Search results for 'action explanation' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Sean Crawford (2012). De Re and De Dicto Explanation of Action. Philosophia 40 (4):783-798.
    This paper argues for an account of the relation between thought ascription and the explanation of action according to which de re ascriptions and de dicto ascriptions of thought each form the basis for two different kinds of action explanations, nonrationalizing and rationalizing ones. The claim that de dicto ascriptions explain action is familiar and virtually beyond dispute; the claim that that de re ascriptions are explanatory of action, however, is not at all familiar and (...)
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  2. Constantine Sandis (2006). The Explanation of Action in History. Essays in Philosophy 7 (2):12.
    This paper focuses on two conflations which frequently appear within the philosophy of history and other fields concerned with action explanation. The first of these, which I call the Conflating View of Reasons, states that the reasons for which we perform actions are reasons why (those events which are) our actions occur. The second, more general conflation, which I call the Conflating View of Action Explanation, states that whatever explains why an agent performed a certain (...) explains why (that event which was) her action occurred. Both conflations ignore the fact that there are at least two distinct objects that legitimately qualify as objects of action explanation2. As Jennifer Hornsby (1993) has previous suggested, one thing we might wish to explain is ‘why did A do what she did?’ another is, ‘why did the event of her doing it occur?’ -/- I shall argue that when these two views are combined they give rise to a futile debate about explanation in the philosophies of history and the social sciences, and to an almost identical debate in moral psychology and the philosophy of mind. In so doing, I shall also examine a proposed distinction between explaining a phenomenon, and rendering it intelligible. I conclude by distinguishing between four different objects of historical understanding, each of which is to be understood in the light of the aforementioned distinctions between event and thing done, and explanation and intelligibility. (shrink)
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  3.  45
    Jakub Čapek (2008). Explanation and Understanding: Action as “Historical Structure”. Philosophia 36 (4):453-463.
    The first part of this essay is basically historical. It introduces the explanation–understanding divide, focusing in particular on the general–unique distinction. The second part is more philosophical and it presents two different claims on action. In the first place, I will try to say what it means to understand an action. Secondly, we will focus on the explanation of action as it is seen in some explanatory sciences. I will try to argue that in some (...)
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  4.  62
    Philip Pettit (1986). A Priori Principles and Action-Explanation. Analysis 46 (1):39 - 45.
    This paper is a defence of the view that action explanation deploys (relatively) a priori principles. The argument is that this is so because action explanation succeeds, Not just through revealing regularity, But through exhibiting the presence of an expected and privileged pattern. Its job is to 'normalise' action, Not just 'regularise' it.
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  5. Scott R. Sehon (2000). An Argument Against the Causal Theory of Action Explanation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):67-85.
    It is widely held that belief explanations of action are a species of causal explanation. This paper argues against the causal construal of action explanation. It first defends the claim that unless beliefs are brain states, beliefs cannot causally explain behavior. Second, the paper argues against the view that beliefs are brain states. It follows from these claims that beliefs do not causally explain behavior. An alternative account is then proposed, according to which action (...) is teleological rather than causal, and the paper closes by suggesting that teleological account makes sense of and supports the autonomy of common sense psychology. (shrink)
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  6. Constantine Sandis (2012). The Objects of Action Explanation. Ratio 25 (3):326-344.
    This paper distinguishes between various different conceptions of behaviour and action before exploring an accompanying variety of distinct things that ‘action explanation’ may plausibly amount to viz. different objectives of action explanation. I argue that a large majority of philosophers are guilty of conflating many of these, consequently offering inadequate accounts of the relation between actions and our reasons for performing them. The paper ends with the suggestion that we would do well to opt for (...)
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  7. Donald Davidson (1987). Problems in the Explanation of Action. In Philip Pettit, Richard Sylvan & J. Norman (eds.), Metaphysics and Morality. Blackwell
  8. Mark Risjord (2005). Reasons, Causes, and Action Explanation. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 35 (3):294-306.
