Although chimpanzees have been reported to understand to some extent others' visual perception, previous studies using food requesting tasks are divided on whether or not chimpanzees understand the role of eye gaze. One plausible reason for this discrepancy may be the familiarity of the testing situation. Previous food requesting tasks with negative results used an unfamiliar situation that may be difficult for some chimpanzees to recognize as a requesting situation, whereas those with positive results used a familiar situation. The present (...) study tested chimpanzees' understanding of others' attentional states by comparing two requesting situations: an unfamiliar situation in which food was put on a table, and a familiar situation in which chimpanzees requested food held by an experimenter. Chimpanzees showed evidence of understanding the experimenter's attentional variations and the role of eye gaze only in the latter task. This suggests that an unfamiliar requesting situation may keep subjects from expressing their understanding of others' attentional states even though they are sensitive to them. Keywords: Understanding attention; Social cognition; Chimpanzees. (shrink)
A robot that is easy to teach not only has to be able to adapt to humans but also has to be easily adaptable to. In order to develop a robot with mutual adaptation ability, we believe that it will be beneficial to first observe the mutual adaptation behaviors that occur in humanâhuman communication. In this paper, we propose a humanâhuman WOZ (Wizard-of-Oz) experiment setting that can help us to observe and understand how the mutual adaptation procedure occurs between human (...) beings in nonverbal communication. By analyzing the experimental results, we obtained three important findings: alignment-based action, symbol-emergent learning, and environmental learning. (shrink)
In this paper, I argue that later Nishida's analysis of self-awareness (jikaku) provides a new perspective on the nature of self-awareness as understood in the philosophical literature today. I argue that the contemporary literature deals with two kinds of self-awareness; the higher-order theory understands self-awareness to be an objectified awareness and the phenomenological tradition generally understands self-awareness to be, at least primarily, a non-objectified awareness. In light of this, I first give an account of Nishida's ?acting-intuition? with reference to the (...) ?historical body.? Then I argue that later Nishida's analysis of self-awareness depicts the inadequacy of the two kinds of self-awareness as both being stuck in the subject-object dichotomy which, according to Nishida, is but one mode of experience, namely the mode of difference. Nishida provides an account that ultimately foregrounds the experiential mode of unity that negates any sense of differentiation between the subject and object. (shrink)
The idea to work on this topic was come to my mind when I came across Masaaki Hattori’s comment that Dinnaga has accepted Bhartrhari’s views regarding the meaning of a sentence although their theories of word meaning are completely different from each other. According to Bhartrhari, in all phenomenal entities there are two elements viz. jati and vyakti; jati refers to the real element and vyakti to the unreal. Vyakti suffer changes, whereas jati remains constant. Again according to him (...) the real unit of language is a sentence, and not words or letters, because only a sentence conveys one full idea of the speaker. It’s meaning is also an instantaneous flash of pratibha or intuition, which has no parts. Dinnaga, on the other hand did not accept the reality of word‐ meaning (samanya),but maintained that words deal directly with conceptual images or vikalpas, which are purely subjective constructions of the mind, and therefore there can be no direct connection between words and external objects. The function of a word in a sentence is similar to the function of an inferential mark (linga) in the process of inference and it indicates its object through the exclusion of other things (apoha). Thus, there seems to be some contradictions in Dinnaga’s views on sentence meaning. But I think Dinnaga did not accept Bhartrhari’s views in toto. He could not possibly have done so. There is, however, a resemblance between Dinnaga and Bhartrhari in that each accepted that the primary unit of linguistic meaning is the entire sentence; the meaning of an individual word is abstracted from the whole meaning of the sentence. It is only in that respect that the two philosophers can be said to have roughly the same theory of sentential meaning. (shrink)
This proposal for Philosophy of Science Society Japan and its members presents recommendations toward improvement of logic education, outline of logic curriculum to be shared among community, and requisite components of logical skills and knowledge for philosophers of each field. It also provides information on the past workshops on logic education by PSSJ as well as a summary of ASL guideline and ASL inquiry on logic education (1995).
The goal of computational cognitive neuroscience is to understand how the brain embodies the mind by using biologically based computational models comprised of networks of neuronlike units. This text, based on a course taught by Randall O'Reilly and Yuko Munakata over the past several years, provides an in-depth introduction to the main ideas in the field. The neural units in the simulations use equations based directly on the ion channels that govern the behavior of real neurons and the neural (...) networks incorporate anatomical and physiological properties of the neocortex. Thus the text provides the student with knowledge of the basic biology of the brain as well as the computational skills needed to simulate large-scale cognitive phenomena. (shrink)
The developmental modeling approach to investigating developmental disorders appears highly promising. In this commentary, we question the untapped potential of this approach for supporting insights into particular developmental disorders, developmental processes across the life span, and the viability of traditional theories of developmental disorders.
With our state-guaranteed or internationally recognized human rights, liberalism is rather a common basis of political discussion today. John Rawls’s theory of justice, which set a framework for liberal theory of justice in the last decades of the twentieth century, is notably contractarian. Martha Nussbaum, although claiming to be a neo-Aristotelian, argues that her capabilities approach (hereafter CA) can upgrade the liberal theory of justice, particularly that of political liberalism, to deal with unsolved problems of justice, namely, disability, nationality, and (...) species membership. However, this paper argues that her proposal issuccessful only when her CA-based theory proves its affiliation with political liberalism in more detail. As defined by Rawls, political liberalism produces “free-standing” political conceptions and rejects any metaphysical or religious ideas. It halts conceptions of justice that promote conceptions of good derived from particular comprehensive doctrines. I do not believe a mere convergence between CA and contractarianism is sufficient enough to secure the rational acceptability of her CA-based theory. I suggest that if she wishes to maintain her CA-based theory’s being politically liberal, she either has to prove more of the public, in particular the global public, acceptability of her intuitive ideas of human dignity without relying on her intuitions or alter the meaning of political liberalism itself so that it allows a room for some sort of comprehensive doctrine. (shrink)