Search results for 'Zhuran You' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  28
    Zhuran You & A. G. Rud (2010). A Model of Dewey's Moral Imagination for Service Learning: Theoretical Explorations and Implications for Practice in Higher Education. Education and Culture 26 (2):36-51.
    Moral education through service learning at post-secondary level is an important but under-researched field. Most existing studies center on its learning outcomes like academic progress, personal development, communication, and leadership skills, with only a few evaluating the moral development of college students participating in service-learning projects. The lack of study on moral development in service learning indicates a need for clarification of the theoretical underpinnings of service learning, John Dewey's ideas on moral growth, in particular his model of moral imagination (...)
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  2. Zongqi You (2006). Xin Bu Xin You Ni: Cong Zhe Xue Kan Zong Jiao. San Min Shu Ju.
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  3.  15
    Zhuran You A. G. Rud (2010). A Model of Dewey's Moral Imagination for Service Learning: Theoretical Explorations and Implications for Practice in Higher Education. Education and Culture 26 (2):36-51.
  4.  70
    Gene Fendt (1995). Resolution, Catharsis, Culture: As You Like It. Philosophy and Literature 19 (2):248-260.
    This paper is not so much a reading of Shakespeare's play as reading through As You Like It to the kinds of resolution and catharsis that can exist in comedy. We will find two kinds of resolution and catharsis, and within each kind two sub-types. We will then read through the figures of the play and the catharses available in it to the kinds of culture that need or can use each type of catharsis.
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  5.  13
    Stacy Thompson (2009). Consumer Ethics in Thank You For Smoking. Film-Philosophy 13 (1):53-67.
    My question, then, is how does Thank You For Smoking, in addition to othercultural and social phenomena such as Parrish’s stance, enact this same divorcebetween the abstract form of corporate America and its particular contents oremployees? My answer is that, to win its viewers’ identification with itscharacters and, through them, its ideological assumptions, the film organises itscontent around an ethical form, that of the tragic hero in Søren Kierkegaard’ssense. Consequently, what I hope to enact in this essay is the revenge (...)
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  6.  14
    Alan Levinovitz (2012). The Zhuangzi and You 遊: Defining an Ideal Without Contradiction. Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 11 (4):479-496.
    You 遊 is a crucial term for understanding the Zhuangzi . Translated as “play,” “free play,” and “wandering,” it is usually defined as an ideal, playful Zhuangzian way of being. There are two problems with this definition. The first is logical: the Zhuangzi cannot consistently recommend playfulness as an ideal, since doing so vitiates the essence of you —it becomes an ethical imperative instead of an activity freely undertaken for its own sake. The second problem is performative: arguments for playful (...)
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  7.  2
    Who Do You ThinkYou Are (2009). In “You're Not in Kansas Anymore,” Canadian Author Ivan E. Coyote Prepares to Change Her Legal Name and Writes About the Anxieties That This Creates. In Laurie J. Shrage (ed.), You've Changed: Sex Reassignment and Personal Identity. OUP Usa
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  8. Clayton Littlejohn (2015). Who Cares What You Accurately Believe? Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):217-248.
    This is a critical discussion of the accuracy-first approach to epistemic norms. If you think of accuracy (gradational or categorical) as the fundamental epistemic good and think of epistemic goods as things that call for promotion, you might think that we should use broadly consequentialist reasoning to determine which norms govern partial and full belief. After presenting consequentialist arguments for probabilism and the normative Lockean view, I shall argue that the consequentialist framework isn't nearly as promising as it might first (...)
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  9. Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (forthcoming). If You Justifiably Believe That You Ought to Φ, You Ought to Φ. Philosophical Studies:1-23.
    In this paper, we claim that, if you justifiably believe that you ought to perform some act, it follows that you ought to perform that act. In the first half, we argue for this claim by reflection on what makes for correct reasoning from beliefs about what you ought to do. In the second half, we consider a number of objections to this argument and its conclusion. In doing so, we arrive at another argument for the view that justified beliefs (...)
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  10.  85
    Benjamin Kiesewetter (forthcoming). You Ought to Φ Only If You May Believe That You Ought to Φ. Philosophical Quarterly.