    To explain an intentional action one must exhibit the agent’s reasons. Donald Davidson famously argued that the only clear way to understand action explanation is to hold that reasons are causes. Davidson’s discussion conflated two issues: whether reasons are causes and whether reasons causally explain intentional action. Contemporary work on explanation and normativity help disentangle these issues and ground an argument that intentional action explanations cannot be a species of causal explanation. Interestingly, this (...)
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  9.  33
    Cord Friebe (2015). Psychoanalytic Action Explanation. Philosophical Explorations 18 (1):34-44.
    Psychoanalysis is concerned with neurotic behaviour that counts as an action if one takes into account “repressed” mental states. Freud's paradigmatic examples are a challenge for philosophical theories of action explanation. The main problem is that such symptomatic behaviour is, in a characteristic way, irrational. In line with standard interpretations, I will recap that psychoanalytic action explanation is not in accordance with Davidson's classical reason-explanation model, and I will recall that Freud's unconsciousness is not (...)
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  10.  45
    Duncan Macintosh (2007). Reasons and Purposes: Human Rationality and the Teleological Explanation of Action - By G.F. Schueler. Philosophical Books 48 (1):86-88.
  11.  34
    Scott R. Sehon (1998). Connectionism and the Causal Theory of Action Explanation. Philosophical Psychology 11 (4):511-532.
    It is widely assumed that common sense psychological explanations of human action are a species of causal explanation. I argue against this construal, drawing on Ramsey et al.'s paper, “Connectionism, eliminativism, and the future of folk psychology”. I argue that if certain connec-tionist models are correct, then mental states cannot be identified with functionally discrete causes of behavior, and I respond to some recent attempts to deny this claim. However, I further contend that our common sense psychological practices (...)
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  12. Scott Sehon (2016). Free Will and Action Explanation: A Non-Causal, Compatibilist Account. Oxford University Press Uk.
    Do we have free will and moral responsibility? Is free will compatible with determinism? Scott Sehon argues that we can make progress on these questions by focusing on an underlying issue: the nature of action explanation. When a person acts, or does something on purpose, we explain the behavior by citing the agent's reasons. The dominant view in philosophy of mind has been to construe such explanations as a species of causal explanation. Sehon proposes and defends a (...)
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  13.  69
    Karsten R. Stueber (2008). 2. Reasons, Generalizations, Empathy, and Narratives: The Epistemic Structure of Action Explanation. History and Theory 47 (1):31–43.
    It has become something of a consensus among philosophers of history that historians, in contrast to natural scientists, explain in a narrative fashion. Unfortunately, philosophers of history have not said much about how it is that narratives have explanatory power. they do, however, maintain that a narrative’s explanatory power is sui generis and independent of our empathetic or reenactive capacities and of our knowledge of law-like generalizations. In this article I will show that this consensus is mistaken at least in (...)
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  14.  25
    Ishtiyaque Haji (2005). Libertarianism, Luck, and Action Explanation. Journal of Philosophical Research 30:321-340.
    My primary objective is to motivate the concern that leading libertarian views of free action seem unable to account for an agent’s behavior in a way that reveals an explanatorily apt connection between the agent’s prior reasons and the intentional behavior to be explained. I argue that it is this lack of a suitable reasons explanation of purportedly free decisions that underpins the objection that agents who act with the pertinent sort of libertarian freedom cannot be morally responsible (...)
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  15.  17
    T. Uebel (2012). Narratives and Action Explanation. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 42 (1):31-67.
    This article discusses an epistemological problem faced by causal explanations of action and a proposed solution. The problem is to justify why one particular reason rather than another is specified as causally efficacious. It is argued that the problem arises independently of one’s preferred conception of singular causal claims, psychological and psychophysical generalizations, and our folk-psychological competence. The proposed fallibilist solution involves the supplementation of the reason given by narratives that contextualize it and provide additional criteria for justifying the (...)
