Search results for 'Zhuran You' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Zhuran You & A. G. Rud (2010). A Model of Dewey's Moral Imagination for Service Learning: Theoretical Explorations and Implications for Practice in Higher Education. Education and Culture 26 (2):36-51.score: 120.0
    Moral education through service learning at post-secondary level is an important but under-researched field. Most existing studies center on its learning outcomes like academic progress, personal development, communication, and leadership skills, with only a few evaluating the moral development of college students participating in service-learning projects. The lack of study on moral development in service learning indicates a need for clarification of the theoretical underpinnings of service learning, John Dewey's ideas on moral growth, in particular his model of moral imagination (...)
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  2. Zongqi You (2006). Xin Bu Xin You Ni: Cong Zhe Xue Kan Zong Jiao. San Min Shu Ju.score: 120.0
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  3. Alan Levinovitz (2012). The Zhuangzi and You 遊: Defining an Ideal Without Contradiction. Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 11 (4):479-496.score: 18.0
    You 遊 is a crucial term for understanding the Zhuangzi . Translated as “play,” “free play,” and “wandering,” it is usually defined as an ideal, playful Zhuangzian way of being. There are two problems with this definition. The first is logical: the Zhuangzi cannot consistently recommend playfulness as an ideal, since doing so vitiates the essence of you —it becomes an ethical imperative instead of an activity freely undertaken for its own sake. The second problem is performative: arguments for playful (...)
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  4. Gene Fendt (1995). Resolution, Catharsis, Culture: As You Like It. Philosophy and Literature 19 (2):248-260.score: 15.0
  5. Zhuran You A. G. Rud (2010). A Model of Dewey's Moral Imagination for Service Learning: Theoretical Explorations and Implications for Practice in Higher Education. Education and Culture 26 (2):36-51.score: 15.0
  6. Who Do You ThinkYou Are (2009). In “You're Not in Kansas Anymore,” Canadian Author Ivan E. Coyote Prepares to Change Her Legal Name and Writes About the Anxieties That This Creates. In Laurie J. Shrage (ed.), You've Changed: Sex Reassignment and Personal Identity. Oup Usa.score: 15.0
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  7. Stacy Thompson (2009). Consumer Ethics in Thank You For Smoking. Film-Philosophy 13 (1).score: 15.0
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  8. Roman Frigg & Ioannis Votsis (2011). Everything You Always Wanted to Know About Structural Realism but Were Afraid to Ask. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (2):227-276.score: 12.0
    Everything you always wanted to know about structural realism but were afraid to ask Content Type Journal Article Pages 227-276 DOI 10.1007/s13194-011-0025-7 Authors Roman Frigg, Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method, London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London, WC2A 2AE UK Ioannis Votsis, Philosophisches Institut, Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf, Universitätsstraße 1, Geb. 23.21/04.86, 40225 Düsseldorf, Germany Journal European Journal for Philosophy of Science Online ISSN 1879-4920 Print ISSN 1879-4912 Journal Volume Volume 1 Journal Issue Volume 1, Number 2.
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  9. Tyler Doggett & Andy Egan (2007). Wanting Things You Don't Want: The Case for an Imaginative Analogue of Desire. Philosophers' Imprint 7 (9):1-17.score: 12.0
    You’re imagining, in the course of a different game of make-believe, that you’re a bank robber. You don’t believe that you’re a bank robber. You are moved to point your finger, gun-wise, at the person pretending to be the bank teller and say, “Stick ‘em up! This is a robbery!”.
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  10. Roger White (2010). You Just Believe That Because…. Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):573-615.score: 12.0
    I believe that Tom is the proud father of a baby boy. Why do I think his child is a boy? A natural answer might be that I remember that his name is ‘Owen’ which is usually a boy’s name. Here I’ve given information that might be part of a causal explanation of my believing that Tom’s baby is a boy. I do have such a memory and it is largely what sustains my conviction. But I haven’t given you just (...)
