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  1. Yaroslav Shramko (forthcoming). The Logical Way of Being True: Truth Values and the Ontological Foundation of Logic. Logic and Logical Philosophy.
    In this paper I reject the normative interpretation of logic and give reasons for a realistic account based on the ontological treatment of logical values.
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  2. Dmitry Zaitsev & Yaroslav Shramko (2013). Bi-Facial Truth: A Case for Generalized Truth Values. Studia Logica 101 (6):1299-1318.
    We explore a possibility of generalization of classical truth values by distinguishing between their ontological and epistemic aspects and combining these aspects within a joint semantical framework. The outcome is four generalized classical truth values implemented by Cartesian product of two sets of classical truth values, where each generalized value comprises both ontological and epistemic components. This allows one to define two unary twin connectives that can be called “semi-classical negations”. Each of these negations deals only with one of the (...)
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  3. Yaroslav Shramko (2012). What is a Genuine Intuitionistic Notion of Falsity? Logic and Logical Philosophy 21 (1):3-23.
    I highlight the importance of the notion of falsity for a semantical consideration of intuitionistic logic. One can find two principal (and non-equivalent) versions of such a notion in the literature, namely, falsity as non-truth and falsity as truth of a negative proposition. I argue in favor of the first version as the genuine intuitionistic notion of falsity.
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  4. Yaroslav Shramko, Truth Values. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  5. Yaroslav Shramko & Heinrich Wansing (2009). Editorial Introduction. Truth Values: Part I. [REVIEW] Studia Logica 91 (3):295-304.
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  6. Yaroslav Shramko & Heinrich Wansing (2009). Editorial Introduction. Truth Values: Part II. [REVIEW] Studia Logica 92 (2):143-146.
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  7. Yaroslav Shramko & Heinrich Wansing (2009). The Slingshot Argument and Sentential Identity. Studia Logica 91 (3):429 - 455.
    The famous “slingshot argument” developed by Church, Gödel, Quine and Davidson is often considered to be a formally strict proof of the Fregean conception that all true sentences, as well as all false ones, have one and the same denotation, namely their corresponding truth value: the true or the false . In this paper we examine the analysis of the slingshot argument by means of a non-Fregean logic undertaken recently by A.Wóitowicz and put to the test her claim that the (...)
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  8. Yaroslav Shramko & Heinrich Wansing (2009). Truth Values. Part I. Studia Logica 91 (3).
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  9. Yaroslav Shramko & Heinrich Wansing (2009). Truth Values. Part II. Studia Logica 92 (2).
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  10. Heinrich Wansing & Yaroslav Shramko (2008). Erratum to Suszko's Thesis, Inferential Many-Valuedness, and the Notion of a Logical System Studia Logica , 88:405–429, 2008. [REVIEW] Studia Logica 89 (1):147-147.
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  11. Heinrich Wansing & Yaroslav Shramko (2008). Suszko's Thesis, Inferential Many-Valuedness, and the Notion of a Logical System. Studia Logica 88 (3):405 - 429.
    According to Suszko’s Thesis, there are but two logical values, true and false. In this paper, R. Suszko’s, G. Malinowski’s, and M. Tsuji’s analyses of logical twovaluedness are critically discussed. Another analysis is presented, which favors a notion of a logical system as encompassing possibly more than one consequence relation. [A] fundamental problem concerning many-valuedness is to know what it really is. [13, p. 281].
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  12. Yaroslav Shramko & Heinrich Wansing (2007). Entailment Relations and/as Truth Values. Bulletin of the Section of Logic 36 (3/4):131-143.
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  13. Yaroslav Shramko & Heinrich Wansing (2006). Hyper-Contradictions, Generalized Truth Values and Logics of Truth and Falsehood. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 15 (4):403-424.
    In Philosophical Logic, the Liar Paradox has been used to motivate the introduction of both truth value gaps and truth value gluts. Moreover, in the light of “revenge Liar” arguments, also higher-order combinations of generalized truth values have been suggested to account for so-called hyper-contradictions. In the present paper, Graham Priest's treatment of generalized truth values is scrutinized and compared with another strategy of generalizing the set of classical truth values and defining an entailment relation on the resulting sets of (...)
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  14. Yaroslav Shramko (2005). Dual Intuitionistic Logic and a Variety of Negations: The Logic of Scientific Research. Studia Logica 80 (2-3):347 - 367.
    We consider a logic which is semantically dual (in some precise sense of the term) to intuitionistic. This logic can be labeled as “falsification logic”: it embodies the Popperian methodology of scientific discovery. Whereas intuitionistic logic deals with constructive truth and non-constructive falsity, and Nelson's logic takes both truth and falsity as constructive notions, in the falsification logic truth is essentially non-constructive as opposed to falsity that is conceived constructively. We also briefly clarify the relationships of our falsification logic to (...)
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  15. Yaroslav Shramko & Heinrich Wansing (2005). Some Useful 16-Valued Logics: How a Computer Network Should Think. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophical Logic 34 (2):121 - 153.
    In Belnap's useful 4-valued logic, the set 2 = {T, F} of classical truth values is generalized to the set 4 = (2) = {Ø, {T}, {F}, {T, F}}. In the present paper, we argue in favor of extending this process to the set 16 = ᵍ (4) (and beyond). It turns out that this generalization is well-motivated and leads from the bilattice FOUR₂ with an information and a truth-and-falsity ordering to another algebraic structure, namely the trilattice SIXTEEN₃ with an (...)
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  16. Heinrich Wansing, Sergei Odintsov & Yaroslav Shramko (2005). From the Editors. Studia Logica 80 (2-3):153-157.
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  17. Fabian Neuhaus, Uwe Scheffler & Yaroslav Shramko (2003). Tautologien und Trivialitäten? Logische Methoden in der Philosophie. Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 57 (3):412 - 430.
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  18. Yaroslav Shramko (2003). Relevant Properties. Logic and Logical Philosophy 2 (5):103-115.
    I would like to start my paper with the following statement of Barry Smith: “Relevance logic has become ontologically fertile.”.
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  19. Yaroslav Shramko, J. Michael Dunn & Tatsutoshi Takenaka (2001). The Trilaticce of Constructive Truth Values. Journal of Logic and Computation 11 (1):761--788.
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  20. Olga Korpalo, Valentin Omelyantchik & Yaroslav Shramko (1999). Presentation. Theoria 14 (1):5-9.
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  21. Valentín Omelyantchik, Yaroslav Shramko & Olga Korpalo (1999). Analytical Philosophy and Epistemology in Ukraine: Presentation. Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 14 (34):5-9.
  22. Yaroslav Shramko (1999). A Theory of Relevant Properties 1: Reflections and Definitions. Theoria 14 (1):63-81.
    In the paper a theory of relevant properties is developed. The theory permits us to distinguish between properties that are relevant to an object and the properties that are irrelevant to it. Predication is meaningful only if a property is relevant to an object. On the base of introducing a special negative type of predication as opposed to usual sentential negation, a new notion of generalization for properties is defined. Context-free, as weIl as context-depended relevance of properties are considered.
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  23. Yaroslav Shramko (1999). A Theory of Relevant Properties I: Reflections and Definitions. Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 14 (34):63-81.
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  24. Yaroslav Shramko (1998). A Philosophically Plausible Modified Grzegorczyk Semantics for First-Degree Intuitionistic Entailment. Logique Et Analyse 161:162-163.
     
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  25. Yaroslav Shramko (1996). Review of Walter P. Van Stigt: Brouwer's Intuitionism. [REVIEW] Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 6 (3):292-295.
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