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Xiang Chen [26]Xiangling Chen [1]
  1. Xiang Chen (2014). Why Are We Reluctant to Act Immediately on Climate Change?: From Ontological Assumptions to Core Cognition. Perspectives on Science 22 (4):574-592.
    Surveys of public opinions on climate change found that a majority of American respondents regarded global warming as a critical or an important threat . Given this consensus, one might expect that a majority of Americans are ready to take immediate action to deal with the environmental crisis. However, when they were asked whether we should begin taking steps now, only 43% of American respondents said yes; 54% of them chose either the option “until we are sure that global warming (...)
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  2. Xiang Chen (2010). A Different Kind of Revolutionary Change: Transformation From Object to Process Concepts. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (2):182-191.
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  3. Xiang Chen (2010). Kongzi de Zhi Hui =. Guo Jia Chu Ban She.
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  4. Xiangling Chen (2010). Jue Ce Zhi Hui Yu Li Shi Bo Yi. Guo Fang da Xue Chu Ban She.
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  5. Xiang Chen (2007). The Object Bias and the Study of Scientific Revolutions: Lessons From Developmental Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 20 (4):479 – 503.
    I propose a new perspective on the study of scientific revolutions. This is a transformation from an object-only perspective to an ontological perspective that properly treats objects and processes as distinct kinds. I begin my analysis by identifying an object bias in the study of scientific revolutions, where it takes the form of representing scientific revolutions as changes in classification of physical objects. I further explore the origins of this object bias. Findings from developmental psychology indicate that children cannot distinguish (...)
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  6. Xiang Chen (2005). Transforming Temporal Knowledge: Conceptual Change Between Event Concepts. Perspectives on Science 13 (1):49-73.
    : This paper offers a preliminary analysis of conceptual change between event concepts. It begins with a brief review of the major findings of cognitive studies on event knowledge. The script model proposed by Schank and Abelson was the first attempt to represent event knowledge. Subsequent cognitive studies indicated that event knowledge is organized in the form of dimensional organizations in which temporally successive actions are related causally. This paper proposes a frame representation to capture and outline the internal structure (...)
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  7. Xiang Chen & Bernard R. Goldstein (2005). Tools: Cultures of Organic Chemistry in the Nineteenth Century (2003), and Edi-Tor of Tools and Modes of Representation in the Laboratory Sciences (2001). Her Recent Research is on the History of Experimentation and Technoscience in the Eighteenth-and Early Nineteenth Centuries. [REVIEW] Perspectives on Science 13 (1).
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  8. Peter Barker, Xiang Chen & Hanne Andersen (2003). Kuhn on Concepts and Categorization. In Thomas Nickles (ed.), Thomas Kuhn. Cambridge University Press. 212--245.
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  9. Xiang Chen (2003). Object and Event Concepts: A Cognitive Mechanism of Incommensurability. Philosophy of Science 70 (5):962-974.
    In this paper I examine a cognitive mechanism of incommensurability. Using the frame model of concept representation to capture structural relations within concepts, I reveal an ontological difference between object and event concepts: the former are spatial but the latter temporal. Experiments from cognitive sciences further demonstrate that the mind treats object and event concepts differently. Thus, incommensurability can occur in conceptual change across different ontological categories. I use a historical case to illustrate how the ontological difference between an object (...)
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  10. Sandra D. Mitchell, Anjan Chakravartty, Ioannis Votsis, Timothy D. Lyons, Hasok Chang, P. Kyle Stanford, Justin Garson, Uljana Feest, Andrea Scarantino & Xiang Chen (2003). 1. Preface Preface (P. Vii). Philosophy of Science 70 (5).
     
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  11. Xiang Chen (2002). The 'Platforms' for Comparing Incommensurable Taxonomies: A Cognitive-Historical Analysis. [REVIEW] Journal for General Philosophy of Science 33 (1):1-22.
    This paper examines taxonomy comparison from a cognitive perspective. Arguments are developed by drawing on the results of cognitive psychology, which reveal the cognitive mechanisms behind the practice of taxonomy comparison. The taxonomic change in 19th-century ornithology is also used to uncover the historical practice that ornithologists employed in the revision of the classification of birds. On the basis of cognitive and historical analyses, I argue that incommensurable taxonomies can be compared rationally. Using a frame model to represent taxonomy, I (...)
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  12. Xiang Chen (2001). Perceptual Symbols and Taxonomy Comparison. Philosophy of Science 3 (September):S200-S212.
    Many recent cognitive studies reveal that human cognition is inherently perceptual, sharing systems with perception at both the conceptual and the neural levels. This paper introduces Barsalou's theory of perceptual symbols and explores its implications for philosophy of science. If perceptual symbols lie in the heart of conceptual processing, the process of attribute selection during concept representation, which is critical for defining similarity and thus for comparing taxonomies, can no longer be determined solely by background beliefs. The analogous nature of (...)
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  13. Xiang Chen (2000). To See or Not to See: The Uses of Photometers and Measurements of Reflective Power. Perspectives on Science 8 (1):1-28.
