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Profile: Zoe Drayson (University of Stirling)
  1. Zoe Drayson (2014). Intentional Action and the Post-Coma Patient. Topoi 33 (1):23-31.
    Detecting conscious awareness in a patient emerging from a coma state is problematic, because our standard attributions of conscious awareness rely on interpreting bodily movement as intentional action. Where there is an absence of intentional bodily action, as in the vegetative state, can we reliably assume that there is an absence of conscious awareness? Recent neuroimaging work suggests that we can attribute conscious awareness to some patients in a vegetative state by interpreting their brain activity as intentional mental action. I (...)
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  2. Zoe Drayson (2014). The Personal/Subpersonal Distinction. Philosophy Compass 9 (5):338-346.
    Daniel Dennett's distinction between personal and subpersonal explanations was fundamental in establishing the philosophical foundations of cognitive science. Since it was first introduced in 1969, the personal/subpersonal distinction has been adapted to fit different approaches to the mind. In one example of this, the ‘Pittsburgh school’ of philosophers attempted to map Dennett's distinction onto their own distinction between the ‘space of reasons’ and the ‘space of causes’. A second example can be found in much contemporary philosophy of psychology, where Dennett's (...)
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  3. Zoe Drayson (2012). The Uses and Abuses of the Personal/Subpersonal Distinction. Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):1-18.
    In this paper, I claim that the personal/subpersonal distinction is first and foremost a distinction between two kinds of psychological theory or explanation: it is only in this form that we can understand why the distinction was first introduced, and how it continues to earn its keep. I go on to examine the different ontological commitments that might lead us from the primary distinction between personal and subpersonal explanations to a derivative distinction between personal and subpersonal states. I argue that (...)
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  4. Zoe Drayson (2011). Cognition and Perception: How Do Psychology and Neuroscience Inform Philosophy? [REVIEW] Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (7-8):242-249.
  5. Zoe Drayson (2010). Extended Cognition and the Metaphysics of Mind. Cognitive Systems Research 11 (4):367-377.
    This paper explores the relationship between several ideas about the mind and cognition. The hypothesis of extended cognition claims that cognitive processes can and do extend outside the head, that elements of the world around us can actually become parts of our cognitive systems. It has recently been suggested that the hypothesis of extended cognition is entailed by one of the foremost philosophical positions on the nature of the mind: functionalism, the thesis that mental states are defined by their functional (...)
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  6. Zoe Drayson (2009). Embodied Cognitive Science and its Implications for Psychopathology. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 16 (4):329-340.
    The past twenty years have seen an increase in the importance of the body in psychology, neuroscience, and philosophy of mind. This 'embodied' trend challenges the orthodox view in cognitive science in several ways: it downplays the traditional 'mind-as-computer' approach and emphasizes the role of interactions between the brain, body, and environment. In this article, I review recent work in the area of embodied cognitive science and explore the approaches each takes to the ideas of consciousness, computation and representation. Finally, (...)
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  7. Zoe Drayson & Andy Clark (2007). Augmentation, Agency, and the Spreading of the Mental State. American Journal of Bioethics 7 (9):3 - 11.