w a y s h a v e b e e n . W e a l l r e m e m b e r M a (...) class='Hi'> r x ' s p o l e m i c a g a i n s t P r o u d h o n , t h e Manifesto's critique of "historical action [yielding] to personal inventive action, historically created conditions of emancipation to fantastic ones, and the gradual spontaneous class organizations of the proletariat to an organization of society specially contrived by these inventors" (Marx and Engels, 1986, 64), and the numerous other occasions when the fathers of "scientific socialism" went a f t e r t h e " u t o p i a n s . " I n general this Marxian aversion to drawing up blueprints has been healthy, fueled at least in part by a respect for the concrete specificity of the revolutionary situation and for the agents engaged in revolutionary activity: it is not the business of Marxist intellectuals to tell the agents of revolution how they are to construct their postrevolutionary economy. (shrink)
The way Cambodian patients and health professionals judge the priority of HIV-infected patients in relation to the allocation of antiretroviral drugs was examined. Participants were either (...) class='Hi'>HIV-infected patients attending the HIV/AIDS Care and Support Centre for People Living with HIV/AIDS in Phnom Penh (29 females and 21 males) or members of the staff (9 physicians, 6 pharmacists and 15 health counsellors and health educators). They were presented with stories of a few lines depicting a patient's situation and were instructed to judge the extent to which the patient should be given priority for HIV drugs. The stories were composed according to a four within-subject factor design: (a) the patient's family responsibilities, (b) the severity of infection, (c) the time elapsed since the first consultation, and (d) the financial difficulties of the family. Most patients expressed the view that the drugs should be used for the patients who are most important from a familial point of view, namely, when the family contains small children and/or is already in a precarious financial condition. (shrink)
Jiang, Wenye 江文也, A Discourse on Confucius’s Music 孔子的樂論. Translated from 上代支那正樂考—孔子の音樂論 by Y ang Rubin 楊儒賓 Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11712-009-9148- (...) class='Hi'>3 Authors Huaiyu Wang, Georgia College & State University Department of History, Geography, and Philosophy Campus Box 47 Milledgeville GA 31061 USA Journal Dao Online ISSN 1569-7274 Print ISSN 1540-3009 Journal Volume Volume 9 Journal Issue Volume 9, Number 1. (shrink)
En El constructivismo ético, C.S. Nino sostuvo que "la discusión y la decisión intersubjetiva es el procedimiento más confiable de acceso a la verdad moral". Esta (...) class='Hi'>tesis epistémica sobre el conocimiento moral posee claramente un costado político: a los fines de atender imparcialmente los intereses de todos los integrantes de una comunidad, "el intercambio de ideas y la necesidad de justificarse frente a los demás" acrecientan las posibilidades de éxito. Por el contrario, bastante menos claro resulta determinar en la obra de Nino las derivaciones de semejante tesis en lo tocante a la dimensión autorreferencial de la moralidad. Intentando llenar este vacío, exploraré en el presente trabajo las relaciones que deberían mediar entre la práctica social del discurso moral y el descubrimiento y la justificación de los ideales de conducta autorreferenciales. In El constructivismo ético, C.S. Nino pointed out that "discussion and inter-subjective decision is the most trustable procedure when trying to arrive to moral truth". This epistemic thesis about moral knowledge clearly embraces a political assessment: in order to succeed at impartially satisfying the interests of everyone in a community, "the interchange of ideas and each person's necessity to justify in the face of the others" play a pivotal role. On the contrary, when the task in question is related to the auto-referential dimension of morality, the derivations of that thesis in Nino's work become certainly unclear. By attempting to overstep this bound, I will explore in the present paper the connection that is supposed to exist between the social practice of moral communication and the discovery and justification of the auto-referential principles of behavior. (shrink)
Raul Orayen's book _Lógica, significado y ontología_ is a deep study into a range of issues in the philosophy of logic, taking Quine as the main (...) class='Hi'>interlocutor. It goes into subjects such as Truth-bearerss, Logical Truth, Validity, Propositions, Quine's Extensionalism, Relevant Logic and disjunctive syllogism, and Castañeda's ontology of Guises. (shrink)
