Search results for 'Zombie' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Amir Horowitz (2009). Turning the Zombie on its Head. Synthese 170 (1):191 - 210.score: 18.0
    This paper suggests a critique of the zombie argument that bypasses the need to decide on the truth of its main premises, and specifically, avoids the need to enter the battlefield of whether conceivability entails metaphysical possibility. It is argued that if we accept, as the zombie argument’s supporters would urge us, the assumption that an ideal reasoner can conceive of a complete physical description of the world without conceiving of qualia, the general principle that conceivability entails metaphysical (...)
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  2. Selmer Bringsjord (1999). The Zombie Attack on the Computational Conception of Mind. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):41-69.score: 15.0
  3. Raphaël Millière (forthcoming). Is God a Zombie? Divine Consciousness and Omnipresence. International Journal of Philosophy and Theology:1-17.score: 15.0
    While nobody will ever know what it may be like to be God, there is a more basic question one may try to answer: does God have phenomenal consciousness, does He have experiences within a conscious point of view (POV)? Drawing on recent debates within philosophy of mind, I argue that He doesn’t: if God exists, ‘He’ is not phenomenally conscious, at least in the sense that there is no ‘divine subjectivity’. The article aims at displaying an incompatibility between God’s (...)
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  4. Jaron Lanier (1995). You Can't Argue with a Zombie. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (4):333-345.score: 15.0
  5. Robert Stalnaker (2002). What is It Like to Be a Zombie? In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press. 385--400.score: 15.0
     
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  6. R. C. W. Ettinger (2004). To Be or Not to Be: The Zombie in the Computer. In Nick Bostrom, R.C.W. Ettinger & Charles Tandy (eds.), Death and Anti-Death, Volume 2: Two Hundred Years After Kant, Fifty Years After Turing. Palo Alto: Ria University Press.score: 15.0
     
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  7. Wayne Wu (2013). The Case for Zombie Agency. Mind 122 (485):217-230.score: 14.0
    In response to Mole 2009, I present an argument for zombie action. The crucial question is not whether but rather to what extent we are zombie agents. I argue that current evidence supports only minimal zombie agency.
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  8. Daniel C. Dennett (1995). The Unimagined Preposterousness of Zombies. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (4):322-26.score: 12.0
    Knock-down refutations are rare in philosophy, and unambiguous self-refutations are even rarer, for obvious reasons, but sometimes we get lucky. Sometimes philosophers clutch an insupportable hypothesis to their bosoms and run headlong over the cliff edge. Then, like cartoon characters, they hang there in mid-air, until they notice what they have done and gravity takes over. Just such a boon is the philosophers' concept of a zombie, a strangely attractive notion that sums up, in one leaden lump, almost everything (...)
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  9. Owen J. Flanagan & Thomas W. Polger (1995). Zombies and the Function of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (4):313-21.score: 12.0
    Todd Moody’s Zombie Earth thought experiment is an attempt to show that ‘conscious inessentialism’ is false or in need of qualification. We defend conscious inessentialism against his criticisms, and argue that zombie thought experiments highlight the need to explain why consciousness evolved and what function(s) it serves. This is the hardest problem in consciousness studies.
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  10. Robert Kirk (ed.) (2006/2007). Zombies and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.score: 12.0
    Zombies and minimal physicalism -- The case for zombies -- Zapping the zombie idea -- What has to be done -- Deciders -- Decision, control, and integration -- De-sophisticating the framework -- Direct activity -- Gap? What gap? -- Survival of the fittest.
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  11. Keith Frankish (2007). The Anti-Zombie Argument. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (229):650–666.score: 12.0
    In recent years the 'zombie argument' has come to occupy a central role in the case against physicalist views of consciousness, in large part because of the powerful advocacy it has received from David Chalmers.1 In this paper I seek to neutralize it by showing that a parallel argument can be run for physicalism, an argument turning on the conceivability of what I shall call anti-zombies. I shall argue that the result is a stand-off, and that the zombie (...)
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  12. Josh Weisberg (2011). The Zombie's Cogito: Meditations on Type-Q Materialism. Philosophical Psychology 24 (5):585 - 605.score: 12.0
    Most materialist responses to the zombie argument against materialism take either a ?type-A? or ?type-B? approach: they either deny the conceivability of zombies or accept their conceivability while denying their possibility. However, a ?type-Q? materialist approach, inspired by Quinean suspicions about a priority and modal entailment, rejects the sharp line between empirical and conceptual truths needed for the traditional responses. In this paper, I develop a type-Q response to the zombie argument, one stressing the theory-laden nature of our (...)
