Search results for 'actualism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Axiological Actualism & Process Mediated Mentation (2002). Free Online Trial! Try the Online Version of the Ajp Absolutely Free Until February 28, 2003. There is No Obligation to Subscribe. Simply Follow the Instructions Below and Enjoy Everything the Ajp Online has to Offer. 1 Go To: Http://Www3. Oup. Co. Uk/Online/? H2= 2. [REVIEW] Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 76:149.score: 30.0
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  2. Gabriele Contessa (2010). Modal Truthmakers and Two Varieties of Actualism. Synthese 174 (3):341 - 353.score: 24.0
    In this paper, I distinguish between two varieties of actualism—hardcore actualism and softcore actualism—and I critically discuss Ross Cameron’s recent arguments for preferring a softcore actualist account of the truthmakers for modal truths over hardcore actualist ones. In the process, I offer some arguments for preferring the hardcore actualist account of modal truthmakers over the softcore actualist one.
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  3. Christopher Menzel (1990). Actualism, Ontological Commitment, and Possible World Semantics. Synthese 85 (3):355 - 389.score: 24.0
    Actualism is the doctrine that the only things there are, that have being in any sense, are the things that actually exist. In particular, actualism eschews possibilism, the doctrine that there are merely possible objects. It is widely held that one cannot both be an actualist and at the same time take possible world semantics seriously — that is, take it as the basis for a genuine theory of truth for modal languages, or look to it for insight (...)
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  4. Michael Nelson & Edward N. Zalta (2009). Bennett and “Proxy Actualism”. Philosophical Studies 142 (2):277-292.score: 24.0
    Karen Bennett has recently argued that the views articulated by Linsky and Zalta (Philos Perspect 8:431–458, 1994) and (Philos Stud 84:283–294, 1996) and Plantinga (The nature of necessity, 1974) are not consistent with the thesis of actualism, according to which everything is actual. We present and critique her arguments. We first investigate the conceptual framework she develops to interpret the target theories. As part of this effort, we question her definition of ‘proxy actualism’. We then discuss her main (...)
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  5. Christopher Menzel, Actualism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 24.0
    To understand the thesis of actualism, consider the following example. Imagine a race of beings — call them ‘Aliens’ — that is very different from any life-form that exists anywhere in the universe; different enough, in fact, that no actually existing thing could have been an Alien, any more than a given gorilla could have been a fruitfly. Now, even though there are no Aliens, it seems intuitively the case that there could have been such things. After all, life (...)
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  6. Christopher Menzel (1991). Temporal Actualism and Singular Foreknowledge. Philosophical Perspectives 5:475-507.score: 24.0
    Suppose we believe that God created the world. Then surely we want it to be the case that he intended, in some sense at least, to create THIS world. Moreover, most theists want to hold that God didn't just guess or hope that the world would take one course or another; rather, he KNEW precisely what was going to take place in the world he planned to create. In particular, of each person P, God knew that P was to exist. (...)
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  7. Antony Eagle (2009). Causal Structuralism, Dispositional Actualism, and Counterfactual Conditionals. In Toby Handfield (ed.), Dispositions and Causes. Oxford University Press. 65--99.score: 18.0
    Dispositional essentialists are typically committed to two claims: that properties are individuated by their causal role (‘causal structuralism’), and that natural necessity is to be explained by appeal to these causal roles (‘dispositional actualism’). I argue that these two claims cannot be simultaneously maintained; and that the correct response is to deny dispositional actualism. Causal structuralism remains an attractive position, but doesn’t in fact provide much support for dispositional essentialism.
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  8. Karen Bennett (2006). Proxy “Actualism”. Philosophical Studies 129 (2):263 - 294.score: 18.0
    Bernard Linsky and Edward Zalta have recently proposed a new form of actualism. I characterize the general form of their view and the motivations behind it. I argue that it is not quite new – it bears interesting similarities to Alvin Plantinga’s view – and that it definitely isn’t actualist.
