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  1. Zachary Ernst, An Incomplete Rough Draft of a Paper on Using Automata to Describe Infinite Countermodels for Propositional Calculi (and Maybe Algebras, Too).
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  2. Zachary Ernst (2011). What Is Common Knowledge? Episteme 8 (3):209-226.
    Common knowledge is usually defined as a state in which everyone knows that p, everyone knows that everyone knows that p, and so on, ad infinitum. This definition is usually attributed to David Lewis, despite the fact that his own formulation bears no resemblance to common knowledge as it is usually understood. In this paper, I argue that this concept of common knowledge requires revision. Contrary to usual practice, it turns out to be difficult to model formally because existing models (...)
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  3. Sara Rachel Chant & Zachary Ernst (2008). Epistemic Conditions for Collective Action. Mind 117 (467):549-573.
    Writers on collective action are in broad agreement that in order for a group of agents to form a collective intention, the members of that group must have beliefs about the beliefs of the other members. But in spite of the fact that this so-called "interactive knowledge" is central to virtually every account of collective intention, writers on this subject have not offered a detailed account of the nature of interactive knowledge. In this paper, we argue that such an account (...)
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  4. Hans-Johan Glock, Judith Baker, Eliza Block, Sarah Buss, Sara Rachel Chant, Zachary Ernst, Gopal Sreenivasan & Sungho Choi (2008). Index of MIND Vol. 117 Nos 1–4, 2008. Mind 117:468.
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  5. Sara Rachel Chant & Zachary Ernst (2007). Group Intentions as Equilibria. Philosophical Studies 133 (1):95 - 109.
    In this paper, we offer an analysis of ‘group intentions.’ On our proposal, group intentions should be understood as a state of equilibrium among the beliefs of the members of a group. Although the discussion in this paper is non-technical, the equilibrium concept is drawn from the formal theory of interactive epistemology due to Robert Aumann. The goal of this paper is to provide an analysis of group intentions that is informed by important work in economics and formal epistemology.
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  6. Zachary Ernst (2007). Game Theory in Evolutionary Biology. In David L. Hull & Michael Ruse (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to the Philosophy of Biology. Cambridge University Press.
     
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  7. Zachary Ernst (2007). Philosophical Issues Arising From Experimental Economics. Philosophy Compass 2 (3):497–507.
    Human beings are highly irrational, at least if we hold to an economic standard of ‘rationality’. Experimental economics studies the irrational behavior of human beings, with the aim of understanding exactly how our behavior deviates from the Homo economicus, as ‘rational man’ has been called. Insofar as philosophical theories depend upon rationality assumptions, experimental economics is the source of both problems and (at least potential) solutions to several philosophical issues. This article offers a programmatic and highly biased survey of some (...)
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  8. Zachary Ernst (2007). The Liberationists' Attack on Moral Intuitions. American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (2):129 - 142.
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  9. Zachary Ernst & Sara Rachel Chant (2007). Collective Action as Individual Choice. Studia Logica 86 (3):415 - 434.
    We argue that conceptual analyses of collective action should be informed by game-theoretic analyses of collective action. In particular, we argue that Ariel Rubenstein’s so-called ‘Electronic Mail Game’ provides a useful model of collective action, and of the formation of collective intentions.
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  10. Zachary Ernst (2005). A Plea for Asymetric Games. Journal of Philosophy 102 (3):109 - 125.
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  11. Zachary Ernst (2005). Robustness and Conceptual Analysis in Evolutionary Game Theory. Philosophy of Science 72 (5):1187-1196.
  12. Zachary Ernst (2002). Completions From TV-> to H->. Bulletin of the Section of Logic 31 (1):7-14.
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  13. Zachary Ernst, Branden Fitelson, Kenneth Harris & Larry Wos (2002). Shortest Axiomatizations of Implicational S4 and S. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 43 (3):169-179.
    Shortest possible axiomatizations for the implicational fragments of the modal logics S4 and S5 are reported. Among these axiomatizations is included a shortest single axiom for implicational S4—which to our knowledge is the first reported single axiom for that system—and several new shortest single axioms for implicational S5. A variety of automated reasoning strategies were essential to our discoveries.
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  14. Zachary Ernst (2001). Explaining the Social Contract. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (1):1-24.
    Brian Skyrms has argued that the evolution of the social contract may be explained using the tools of evolutionary game theory. I show in the first half of this paper that the evolutionary game-theoretic models are often highly sensitive to the specific processes that they are intended to simulate. This sensitivity represents an important robustness failure that complicates Skyrms's project. But I go on to make the positive proposal that we may none the less obtain robust results by simulating the (...)
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  15. Zachary Ernst, Branden Fitelson, Kenneth Harris & Larry Wos (2001). A Concise Axiomatization of RM→. Bulletin of the Section of Logic 30 (4):191-194.
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