Such thinkers as John Stuart Mill, Gerald Dworkin, and Richard Doerflinger have appealed to the value of freedom to explain both what is wrong with slavery and (...) what is wrong with selling oneself into slavery. Practical ethicists, including Dworkin and Doerflinger, sometimes use selling oneself into slavery in analogies intended to illustrate justifiable forms of paternalism. I argue that these thinkers have misunderstood the moral problem with slavery. Instead of being a central value in itself, I argue that freedom is a means of serving the real value of autonomy. Moreover, I argue that autonomy is ambiguous. In cases of conflict, autonomous choice, here called "shallow autonomy", can justifiably be limited to serve "deep autonomy", or self-rule. I use these notions to give a better understanding of the problem with selling oneself into slavery, and argue that the work of Dworkin has to be seriously revised, and Doerflinger's position has to be given up altogether.\\\ John Stuart Mill, Gerald Dworkin y Richard Doerflinger han recurrido al valor de la libertad para explicar tanto porque está mal moralmente la esclavitud como venderse uno mismo como esclavo. Los teóricos de la ética práctica, incluidos Dworkin y Doerflinger, a veces utilizan el caso de venderse uno mismo como esclavo en analogias que pretenden ilustrar formas justificables de paternalismo. Sostengo que estos pensadores han malinterpretado el problema moral con la esclavitud. Argumento que en lugar de ser un valor fundamental en si mismo, la libertad es un medio para el valor real de la autonomia. Arguyo, por otra parte, que la autónomia es ambigua. En casos de conflicto, la elección autonóma, denominada aqui "autonomia superficial", puede justificadamente estar limitada a servir a la "autonomia profunda", o autogobierno. Utilizo estas nociones para ofrecer una mejor interpretatión del problema moral con venderse uno mismo como esclavo, y sostengo que la obra de Dworkin se debe revisar con seriedad, y que se debe abandonar por completo la postura de Doerflinger. (shrink)
In this essay, I focus on Recanati's treatment of 'What is said' in his book Literal Meaning. I discuss Recanati's conception of Minimalism, his views on (...) class='Hi'> propositional completeness, and his understanding of the processes governing the semantic interpretation of meaning-controlled contextuality. In the final sections, I draw some conclusions pertaining to Recanati's assessment of the interface between pragmatic and semantic processes. /// En este ensayo me enfoco en el trato que le da Recanati a "lo que se dice" en su libro Literal Meaning. Discuto su concepción del minimismo, su posición sobre la completud proposicional y su comprensión de los procesos que rigen la interpretación semántica de la contextualidad controlada por el significado. En las secciones finales, extraigo algunas conclusiones acerca de la evaluación que Recanati hace de la interfase entre procesos semánticos y pragmáticos. (shrink)
Este trabajo discute la interpretación de Marcelo Boeri sobre el compatibilismo estoico; esto es, la tesis de que es compatible con el determinismo que rige al mundo (...) natural el que podamos ser genuinamente responsables de nuestras acciones. Según Boeri, los estoicos intentaron conciliar las dos cosas abriendo un margen de indeterminación gracias al cual nuestras acciones no están sujetas a la necesidad que domina los demás fenómenos naturales. La discusión que se ofrece aquí se basa en un análisis del concepto antiguo de lo que depende de nosotros y de los conceptos estoicos de determinismo y modalidad. /// This paper discusses Marcelo Boeri's interpretation of Stoic compatibilism, the thesis that natural determinism does not rule out that we can genuinely be responsible for our actions. According to Boeri, the Stoic hold that this is so because our actions are to a great extent free from determination. The discussion of this interpretation is based on an analysis of the ancient concept of what depends on us and of Stoic concepts of determinism and modality. (shrink)
Abstract Like all monisms Vedanta posits a distinction between the relatively and the absolutely Real, and a theory of illusion to explain their paradoxical relationship. Sankara's (...) class='Hi'>resolution of the problem emerges from his discourse on the nature of m?y? which mediates the relationship of the world of empirical, manifold phenomena and the one Reality of Brahman. Their apparent separation is an illusory fissure deriving from ignorance and maintained by ?superimposition?. M?y?, enigmatic from the relative viewpoint, is not inexplicable but only not self?explanatory. Sahkara's exposition is in harmony with sapiential doctrines from other religious traditions and implies a profound spiritual therapy. (shrink)