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  13. Mike Kearns, Could Daniel Dennett Be a Zombie?score: 12.0
  14. Susanna Siegel, The Dog and the Zombie.score: 12.0
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  15. Michael P. Lynch (2006). Zombies and the Case of the Phenomenal Pickpocket. Synthese 149 (1):37-58.score: 12.0
    A prevailing view in contemporary philosophy of mind is that zombies are logically possible. I argue, via a thought experiment, that if this prevailing view is correct, then I could be transformed into a zombie. If I could be transformed into a zombie, then surprisingly, I am not certain that I am conscious. Regrettably, this is not just an idiosyncratic fact about my psychology; I think you are in the same position. This means that we must revise or (...)
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  16. Andy Clark (2007). What Reaching Teaches: Consciousness, Control, and the Inner Zombie. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (3):563 - 594.score: 12.0
    What is the role of conscious visual experience in the control and guidance of human behaviour? According to some recent treatments, the role is surprisingly indirect. Conscious visual experience, on these accounts, serves the formation of plans and the selection of action types and targets, while the control of 'online' visually guided action proceeds via a quasi-independent non-conscious route. In response to such claims, critics such as (Wallhagen [2007], pp. 539-61) have suggested that the notions of control and guidance invoked (...)
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  17. W. R. Webster (2006). Human Zombies Are Metaphysically Impossible. Synthese 151 (2):297-310.score: 12.0
    Chalmers (The Conscious Mind, Oxford Unversity Press, Oxford 1996) has argued for a form of property dualism on the basis of the concept of a zombie (which is physically identical to normals), and the concept of the inverted spectrum. He asserts that these concepts show that the facts about consciousness, such as experience or qualia, are really further facts about our world, over and above the physical facts. He claims that they are the hard part of the mind-body issue. (...)
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  18. John McCarthy (1995). Todd Moody's Zombies. Journal Of Consciousness Studies 2 (4):345-347.score: 12.0
    From the AI point of view, consciousness must be regarded as a collection of interacting processes rather than the unitary object of much philosophical speculation. We ask what kinds of propositions and other entities need to be designed for consciousness to be useful to an animal or a machine. We thereby assert that human consciousness is useful to human functioning and not just and epiphenomenon. Zombies in the sense of Todd Moody's article are merely the victims of Moody's prejudices. To (...)
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  19. Raamy Majeed (forthcoming). From Zombie Art to Dead Art. Think.score: 12.0
    Zombie art, or salvage art, are artworks that are damaged beyond repair, deemed ‘no-longer-art’ by insurance companies, and removed from the market and stored at claims inventories due to their purported loss of value. This paper aims to make sense of the notion of zombie art. It then aims to determine whether artefacts that fall under this concept retain any aesthetic value, and whether they can genuinely cease being artworks, i.e. be dead art.
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  20. Heather Brook (2013). Zombie Law: Conjugality, Annulment, and the (Married) Living Dead. [REVIEW] Feminist Legal Studies 22 (1):1-18.score: 12.0
    This article deploys and extends Ulrich Beck’s critique of ‘zombie categories’ (Beck in J Consum Cult 1 (2):261–277, 2001) to consider how conjugal relationships are brought into being before the law. The argument presented here is that sexual performatives relating to marriage—and especially, in this instance, consummation—continue to produce a kind of social-legal magic, even as the social flesh of their enactment is rotting. Rules concerning annulment relating to wedding ceremonies, consent, disclosure, and consummation demonstrate that certain frameworks of (...)
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  21. Shaka McGlotten & Lisa Jean Moore (2013). The Geriatric Clinic: Dry and Limp: Aging Queers, Zombies, and Sexual Reanimation. [REVIEW] Journal of Medical Humanities 34 (2):261-268.score: 12.0
    This essay looks to the omission of aging queer bodies from new medical technologies of sex. We extend the Foucauldian space of the clinic to the mediascape, a space not only of representations but where the imagination is conditioned and different worlds dreamed into being. We specifically examine the relationship between aging queers and the marketing of technologies of sexual function. We highlight the ways queers are excluded from the spaces of the clinic, specifically the heternormative sexual scripts that organize (...)
