Zero pronominals challenge Type Logical Grammar in two ways. One, TLG displays a linear resource management regime for semantic composition, meaning that pronominals call for special treatment if they want to do resource multiplication. Two, as a grammar of lexicalism, TLG applies to phonologically realized lexical entries only, illegitimating the phonetically null items during syntactic derivation. Jägor extends the inventory of category-forming connectives of TLG by a third kind of implication that creates categories of anaphoric items and solves the first (...) problem above. This article goes a step further to tackle the second one. In order to formalize the constructions with zero pronominals, we design a ternary category A B C and include the latter into Jägor’s system. The proposed system is proof-theoretically well-behaved. It is complete, sound, and decidable. More importantly, zero pronominals of various forms can be derived in the system. (shrink)

There are at least five kinds of causative constructions in Chinese, the constructions of the collocation of verbs and prepositional phrases, verb-copying constructions, “ba” constructions with an object ahead, verb-copying constructions with their complements, and pivotal constructions with commands. But the current type-logical grammar has no tools representing the meanings of causative constructions. It would be neither intuitive nor simple to describe these constructions by means of the current type-logical grammar. So we intend to improve the type-logical grammar by adding (...) CAUSE as a logical constant, complementing the structure rules about the movement and addition or deletion of some components of causative constructions, assigning categories to Chinese nouns and prepositions; then we give an intuitive as well as simple analysis on these causative constructions. Based on this work we shall extend the multimodal system of type-logical grammar, increase structure postulates, make constraints on frame semantics, and then prove the soundness and completeness of that system. (shrink)

本书以现实人生为立足点,通过一系列美学范畴的辩证运动,论证审美关系的生成、审美意识的结构与功能及人性结构的主体化等。.

In the traditional Chinese conception, ‘things’ (wu 物) serve as the fundamental ‘components’ of order. Moreover, it is through things and their changes that humans can grasp moral and political norms based on the notion of resonance (ganying 感應). This implies that human society and the world of things are necessarily interconnected. In opposition to this view of order Xiong Bolong 熊伯龍 (1617–1670) in his work Wuhe ji 無何集 (Collected Passages on Being without Causes) critiqued the notion of resonance and (...) arrived at a more ‘disenchanted’ approach to ‘things’ by incorporating the idea of contingency from Wang Chong’s 王充 (27–c. 97) philosophical thought. However, Xiong’s view of order full of contingency does not entirely diverge from the traditional mainstream Chinese view, because in his world of thought, a belief in the underlying necessity of a perfect order within the holistic arrangement of myriad things including humans remained. (shrink)

Ben shu xi tong chan shu liao Zhongguo zhe xue de yuan qi, fa zhan he wei lai.quan shu gong fen cheng si ge da bu fen:yuan qi yu chu xing; er, ge ming hua de ding xing; san, xin shi dai de zhuan xiang;si, zou xiang quan qiu hua shi dai de Zhongguo zhe xue.

本书饱蘸着我军军魂所赋予我们的激情,与战友们一起追忆我军以往的辉煌历程,讴歌我军当今的伟大壮举,憧憬我军未来的丰功伟绩,漫议军人的理想、信仰、道德、信念、气节、情操、奉献、价值。.

Ben shu quan mian chan shu zhu xi de li xue yu ke xue si xiang,Te bie jiu zhu xi zhong shi zi ran yan jiu,Shen ru ke xue tan suo,Chuang xin ke xue si xiang,Chuan bo zi ran zhi shi yi ji zhu xi li xue de ke xue jia zhi zhan kai ju ti de lun shu,Chong fen ken ding zhu xi ke xue si xiang dui yu hou shi ke ji fa zhan de zhong yao zuo yong,Yi (...) qi dui jin tian de ke ji yu wen hua de fa zhan zhu ru yuan tou huo shui. (shrink)

Zou Rong received a classical education but, uninterested in an official career and frustrated by the irrelevance of his schooling to the day's issues, traveled to Japan in 1901 to further his studies. There he wrote The Revolutionary Army, which was published in Shanghai after his return to China in 1903. The Revolutionary Army, which was scathingly critical of the Manchu rulers of China, enraged government authorities who sought his immediate arrest. Zou was protected by authorities of the International Settlement (...) in Shanghai, and eventually sentenced to only two years in jail. Be this as it may, Zou contracted an illness in prison and died in April of 1905. The Revolutionary Army is far more than an anti-Manchu racist tract. It advocates political and social revolution, and Zou's account of the justification for and goals of these revolutions rests in no small part on natural rights and independence, as discussed in the two chapters from the work that we translate here. (shrink)

A common assumption in the selection of nonhuman animal subjects for research and the approval of research is that, if the risks of a procedure are too great for humans, and if there is a so-called scientific necessity, then it is permissible to use nonhuman animal subjects. I reject the common assumption as neglecting the central ethical issue of the permissibility of using nonhuman animal subjects and as being inconsistent with the principle of justice used in human subjects research ethics. (...) This principle requires that certain classes of individuals not be subjected to a disproportionate share of the burdens or risks of research. I argue for an extension of this principle to nonhuman animal research and show that a prima facie violation of the principle occurs because nonhuman animals bear an overwhelmingly disproportionate share of the risks of research without sufficient justification or reciprocal benefit. (shrink)

