Search results for 'agent causation' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  9
    Jordan Baker (forthcoming). Rejecting Pereboom’s Empirical Objection to Agent-Causation. Synthese:1-16.
    In this paper I argue that Pereboom’s empirical objection to agent causation fails to undermine the most plausible version of agent-causal libertarianism. This is significant because Pereboom concedes that such libertarianism is conceptually coherent and only falls to empirical considerations. To substantiate these claims I outline Pereboom’s taxonomy of agent-causal views, develop the strongest version of his empirical objections, and then show that this objection fails to undermine what I consider the most plausible view of (...)
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  2. Ned Markosian (1999). A Compatibilist Version of the Theory of Agent Causation. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (3):257-277.
    The problem of freedom and determinism has vexed philosophers for several millennia, and continues to be a topic of lively debate today. One of the proposed solutions to the problem that has received a great deal of attention is the Theory of Agent Causation. While the theory has enjoyed its share of advocates, and perhaps more than its share of critics, the theory’s advocates and critics have always agreed on one thing: the Theory of Agent Causation (...)
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  3. Ned Markosian (2012). Agent Causation as the Solution to All the Compatibilist's Problems. Philosophical Studies 157 (3):383 - 398.
    In a recent paper I argued that agent causation theorists should be compatibilists. In this paper, I argue that compatibilists should be agent causation theorists. I consider six of the main problems facing compatibilism: (i) the powerful intuition that one can't be responsible for actions that were somehow determined before one was born; (ii) Peter van Inwagen's modal argument, involving the inference rule (β); (iii) the objection to compatibilism that is based on claiming that (...)
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  4. Ishtiyaque Haji (2004). Active Control, Agent-Causation and Free Action. Philosophical Explorations 7 (2):131-148.
    Key elements of Randolph Clarke's libertarian account of freedom that requires both agent-causation and non-deterministic event-causation in the production of free action is assessed with an eye toward determining whether agent-causal accounts can accommodate the truth of judgments of moral obligation.
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  5. Manuel Dries (2013). The Feeling of Doing – Nietzsche on Agent Causation. Nietzscheforschung 20 (1).
    This article examines Nietzsche’s analysis of the phenomenology of agent causation. Sense of agent causation, our sense of self-efficacy, is tenacious because it originates, according to Nietzsche’s hypothesis, in the embodied and situated experience of effort in overcoming resistances. It arises at the level of the organism and is sustained by higher-order cognitive functions. Based on this hypothesis, Nietzsche regards the sense of self as emerging from a homeostatic system of drives and affects that unify such (...)
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  6.  76
    Daniel von Wachter (2003). Agent Causation Before and After the Ontological Turn. In Edmund Runggaldier, Christian Kanzian & Josef Quitterer (eds.), Persons: An Interdisciplinary Approach. Öbvhpt
    Chisholm's theory of agent causation is criticised. An alternative theory of agent causation is proposed.
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  7. Stuart Silvers (2003). Agent Causation, Functional Explanation, and Epiphenomenal Engines: Can Conscious Mental Events Be Causally Efficacious? Journal of Mind and Behavior 24 (2):197-228.
    Agent causation presupposes that actions are behaviors under the causal control of the agent’s mental states, its beliefs and desires. Here the idea of conscious causation in causal explanations of actions is examined, specifically, actions said to be the result of conscious efforts. Causal–functionalist theories of consciousness purport to be naturalistic accounts of the causal efficacy of consciousness. Flanagan argues that his causal–functionalist theory of consciousness satisfies naturalistic constraints on causation and that his causal efficacy (...)
     
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  8.  36
    Neil Levy (2015). Luck and Agent-Causation: A Response to Franklin. Criminal Law and Philosophy 9 (4):779-784.
    Christopher Franklin argues that the hard luck view, which I have recently defended, is misnamed: the arguments turn on absence of control and not on luck. He also argues that my objections to agent-causal libertarianism depend on a demand, for a contrastive explanation that guarantees the choice the agent makes, which would be question-begging in the dialectical context. In response to the first objection, I argue that though Franklin may be right that it is absence of control that (...)
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  9.  44
    E. J. Lowe (2001). Event Causation and Agent Causation. Grazer Philosophische Studien 61 (1):1-20.
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  10.  43
    David Widerker (2005). Agent-Causation and Control. Faith and Philosophy 22 (1):87-98.
  11.  20
    Ralph D. Ellis (1983). Agent Causation, Chance, and Determinism. Philosophical Inquiry 5 (1):29-42.
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  12. Therese Scarpelli Cory (2015). Averroes and Aquinas on the Agent Intellect's Causation of Intelligibles. Recherches de Theologie Et Philosophie Medievales 82:1-60.