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  22. Dean Zimmerman (forthcoming). Dispatches From the Zombie Wars. The Times Literary Supplement (April 28).score: 11.0
    Review of Daniel Dennett's *Sweet Dreams* and Gregg Rosenberg's *A Place for Consciousness*.
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  23. Eric Marcus (2004). Why Zombies Are Inconceivable. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3):477-90.score: 10.0
    I argue that zombies are inconceivable. More precisely, I argue that the conceivability-intuition that is used to demonstrate their possibility has been misconstrued. Thought experiments alleged to feature zombies founder on the fact that, on the one hand, they _must_ involve first-person imagining, and yet, on the other hand, _cannot_. Philosophers who take themselves to have imagined zombies have unwittingly conflated imagining a creature who lacks consciousness with imagining a creature without also imagining the consciousness it may or may not (...)
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  24. Nigel J. T. Thomas (1998). Zombie Killer. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press.score: 10.0
    Philosopher's zombies are hypothetical beings behaviorally, functionally, and perhaps even physically indistinguishable from normal humans, but who lack our consciousness. Many people seem to be convinced that such zombies are a real conceptual possibility, and that this bare possibility entails that understanding human consciousness must remain forever beyond the reach of science. However, the conceptual entailments of zombiehood have not been sufficiently examined. This brief article shows that any way of understanding the behavior of zombies that does in fact support (...)
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  25. Jan Sleutels (2006). Greek Zombies. Philosophical Psychology 19 (2):177-197.score: 10.0
    This paper explores the possibility that the human mind underwent substantial changes in recent history. Assuming that consciousness is a substantial trait of the mind, the paper focuses on the suggestion made by Julian Jaynes that the Mycenean Greeks had a "bicameral" mind instead of a conscious one. The suggestion is commonly dismissed as patently absurd, for instance by critics such as Ned Block. A closer examination of the intuitions involved, considered from different theoretical angles (social constructivism, idealism, eliminativism, realism), (...)
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  26. Paul G. Skokowski (2002). I, Zombie. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (1):1-9.score: 10.0
    Certain recent philosophical theories offer the prospect that zombies are possible. These theories argue that experiential contents, or qualia, are nonphysical properties. The arguments are based on the conceivability of alternate worlds in which physical laws and properties remain the same, but in which qualia either differ or are absent altogether. This article maintains that qualia are, on the contrary, physical properties in the world. It is shown how, under the burden of the a posteriori identification of qualia with physical (...)
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  27. István Aranyosi (2005). Chalmers' Zombie Argument. In Type-a Dualism: A Novel Theory of the Mental-Physical Nexus. Dissertation, Central European University.score: 9.0
  28. David J. Chalmers (2004). Imagination, Indexicality, and Intensions. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):182-90.score: 9.0
    John Perry's book Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness is a lucid and engaging defense of a physicalist view of consciousness against various anti-physicalist arguments. In what follows, I will address Perry's responses to the three main anti-physicalist arguments he discusses: the zombie argument (focusing on imagination), the knowledge argument (focusing on indexicals), and the modal argument (focusing on intensions).
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  29. Eric Dietrich & Julietta Rose (2009). The Paradox of Consciousness and the Realism/Anti-Realism Debate. Logos Architekton 3 (1):7-37.score: 9.0
    Beginning with the paradoxes of zombie twins, we present an argument that dualism is both true and false. We show that avoiding this contradiction is impossible. Our diagnosis is that consciousness itself engenders this contradiction by producing contradictory points of view. This result has a large effect on the realism/anti-realism debate, namely, it suggests that this debate is intractable, and furthermore, it explains why this debate is intractable. We close with some comments on what our results mean for metaphysics (...)
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  30. Todd C. Moody (1994). Conversations with Zombies. Journal of Consciousness Studies 1 (2):196-200.score: 9.0
  31. Brian Jonathan Garrett (2009). Causal Essentialism Versus the Zombie Worlds. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (1):pp. 93-112.score: 9.0
  32. Joshua Shepherd (forthcoming). Conscious Control Over Action. Mind and Language.score: 9.0
    The extensive involvement of nonconscious processes in human behaviour has led some to suggest that consciousness is much less important for the control of action than we might think. In this paper I push against this trend, developing an understanding of conscious control that is sensitive to our best models of overt (that is, bodily) action control. Further, I assess the cogency of various zombie challenges – challenges that seek to demote the importance of conscious control for human agency. (...)