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  11. Chris Tucker (2014). If Dogmatists Have a Problem with Cognitive Penetration, You Do Too. Dialectica 68 (1):35-62.score: 12.0
    Perceptual dogmatism holds that if it perceptually seems to S that P, then S thereby has prima facie perceptual justification for P. But suppose Wishful Willy's desire for gold cognitively penetrates his perceptual experience and makes it seem to him that the yellow object is a gold nugget. Intuitively, his desire-penetrated seeming can't provide him with prima facie justification for thinking that the object is gold. If this intuitive response is correct, dogmatists have a problem. But if dogmatists have a (...)
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  12. James L. Christian, What Do You Mean Philosophy???score: 12.0
    Sometime, at your leisure—if you want to know what philosophy is—go into a large bookstore and browse. Check a variety of books in psychology, anthropology, physics, chemistry, archeology, astronomy, and other nonfiction fields. Look at the last chapter in each book. In a surprising number of cases, you will find that the author has chosen to round out his work with a final summation of what the book is all about. That is, having written a whole book on a specialized (...)
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  13. Mitchell S. Green (2005). &Quot;you Perceive with Your Mind&Quot;: Knowledge and Perception. In D. Darby and T. Shelby (ed.), Hip Hop and Philosophy. Open Court.score: 12.0
    A major theme in rap lyrics is that the only way to survive is to use your head, be aware, know whats going on around you. That simple idea packs a lot of background. The most obvious ideas about knowledge turn out if you look at them close up to be pretty questionable. For example: How do we get knowledge about the world? A natural and ancient answer to this question is that much if not all of our knowledge comes (...)
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  14. David Enoch, Why I Am an Objectivist About Ethics (And Why You Are, Too).score: 12.0
    You may think that you're a moral relativist or subjectivist - many people today seem to. But I don't think you are. In fact, when we start doing metaethics - when we start, that is, thinking philosophically about our moral discourse and practice - thoughts about morality's objectivity become almost irresistible. Now, as is always the case in philosophy, that some thoughts seem irresistible is only the starting point for the discussion, and under argumentative pressure we may need to revise (...)
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  15. Mitchell S. Green (2005). &Quot;you Don't See with Your Eyes, You Perceive with Your Mind&Quot;: Knowledge and Perception. In D. Darby & T. Shelby (eds.), Hip Hop and Philosophy. Open Court.score: 12.0
    A major theme in rap lyrics is that the only way to survive is to use your head, be aware, know what’s going on around you. That simple idea packs a lot of background. The most obvious ideas about knowledge turn out if you look at them close up to be pretty questionable. For example: How do we get knowledge about the world? A natural and ancient answer to this question is that much if not all of our knowledge comes (...)
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  16. Delia Graff Fara (2011). You Can Call Me 'Stupid', ... Just Don't Call Me Stupid. Analysis 71 (3):492-501.score: 12.0
    In this paper I argue that names are predicates when they occur in the appellation position of 'called'-predications. This includes not only proper names, but all names -- including quote-names of proper names and quote-names of other words or phrases. Thus in "You can call me Al", the proper name 'Al' is a predicate. And in "You can call me 'Al'," the quote-name of 'Al' -- namely ' 'Al' ' -- is also a predicate.
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  17. L. A. Paul (2015). What You Can't Expect When You're Expecting. Res Philosophica 92 (2):1-23.score: 12.0
    It seems natural to choose whether to have a child by reflecting on what it would be like to actually have a child. I argue that this natural approach fails. If you choose to become a parent, and your choice is based on projections about what you think it would be like for you to have a child, your choice is not rational. If you choose to remain childless, and your choice is based upon projections about what you think it (...)
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  18. Coleen Macnamara (2013). “Screw You!” & “Thank You”. Philosophical Studies 165 (3):893-914.score: 12.0
    If I do you a good turn, you may respond with gratitude and express that gratitude by saying “Thank you.” Similarly, if I insult you, you may react with resentment which you express by shouting, “Screw you!” or something of the sort. Broadly put, when confronted with another’s morally significant conduct, we are inclined to respond with a reactive attitude and to express that reactive attitude in speech. A number of familiar speech acts have a call-and-response structure. Questions, demands and (...)
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  19. Luce Irigaray (1996). I Love to You: Sketch for a Felicity Within History. Routledge.score: 12.0
    In I Love to You , Luce Irigaray moves from the critique of patriarchy to an exploration of the ground for a possible inter-subjectivity between the two sexes. Continuing her rejection of demands for equality, Irigaray poses the question: how can we move to a new era of sexual difference in which women and men establish lasting relations with one another without reducing the other to the status of object? Drawing upon Hegel, Irigaray proposes a dialectic appropriate to each sex (...)