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  9. Karen Bennett (2005). Two Axes of Actualism. Philosophical Review 114 (3):297-326.score: 18.0
    Actualists routinely characterize their view by means of the slogan, “Everything is actual.” They say that there aren’t any things that exist but do not actually exist—there aren’t any “mere possibilia.” If there are any things that deserve the label ‘possible world’, they are just actually existing entities of some kind—maximally consistent sets of sentences, or maximal uninstantiated properties, or maximal possible states of affairs, or something along those lines. Possibilists, in contrast, do think that there are mere possibilia, that (...)
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  10. Jacob Ross (forthcoming). Actualism, Possibilism, and Beyond. Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics.score: 18.0
    How is what an agent ought to do related to what an agent ought to prefer that she does? More precisely, suppose we know what an agent’s preference ordering ought to be over the prospects of performing the various courses of action open to her. Can we infer from this information how she ought to act, and if so, how can we infer it? One view (which, for convenience, I will call ‘actualism’) is that an agent ought to  (...)
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  11. John Mullarkey (2004). Forget the Virtual: Bergson, Actualism, and the Refraction of Reality. [REVIEW] Continental Philosophy Review 37 (4):469-493.score: 18.0
    In this essay I critique a particular reading of Bergson that places an excessive weight on the concept of the ‘virtual’. Driven by the popularity of Deleuze’s use of the virtual, this image of Bergson (seen especially through his text of 1896, Matter and Memory, where the idea is introduced) generates an imbalance that fails to recognise the importance of concepts of actuality, like space or psychology, in his other works. In fact, I argue that the virtual is not the (...)
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  12. Ori Simchen (2006). Actualist Essentialism and General Possibilities. Journal of Philosophy 103 (1):5-26.score: 18.0
    Particular possibilities -- such as that this particular chair occupy the only vacant corner of my office -- are commonly supposed to depend on what actual things there are and what they are like, whereas general possibilities -- such as that some chair or other occupy some vacant corner or other of some office or other -- are commonly supposed not to be so dependent. I articulate a different conception whereby general possibilities are no less determined by what actual things (...)
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  13. Alan McMichael (1983). A Problem for Actualism About Possible Worlds. Philosophical Review 92 (1):49-66.score: 18.0
    Actualists who believe in possible worlds typically regard them as "abstract" objects of some special sort. For example, Alvin plantinga takes worlds to be maximal possible states-Of-Affairs, All of which "exist", As actualism requires, But only one of which "obtains". Views like plantinga's run into difficulty in the interpretation of statements of "iterated" modality, Statements about what is "possible" for individuals that "could" exist but that do not actually exist. These statements seem to require the existence of "singular" states-Of-Affairs (...)
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  14. Rocco J. Gennaro (2003). Papineau on the Actualist HOT Theory of Consciousness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):581-586.score: 18.0
    In Thinking About Consciousness , David Papineau [2002] presents a criticism of so-called 'actualist HOT theories of consciousness'. The HOT theory, held most notably by David Rosenthal, claims that the best explanation for what makes a mental state conscious is that it is the object of an actual higher-order thought directed at the mental state. Papineau contends that actualist HOT theory faces an awkward problem in relation to higher-order memory judgements; for example, that the theory cannot explain how one could (...)
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  15. Michael Nelson (2007). Review: Ways an Actualist Might Be. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 133 (3):455 - 471.score: 18.0
    I discuss Stalnaker's views on modality. In particular, his views on actualism, anti-essentialism, counterpart theory, and the Barcan formulas.
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  16. Reina Hayaki (2003). Actualism and Higher-Order Worlds. Philosophical Studies 115 (2):149 - 178.score: 18.0
    It has been argued that actualism – the view that there are no non-actual objects – cannot deal adequately with statements involving iterated modality, because such claims require reference, either explicit or surreptitious, to non-actual objects. If so, actualists would have to reject the standard semantics for quantified modal logic (QML). In this paper I develop an account of modality which allows the actualist to make sense of iterated modal claims that are ostensibly about non-actual objects. Every occurrence of (...)