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  16. Stephen Boulter (2009). Aquinas on Action and Action Explanation. In Constantine Sandis (ed.), New Essays on the Explanation of Action. Palgrave Macmillan
  17. E. J. Lowe (2009). Free Agency, Causation and Action Explanation. In Constantine Sandis (ed.), New Essays on the Explanation of Action. Palgrave Macmillan
  18. Elisabeth Pacherie (2002). The Role of Emotions in the Explanation of Action. European Review of Philosophy 5:53-92.
  19.  77
    Carl Ginet (1989). Reasons Explanation of Action: An Incompatibilist Account. Philosophical Perspectives 3:17-46.
  20.  64
    Ruth Macklin (1969). Explanation and Action: Recent Issues and Controversies. Synthese 20 (October):388-415.
  21. P. Ivet (2002). Emotions, Revision, and the Explanation of Emotional Action. European Review of Philosophy 5.
     
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  22.  55
    G. F. Schueler (1995). Desire: Its Role in Practical Reason and the Explanation of Action. MIT Press.
    Does action always arise out of desire? G. F. Schueler examines this hotly debated topic in philosophy of action and moral philosophy, arguing that once two senses of "desire" are distinguished - roughly, genuine desires and pro attitudes - apparently plausible explanations of action in terms of the agent's desires can be seen to be mistaken. Desire probes a fundamental issue in philosophy of mind, the nature of desires and how, if at all, they motivate and justify (...)
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  23.  17
    Iskra Fileva (forthcoming). Two Senses of "Why": Traits and Reasons in the Explanation of Action. In Questions of Character. Oxford University Press
    I discuss the respective roles of traits and reasons in the explanation of action. I begin by noting that traits and reasons explanations are systematically connected: traits explanations require motivation by reasons. Actions due to psychiatric conditions such as mental disorders cannot be explained by an appeal to traits. Because traits require motivation by reasons, it is often possible to explain one and the same action by an appeal to either the agent's traits or to her reasons. (...)
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  24.  62
    Zhu Xu (2010). Laws, Causality and the Intentional Explanation of Action. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 5 (2):280-293.
    Whether or not an intentional explanation of action necessarily involves law-like statements is related to another question, namely, is it a causal explanation? The Popper-Hempel Thesis , which answers both questions affirmatively, inevitably faces a dilemma between realistic and universalistic requirements. However, in terms of W.C. Salmon’s concept of causal explanation, intentional explanation can be a causal one even if it does not rely on any laws. Based on this, we are able to refute three (...)
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  25.  23
    Julia Tanney, Causation Vs. Reasons in Action Explanation.
  26.  2
    Werner Greve (2001). Traps and Gaps in Action Explanation: Theoretical Problems of a Psychology of Human Action. Psychological Review 108 (2):435-451.
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  27.  25
    Scott Sehon (2012). Action Explanation and the Free Will Debate: How Incompatibilist Arguments Go Wrong1. Philosophical Issues 22 (1):351-368.
  28. M. W. Risjord (2000). Woodcutters and Witchcraft: Rationality and Interpretive Change in the Social Sciences. Albany: State University of New York Press. 2005 Reasons, Causes, and Action Explanation. [REVIEW] Philosophy of the Social Sciences 35:1-13.
     
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  29. Carlos Moya Espí (1998). Reason and Causation in Davidson's Theory of Action Explanation. Critica 30 (89):29-43.
  30.  23
    Carlos J. Moya (1998). Reason and Causation in Davidson's Theory of Action Explanation. Critica 30 (89):29 - 43.
    En la concepcion de Davidson, las explicaciones de la accion en terminos de razones incluyen dos aspectos o condiciones independientes entre si: una condicion de racionalidad o justificacion racional y una condicion causal. La satisfaccion de la primera depende de relaciones logicas apropiadas entre las descripciones de la razon y de la accion. La segunda exige unicamente la existencia de un vinculo causal entre razon y accion. Es esta independencia entre las dos condiciones la que, en nuestra opinion, genera en (...)