    : Armed with a photometer originally designed for evaluating telescopes, Richard Potter in the early 1830s measured the re(integral)ective power of metallic and glass mirrors. Because he found significant discrepancies between his measurements and Fresnel's predictions, Potter developed doubts concerning the wave theory. However, Potter's measurements were colored by a peculiar procedure. In order to protect the sensitivity of the eye, Potter made certain approximations in the measuring process, which exaggerated the discrepancies between the theory and the data. Potter's measurements (...)
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  14. Xiang Chen & Peter Barker (2000). Continuity Through Revolutions: A Frame-Based Account of Conceptual Change During Scientific Revolutions. Philosophy of Science 67 (3):223.
    In this paper we examine the pattern of conceptual change during scientific revolutions by using methods from cognitive psychology. We show that the changes characteristic of scientific revolutions, especially taxonomic changes, can occur in a continuous manner. Using the frame model of concept representation to capture structural relations within concepts and the direct links between concept and taxonomy, we develop an account of conceptual change in science that more adequately reflects the current understanding that episodes like the Copernican revolution are (...)
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  15. Nancy Nerssessian, Xiang Chen & Peter Barker (2000). Experiment and Conceptual Change-Kuhn, Cognitive Science, and Conceptual Change-Continuity Through Revolutions: A Frame-Based Account of Conceptual Change During Scientific Revolutions. Philosophy of Science 67 (3).
     
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  16. Xiang Chen (1998). Dispersion, Experimental Apparatus, and the Acceptance of the Wave Theory of Light. Annals of Science 55 (4):401-420.
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  17. Xiang Chen, Hanne Andersen & Peter Barker (1998). Kuhn's Theory of Scientific Revolutions and Cognitive Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 11 (1):5 – 28.
    In a previous article we have shown that Kuhn's theory of concepts is independently supported by recent research in cognitive psychology. In this paper we propose a cognitive re-reading of Kuhn's cyclical model of scientific revolutions: all of the important features of the model may now be seen as consequences of a more fundamental account of the nature of concepts and their dynamics. We begin by examining incommensurability, the central theme of Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions, according to two different (...)
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  18. Xiang Chen (1997). Thomas Kuhn's Latest Notion of Incommensurability. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 28 (2):257-273.
    To correct the misconception that incommensurability implies incomparability, Kuhn lately develops a new interpretation of incommensurability. This includes a linguistic theory of scientific revolutions (the theory of kinds), a cognitive exploration of the language learning process (the analogy of bilingualism), and an epistemological discussion on the rationality of scientific development (the evolutionary epistemology). My focus in this paper is to review Kuhn's effort in eliminating relativism, highlighting both the insights and the difficulties of his new version of incommensurability . Finally (...)
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  19. Hanne Andersen, Peter Barker & Xiang Chen (1996). Kuhn's Mature Philosophy of Science and Cognitive Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 9 (3):347 – 363.
    Drawing on the results of modem psychology and cognitive science we suggest that the traditional theory of concepts is no longer tenable, and that the alternative account proposed by Kuhn may now be seen to have independent empirical support quite apart from its success as part of an account of scientific change. We suggest that these mechanisms can also be understood as special cases of general cognitive structures revealed by cognitive science. Against this background, incommensurability is not an insurmountable obstacle (...)
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  20. Xiang Chen (1995). Taxonomic Changes and the Particle-Wave Debate in Early Nineteenth-Century Britain. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 26 (2):251-271.
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  21. Xiang Chen (1994). Experimental Skills and Experiment Appraisal. In Peter Achinstein & Laura J. Snyder (eds.), Scientific Methods: Conceptual and Historical Problems. Krieger Pub. Co.. 45--66.
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  22. Xiang Chen (1994). The Rule of Reproducibility and its Applications in Experiment Appraisal. Synthese 99 (1):87 - 109.
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  23. Xiang Chen & Peter Barker (1992). Cognitive Appraisal and Power: David Brewster, Henry Brougham, and the Tactics of the Emission—Undulatory Controversy During the Early 1850s. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 23 (1):75-101.
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  24. Xiang Chen (1990). Local Incommensurability and Communicability. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990:67 - 76.
    Kuhn regards local incommensurability as an unavoidable result of changes in worldview, but his account fails to explain both historical cases in which rivals with different paradigms obtained consensus, and psychological experiments in which people with different cultural backgrounds accurately presented other points of view. Although the conditions required to generate local incommensurability were present in the dispute between Brewster and Herschel on light absorption, they succeeded in communicating. Ultimately Brewster understood his opponent's position, in the same way that subjects (...)
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  25. Xiang Chen (1990). Young and Lloyd on the Particle Theory of Light: A Response to Achinstein. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 21 (4):665-676.
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  26. Xiang Chen (1988). Reconstruction of the Optical Revolution: Lakatos Vs. Laudan. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:103 - 109.
    According to Lakatos's theory of scientific change, the victory of the wave theory in the nineteenth-century optical revolution was due to its empirical successes. However, historical facts do not support this opinion. Based on Laudan's theory of scientific change, this paper presents a different orientation to reconstruct the optical revolution. By comparing the conceptual problems that both optical theories had, this paper argues that it was the inferior status of the corpuscular theory in dealing with conceptual problems that constituted the (...)
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