    In this paper I present an argument for the claim that you ought to do something only if you may believe that you ought to do it. More exactly, I defend the following principle about normative reasons: An agent A has decisive reason to φ only if she also has sufficient reason to believe that she has decisive reason to φ. I argue that this principle follows from the plausible assumption that it must be possible for an agent to respond (...)
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  11. Daniel Koltonski (forthcoming). A Good Friend Will Help You Move a Body: Friendship and the Problem of Moral Disagreement. Philosophical Review 125 (4).
    On the shared-­ends account of close friendship, proper care for a friend as an agent requires seeing yourself as having important reasons to accommodate and promote the friend’s valuable ends for her own sake. However, that friends share ends doesn't inoculate them against disagreements about how to pursue those ends. This paper defends the claim that, in certain circumstances of reasonable disagreement, proper care for a friend as a practical and moral agent sometimes requires allowing her judgment to decide what (...)
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  12.  65
    Errol Lord (forthcoming). What You're Rationally Required to Do and What You Ought to Do (Are the Same Thing!). Mind.
    It is a truism that we ought to be rational. Despite this (or because of it), it has become popular to think that it is not the case that we ought to be rational. In this paper I argue for a view about rationality--the view that what you are rationally required to do is determined by the normative reasons you possess--by showing that it can vindicate that we ought to be rational. I do this by showing that it is independently (...)
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  13.  21
    Eric Marcus (forthcoming). To Believe is to Know That You Believe. Dialectica.
    Most agree that believing a proposition normally or ideally results in believing that one believes it, at least if one considers the question of whether one believes it. I defend a much stronger thesis. It is impossible to believe without knowledge of one’s belief. I argue, roughly, as follows. Believing that p entails that one is able to honestly assert that p. But anyone who is able to honestly assert that p is also able to just say—i.e., authoritatively, yet not (...)
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  14. L. A. Paul (2015). What You Can't Expect When You 'Re Expecting'. Res Philosophica 92 (2):1-23.
    It seems natural to choose whether to have a child by reflecting on what it would be like to actually have a child. I argue that this natural approach fails. If you choose to become a parent, and your choice is based on projections about what you think it would be like for you to have a child, your choice is not rational. If you choose to remain childless, and your choice is based upon projections about what you think it (...)
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  15.  20
    Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting, If You Justifiably Believe That You Ought To?, You Ought To?
    In this paper, we claim that, if you justifiably believe that you ought to perform some act, it follows that you ought to perform that act. In the first half, we argue for this claim by reflection on what makes for correct reasoning from beliefs about what you ought to do. In the second half, we consider a number of objections to this argument and its conclusion. In doing so, we arrive at another argument for the view that justified beliefs (...)
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  16.  20
    Anthony Skelton (2016). Introduction to the Symposium on Peter Singer, The Most Good You Can Do. Journal of Global Ethics 12 (2).
    This is the introduction to the Journal of Global Ethics symposium on Peter Singer's The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. It summarizes the main features of effective altruism in the context of Singer's work on the moral demands of global poverty and some recent criticisms of effective altruism. The symposium contains contributions by Anthony Skelton, Violetta Igneski, Tracy Isaacs and Peter Singer.
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  17.  15
    Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (2016). If You Justifiably Believe That You Ought to Φ, You Ought to Φ. Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1873-1895.
    In this paper, we claim that, if you justifiably believe that you ought to perform some act, it follows that you ought to perform that act. In the first half, we argue for this claim by reflection on what makes for correct reasoning from beliefs about what you ought to do. In the second half, we consider a number of objections to this argument and its conclusion. In doing so, we arrive at another argument for the view that justified beliefs (...)
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  18. Matthew A. Benton (forthcoming). Knowledge and Evidence You Should Have Had. Episteme.
    Epistemologists focus primarily on cases of knowledge, belief, or credence where the evidence which one possesses, or on which one is relying, plays a fundamental role in the epistemic or normative status of one's doxastic state. Recent work in epistemology goes beyond the evidence one possesses to consider the relevance for such statuses of evidence which one does not possess, particularly when there is a sense in which one should have had some evidence. I focus here on Sanford Goldberg's approach (...)