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  31. John Campbell (2003). The Role of Demonstratives in Action-Explanation. In Johannes Roessler & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Clarendon Press
     
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  32.  4
    Huw Price (1989). Action Explanation and the Nature of Mind. In Peter Slezak (ed.), Computers, Brains and Minds. Kluwer 221--251.
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  33. Hiranmoy Banerjee & Tirthanath Bandyopadhyay (eds.) (1990). Action: Explanation and Interpretation. K.P. Bagchi & Co. In Collaboration with Jadavpur University.
     
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  34. Stephen A. Butterfill (1999). Truth Theories and Action Explanation.
     
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  35. Carol A. Donovan (1977). Physicalism and Action Explanation. Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
     
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  36.  73
    Carl F. Craver (2008). Physical Law and Mechanistic Explanation in the Hodgkin and Huxley Model of the Action Potential. Philosophy of Science 75 (5):1022-1033.
    Hodgkin and Huxley’s model of the action potential is an apparent dream case of covering‐law explanation in biology. The model includes laws of physics and chemistry that, coupled with details about antecedent and background conditions, can be used to derive features of the action potential. Hodgkin and Huxley insist that their model is not an explanation. This suggests either that subsuming a phenomenon under physical laws is insufficient to explain it or that Hodgkin and Huxley were (...)
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  37. Charles Pigden (2009). A Niggle at Nagel: Causally Active Desires and the Explanation of Action. In Constantine Sandis (ed.), New Essays on the Explanation of Action. Palgrave Macmillan 220--40.
    This paper criticizes an influential argument from Thomas Nagel’s THE POSSIBILTIY OF ALTRUISM, an argument that plays a foundational role in the philosophies of (at least) Philippa Foot, John McDowell and Jonathan Dancy. Nagel purports to prove that a person can be can be motivated to perform X by the belief that X is likely to bring about Y, without a causally active or biffy desire for Y. If Cullity and Gaut are to be believed (ETHICS AND PRACTICAL REASONING) this (...)
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  38.  15
    Dagfinn Follesdal (1982). The Status of Rationality Assumptions in Interpretation and in the Explanation of Action. Dialectica 36 (4):301-316.
    SummaryThe rationality assumptions that are made when one interprets texts or explains actions have been regarded as necessary , empirical , superfluous , or false .After a survey of different notions of rationality and the role that each of them plays in interpretation and in the explanation of action, the author's view is presented in four theses: some degree of rationality is necessary, reasons for actions should always be included in their explanation, even where purely causal factors (...)
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  39.  17
    John D. Greenwood (1990). The Social Constitution of Action: Objectivity and Explanation. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 20 (2):195-207.
    It is argued in this article that human actions may be said to be socially constituted : as being behavior that is constituted as human action by social relations and by participant agent and collective representations of behavior. In contrast to recent social constructionist accounts, it is argued that the social constitution of action does not pose any threat to the objectivity of classification or explanation in social psychological science. It does mark some significant ontological differences between (...)
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  40.  14
    George Sher (1973). Causal Explanation and the Vocabulary of Action. Mind 82 (325):22-30.
    It seems plausible to suppose that (a) the vocabulary of action is distinct from and irreducible to that of mere movement, And (b) the causal laws of the natural sciences are couched solely in terms of the latter vocabulary. From these two suppositions, The falsehood of determinism has sometimes been said to follow. I argue that whether this does follow depends on our conception of causal explanation; on the interpretation of this concept that seems to me the most (...)
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  41. Peter Volek (2011). The Influence of Aristotelianism on the Explanation of Action by Thomas Aquinas and Raymund Lullus. Filozofia 66 (1):11-23.