What should we do about “tainted” public commemorations? Recent events have highlighted the urgency of reaching a consensus on this question. However, existing discussions appear to be dominated by two naïve opposing views – to remove or preserve them. My aims in this essay are two-fold. First, I argue that the two views are not naïve, but undergirded by concerns with securing self-respect and with the character of our engagement with the past. Second, I offer a qualified defence of vandalising (...) tainted commemorations. The defence comprises two parts. I consider two prominent suggestions – to install counter-commemorations and to add contextualising plaques – and argue that they are typically beset with difficulties. I then argue that in some circumstances, constrained vandalism is a response to tainted commemorations which effectively adjudicates the demands of the two opposing views. (shrink)

在宋儒學脈自二程至黃幹一系師承的啟發下，本書稿連續性地縱觀明儒學脈的師承進路，延著吳溥、楊溥—吳康齋—陳白沙—湛甘泉—唐一庵—許敬庵—劉念台不間斷的時間線索，圍繞明代諸儒的核心範疇與核心概念“至善性體 ”展開，試圖在陽明心學于明朝大瀾、大明與大傳播的框架外，找尋明儒學脈的新線索，發現有明一朝中國學術內在邏輯成長的新視野。.

本书是我国学者全面系统地阐述杜威学术思想的第一部专著,对杜威的哲学思想和教育思想做出实事求是的评价。.

《中國禮文化與儒學研究》通過對《禮記》《老子》《春秋》等儒家經典著作的研究，結合馬克思主義關於人類社會發展的相關理論，指出“禮”是中國文化的根基，強調了《禮記》在古禮研究中的價值和意義，探討了古禮的起 源以及先民的社會生活模式，並在此基礎上，對古禮的類別和結構、主要功能及其內在統一性進行了論述，分析了古禮的基本功能與中國文明形成道路的內在聯繫和重要意義。通過對《老子》的研究，分析了儒道之間的異同，並 闡述了老子思想的現代意義。通過分析儒家禮教思想與古代禮教的關係，探討了儒家禮教思想的人文價值，論述了儒家禮教思想與傳統政治制度的關係，提出《春秋》中的大一統思想是儒家學說中的外王思想，並探討了這種思想 在漢代大一統政治局面形成中的作用。.

A central idea of public reason liberalism is that the exercise of political power is legitimate when supported only by reasons which all citizens accept. Public reason serves as a necessary standard for evaluating the legitimacy of political decisions. In this paper, I examine the directive to employ public reason from the citizens’ perspective. I suggest that employing public reason potentially involves them engaging in different types of compromise. I consider how acknowledging these compromises sheds light on public reason liberalism. (...) Public reason may not offer a necessary standard for evaluating the legitimacy of decisions, and the evaluation it offers may not have great weight relative to other moral and political considerations. (shrink)