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  19. Chris Tucker (2014). If Dogmatists Have a Problem with Cognitive Penetration, You Do Too. Dialectica 68 (1):35-62.
    Perceptual dogmatism holds that if it perceptually seems to S that P, then S thereby has prima facie perceptual justification for P. But suppose Wishful Willy's desire for gold cognitively penetrates his perceptual experience and makes it seem to him that the yellow object is a gold nugget. Intuitively, his desire-penetrated seeming can't provide him with prima facie justification for thinking that the object is gold. If this intuitive response is correct, dogmatists have a problem. But if dogmatists have a (...)
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  20. Roger White (2010). You Just Believe That Because…. Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):573-615.
    I believe that Tom is the proud father of a baby boy. Why do I think his child is a boy? A natural answer might be that I remember that his name is ‘Owen’ which is usually a boy’s name. Here I’ve given information that might be part of a causal explanation of my believing that Tom’s baby is a boy. I do have such a memory and it is largely what sustains my conviction. But I haven’t given you just (...)
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  21. Tyler Doggett & Andy Egan (2007). Wanting Things You Don't Want: The Case for an Imaginative Analogue of Desire. Philosophers' Imprint 7 (9):1-17.
    You’re imagining, in the course of a different game of make-believe, that you’re a bank robber. You don’t believe that you’re a bank robber. You are moved to point your finger, gun-wise, at the person pretending to be the bank teller and say, “Stick ‘em up! This is a robbery!”.
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  22. David Enoch (2014). Why I Am an Objectivist About Ethics (And Why You Are, Too). In Russ Shafer Landau (ed.), The Ethical Life, 3rd ed. OUP
    You may think that you're a moral relativist or subjectivist - many people today seem to. But I don't think you are. In fact, when we start doing metaethics - when we start, that is, thinking philosophically about our moral discourse and practice - thoughts about morality's objectivity become almost irresistible. Now, as is always the case in philosophy, that some thoughts seem irresistible is only the starting point for the discussion, and under argumentative pressure we may need to revise (...)
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  23. Roman Frigg & Ioannis Votsis (2011). Everything You Always Wanted to Know About Structural Realism but Were Afraid to Ask. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (2):227-276.
    Everything you always wanted to know about structural realism but were afraid to ask Content Type Journal Article Pages 227-276 DOI 10.1007/s13194-011-0025-7 Authors Roman Frigg, Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method, London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London, WC2A 2AE UK Ioannis Votsis, Philosophisches Institut, Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf, Universitätsstraße 1, Geb. 23.21/04.86, 40225 Düsseldorf, Germany Journal European Journal for Philosophy of Science Online ISSN 1879-4920 Print ISSN 1879-4912 Journal Volume Volume 1 Journal Issue Volume 1, Number 2.
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  24.  9
    Julia Zakkou (forthcoming). Jesus Loves You! Philosophical Studies:1-19.
    According to orthodox semantics, a given sentence as used at a given situation expresses at most one content. In the last decade, this view has been challenged with several objections. Many of them have been addressed in the literature. But one has gone almost unheeded. It stems from sentences that are used to address several people individually, like ‘Jesus loves you!’ as uttered by a priest at a sermon. Cappelen :23–46, 2008), Egan :251–279, 2009), López de Sa :241–253, 2014), and (...)
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  25. Delia Graff Fara (2011). You Can Call Me 'Stupid', ... Just Don't Call Me Stupid. Analysis 71 (3):492-501.
    In this paper I argue that names are predicates when they occur in the appellation position of 'called'-predications. This includes not only proper names, but all names -- including quote-names of proper names and quote-names of other words or phrases. Thus in "You can call me Al", the proper name 'Al' is a predicate. And in "You can call me 'Al'," the quote-name of 'Al' -- namely ' 'Al' ' -- is also a predicate.
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  26. Rachel McKinnon (2012). How Do You Know That 'How Do You Know?' Challenges a Speaker's Knowledge? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (1):65-83.
    It is often argued that the general propriety of challenging an assertion with ‘How do you know?’ counts as evidence for the Knowledge Norm of Assertion (KNA). Part of the argument is that this challenge seems to directly challenge whether a speaker knows what she asserts. In this article I argue for a re-interpretation of the data, the upshot of which is that we need not interpret ‘How do you know?’ as directly challenging a speaker's knowledge; instead, it's better understood (...)