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  33. Christof Koch & Francis Crick (2001). On the Zombie Within. Nature 411 (6840):893-893.score: 9.0
  34. Julia Tanney (2004). On the Conceptual, Psychological, and Moral Status of Zombies, Swamp-Beings, and Other 'Behaviourally Indistinguishable' Creatures. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):173-186.score: 9.0
    In this paper I argue that it would be unprincipled to withhold mental predicates from our behavioural duplicates however unlike us they are "on the inside." My arguments are unusual insofar as they rely neither on an implicit commitment to logical behaviourism in any of its various forms nor to a verificationist theory of meaning. Nor do they depend upon prior metaphysical commitments or to philosophical "intuitions". Rather, in assembling reminders about how the application of our consciousness and propositional attitude (...)
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  35. Tillmann Vierkant (2002). Zombie Mary and the Blue Banana. On the Compatibility of the 'Knowledge Argument' with the Argument From Modality. Psyche 8 (19).score: 9.0
  36. David B. Macintosh, The Philosophical Zombie Versus The Tennis Playing Zombie: An Explanation of Consciousness.score: 9.0
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  37. Christopher Mole (2009). Illusions, Demonstratives and the Zombie Action Hypothesis. Mind 118 (472):995-1011.score: 9.0
    David Milner and Melvyn Goodale, and the many psychologists and philosophers who have been influenced by their work, claim that ‘the visual system that gives us our visual experience of the world is not the same system that guides our movements in the world’. The arguments that have been offered for this surprising claim place considerable weight on two sources of evidence — visual form agnosia and the reaching behaviour of normal subjects when picking up objects that induce visual illusions. (...)
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  38. Selmer Bringsjord (1995). In Defense of Impenetrable Zombies. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (4):348-351.score: 9.0
  39. Charles Huenemann (2004). The Sage Meets the Zombie: Spinoza's Wise Man and Chalmers' The Conscious Mind. Studia Spinozana: An International and Interdisciplinary Series 14:21-33.score: 9.0
  40. Mary Midgley (1995). Zombies and the Turing Test. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (4):351-352.score: 9.0
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  41. Peter Marton (1998). Zombies Versus Materialists: The Battle for Conceivability. Southwest Philosophy Review 14 (1):131-138.score: 9.0
  42. Diana Raffman (2005). Even Zombies Can Be Surprised: A Reply to Graham and Horgan. Philosophical Studies 122 (2):189-202.score: 9.0
    In their paper “Mary, Mary, Quite Contrary” (2000), George Graham and Terence Horgan argue, contrary to a widespread view, that the socalled Knowledge Argument may after all pose a problem for certain materialist accounts of perceptual experience. I propose a reply to Graham and Horgan on the materialist’s behalf, making use of a distinction between knowing what it’s like to see something F and knowing how F things look.
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  43. Ivan Havel (1999). Living in Conceivable Worlds. Foundations of Science 3 (2):375-394.score: 9.0
    Certain cognitive and philosophical aspects of the concept of conceivability with intended or established diversion from (putative) reality are discussed. The “coherence gap problem” arises when certain fragments of the real world are replaced with imaginary situations while most details are (intentionally or not) ignored. Another issue, “the spectator problem”, concerns the participation of the conceiver himself in the world conceived. Three different examples of conceivability are used to illustrate our points, namely thought experiments in physics, a hypothetical world devoid (...)
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  44. Philip Goff (2013). The Zombie Threat to a Science of Mind. Philosophy Now 96:6-7.score: 9.0
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  45. Wallace I. Matson (2003). Zombies Begone! Against Chalmers' Mind/Brain Dualism. Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 24 (1):123-136.score: 9.0
  46. Fred Dretske (2003). How Do You Know You Are Not a Zombie? In Brie Gertler (ed.), Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate. 1--14.score: 9.0
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  47. Jamie L. Phillips (1998). A Problem with Marton's Zombies Vs. Materialists: The Battle for Conceivability. Southwest Philosophy Review 14 (2):175-178.score: 9.0
  48. Brian Boyd (2006). Theory Is Dead--Like a Zombie. Philosophy and Literature 30 (1):289-298.score: 9.0
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  49. Dien Ho (2013). What's So Bad About Being a Zombie. Philosophy NOW 96 (96):8-11.score: 9.0
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