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  17. Agustin Rayo (2012). An Actualist´s Guide to Quantifying In. Critica 44 (132):3-34.score: 18.0
    I develop a device for simulating quantification over merely possible objects from the perspective of a modal actualist ---someone who thinks that everything that exists actually exists.
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  18. Charles F. Manski (2011). Actualist Rationality. Theory and Decision 71 (2):195-210.score: 18.0
    This article concerns the prescriptive function of decision analysis. Consider an agent who must choose an action yielding welfare that varies with an unknown state of nature. It is often asserted that such an agent should adhere to consistency axioms which imply that behavior can be represented as maximization of expected utility. However, our agent is not concerned the consistency of his behavior across hypothetical choice sets. He only wants to make a reasonable choice from the choice set that he (...)
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  19. Amihud Gilead (2010). Actualist Fallacies, From Fax Machines to Lunar Journeys. Philosophy and Literature 34 (1):pp. 173-187.score: 18.0
    Already in 1863, Jules Verne knew about Caselli's "pantelegraphy," which was what he described as a "photographic telegraphy, invented during the last century by Professor Giovanni Caselli of Florence."1 Following the mistaken belief that facsimile machines could not been invented until well after the nineteenth century, and wrongly assuming that Caselli was a fictional inventor, merely a figment of Verne's most productive fertile imagination (as such imaginative elements characterize his latter writings), some of Verne's readers mistakenly ascribed to him the (...)
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  20. Michael Losonsky (1986). No Problem for Actualism. Philosophical Review 95 (1):95-97.score: 18.0
    Alan mcmichaels has argued that actualism, The view that there are no non-Actual entities, Has a problem with iterated modalities. This paper argues that this is not the case.
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  21. Harold Zellner (1988). Spinoza's Temporal Argument for Actualism. Philosophy Research Archives 14:303-309.score: 18.0
    In three places Spinoza presents an argument from (a) determinism and (b) God’s “eternity” to (c) “actualism”, i.e., the doctrine that this is (in some sense) the only possible world. That he does so shows that he distinguishes (a) from (c), which he has been thought to conflate. On one reading of ‘eternal’, he is claiming that an infinite past entails no other world was a “real” possibility. As might be expected, the argument is a failure, but it may (...)
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  22. Dale E. Miller (2003). Axiological Actualism and the Converse Intuition. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):123 – 125.score: 18.0
    In 'Axiological Actualism' Josh Parsons argues that 'axiological actualism', which is 'the doctrine that ethical theory should refrain from assigning levels of welfare, or preference orderings, or anything of the sort to merely possible people', lends plausibility to 'the converse intuition'. This is the proposition that 'the welfare a person would have, were they actual, can give us a reason not to bring that person into existence'. I show that Parsons's argument delivers less than he promises. It could (...)