    The paper examines the influence of aristotelianism on the explanation of action by Thomas Aquinas and Raymund Lullus. The main focus is on the basic elements of this influence, on the originality of the thought of Thomas Aquinas and Raymund Lullus, on their different interpretations of action in comparison with aristotelianism, and on reasons leading to different ways of accepting aristotelianism.
     
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  42.  51
    Jerome C. Wakefield (2002). Broad Versus Narrow Content in the Explanation of Action: Fodor on Frege Cases. Philosophical Psychology 15 (2):119-33.
    A major obstacle to formulating a broad-content intentional psychology is the occurrence of ''Frege cases'' - cases in which a person apparently believes or desires Fa but not Fb and acts accordingly, even though "a" and "b" have the same broad content. Frege cases seem to demand narrow-content distinctions to explain actions by the contents of beliefs and desires. Jerry Fodor ( The elm and the expert: Mentalese and its semantics , Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994) argues that an explanatorily (...)
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  43.  55
    Cynthia Macdonald & Graham F. Macdonald (1986). Mental Causes and Explanation of Action. Philosophical Quarterly 36 (April):145-58.
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  44. Robert M. Gordon (2000). Simulation and the Explanation of Action. In K. R. Stueber & H. H. Kogaler (eds.), Empathy and Agency: The Problem of Understanding in the Human Sciences. Boulder: Westview Press
  45. Constantine Sandis (2009). Gods and Mental States : The Causation of Action in Ancient Tragedy and Modern Philosophy of Mind. In New Essays on the Explanation of Action. Palgrave Macmillan 358--385.
    This paper argues that contemporary philosophy of mind and action could learn much from the structure of action explanation manifested in ancient Greek tragedy, which is less deterministic than typically supposed and which does not conflate the motivation of action with its causal production.
     
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  46.  66
    G. F. Schueler (2003). Reasons and Purposes: Human Rationality and the Teleological Explanation of Action. Oxford University Press.
    People act for reasons. That is how we understand ourselves. But what is it to act for a reason? This is what Fred Schueler investigates. He rejects the dominant view that the beliefs and desires that constitute our reasons for acting simply cause us to act as we do, and argues instead for a view centred on practical deliberation--our ability to evaluate the reasons we accept. Schueler's account of 'reasons explanations' emphasizes the relation between reasons and purposes, and the fact (...)
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  47.  81
    David Sobel (2001). Explanation, Internalism, and Reasons for Action. Social Philosophy and Policy 18 (2):218.
    These days, just about every philosophical debate seems to generate a position labeled internalism. The debate I will be joining in this essay concerns reasons for action and their connection, or lack of connection, to motivation. The internalist position in this debate posits a certain essential connection between reasons and motivation, while the externalist position denies such a connection. This debate about internalism overlaps an older debate between Humeans and Kantians about the exclusive reason-giving power of desires. As we (...)
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  48.  53
    David-Hillel Ruben (2003). Action and its Explanation. Oxford University Press.
    David-Hillel Ruben mounts a defence of some unusual and original positions in the philosophy of action. Written from a point of view out of sympathy with the assumptions of much of contemporary philosophical action theory, his book draws its inspiration from philosophers as diverse as Aristotle, Berkeley, and Marx. Ruben 's work is located in the tradition of the metaphysics of action, and will attract much attention from his peers and from students in the field.
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  49. Michael Lissack & Abraham Graber (eds.) (2014). Modes of Explanation: Affordances for Action and Prediction. Palgrave.
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  50.  28
    Robert Audi (1979). Wants and Intentions in the Explanation of Action. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 9 (3):227–249.
    This paper replies to criticisms of the author's accounts of intending ("journal of philosophy", 1973), wanting ("philosophical studies", 1973), and common-sense explanations of intentional actions; and it extends the nomological theory of intentional action developed in those and other articles. the paper argues, negatively, that theoretical construct accounts of intentional concepts do not entail implausible views of self-knowledge, nor assimilate reasons to mechanical causes; and, positively, that both the way in which reasons render intelligible the actions they explain and (...)
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