本书是一本关于陈冲体验人生感悟人生的书法集子。内容包括:悟道篇;明理篇;做人篇;处世篇等。.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Clinical CommentaryChong Siow Ann, Associate ProfessorDr. G appears to experiencing symptoms of schizophrenia, which is arguably the most severe mental disorder and which afflicts about one in a hundred people. This is a psychotic disorder that causes disturbances and distortions in thinking, including neurocognitive impairments, perception and behaviour. There is no cure for this often devastating disorder. Current antipsychotic medications can alleviate some of the symptoms but it often (...) comes at a price as these antipsychotics have burdensome side effects.A feature of this disorder is anosognosia, which is a lack of awareness or “insight” that an illness is present. This lack of insight presents a particular challenge because these individuals would, as in the case of Dr. G, refuse needed treatment as they do not perceive that they are ill. This is not necessarily an all-or-none phenomenon but is rather more complex and multidimensional; there might be an unawareness or recognition on behalf of the patient that they are suffering from a mental illness, the failure to appreciate the necessity of treatment; and/or the inability to recognise and define the psychotic symptoms like unusual thoughts and hallucinations as signs of illness1 and in many instances, all three are present. It is also by no means uncommon. Studies have found that between 60% and 80% of people with schizophrenia lack awareness of their illness to varying degrees.2This phenomenon remains an enigma. Some regard it as a form of psychological defence against the harsh reality of a psychotic illness — awareness of having a chronic and devastating illness might lead to demoralisation, hopelessness and suicide.3 Recent research, however, [End Page 250] indicates that this psychological denial plays a small part, if any, and instead has found an association with certain neuropsychological and neurocognitive deficits,4 as well as functional and structural brain abnormalities in the frontal lobe of the brain.5The prevailing clinical view thus is that this is an intrinsic and organic aspect of the schizophrenic illness which has nothing to do with wilfulness but rather the incapacity to perceive the presence of the illness. Edwin Fuller Torrey, an eminent psychiatrist and executive director of the Stanley Medical Research Foundation, calls anosognosia the “single largest reason why individuals with schizophrenia and bipolar disorder do not take their medications”, and he has remarked that “to keep talking about civil liberty is illogical. Patients are anything but free when they’re at the beck and call of their own delusions”.6It is also this view that it is a product of a brain disorder that some — particularly patients — find unacceptable. At one level, it does not take into context the person’s own experiences, and at a deeper level it calls into question the conception of the self with its capacity to exercise judgements and the autonomy to make decisions.This is a perennial ethical issue in psychiatry when people with severe mental illnesses refuse treatment. This becomes a Catch-22 situation where part of the illness that needs treatment is also preventing any treatment to be given: implicit in the principle of informed consent for treatment is that the person should be aware of the nature and course of their illness and acknowledge the need for treatment. While there are laws for involuntary commitment, the bar is usually high in that there must be a clear and present risk of harm to the person or others. Alan Stone, a professor of law and psychiatry at Harvard University proposed a possible justification for involuntary treatment based on his “thank-you theory” which assumes that patients will become well and subsequently agree that the intervention was in their best interests but research suggests that only half of these patients would admit so.7One suggested mechanism is the use of advance directives — psychiatry’s version of the living will in which people can specify what sort of medical care they would like should they become mentally unwell and unable to exercise appropriate judgement. An intrinsic part of this might include a “Ulysses contract” — just as Ulysess instructed his crew to lash him to the mast of the his ship so that he could... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Underplayed Ethics and the Dilemmas of Psychiatric CareChong Siow Ann and Tamra LysaghtThe practice of psychiatry is fraught with uncertainty. The exact causes and the biological substrates underlying mental disorders remain to be elucidated; even the diagnosis of these disorders is descriptive and not based on an etiological understanding and no biological diagnostic markers have been validated. The manifestation of almost all mental disorders results from a complex interaction (...) of biological and environmental factors which encompasses the patient’s unique life history, experiences and relationship with others and the community. In the face of such uncertainties — at times extending to the types of treatment (psychiatry is generally acknowledged not be an exact science) — it has been argued that adopting a pragmatic approach is necessary.1 Accordingly, this approach necessitates high ethical standards among mental health practitioners.Some mental illnesses are associated with varying degrees and types of cognitive impairments. Others have certain symptoms like auditory hallucinations and delusions that might severely compromise the patients’ autonomy, distort their sense of reality, increase the risk of harm to themselves or others and render them incapable of making informed decisions in their treatment and participation in research.Consequently, there are issues that are particular to the provision of mental healthcare. These include the need for enforced involuntary treatment with the corollary of depriving a patient of his personal liberty even [End Page 173] though it is often justified on the grounds that it is in the patient’s best interests. However, at times, it is the legal and societal obligation of mental health practitioners to protect those who might be harmed from the patient’s action that might seem to be more pressing. In this situation of double agency, lies the tension of providing confidential care for patients and acting as “an agent of the state” where that patient’s confidentiality might be breached and his liberty infringed upon. This situation is further aggravated by the stigma that clings ever so tenaciously to those who suffer from mental disorders and where it is the norm to stereotype them as dangerous and unpredictable.Consideration of a patient’s autonomy is also challenged by characteristics that are unique to the practice of psychiatry. The prescription of certain psychotropic medications can alter how people think and feel, while psychotherapy works towards changing the patient’s views and values. The philosopher, Jennifer Radden, describes this process as “re-forming the patient’s whole self or character … akin to the responsibilities of raising children”.2 The psychotherapeutic relationship is thus particularly personal and intimate because patients are asked to provide information that often reveals their innermost feelings, fears and fantasies. This information is provided on the basis of trust and assurance of confidentiality, and with expectation of being helped.Jeremy Holmes and Gwen Adshead have elaborated on the vulnerability of patients seeking psychotherapy: they might be particularly susceptible to exploitation because their past experiences of being exploited have led to their distress and help seeking — their dependency and the extreme privacy of the therapeutic relationship make any transgression difficult to be uncovered.3 There is a calamitous combination of the “unconscious wish in the patient to be used” with the complicity of an unethical therapist seeking to fulfil his own interests.4As in any other doctor-patient relationship, the relationship between the mental healthcare practitioner and the patient is one of unequal power where the former is ascendant. While that power should be exercised to heal and to relieve suffering, it also gives the practitioner tremendous power “to harm, reject, misunderstand, or exploit patients who struggle with the experience of mental illness, which itself may generate helplessness, despair, distress, and exceptional dependence on the clinician”.5 Given the potential of doing good and harm coupled with the likelihood of being so significant in the life of the patient,6 providing care for those with mental disorders and distress is necessarily ethically exacting — arguably more so than in other medical practice settings. [End Page 174]This precariousness has led to the suggestion that ethics in psychiatry should have a special status and that the more general principles of biomedical ethics are too limited in scope to... (shrink)