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Zoltan Jakab [15]ZoltÁ Jakab [2]
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Profile: Zoltan Jakab (Eotvos Lorand University of Sciences)
  1. Peter Fazekas & Zoltán Jakab, Sensory Representation and Cognitive Architecture: An Alternative to Phenomenal Concepts.
    We present a cognitive-physicalist account of phenomenal consciousness. We argue that phenomenal concepts do not differ from other types of concepts. When explaining the peculiarities of conscious experience, the right place to look at is sensory/ perceptual representations and their interaction with general conceptual structures. We utilize Jerry Fodor’s psycho- semantic theory to formulate our view. We compare and contrast our view with that of Murat Aydede and Güven Güzeldere, who, using Dretskean psychosemantic theory, arrived at a solution different from (...)
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  2. Zoltan Jakab, Metameric Surfaces: The Ultimate Case Against Color Physicalism and Representational Theories of Phenomenal Consciousness.
    In this paper I argue that there are problems with the foundations of the current version of physicalism about color. In some sources laying the foundations of physicalism, types of surface reflectance corresponding to (veridical) color perceptions are characterized by making reference to properties of the observer. This means that these surface attributes are not objective (i.e. observer-independent). This problem casts doubt on the possibility of identifying colors with types of surface reflectance. If this identification cannot be maintained, that in (...)
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  3. Mariann Hudak, Zoltan Jakab & Ilona Kovacs (2013). Phenomenal Qualities and the Development of Perceptual Integration. In Liliana Albertazzi (ed.), The Wiley-Blackwell Handbook of Experimental Phenomenology; Visual Perception of Shape, Space and Appearance. Wiley-Blackwell.
    In this chapter, data concerning the development of principal aspects of vision is reviewed. First, the development of colour vision and luminance perception is discussed. Relevant data accumulated so far indicates that perception of colour and luminance is present by 6-9 months of age. The presence of typical color illusions at this age suggests that the phenomenal character of color experience is comparable to that of adults well before the first birthday. Thus it seems plausible that color perception develops on (...)
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  4. Zoltan Jakab, How to Improve on Quinian Bootstrapping – a Response to Nativist Objections. Proceedings of the 35th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society.
    Quinian bootstrapping is Susan Carey's solution to Fodor’s paradox of concept learning. Carey claims that contrary to Fodor’s view, not all learning amounts to hypothesis testing, and that there are ways in which even primitive concepts can be learned. Recently Georges Rey has argued that Carey’s attempt to refute radical concept nativism is unsuccessful. First it cannot explain how the expressive power of mental representational systems could increase due to learning. Second, both Fodorian circularity charges and Goodmanian problems of indeterminacy (...)
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  5. Zoltan Jakab (2013). Reflectance Physicalism About Color. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 12 (3):463-488.
    A stubborn problem for reflectance physicalism about color is to account for individual differences in normal trichromat color perception. The identification of determinate colors with physical properties of visible surfaces in a universal, perceiver-independent way is challenged by the observation that the same surfaces in identical viewing conditions often look different in color to different human subjects with normal color vision. Recently, leading representatives of reflectance physicalism have offered some arguments to defend their view against the individual differences challenge. In (...)
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  6. Zoltan Jakab (2012). Reflectance Physicalism About Color: The Story Continues. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 12 (3):463-488.
    A stubborn problem for reflectance physicalism about color is to account for individual differences in normal trichromat color perception. The identification of determinate colors with physical properties of visible surfaces in a universal, perceiver-independent way is challenged by the observation that the same surfaces in identical viewing conditions often look different in color to different human subjects with normal color vision. Recently, leading representatives of reflectance physicalism have offered some arguments to defend their view against the individual differences challenge. In (...)
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  7. Zoltan Jakab (2006). Revelation and Normativity in Visual Experience. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (1):25-56.
  8. Alexa Bódog, Gábor P. Háden, Zoltán Jakab & Zsolt Palatinus (2005). Language, Ecological Structure, and Across-Population Sharing. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (4):490-491.
    We propose a way to achieve across-population sharing within the authors' model in a way that is plausibly in accordance with human evolution, and also a simple way to capture ecological structure. Finally, we briefly reflect on the model's scope and limits in modeling linguistic communication.
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  9. Zoltán Jakab (2005). Opponent Processing, Linear Models, and the Veridicality of Color Perception. In Andrew Brook (ed.), Cognition and the Brain. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 336--378.
  10. Zoltan Jakab (2003). Phenomenal Projection. Psyche 9 (4).
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  11. Zoltán Jakab & Brian P. McLaughlin (2003). Why Not Color Physicalism Without Color Absolutism? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):34-35.
    We make three points. First, the concept of productance value that the authors propose in their defense of color physicalism fails to do the work for which it is intended. Second, the authors fail to offer an adequate physicalist account of what they call the hue-magnitudes. Third, their answer to the problem of individual differences faces serious difficulties.
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  12. Zoltán Jakab (2001). Commentary on P. W. Ross: The Location Problem for Color Subjectivism. Consciousness and Cognition 10 (1):133-139.
  13. Zoltan Jakab (2000). Ineffability of Qualia: A Straightforward Naturalistic Explanation. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (3):329-351.
    In this paper I offer an explanation of the ineffability (linguistic inexpressibility) of sensory experiences. My explanation is put in terms of computational functionalism and standard externalist theories of representational content. As I will argue, many or most sensory experiences are representational states without constituent structure. This property determines both the representational function these states can serve and the information that can be extracted from them when they are processed. Sensory experiences can indicate the presence of certain external states of (...)
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  14. Mohan Matthen, C. Wade Savage, Zoltán Jakab, Nigel J. T. Thomas, Peter W. Ross, Joseph Glicksohn, PierCarla Cicogna, Marino Bosinelli, Kelly A. Forrest & Craig Kunimoto (2000). MT Turvey, Virgil Whitmyer, and Kevin Shockley. Explaining Metamers: Right Degrees of Free. Consciousness and Cognition 9:638.
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  15. ZoltÁ Jakab & N. (1999). Overlooking the Resources of Functionalism? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):957-957.
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  16. Zoltán Jakab (1999). Overlooking the Resources of Functionalism? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):957-957.
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