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  20. David Barnett (2010). You Are Simple. In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism. Oxford University Press. 161--174.score: 12.0
    I argue that, unlike your brain, you are not composed of other things: you are simple. My argument centers on what I take to be an uncontroversial datum: for any pair of conscious beings, it is impossible for the pair itself to be conscious. Consider, for instance, the pair comprising you and me. You might pinch your arm and feel a pain. I might simultaneously pinch my arm and feel a qualitatively identical pain. But the pair we form would not (...)
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  21. Robin James (2013). From "No Future" to "Delete Yourself (You Have No Chance To Win)&Quot;. Journal of Popular Music Studies 25 (4).score: 12.0
    Beginning with the role of the Sex Pistols’s (1977) “God Save the Queen” in Lee Edelman (2004) and J. Jack Halberstam’s (2010) debates about queer death and failure, I follow a musical motive (the main guitar riff) from the Pistols track to its reappearance in Atari Teenage Riot’s (ATR’s) 1995 “Delete Yourself (You Have No Chance To Win).” In this song, as in much of ATR’s work from the 1990s, overlapping (and often appropriated) queer and Afro-diasporic aesthetics condense around the (...)
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  22. Peter Singer, What Should a Billionaire Give – and What Should You? The New York Times Magazine , December 17, 2006.score: 12.0
    What is a human life worth? You may not want to put a price tag on a it. But if we really had to, most of us would agree that the value of a human life would be in the millions. Consistent with the foundations of our democracy and our frequently professed belief in the inherent dignity of human beings, we would also agree that all humans are created equal, at least to the extent of denying that differences of sex, (...)
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  23. Selmer Bringsjord (2007). Offer: One Billion Dollars for a Conscious Robot; If You're Honest, You Must Decline. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (7):28-43.score: 12.0
    You are offered one billion dollars to 'simply' produce a proof-of-concept robot that has phenomenal consciousness -- in fact, you can receive a deliciously large portion of the money up front, by simply starting a three-year work plan in good faith. Should you take the money and commence? No. I explain why this refusal is in order, now and into the foreseeable future.
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  24. David Papineau (2003). Why You Don’T Want to Get in the Box with Schrödinger's Cat. Analysis 63 (277):51–58.score: 12.0
    By way of an example, Lewis imagines your being invited to join Schrödinger’s cat in its box for an hour. This box will either fill up with deadly poison fumes or not, depending on whether or not some radioactive atom decays, the probability of decay within an hour being 50%. The invitation is accompanied with some further incentive to comply (Lewis sets it up so there is a significant chance of some pretty bad but not life-threatening punishment if you don’t (...)
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  25. Keith DeRose (2000). Now You Know It, Now You Don't. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 5:91-106.score: 12.0
    Resistance to contextualism comes in the form of many very different types of objections. My topic here is a certain group or family of related objections to contextualism that I call “Now you know it, now you don’t” objections. I responded to some such objections in my “Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions” a few years back. In what follows here, I will expand on that earlier response in various ways, and, in doing so, I will discuss some aspects of David Lewis’s (...)
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  26. David Braun (2006). Now You Know Who Hong Oak Yun Is. Philosophical Issues 16 (1):24-42.score: 12.0
    Hong Oak Yun is a person who is over three inches tall. And now you know who Hong Oak Yun is. For if someone were to ask you ‘Who is Hong Oak Yun?’, you could answer that Hong Oak Yun is a person who is over three inches tall, and you would know what you were saying. So you know an answer to the question ‘Who is Hong Oak Yun?’, and that is sufficient for knowing who Hong Oak Yun is. (...)
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  27. Anthony Skelton (2009). Review of Peter Singer The Life You Can Save. [REVIEW] The Globe and Mail: F11.score: 12.0
    This is a review of Peter Singer The Life You Can Save. The author argues that the book is excellent and sees Singer at his best.