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  27. Matthias Haase (2014). Am I You? Philosophical Explorations 17 (3):358-371.
    It has been suggested that a rational being stands in what is called a “second-personal relation” to herself. According to philosophers like S. Darwall and Ch. Korsgaard, being a rational agent is to interact with oneself, to make demands on oneself. The thesis of the paper is that this view rests on a logical confusion. Transitive verbs like “asking”, “making a demand” or “obligating” can occur with the reflexive pronoun, but it is a mistake to assume that the reflexive and (...)
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  28. Peter Singer (2015). The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. Yale University Press.
    Peter Singer’s books and ideas have been disturbing our complacency ever since the appearance of _Animal Liberation_. Now he directs our attention to a new movement in which his own ideas have played a crucial role: effective altruism. Effective altruism is built upon the simple but profound idea that living a fully ethical life involves doing the "most good you can do." Such a life requires an unsentimental view of charitable giving: to be a worthy recipient of our support, an (...)
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  29.  79
    Coleen Macnamara (2013). “Screw You!” & “Thank You”. Philosophical Studies 165 (3):893-914.
    If I do you a good turn, you may respond with gratitude and express that gratitude by saying “Thank you.” Similarly, if I insult you, you may react with resentment which you express by shouting, “Screw you!” or something of the sort. Broadly put, when confronted with another’s morally significant conduct, we are inclined to respond with a reactive attitude and to express that reactive attitude in speech. A number of familiar speech acts have a call-and-response structure. Questions, demands and (...)
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  30.  65
    Luce Irigaray (1996). I Love to You: Sketch for a Felicity Within History. Routledge.
    In I Love to You , Luce Irigaray moves from the critique of patriarchy to an exploration of the ground for a possible inter-subjectivity between the two sexes. Continuing her rejection of demands for equality, Irigaray poses the question: how can we move to a new era of sexual difference in which women and men establish lasting relations with one another without reducing the other to the status of object? Drawing upon Hegel, Irigaray proposes a dialectic appropriate to each sex (...)
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  31.  65
    David Braun (2006). Now You Know Who Hong Oak Yun Is. Philosophical Issues 16 (1):24-42.
    Hong Oak Yun is a person who is over three inches tall. And now you know who Hong Oak Yun is. For if someone were to ask you ‘Who is Hong Oak Yun?’, you could answer that Hong Oak Yun is a person who is over three inches tall, and you would know what you were saying. So you know an answer to the question ‘Who is Hong Oak Yun?’, and that is sufficient for knowing who Hong Oak Yun is. (...)
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  32.  46
    Beata Stawarska (2009). Between You and I: Dialogical Phenomenology. Ohio University Press.
    Classical phenomenology -- The transcendental tradition -- The logical investigations of the I -- From the I to the ego -- The grammar of the transcendental ego -- Strawson on the primacy of personhood -- Wittgenstein on the lure of words -- The grammar of the transcendental ego -- Zahavi on transcendental subjectivity as intersubjectivity -- Contemporary arguments for the transcendental ego : Marbach, Soffer -- Schutz, Theunissen on social phenomenology -- Husserl's later thought -- The multidiscipline of dialogical phenomenology (...)
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  33.  86
    Keith DeRose (2000). Now You Know It, Now You Don't. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 5:91-106.
    Resistance to contextualism comes in the form of many very different types of objections. My topic here is a certain group or family of related objections to contextualism that I call “Now you know it, now you don’t” objections. I responded to some such objections in my “Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions” a few years back. In what follows here, I will expand on that earlier response in various ways, and, in doing so, I will discuss some aspects of David Lewis’s (...)
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  34. Robert Alan Burton (2008). On Being Certain: Believing You Are Right Even When You're Not. St. Martin's Press.
    You recognize when you know something for certain, right? You "know" the sky is blue, or that the traffic light had turned green, or where you were on the morning of September 11, 2001--you know these things, well, because you just do. In On Being Certain , neurologist Robert Burton challenges the notions of how we think about what we know. He shows that the feeling of certainty we have when we "know" something comes from sources beyond our control and (...)
