Insurance is pervasive in many social settings. As a cooperative device based on risk pooling, it serves to attenuate the adverse consequences of various risks by offering policyholders coverage against the losses implied by adverse events in exchange for the payment of premiums. In the insurance industry, the concept of actuarial fairness serves to establish what could be adequate, fair premiums. Accordingly, premiums paid by policyholders should match as closely as possible their risk exposure. Such premiums are the product of (...) the probabilities of losses and the expected losses. This article presents a discussion of the fairness of actuarial fairness through three steps: defining the concept based on its formulation within the insurance industry; determining in which sense it may be about fairness; and raising some objections to the actual fairness of actuarial fairness. The necessity of a normative evaluation of actuarial fairness is justified by the influence of the concept on the current reforms of public insurance systems and the fact that it highlights the question of the repartition of the gains and burdens of social cooperation. (shrink)

Xavier Landes | : Happiness has become a central theme in public debates. Happiness indicators illustrate this importance. This article offers a typology of the main challenges conveyed by the elaboration of happiness indicators, where happiness can be understood as hedonia, subjective well-being, or eudaimonia. The typology is structured around four questions: what to measure?—i.e., the difficulties linked to the choice of a particular understanding of happiness for building an indicator; whom to include?—i.e., the limits of the community monitored by (...) such an indicator; how to collect the data?—i.e., the difficulties stemming from objective and subjective reporting; what to do?—i.e., the concerns about the use of happiness indicators in public policy. The major points of normative contention are discussed for each of these dimensions. The purpose of this article is to contribute in a constructive manner to happiness research by offering an overview of some major philosophical and political challenges of building happiness indicators. The conclusion underlines the importance of the strategy of diversification- hybridization, which consists in setting a variety of indicators or composite indicators that articulate different understandings of happiness. It is stressed that happiness indicators raise democratic and institutional issues with which normative thinkers should deal. | : Le bonheur est devenu un thème central dans les débats publics. Les indicateurs de bonheur illustrent cette importance. Cet article offre une typologie des principaux enjeux contenus dans le travail d’élaboration d’indicateurs de bonheur quand ce dernier est compris comme hedonia, bien-être subjectif ou eudaimonia. La typologie est structurée autour de quatre questions : 1) que mesurer?, où sont en jeu les difficultés liées au choix d’une compréhension particulière du bonheur pour construire un indicateur; 2) qui inclure?, c’est-à-dire comment tracer les limites de la communauté morale qui est l’objet d’un tel indicateur; 3) comment collecter les données?, où on interroge les difficultés propres aux techniques subjectives et objectives de collecte de données; 4) que faire?, où on soulève l’enjeu des craintes quant à l’usage d’indicateurs de bonheur dans les politiques publiques. Les points majeurs de dispute normative sont discutés pour chaque dimension. Nous espérons ainsi contribuer de manière constructive à la recherche sur le bonheur en offrant un aperçu de quelques défis philosophiques et politiques majeurs relatifs à la construction d’indicateurs de bonheur. Nous concluons en soulignant l’importance de la stratégie de diversification-hybridation qui consiste à mettre en place des indicateurs variés ou composites articulant différentes compréhensions du bonheur. Ces indicateurs soulèvent des enjeux démocratiques et institutionnels que les penseurs normatifs doivent considérer. (shrink)

Status inequalities seem to play a fairly big role in creating inequalities in health. This article assumes that there can be good reasons to fight status inequalities in order to reduce inequalities in health. It examines whether the neorepublican ideal of non-dominance does a better job as a theoretical foil for this as compared to a liberal notion of non-interference. The article concludes that there is a prima facie case for incorporating non-dominance into our thinking about public health, but that (...) it needs to go hand in hand with a more traditional liberal ideal of non-interference. (shrink)