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  28. John Gibbons (2010). Seeing What You're Doing. In T. Szabo Gendler & J. Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press.score: 12.0
    Do we have privileged access to what we’re intentionally doing? Well, that probably depends on what privileged access is. One way to think about privileged access is to try to identify a true formal principle. One thing you’ll need to do when identifying the formal principle is to specify the relevant range of propositions to which you have privileged access. These ranges are usually specified by subject matter: propositions about your own current, conscious propositional attitudes, propositions about your own sensations, (...)
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  29. Beata Stawarska (2008). 'You' and 'I', 'Here' and 'Now': Spatial and Social Situatedness in Deixis. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (3):399 – 418.score: 12.0
    I examine the ordinary-language use of deictic terms, notably the personal, spatial and temporal markers 'I' and 'you', 'here' and 'now', in order to make manifest that their meaning is inextricably embedded within a pragmatic, perceptual and interpersonal situation. This inextricable embeddedness of deixis within the shared natural and social world suggests, I contend, an I-you connectedness at the heart of meaning and experience. The thesis of I-you connectedness extends to the larger claim about the situatedness of embodied perceivers within (...)
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  30. Liane Young & Rebecca Saxe (2010). It's Not Just What You Do, but What's on Your Mind: A Review of Kwame Anthony Appiah's “Experiments in Ethics”. [REVIEW] Neuroethics 3 (3):201-207.score: 12.0
    What is the impact of science on philosophy? In “Experiments in Ethics”, Kwame Anthony Appiah addresses this question for morality and ethics. Appiah suggests that scientific results may undermine moral intuitions by undermining our confidence in the actual sources of our intuitions, or by invalidating our factual assumptions about the causes of human behavior. Appiah worries that scientific results showing situational causes on human behavior force us to abandon the intuition, formalized in virtue ethics, that what matters is “who you (...)
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  31. Ted Honderich (1993). How Free Are You? Oxford University Press.score: 12.0
    _Can attitudes like those that have seemed welded to indeterminism and free will_ _actually go with determinism? Is it not a contradiction to suppose so? The little_ _Oxford University Press book_ _How Free Are You?_ _in its first edition, much_ _translated, was a summary of the indigestible or anyway not widely digested_.
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  32. Beata Stawarska (2009). Between You and I: Dialogical Phenomenology. Ohio University Press.score: 12.0
    Classical phenomenology -- The transcendental tradition -- The logical investigations of the I -- From the I to the ego -- The grammar of the transcendental ego -- Strawson on the primacy of personhood -- Wittgenstein on the lure of words -- The grammar of the transcendental ego -- Zahavi on transcendental subjectivity as intersubjectivity -- Contemporary arguments for the transcendental ego : Marbach, Soffer -- Schutz, Theunissen on social phenomenology -- Husserl's later thought -- The multidiscipline of dialogical phenomenology (...)
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  33. Volkert Beekman (2000). You Are What You Eat: Meat, Novel Protein Foods, and Consumptive Freedom. [REVIEW] Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 12 (2):185-196.score: 12.0
    Animal husbandry has been accused ofmaltreating animals, polluting the environment, and soon. These accusations were thought to be answered whenthe Dutch research program ``Sustainable TechnologicalDevelopment'' (STD) suggested a government-initiatedconversion from meat to novel protein foods (NPFs).STD reasoned that if consumers converted from meat toNPFs, non-sustainable animal husbandry would no longerbe needed. Whereas STD only worried about how toconstruct NPFs with a meat bite, this paper drawsattention to the presumed, but problematic, role forthe government in the execution of the STDsuggestions. Although (...)
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  34. Rachel McKinnon (2012). How Do You Know That 'How Do You Know?' Challenges a Speaker's Knowledge? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (1):65-83.score: 12.0
    It is often argued that the general propriety of challenging an assertion with ‘How do you know?’ counts as evidence for the Knowledge Norm of Assertion (KNA). Part of the argument is that this challenge seems to directly challenge whether a speaker knows what she asserts. In this article I argue for a re-interpretation of the data, the upshot of which is that we need not interpret ‘How do you know?’ as directly challenging a speaker's knowledge; instead, it's better understood (...)
