In a recent paper, Cavusoglu and Tebaldi (2006) provided an evaluation of neoclassical and endogenous growth theories according to Lakatos's methodology of scientific research programmes. This paper offers three criticisms of their contribution as well as a rival Lakatosian appraisal of growth theories. First, we hold that Cavusoglu and Tebaldi do not provide a proper structure of theory comparison in their contribution. Second, we argue that they use an inadequate version of Lakatos's appraisal criterion. Third, against the claim (...) of the authors, we show that there are seminal endogenous growth models, which predict income convergence among countries. Finally, in contrast to Cavusoglu and Tebaldi, our analysis suggests that by Lakatos's standards, Schumpeterian variant of endogenous growth theory is both theoretically and empirically progressive over neoclassical growth theory. (shrink)
Table of ContentsAndrzej KLAWITER, Krzystof #ASTOWSKI: Introduction: Originality, Courage and Responsibility List of Books by Leszek NowakSelected Bibliography of Leszek Nowak's WritingsScience and Idealization Theo A.F. KUIPERS: On Two ...
This paper attempts to define the concept of placebo as it is used in the clinical context The author claims that X is a placebo if and only if X has such a property dp, that whenever in a therapeutic situation T a stimulus S appears, then in attending conditions A, it will cause a beneficial reaction R in the patient. Formally, the same structure may be used to define any pharmacologically active drug. The main difference between the drug and (...) a placebo is in the range of possible substitutions for X and the property d. For the active drug there is only one possible substitution for X and property d and it can be scientifically explained why, and how the drug works. In the case of a placebo a set of possible substitutions for X and d is open, and so far it is impossible to offer any scientifically valid explanation of the action mechanism of placebo. (shrink)
In the Letter to the Faculty of Theology of the Sorbonne, Descartes makes a reference to Leo's X's encyclical Apostolici Regiminis (1513), which supports the Aristotelian-Scholastic conception of the soul as anima corporis forma According to Descartes' doctrine of the eternal truths, God's power is absolutely unlimited. One of the consequences of this doctrine is that God could join a rational (human) soul to any body, which implies that the union of soul and the body in the Cartesian system is (...) not substantial in the Scholastic sense of the word. In bringing in Leo's X's encyclical to support his conception of the soul, Descartes used a papal document for purposes contrary to those for which it had been designed. Dans la Lettre à la Faculté de théologie de la Sorbonne, Descartes fait référence à l'encyclique Apostolici Regiminis (1513), qui soutient la conception aristotélico-scolastique de l'âme en tant qu'anima corporis forma Or, selon la doctrine de la création des vérités éternelles, le pouvoir de Dieu est sans limites : une de ses conséquences en est que Dieu eût pu unir l'âme rationnelle (humaine) à n'importe quel corps, ce qui implique que l'union de l'âme et du corps dans la philosophie cartésienne ne soit pas substantielle — du moins au sens scolastique du terme. En citant l'encyclique Apostolici Regiminis au commencement des Meditations, Descartes a en fait utilisé le document pontifical à l'opposé du but pour lequel il avait été conçu. (shrink)
Technology has been developed in order to protect and safeguard human dignity; however, technology may also threaten it. The principle of human dignity plays an important role in assessing medical technology and medical practices. Keywords: autonomy, medical ethics, dignity, technology assessment, Poland, bioethics CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this?
The presence of philosophy, amidst other humanities,within the body of medical education seems to raise no doubt nowadays. There are, however, some questions of a general nature to be discussed regarding the aforementioned fact. Three of them are of the greatest importance: (1) What image of medicine prevails in modern Western societies? (2)What ideals of medical professionals are commonly shared in these societies? (3) What is the intellectual background of the students of medico-related faculties? The real purposes and goals ascribed (...) to philosophy as a part of medical curricula, as well as methods of teaching philosophy depend on the answers given to these questions. An option to be presented here is influenced by the experience of teaching philosophy to students of medical faculties at the Jagiellonian University in Krakw. This approach is deliberately posed against mainstream medical education that is usually based on an unquestioned belief in the power of biomedical sciences. Such a model cannot, however,pretend to be a universal one to be implemented allover the world. In any case, it is the only thing a philosopher can do to improve the quality of a physician-patient encounter in facing a disease. (shrink)
When theoreticians talk about noise, they frequently forget about the idealization coupled with this term. Another implicit and rarely mentioned assumption is that the tools of mathematics used are idealizations, too. Though some of Tsuda's ideas are similar to mine (e.g., we both believe that nonlinearity is one of the main reasons why the brain works the way it does; Kowalik et al. 1996), some critical remarks are in order.
Scanlon grounds all moral principles in claims about "what individuals have reasons to agree to." Analyzing Scanlon's groundwork, I discuss his central reason for being concerned with morality and why personal and impersonal reasons for moral conduct cannot co-exist in his contractualism. I demonstrate that personal values and reasons are incommensurable with impersonal values and reasons. Thus, Scanlon needs to exclude impersonal reasons from the moral theory he advocates. But I argue that there may be a means of inclusion of (...) both the personal and impersonal values and reasons. I propose Aristotelian virtue ethics as a plausible foundation for subordinating the impersonal values and reasons to the value of human rationality in its full capacity. This subordination may provide the defensible condition that Scanlon's contractualism requires to justify moral principles to each person on the grounds of respect for human rationality. (shrink)
The properties of monotonic inference systems and the properties of their theories are strongly linked. These links, however, are much weaker in nonmonotonic inference systems. In this paper we introduce the notion of anaxiomatic variety for a theory and show how this notion, instead of the notion of a theory, can be used for the syntactic and semantic analysis of nonmonotonic inferences.