenstein on the Foundations of Mathematics. Harvard University Press.
  25. Crispin Wright (2008). Comment on John McDowell's "The Disjunctive Conception of Experience as Material for a Transcendental Argument". In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action and Knowledge. Oxford University Press 390.
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  26.  36
    Crispin Wright (2016). Assessment‐Sensitivity: The Manifestation Challenge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1):189-196.
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  27. Bob Hale & Crispin Wright (2012). Horse Sense. Journal of Philosophy 109 (1-2):85-131.
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  28. Crispin Wright (2008). Relativism About Truth Itself: Haphazard Thoughts About the Very Idea. In Manuel García-Carpintero & Max Kölbel (eds.), Relative Truth. Oxford University Press 157.
  29.  60
    Crispin Wright (2005). Contextualism and Scepticism: Even-Handedness, Factivity and Surreptitiously Raising Standards. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):236–262.
    The central contentions of this paper are two: first, that contextualism about knowledge cannot fulfil the eirenic promise which, for those who are drawn to it, constitutes, I believe, its main attraction; secondly, that the basic diagnosis of epistemological scepticism as somehow entrapping us, by diverting attention from a surreptitious shift to a special rarefied intellectual context, rests on inattention to the details of the principal sceptical paradoxes. These contentions are consistent with knowledge-contextualism, of some stripe or other, being true. (...)
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  30. Charles W. Wright (2004). Particularity and Perspective Taking: On Feminism and Habermas's Discourse Theory of Morality. Hypatia 19 (4):47-74.
    : Seyla Benhabib's critique of Jürgen Habermas's moral theory claims that his approach is not adequate for the needs of a feminist moral theory. I argue that her analysis is mistaken. I also show that Habermas's moral theory, properly understood, satisfies many of the conditions identified by feminist moral philosophers as necessary for an adequate moral theory. A discussion of the compatibility between the model of reciprocal perspective taking found in Habermas's moral theory and that found in María Lugones's essay (...)
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  31. C. J. G. Wright (2001). Rails to Infinity: Essays on Themes From Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. Harvard University Press.
  32.  24
    Crispin Wright (2001). On Being in a Quandary. Mind 110 (1):45--98.
    This paper addresses three problems: the problem of formulating a coherent relativism, the Sorites paradox and a seldom noticed difficulty in the best intuitionistic case for the revision of classical logic. A response to the latter is proposed which, generalised, contributes towards the solution of the other two. The key to this response is a generalised conception of indeterminacy as a specific kind of intellectual bafflement-Quandary. Intuitionistic revisions of classical logic are merited wherever a subject matter is conceived both as (...)
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  33. Iris Rooij, Cory D. Wright & Todd Wareham (2012). Intractability and the Use of Heuristics in Psychological Explanations. Synthese 187 (2):471-487.
    Many cognitive scientists, having discovered that some computational-level characterization f of a cognitive capacity φ is intractable, invoke heuristics as algorithmic-level explanations of how cognizers compute f. We argue that such explanations are actually dysfunctional, and rebut five possible objections. We then propose computational-level theory revision as a principled and workable alternative.
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  34. Crispin Wright (2008). Internal-External: Doxastic Norms and the Defusing of Skeptical Paradox. Journal of Philosophy 105 (9):501-517.
  35. Crispin Wright (1995). Truth in Ethics. Ratio 8 (3):209-226.
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  36.  33
    Crispin Wright (2012). Replies. In Crispin Wright & Annalisa Coliva (eds.), Mind, Meaning, and Knowledge: Themes From the Philosophy of Crispin Wright. Oxford University Press 201-219.
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  37. Crispin Wright (1991). Scepticism and Dreaming: Imploding the Demon. Noûs 25 (2):205.
  38.  44
    Crispin Wright (2004). Wittgensteinian Certainties. In Denis McManus (ed.), Wittgenstein and Scepticism. Routledge 22--55.
  39. Crispin Wright (2004). Intuition, Entitlement and the Epistemology of Logical Laws. Dialectica 58 (1):155–175.
    The essay addresses the well‐known idea that there has to be a place for intuition, thought of as a kind of non‐inferential rational insight, in the epistemology of basic logic if our knowledge of its principles is non‐empirical and is to allow of any finite, non‐circular reconstruction. It is argued that the error in this idea consists in its overlooking the possibility that there is, properly speaking, no knowledge of the validity of principles of basic logic. When certain important distinctions (...)
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  40.  6
    Cory Wright (forthcoming). Truth, Explanation, Minimalism. Synthese:1-23.
    Minimalists about truth contend that traditional inflationary theories systematically fail to explain certain facts about truth, and that this failure licenses a ‘reversal of explanatory direction’. Once reversed, they purport that their own minimal theory adequately explains all of the facts involving truth. But minimalists’ main objection to inflationism seems to misfire, and the subsequent reversal of explanatory direction, if it can be made sense of, leaves minimalism in no better explanatory position; and even if the objection were serviceable and (...)
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  41.  34
    Crispin Wright (2003). Saving the Differences: Essays on Themes From Truth and Objectivity. Harvard University Press.
    The essays in this companion volume prefigure, elaborate, or defend the proposals put forward in that landmark work.
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  42. Cory D. Wright (2010). Truth, Ramsification, and the Pluralist's Revenge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (2):265-283.
    Functionalists about truth employ Ramsification to produce an implicit definition of the theoretical term _true_, but doing so requires determining that the theory introducing that term is itself true. A variety of putative dissolutions to this problem of epistemic circularity are shown to be unsatisfactory. One solution is offered on functionalists' behalf, though it has the upshot that they must tread on their anti-pluralist commitments.
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  43. Crispin Wright (2007). On Quantifying Into Predicate Position: Steps Towards a New (Tralist) Perspective. In Mary Leng, Alexander Paseau & Michael D. Potter (eds.), Mathematical Knowledge. Oxford University Press 150--74.
  44. Crispin Wright (1988). Realism, Antirealism, Irrealism, Quasi-Realism. Gareth Evans Memorial Lecture, Delivered in Oxford on June 2, 1987. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 12 (1):25-49.
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  45.  41
    Crispin Wright (1987). Further Reflections on the Sorites Paradox. Philosophical Topics 15 (1):227-290.
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  46. Crispin Wright (1984). Kripke's Account of the Argument Against Private Language. Journal of Philosophy 81 (12):759-78.
  47. Alexander Miller & C. J. G. Wright (eds.) (2002). Rule-Following and Meaning. Acumen.
    A selection of readings on a central topic in contemporary philosophy of language, mind, and metaphysics.
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  48.  10
    Christopher Wright & Alexis Rwabizambuga (2006). Institutional Pressures, Corporate Reputation, and Voluntary Codes of Conduct: An Examination of the Equator Principles. Business and Society Review 111 (1):89-117.
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  49. Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (2010). Truth, Pluralism, Monism, Correspondence. In Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth. Palgrave Macmillan
    When talking about truth, we ordinarily take ourselves to be talking about one-and-the-same thing. Alethic monists suggest that theorizing about truth ought to begin with this default or pre-reflective stance, and, subsequently, parlay it into a set of theoretical principles that are aptly summarized by the thesis that truth is one. Foremost among them is the invariance principle.
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  50. Crispin Wright (1975). On the Coherence of Vague Predicates. Synthese 30 (3-4):325--65.
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