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  35. Babette Babich, Nietzsche's Imperative as a Friend's Encomium: On Becoming the One You Are, Ethics, and Blessing.score: 12.0
    you ought to - you should - become the one you are -, such a command opposes the strictures of Kant’s practical imperatives, offering an assertion that seems to encourage us as what we are. As David B. Allison stresses in his book, Nietzsche’s is a voice that addresses us as a friend would: “like a friend who seems to share your every concern - and your aversions and suspicions as well. Like a true friend, he rarely tells you (...)
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  36. Susan Blackmore, Is Meditation Good for You?score: 12.0
    Are you tempted by the prospect of a reversal of ageing, increased intelligence, improved relationships or irreversible world peace? These are just some of the benefits of meditation promised by the Transcendental Meditation organisation. Admittedly, it doesn't seem very plausible. Such claims imply that sitting still silently repeating a phrase - one form of meditation practiced by the followers of the TM movement - can have profound physical, psychological and even sociological effects. Indeed, it sounds so implausible that many people (...)
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  37. Aaron Ben-Ze’ev (2008). Hating the One You Love. Philosophia 36 (3):277-283.score: 12.0
    Many testimonies, as well as fictional works, describe situations in which people find themselves hating the person that they love. This might initially appear to be contradiction, as how can one love and hate the same person at the same time? A discussion of this problem requires making a distinction between logical consistency and psychologically compatibility. Hating the one you love may be a consistent experience, but it raises difficulties concerning its psychological compatibility.
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  38. Stefano Pred Elli (2001). You Just Can't Tell: An Analysis of the Non-Specific Use of Indexicals. Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic 6 (2):103-118.score: 12.0
    In this paper I provide a semantic analysis of non-specific uses of indexical expressions, such as "you" in typical utterances of "you just can't tell". My treatment employs independently motivated conceptual tools, such as the treatment of generics within Discourse Representation Theory, and the distinction between context of utterance and context of interpretation.
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  39. Dan Heilbrunn (2009). Hermann Hesse and the Daodejing on the Wu 無 and You 有 of Sage-Leaders. Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 8 (1):79-93.score: 12.0
    Hermann Hesse (1877–1962), the poet, novelist, man of letters, and painter, created characters who, like the Daoist sages, had many paradoxical characteristics. Some of Hesse’s characters manage their paradoxical natures well and, like the balanced sages, are able to be simultaneously changing yet stable, full of life but also empty, in unison with nature and the social world. Centered between interchanging extremes, these balanced individuals are carefree yet self-controlled, efficacious in their work yet seemingly inactive, and successful in sustaining leadership (...)
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  40. Ken Wilber, So Who Are You?score: 12.0
    The witnessing of awareness can persist through waking, dreaming and deep sleep. The Witness is fully available in any state, including your own present state of awareness right now. So I'm going to talk you into this state, or try to, using what are known in Buddhism as "pointing out instructions." I am not going to try to get you into a different state of consciousness, or an altered state of consciousness, or a non-ordinary state. I am going to simply (...)
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  41. Emily Borgelt, Daniel Buchman & Judy Illes (2011). Erratum: “ This is Why You've Been Suffering”: Reflections of Providers on Neuroimaging in Mental Health Care. [REVIEW] Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 8 (1):107-107.score: 12.0
    Erratum: “ This is Why you’ve Been Suffering”: Reflections of Providers on Neuroimaging in Mental Health Care Content Type Journal Article Pages 107-107 DOI 10.1007/s11673-011-9284-4 Authors Emily Borgelt, National Core for Neuroethics, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada Daniel Z. Buchman, National Core for Neuroethics, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada Judy Illes, National Core for Neuroethics, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada Journal Journal of Bioethical Inquiry Online ISSN 1872-4353 Print ISSN 1176-7529 Journal Volume Volume 8 Journal Issue Volume (...)
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  42. Tom Dougherty (2013). Rational Numbers: A Non‐Consequentialist Explanation Of Why You Should Save The Many And Not The Few. Philosophical Quarterly 63 (252):413-427.score: 12.0
    You ought to save a larger group of people rather than a distinct smaller group of people, all else equal. A consequentialist may say that you ought to do so because this produces the most good. If a non-consequentialist rejects this explanation, what alternative can he or she give? This essay defends the following explanation, as a solution to the so-called numbers problem. Its two parts can be roughly summarised as follows. First, you are morally required to want the survival (...)