En este artículo me propongo analizar el punto de partida epistemológico de un reciente libro de Philip Kitcher (The Advancement of Science) a través de su discusión (...) con las concepciónes ‘escépticas’. Podemos distinguir entre dos tipos de escepticismo en Ia trama deI libro de Kitcher: uno débil y otro radical. Intentamos difinir el tipo de realismo que Kitcher defiende, para finalmente mostrar que tal tipo de realismo es posible para Kitcher en Ia medida que no toma en cuenta el escepticismo en su versión radical. En efecto, Kitcher sólo se enfrenta al escepticismo débil. Y es precisamente debido a esta restricción que es capaz de mantenerse al margen de una alternativa que sigue siendo crucial: realismo fuerte o realismo “de espíritu kantiano”.The purpose of this article is to carry out an analysis of the epistemologic standpoint on a recent book by Philip Kitcher (The Advancement of Science) by discussing the sceptic ideas which are dealt with there. We can discriminate between two kinds of scepticism appearing on Kitcher’s book: a weak and a radical one. Then we work towards a definition of the kind of realism held by this author and, finally, we try to show that such a viewpoint as Kitcher’s is possible to hold provided that we do not take the radical scepticism into account for that question. Kitcher only objects by means of the weak scepticism. And it is precisely because of that restriction that he is capable of not giving a definition of a crucial alternative: strong realism or realism in “Kantian spirit”. (shrink)
El artículo documenta y analiza las vicisitudes en torno a la incorporación de Hilbert de su famoso axioma de completitud, en el sistema axiomático para la geometría (...) euclídea. Esta tarea es emprendida sobre la base del material que aportan sus notas manuscritas para clases, correspondientes al período 1894–1905. Se argumenta que este análisis histórico y conceptual no sólo permite ganar claridad respecto de cómo Hilbert concibió originalmentela naturaleza y función del axioma de completitud en su versión geométrica, sino que además permite disipar equívocos en cuanto a la relación de este axioma con la propiedad metalógica de completitud de un sistema axiomático, tal como fue concebida por Hilbert en esta etapa inicial.The paper reports and analyzes the vicissitudes around Hilbert’s inclusion of his famous axiom of completeness, into his axiomatic system for Euclidean geometry. This task is undertaken on the basis of his unpublished notes for lecture courses, corresponding to the period 1894–1905. It is argued that this historical and conceptual analysis not only sheds new light on how Hilbert conceived originally the nature of his geometrical axiom of completeness, but also it allows to clarify some misunderstandings regarding this axiom and the metalogical property of completeness of an axiomatic system, as it was understoodby Hilbert in this initial stage. (shrink)
En este articulo relaciono dos asuntos que no se relacionan comunmente en la literatura sobre Frege: el argumento de Frege sobre la interpretacion de las oraciones de (...) identidad y su problema de referirse a las funciones. Primero expongo el argumento y concluyo que es plausible. Luego caracterizo las relaciones semanticas que el argumento le permite introducir. A continuacion trato el problema antes mencionado y muestro corno afecta a la semantica de Frege: esas relaciones semanticas se vuelven innominables y, por tanto, su seolantica resulta ser inexpresable. Finalmente considero una solucion posible a este probierna.In this paper, I relate two items not commonly related in the literature on Frege: Frege’s argument on the interpretation of identity statements and his problem of referring to functions. First, I expound the argument and conclude that it is sound. Second, I characterize the semantical relations which the argument allows him to introduce. In what follows, I deal with the above mentioned problem and show how it affects Frege’s semantics: those semantical relations become unnameable and, therefore, his semantics turns out to be unexpressible. I consider a possible solution of this problem. (shrink)
En este artículo me propongo analizar el punto de partida epistemológico de un reciente libro de Philip Kitcher (The Advancement of Science) a través de su discusión (...) con las concepciónes ‘escépticas’. Podemos distinguir entre dos tipos de escepticismo en Ia trama deI libro de Kitcher: uno débil y otro radical. Intentamos difinir el tipo de realismo que Kitcher defiende, para finalmente mostrar que tal tipo de realismo es posible para Kitcher en Ia medida que no toma en cuenta el escepticismo en su versión radical. En efecto, Kitcher sólo se enfrenta al escepticismo débil. Y es precisamente debido a esta restricción que es capaz de mantenerse al margen de una alternativa que sigue siendo crucial: realismo fuerte o realismo “de espíritu kantiano”.The purpose of this article is to carry out an analysis of the epistemologic standpoint on a recent book by Philip Kitcher (The Advancement of Science) by discussing the sceptic ideas which are dealt with there. We can discriminate between two kinds of scepticism appearing on Kitcher’s book: a weak and a radical one. Then we work towards a definition of the kind of realism held by this author and, finally, we try to show that such a viewpoint as Kitcher’s is possible to hold provided that we do not take the radical scepticism into account for that question. Kitcher only objects by means of the weak scepticism. And it is precisely because of that restriction that he is capable of not giving a definition of a crucial alternative: strong realism or realism in “Kantian spirit”. (shrink)