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  35.  39
    Emar Maier (2016). Why My I is Your You: On the Communication of de Se Attitudes. In Manuel Garcia-Carpintero & Stephan Torre (eds.), About Oneself: De Se Thought and Communication. OUP
    The communication of de se attitudes poses a problem for “participant- neutral” analyses of communication in terms of propositions expressed or proposed updates to the common ground: when you tell me “I am an idiot”, you express a first person de se attitude, but as a result I form a different, second person attitude, viz. that you are an idiot. I argue that when we take seriously the asymmetry between speaker and hearer in semantics this problem disappears. To prove this (...)
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  36. John Gibbons (2010). Seeing What You 'Re Doing'. In T. Szabo Gendler & J. Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press
    Do we have privileged access to what we’re intentionally doing? Well, that probably depends on what privileged access is. One way to think about privileged access is to try to identify a true formal principle. One thing you’ll need to do when identifying the formal principle is to specify the relevant range of propositions to which you have privileged access. These ranges are usually specified by subject matter: propositions about your own current, conscious propositional attitudes, propositions about your own sensations, (...)
     
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  37.  17
    Rosslyn Ives (2015). The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically [Book Review]. Australian Humanist, The 119:24.
    Ives, Rosslyn Review of: The most good you can do: How effective altruism is changing ideas about living ethically, by Peter Singer, Text Publishing Melbourne 2015.
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  38. Mary Midgley (2014). Are You an Illusion? Routledge.
    Renowned philosopher Mary Midgley explores the remarkable gap that has opened up between our own understanding of our sense of our self and today's scientific orthodoxy that claims the self to be nothing more than an elaborate illusion. Bringing her formidable acuity and analytic skills to bear, she exposes some very odd claims and muddled thinking on the part of cognitive scientists and psychologists when it comes to talk about the self. Well-known philosophical problems in causality, subjectivity, empiricism, free will (...)
     
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  39.  80
    Tom Dougherty (2013). Rational Numbers: A Non‐Consequentialist Explanation Of Why You Should Save The Many And Not The Few. Philosophical Quarterly 63 (252):413-427.
    You ought to save a larger group of people rather than a distinct smaller group of people, all else equal. A consequentialist may say that you ought to do so because this produces the most good. If a non-consequentialist rejects this explanation, what alternative can he or she give? This essay defends the following explanation, as a solution to the so-called numbers problem. Its two parts can be roughly summarised as follows. First, you are morally required to want the survival (...)
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  40.  92
    David Barnett (2010). You Are Simple. In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism. Oxford University Press 161--174.
    I argue that, unlike your brain, you are not composed of other things: you are simple. My argument centers on what I take to be an uncontroversial datum: for any pair of conscious beings, it is impossible for the pair itself to be conscious. Consider, for instance, the pair comprising you and me. You might pinch your arm and feel a pain. I might simultaneously pinch my arm and feel a qualitatively identical pain. But the pair we form would not (...)
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  41.  23
    Joel David Hamkins (1998). Destruction or Preservation as You Like It. Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 91 (2-3):191-229.
    The Gap Forcing Theorem, a key contribution of this paper, implies essentially that after any reverse Easton iteration of closed forcing, such as the Laver preparation, every supercompactness measure on a supercompact cardinal extends a measure from the ground model. Thus, such forcing can create no new supercompact cardinals, and, if the GCH holds, neither can it increase the degree of supercompactness of any cardinal; in particular, it can create no new measurable cardinals. In a crescendo of what I call (...)
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  42. David Papineau (2003). Why You Don’T Want to Get in the Box with Schrödinger's Cat. Analysis 63 (277):51–58.
    By way of an example, Lewis imagines your being invited to join Schrödinger’s cat in its box for an hour. This box will either fill up with deadly poison fumes or not, depending on whether or not some radioactive atom decays, the probability of decay within an hour being 50%. The invitation is accompanied with some further incentive to comply (Lewis sets it up so there is a significant chance of some pretty bad but not life-threatening punishment if you don’t (...)