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  43. Tim van Gelder, "Heads I Win, Tails You Lose": A Foray Into the Psychology of Philosophy.score: 12.0
    One of the classic papers of Australian feminist philosophy is G. Lloyd's "The Man of Reason" (Lloyd, 1979). The main concern of this paper is the alleged maleness of the Man of Reason, i.e., the thesis that our philosophical tradition in some deep way associates the concepts rational and male. Lloyd claims that her main goal is to bring this "undoubted" thesis "into clearer focus" (p.18), and indeed she makes no strenuous effort to demonstrate that the to-be-clarified thesis is actually (...)
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  44. Neera Badhwar, Is Realism Really Bad for You? A Realistic Response Neera K. Badhwar 25th November, 2007.score: 12.0
    I. Introduction 1.1 Realism about oneself and one’s circumstances has long been regarded as a hallmark of mental health and authentic happiness by philosophers and psychologists. It has also long invited skepticism from some quarters. Recently, this skepticism has found new support in the work of some social psychologists, who claim that far from being essential for mental health or happiness, realism can be bad for you. Certain positive illusions about yourself, they say, are more conducive to health and happiness (...)
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  45. Robert Brecher (1997). Getting What You Want?: A Critique of Liberal Morality. Routledge.score: 12.0
    Bob Brecher claims that it is wrong to think that morality is simply rooted in what people want. Brecher explains that in our consumerist society, we make the assumption that getting "what people want" is our natural goal, and that this goal is usually a good one. We see that whether it is a matter of pornography or getting married--if people want it, then that's that. But is this really a good thing? Getting What You Want offers a critique of (...)
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  46. Alan Watts (2003). Become What You Are. Shambhala.score: 12.0
    “Life exists only at this very moment, and in this moment it is infinite and eternal. For the present moment is infinitely small; before we can measure it, it has gone, and yet it exists forever…. You may believe yourself out of harmony with life and its eternal Now; but you cannot be, for you are life and exist Now.”–from Become What You Are In this collection of writings, including nine new chapters never before available in book form, Watts (...)
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  47. Babette E. Babich, On Becoming the One You Are, Ethics, and Blessing.score: 12.0
    Nietzsche’s imperative call, Werde, der Du bist - Become the one you are - is, to say the least, an odd sort of imperative: dissonant and yet intrinsically inspiring. Thus Alexander Nehamas in an essay on this very theme names it the “most haunting of Nietzsche’s haunting aphorisms.” 1 Expressed as it is in The Gay Science, “Du sollst der werden, der du bist” (GS 270, KSA 3, p. 519) - Thou shalt -.
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  48. Mireille Hildebrandt (2011). Who Needs Stories If You Can Get the Data? ISPs in the Era of Big Number Crunching. Philosophy and Technology 24 (4):371-390.score: 12.0
    Who Needs Stories if You Can Get the Data? ISPs in the Era of Big Number Crunching Content Type Journal Article Category Special Issue Pages 371-390 DOI 10.1007/s13347-011-0041-8 Authors Mireille Hildebrandt, Institute of Computer and Information Sciences (ICIS), Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the Netherlands Journal Philosophy & Technology Online ISSN 2210-5441 Print ISSN 2210-5433 Journal Volume Volume 24 Journal Issue Volume 24, Number 4.
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  49. Peter Singer, Read Them, Then You Simply Must!score: 12.0
    After reading Fouts' Next Of Kin I was speechless. I can express how wonderful it is to learn from an individual whose humility, concern for life and compassion is his life work. I simply could not put the book down! It was one of the most thoughtful, eye-opening, and educated books that I have ever read. Having the opportunity to listen to Roger Fouts speak on book tour, my heart opened to his message of compassion; his willingness to express his (...)
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  50. Peter Singer, What Should a Billionaire Give €“ and What Should You?score: 12.0
    What is a human life worth? You may not want to put a price tag on a it. But if we really had to, most of us would agree that the value of a human life would be in the millions. Consistent with the foundations of our democracy and our frequently professed belief in the inherent dignity of human beings, we would also agree that all humans are created equal, at least to the extent of denying that differences of sex, (...)
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