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  1. York H. Gunther (2004). The Phenomenology and Intentionality of Emotion. Philosophical Studies 117 (1-2):43-55.
  2. York H. Gunther (2003). Emotion and Force. In , Essays on Nonconceptual Content. MIT Press. 279--88.
    Any satisfactory model of the emotions must at once recognize their place within intentional psychology and acknowledge their uniqueness as mental causes. In the first half of the century, the James-Lange model had considerable influence on reinforcing the idea that emotions are non-intentional (see Lange 1885 and James 1890). The uniqueness of emotions was therefore acknowledged at the price of denying them a place within intentional psychology proper. More recently, cognitive reductionists (including identity theorists) like Robert Solomon and Joel Marks (...)
     
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  3. York H. Gunther (ed.) (2003). Essays on Nonconceptual Content. MIT Press.
  4. York H. Gunther, A Theory of Emotional Content.
    The revived interest in the emotions has generated much discussion of late. Analyses typically begin by considering the various features that are involved in emotional experience generally, e.g., feeling, physiology, cognition, and behavior. This is often followed by explanations about the role of emotions in rationality, moral psychology, ethics, and/or society, as well as examinations of specific emotions like pride, jealousy, love, or guilt. Overall, the topic has been approached from a diversity of perspectives, including philosophy, psychology, evolutionary theory, and (...)
     
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  5. York H. Gunther (2001). Content, Illusion, Partition. Philosophical Studies 102 (2):185-202.
    Philosophers of mind have recently sought to establish a theoret- ical use for nonconceptual content. Although there is disagreement about what nonconceptual content is supposed to be, this much is clear. A state with nonconceptual content is mental. Hence, while one may deny that refrigerators and messy rooms have conceptual capacities, their states, as physical and not mental, do not have nonconceptual content. A state with nonconceptual content is also intentional, which is to say that it represents a feature of (...)
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  6. York H. Gunther (1995). Perceptual Content and the Subpersonal. Conference 6 (1):31-45.
     
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