Public insurance is commonly assimilated with redistributive tools mobilized by the welfare state in the pursuit of an egalitarian ideal. This view contains some truth, since the result of insurance, at a given moment, is the redistribution of resources from the lucky to unlucky. However, Joseph Heath considers that the principle of efficiency provides a better normative explanation and justification of public insurance than the egalitarian account. According to this view, the fact that the state is involved in the provision (...) of specific insurance is explained and justified by the greater efficiency of the state, in comparison with markets, in addressing market failures such as moral hazard or adverse selection. Our argument is that while insurance, intrinsically and idealistically, may diverge from a redistributive scheme, it is nevertheless difficult to deny that insurance has nothing to do with equality. More precisely, we argue that insurance may be understood as an egalitarian tool if our understanding of equality is broadened to include relational equality. Our paper aims to briefly recap the debates surrounding public insurance as a redistributive tool, advancing the idea that public insurance may be a relational egalitarian tool. It then presents a number of relational arguments in favor of the involvement of the state in the provision of specific forms of insurance, arguments that have been overlooked given the domination of luck egalitarian approaches in these debates. (shrink)

In “The Pecking Order,” Dalton Conley argues that inequalities between siblings are larger than inequalities at the level of the overall society. Our article discusses the normative implications for institutions of this observation. We show that the question of state intervention for curbing intra-family inequality reveals an internal tension within liberalism between autonomy and toleration, which bears on the forms that the intervention of institutions may take. Despite the pros and cons of both commitments, autonomy-based liberalism appears more compatible with (...) the involvement of the state for egalitarian reasons within the family than toleration-based liberalism.Export citation Request permission. (shrink)

Xavier Landes | : In this article, consensus, defined as the consent of all citizens, is argued to be the first best for part of the liberal tradition on political legitimacy. Consensus would be the foundation of the liberal society that, when out of reach, needs to be approximated through, for instance, voting. I build on the timid attempts in political theory at using the theorem of the second best as a tool to settle difficult decision making in applied political (...) theory. More precisely, I defend the view that consensus would be the first best for part of the liberal tradition on political legitimacy. Furthermore, I illustrate how moral, factual, disagreements may create second-best problems, especially in terms of stability. Finally, I spell out some reasons why such problems directly affect a liberal order, on pragmatic grounds. The final purpose is to contribute to the literatures on legitimacy and on the application of the theorem of the second best outside economics. The key idea is to stress that much more work has to be done for “importing” the theorem of the second best into political theory. | : Dans cet article, le consensus, défini comme le consentement de tous les citoyens, est présenté comme remplissant la fonction d’optimum de premier rang [first best] pour une partie de la tradition libérale quant à la légitimité politique. Le consensus fonderait la société libérale qui, lorsque hors d’atteinte, nécessiterait d’être approximer au travers, par exemple, du vote. Je m’appuie sur les timides tentatives en théorie politique d’utiliser le théorème de l’optimum de second rang [second best] comme outil pour résoudre des prises de décision difficiles en théorie politique appliquée. Plus précisément, je défends l’idée que le consensus serait l’optimum de premier rang pour une partie de la tradition libérale quant à la légitimité politique. De plus, j’illustre comment les désaccords moraux, factuels peuvent créer des problèmes d’optimum de second rang, en particulier en termes de stabilité. Enfin, j’expose quelques raisons pour lesquelles de tels problèmes affectent directement un ordre libéral, d’un point de vue pragmatique. Le but final est de contribuer aux littératures sur la légitimité et sur l’application du théorème d’optimum de second rang à l’extérieur des sciences économiques. L’idée principale est de souligner qu’il reste beaucoup de travail afin d’« importer » le théorème d’optimum de second rang en théorie politique. (shrink)

Public insurance is both everywhere and nowhere. It is everywhere in the sense that it is omnipresent in industrialised societies: public health insurance, unemployment benefits and pensions. It is a sizeable part of modern nations’ public budget . It has permeated our understanding of societal institutions to the extent that now access to public insurance coverage is understood as being a struggle for equality and equal citizenship .Public insurance is only one aspect of a broader phenomenon: the transformation of modern (...) societies into insurance societies, i.e. societies that are orientated toward risk-management . Nevertheless, public insurance is at the core of the welfare state as insurance system. Paul Krugman once said of the modern state that it is ‘an insurance company with an army’ while David Moss argues that government is the ultimate risk manager ( .. (shrink)

Xavier Landes,Martin Andersen,Klemens Kappel.