A través de una reconstrucción de la evolución de su pensamiento, en este artículo se estudia la utilización de infinitesimales por parte de Newton. Se distingue entre (...) dos concepciones sucesivas de lo que denominó momento. A la primera de estas entidades la caracterizó como un infinitesimal, pero a la segunda (un indivisible generador de magnitudes finitas, que interviene en su método de las primeras y últimas razones) no la consideró como tal. Se entiende así su manifestación de rechazo a los infinitesimales, formulada en una segunda etapa, y se ve que las dudas arrojadas por algunos investigadores sobre la veracidad de tal manifestación se deben a una determinada interpretación de esta última concepción de momento.This paper discusses Newton’s recourse to infinitesimals through the reconstruction of the evolution of his thought. Two successive concepts of what he termed “moment” are told apart. The first of those entities was characterized by him as an infinitesimal, while the second -an indivisible generating finite magnitudes, present in his method of first and last reasons- was not considered such an entity. This move makes understandable his express rejection of infinitesimals in the second stage, and exposes the doubts of some scholars about the sincerity of Newton’s rejection as due to a peculiar interpretation of his last concept of “moment”. (shrink)
This paper deals with the problem of future contingents, and focuses on two classical logical principles, excluded middle and bivalence. One may think that different attitudes are (...) to be adopted towards these two principles in order to solve the problem. According to what seems to be a widely held hypothesis, excluded middle must be accepted while bivalence must be rejected. The paper goes against that line of thought. In the first place, it shows how the rejection of bivalence leads to implausible consequences if excluded middle is accepted. In the second place, it addresses the question of why one should reject bivalence, and finds no satisfactory answer. /// Este artículo trata el problema de los futuros contingentes, y se enfoca en dos principios lógicos clásicos: el tercero excluido y la bivalencia. Se podría pensar que una solución del problema requiere actitudes diferentes hacia estos dos principios. Según una hipótesis que parece ampliamente compartida, el tercero excluido debe ser aceptado, mientras que la bivalencia debe ser rechazada. Este artículo argumenta en contra de esta línea de pensamiento. En primer lugar, se aborda cómo el rechazo de la bivalencia lleva a consecuencias poco plausibles si el tercero excluido es aceptado. En segundo lugar, se enfrenta la cuestión de por qué se debería rechazar la bivalencia, sin encontrar una respuesta satisfactoria. (shrink)
<span class='Hi'>span><span class='Hi'>span><span class='Hi'>span><span class='Hi'>span><span class='Hi'>span><span class='Hi'>span><span class='Hi'>span> readers of Greek ethics tend to (...) class='Hi'> favour those accounts of the virtuous ideal according to which virtue involves the development of our non-rational—appetitive and emotional—<span class='Hi'>span> motivations as well as of our rational motivations.<span class='Hi'>span> So our contemporaries find much of interest and sympathy in Aristotle’s conception of virtue as a condition in which reason does not simply override our appetites and emotions,<span class='Hi'>span> but these non-rational motivations themselves <span class='Hi'>span>‘speak with the same voice as reason’<span class='Hi'>span>.2 By contrast,<span class='Hi'>span> the Stoic.<span class='Hi'>span>. (shrink)
This review looks at Sarah Hoagland's Lesbian Ethics from the position of a lesbian who is also a cultural participant in a colonized heterosexualist culture (la (...) class='Hi'>cultura Nuevomejicana) within the powerful context of its colonizing heterosexualist culture (Angloamerican culture). From this position separation from heterosexualism acquires great complexity since the position described is that of a plural self. In Lesbian Ethics lesbian community is the community of separation where demoralization is avoided by auto-koenonous selves. Because heterosexualism is not a cross-cultural or international system but a series of systems some of which dominate over others and threaten their <span class='Hi'>extinctionspan>, lesbian pluralism cannot be achieved through the inclusion of lesbians of different cultures, classes and situations in a separating group. Neither the need for nor the value of separation from heterosexualism are undermined by the increased complexity that this position adds to the analysis. (shrink)