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  43.  23
    John N. Williams (2015). Not Knowing You Know: A New Objection to the Defeasibility Theory of Knowledge. Analysis 75 (2):213-217.
    Foley and Turri have recently given objections to the defeasibility theory of propositional knowledge. Here, I give an objection of a quite different stripe by looking at what the theory must say about knowing that you know. I end with some remarks on how this objection relates to rival theories and how this might be a worry for some of these.
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  44.  3
    Rhys Mckinnon (2012). How Do You Know That ‘How Do You Know?’ Challenges a Speaker's Knowledge? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (1):65-83.
    It is often argued that the general propriety of challenging an assertion with ‘How do you know?’ counts as evidence for the Knowledge Norm of Assertion . Part of the argument is that this challenge seems to directly challenge whether a speaker knows what she asserts. In this article I argue for a re‐interpretation of the data, the upshot of which is that we need not interpret ‘How do you know?’ as directly challenging a speaker's knowledge; instead, it's better understood (...)
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  45.  3
    Thomas Tang & Roberto Luna-Arocas (2015). Are You Satisfied With Your Pay When You Compare? It Depends on Your Love of Money, Pay Comparison Standards, and Culture. Journal of Business Ethics 128 (2):279-289.
    We develop a theoretical model of income and pay comparison satisfaction with two mediators, examine the direct and the indirect paths of our model, and treat culture as a moderator. Based on 311 professors in the US and Spain, we demonstrate a positive direct path and a negative indirect path. Our subsequent multi-group analysis illustrates: For American professors, their direct path shows that income is directly related to high pay comparison satisfaction. Their indirect path reveals the following new insights: Professors (...)
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  46.  33
    Emily Borgelt, Daniel Buchman & Judy Illes (2011). Erratum: “ This is Why You've Been Suffering”: Reflections of Providers on Neuroimaging in Mental Health Care. [REVIEW] Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 8 (1):107-107.
    Erratum: “ This is Why you’ve Been Suffering”: Reflections of Providers on Neuroimaging in Mental Health Care Content Type Journal Article Pages 107-107 DOI 10.1007/s11673-011-9284-4 Authors Emily Borgelt, National Core for Neuroethics, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada Daniel Z. Buchman, National Core for Neuroethics, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada Judy Illes, National Core for Neuroethics, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada Journal Journal of Bioethical Inquiry Online ISSN 1872-4353 Print ISSN 1176-7529 Journal Volume Volume 8 Journal Issue Volume (...)
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  47.  57
    Selmer Bringsjord (2007). Offer: One Billion Dollars for a Conscious Robot; If You're Honest, You Must Decline. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (7):28-43.
    You are offered one billion dollars to 'simply' produce a proof-of-concept robot that has phenomenal consciousness -- in fact, you can receive a deliciously large portion of the money up front, by simply starting a three-year work plan in good faith. Should you take the money and commence? No. I explain why this refusal is in order, now and into the foreseeable future.
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  48.  6
    Kerry Chamberlain (2015). There's Something Else I Haven't Told You. Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 58 (1):30-30.
    There’s something else I haven’t told you, it might be important... I don’t know. Really. It’s probably nothing, it’s probably trivial, it won’t mean anything I’m sure. But it has been troubling me quite a bit... well, not a lot, but a bit, you know. I suppose I should have mentioned it earlier, but somehow....
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  49.  11
    Robert J. Rydell & Bertram Gawronski (2009). I Like You, I Like You Not: Understanding the Formation of Context-Dependent Automatic Attitudes. Cognition and Emotion 23 (6):1118-1152.
    (2009). I like you, I like you not: Understanding the formation of context-dependent automatic attitudes. Cognition & Emotion: Vol. 23, No. 6, pp. 1118-1152.
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  50. James L. Christian, What Do You Mean Philosophy???
    Sometime, at your leisure—if you want to know what philosophy is—go into a large bookstore and browse. Check a variety of books in psychology, anthropology, physics, chemistry, archeology, astronomy, and other nonfiction fields. Look at the last chapter in each book. In a surprising number of cases, you will find that the author has chosen to round out his work with a final summation of what the book is all about. That is, having written a whole book on a specialized (...)
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