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  23. Alvin Plantinga (1976). Actualism and Possible Worlds. Theoria 42 (1-3):139-160.score: 15.0
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  24. Robert Merrihew Adams (1981). Actualism and Thisness. Synthese 49 (1):3 - 41.score: 15.0
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  25. Frank Jackson & Robert Pargetter (1986). Oughts, Options, and Actualism. Philosophical Review 95 (2):233-255.score: 15.0
  26. Michael Bergmann (1999). (Serious) Actualism and (Serious) Presentism. Noûs 33 (1):118-132.score: 15.0
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  27. Erik Carlson (1999). Consequentialism, Alternatives, and Actualism. Philosophical Studies 96 (3):253-268.score: 15.0
  28. Yannis Stephanou (2007). Serious Actualism. Philosophical Review 116 (2):219-250.score: 15.0
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  29. Donald Brownstein (1985). Troubles with Plantinga's Actualism. Theoria 51 (3):174-189.score: 15.0
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  30. Michael Bergmann (1996). A New Argument From Actualism to Serious Actualism. Noûs 30 (3):356-359.score: 15.0
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  31. William L. Craig (1997). Adams on Actualism and Presentism. Philosophia 25 (1-4):401-405.score: 15.0
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  32. Mark Hinchliff (1989). Plantinga's Defence of Serious Actualism. Analysis 49 (4):182 - 185.score: 15.0
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  33. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1989). Adams on Actualism and Presentism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (2):289-298.score: 15.0
    According to the TDT, no singular propositions about an individual and no "thisnesses" of individuals exist prior to the existence of the indivi­dual in question, where a thisness "is the property of being x, or of being identical with x" and a "singular proposition about an individual x is a proposition that involves or refers to x directly, perhaps by having x or the thisness of x as a constituent, and not merely by way of x's qualitative properties or relations (...)
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  34. James E. Tomberlin (1996). Actualism or Possibilism? Philosophical Studies 84 (2-3):263 - 281.score: 15.0
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  35. Hud Hudson (1997). On a New Argument From Actualism to Serious Actualism. Noûs 31 (4):520-524.score: 15.0
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  36. Michael Jubien (1996). Actualism and Iterated Modalities. Philosophical Studies 84 (2-3):109 - 125.score: 15.0
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  37. G. W. Fitch (1996). In Defense of Aristotelian Actualism. Philosophical Perspectives 10:53 - 71.score: 15.0
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  38. David F. Austin (1981). Plantinga on Actualism and Essences. Philosophical Studies 39 (1):35 - 42.score: 15.0
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  39. Alan McMichael (1983). A New Actualist Modal Semantics. Journal of Philosophical Logic 12 (1):73 - 99.score: 15.0
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  40. Alan McMichael (1986). Actualism: Still Problematic. Philosophical Studies 50 (2):283 - 287.score: 15.0
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  41. Josh Parsons (2002). Axiological Actualism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (2):137 – 147.score: 15.0
    This intuition may be contrasted with the incompatible intuitions that might support, say, average utilitarianism. According to average utilitarianism we should bring about that outcome which has the highest average utility. That someone would have a higher than average level of utility is, therefore, ceteris paribus a reason to act so that that person exists. Because of this, the basic intuition is a reason for rejecting average utilitarianism.
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  42. Claudio Fogu (2003). Actualism and the Fascist Historic Imaginary. History and Theory 42 (2):196–221.score: 15.0
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  43. Alan Nelson (1993). Cartesian Actualism in the Leibniz-Arnauld Correspondence. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):675 - 694.score: 15.0
  44. Bjørn Jespersen (2005). Explicit Intensionalization, Anti-Actualism, and How Smith's Murderer Might Not Have Murdered Smith. Dialectica 59 (3):285–314.score: 15.0
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  45. Josh Weisberg (1999). Active, Thin, and HOT: An Actualist Response to Carruthers' Dispositionalist HOT View. Psyche 5 (6).score: 15.0
    Carruthers proposes that for a mental state to be conscious (state consciousness), it must be present in a.
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  46. A. P. Hazen (1996). Actualism Again. Philosophical Studies 84 (2-3):155 - 181.score: 15.0
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  47. Terence Horgan (1998). Actualism, Quantification, and Contextual Semantics. Philosophical Perspectives 12 (S12):503-509.score: 15.0
  48. James E. Tomberlin (2001). How Not to Be an Actualist. Noûs 35 (s15):421 - 425.score: 15.0
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  49. James E. Tomberlin (1998). Naturalism, Actualism, and Ontology. Philosophical Perspectives 12 (S12):489-498.score: 15.0
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  50. James E. Tomberlin & Frank McGuinness (1994). Troubles with Actualism. Philosophical Perspectives 8:459-466.score: 15.0
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