Los estudios de géneros discursivos han prestado poca atención a las tesis o seminarios producidos para la obtención del grado de licenciatura. En este artículo se describe, (...) desde el enfoque del genre analysis (Swales, 1990), la organización retórica del marco referencial de un conjunto de 30 tesis de pregrado elaboradas por estudiantes de la carrera de Trabajo Social de la UCSC. Se identifican cuatro movidas retóricas: teórico, conceptual, empírico y normativo. Se observa que cada una tiene propósitos diferentes sobre cuestiones teóricas, prácticas y legales relacionadas con el problema social que aborda cada tesis. Se advierte la presencia de algunos pasos retóricos recursivo y, al mismo tiempo, un fuerte compromiso de la investigación con la resolución de un problema social real. Studies of discourse genre have paid little attention to graduation theses produced by undergraduate students. This article describes, from a genre analysis approach (Swales, 1990), the rhetorical organization of the reference framework of a set of 30 undergraduate theses prepared by social work students at the UCSC. The study identifies four rhetorical moves: theoretical, conceptual, empirical, and normative. It is observed that each move has different purposes on theoretical, practical, and legal issues related to the social problem addressed by each thesis. The presence of recursive rhetorical steps is apparent, along with a strong commitment to solving real social problems through research. (shrink)
This paper presents an interpretation of the paradoxical decision of Abraham done by Søren A. Kierkegaard in his work Fear and Trembling as an ethics of silence. (...) The main idea is to understand ethics not as moral standards or specific duties, but as the responsibility of becoming a single individual in time; singularity as the intimate and personal relationship with the calling of love. In such a way, that silence is the experience of the encounter with the paradox that being human means to be singular in conditions that claim an universal and general transparent manifestation dependent of the dominant rational discourse.Then, silence becomes the fundamental ethical claim to become a human person, as spirit in time, where it becomes a time of trial and examination, a temporality, where the trial is the fidelity to love’s calling, the listening of the possibilities that are presented by the anxiety of the decision. These possibilities are not immanent to the world or to history, they call for a personal choice, always containing a space of revelation; therefore of listening to the interiority of the personal choice that for Kierkegaard is the passion of faith, communicated and lived in silence. Concluding that an ethics of silence by the image of Abraham implies to re-think the role of philosophy in relationship to faith, hope and love in time, as a silent thought. (shrink)
One of the most radical dimensions of Davis’s critique of American democracy is her exposure of the vestiges of slavery that remain in the contemporary criminal (...) class='Hi'>justice system. I discuss this aspect of her critical project, its roots in Du Bois’s critique of Black Reconstruction, and the way that it informs her prison abolitionism and her two-pronged program for the formation of a genuine “abolition democracy.” I conclude by reflecting upon Davis’s reticence about abolition as a constructive enterprise and assessing some of the challenges faced by the contemporary abolitionist movement. (shrink)
La presente antología es fruto de la colaboración entre profesores de las Universidades de Paraíba (Brasil) y Jaén (España) y sólo pretende presentar un conjunto de textos (...) extraídos de obras de autores de origen judeoconverso, o vinculados con la antigua Universidad de Baeza (siglos XVI y XVII). En estos fragmentos quedan de manifiesto planteamientos comunes sobre la observación de la naturaleza y el conocimiento, pautas y orientaciones de carácter pedagógico, criterios para la organización del cuerpo social, visión de la espiritualidad, inquietudes por la formación de la mujer, o el problema de la evangelización y adoctrinamiento de los amerindios. (shrink)
In this paper the relations between the almost unknown Spanish mathematician Ventura Reyes Prósper (1863-1922) with Charles S. Peirce and Christine Ladd-Franklin are described. Two brief (...) class='Hi'> papers from Reyes Prósper published in El Progreso Matemático 12 (20 December 1891), pp. 297-300, and 18 (15 June 1892) pp. 170-173 on Ladd-Franklin, and on Peirce and Mitchell, respectively, are translated for first time into English and included at the end of the paper. (shrink)
Proponents of “truth-value glut” responses to the paradoxes of self-reference, such as Priest [6, 7] argue that “truth-value gap” analyses of the paradoxes fall foul (...) of the strengthened liar paradox: “this sentence is not true.” If we pay attention to the role of assertion and denial and the behaviour of negation in both “gap” and “glut” analyses, we see that the situation with these approaches has a pleasing symmetry: gap approaches take some denials to fail to be expressible by negation, and glut approaches take some negations to not express denials. But in the light of this symmetry, considerations against a gap view point to parallel considerations against a glut view. Those who find some reason to prefer one view over another (and this is almost everyone) must find some reason to break this symmetry. (shrink)