    This article examines two medieval thinkers—Averroes and Aquinas—on the kind of causation exercised by the agent intellect in “abstracting” or producing intelligibles from images in the imagination. It argues that abstraction in these thinkers should be interpreted in causal terms, as an act whereby images in the imagination, through the power of the agent intellect, educe their intelligible likeness in a receptive intellect. This Averroan-Thomistic causal approach to abstraction offers an intriguing alternative to the usual approach to (...)
     
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  13. B. P. Dauenhauer (2013). Ricoeur and Agent Causation. Philosophy and Social Criticism 39 (6):523-537.
    It is common today to find in philosophical and scientific works the idea of agent causation dismissed as unintelligible. This article is meant to challenge that view. It argues that the conception of agent causation that Paul Ricoeur has defended is by no means unintelligible. Indeed there are compelling, even if not definitive, reasons for acknowledging the existence of such causation. The point of departure for this argument is Ricoeur’s reflection on the discursive character of (...)
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  14. Timothy O'Connor (1995). Agent Causation. In Agents, Causes, and Events: Essays on Indeterminism and Free Will. Oxford University Press 61-79.
    In what follows, I will contend that the commonsense view of ourselves as fundamental causal agents - for which some have used the term “unmoved movers" but which I think might more accurately be expressed as “not wholly moved movers” - is theoretically understandable, internally consistent, and consistent with what we have thus far come to know about the nature and workings of the natural world. In the section that follows, I try to show how the concept of ‘agent (...)
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  15. Chris Tucker (2007). Agent Causation and the Alleged Impossibility of Rational Free Action. Erkenntnis 67 (1):17 - 27.
    Galen Strawson has claimed that "the impossibility of free will and ultimate moral responsibility can be proved with complete certainty." Strawson, I take it, thinks that this conclusion can be established by one argument which he has developed. In this argument, he claims that rational free actions would require an infinite regress of rational choices, which is, of course, impossible for human beings. In my paper, I argue that agent causation theorists need not be worried by Strawson's argument. (...)
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  16.  12
    Jack Martin (2012). Agent Causation and Compatibilism Reconsidered The Evolutionary and Developmental Emergence of Self-Determining Persons. Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (5-6):5-6.
    The central argument of this paper is that compatibilist theories that understand human agent causation as self-determination are consistent with, and can accommodate, important insights from evolutionary and developmental psychology. Agent causation is nothing more than the non-mysterious self-determining capability of persons, understood as embodied, emergent ontological entities whose nature is not fixed due to their uniquely evolved and developed capabilities of language use, cultural construction, self-consciousness and self-understanding, and moral concern. Relevant arguments of Dennett and (...)
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  17.  55
    Andrei A. Buckareff (1999). Can Agent-Causation Be Rendered Intelligible?: An Essay on the Etiology of Free Action. Dissertation, Texas A&M University
    The doctrine of agent-causation has been suggested by many interested in defending libertarian theories of free action to provide the conceptual apparatus necessary to make the notion of incompatibility freedom intelligible. In the present essay the conceptual viability of the doctrine of agent-causation will be assessed. It will be argued that agent-causation is, insofar as it is irreducible to event-causation, mysterious at best, totally unintelligible at worst. First, the arguments for agent-causation (...)
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  18. Markus E. Schlosser (2008). Agent-Causation and Agential Control. Philosophical Explorations 11 (1):3-21.
    According to what I call the reductive standard-causal theory of agency, the exercise of an agent's power to act can be reduced to the causal efficacy of agent-involving mental states and events. According to a non-reductive agent-causal theory, an agent's power to act is irreducible and primitive. Agent-causal theories have been dismissed on the ground that they presuppose a very contentious notion of causation, namely substance-causation. In this paper I will assume, with the (...)
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  19. Randolph Clarke (2005). Agent Causation and the Problem of Luck. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):408-421.
    : On a standard libertarian account of free will, an agent acts freely on some occasion only if there remains, until the action is performed, some chance that the agent will do something else instead right then. These views face the objection that, in such a case, it is a matter of luck whether the agent does one thing or another. This paper considers the problem of luck as it bears on agent‐causal libertarian accounts. A view (...)
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  20.  36
    Christopher Evan Franklin (2015). Agent-Causation, Explanation, and Akrasia: A Reply to Levy’s Hard Luck. [REVIEW] Criminal Law and Philosophy 9 (4):753-770.
    I offer a brief review of, and critical response to, Neil Levy’s fascinating recent book Hard Luck, where he argues that no one is ever free or morally responsible not because of determinism or indeterminism, but because of luck. Two of Levy’s central arguments in defending his free will nihilism concern the nature and role of explanation in a theory of moral responsibility and the nature of akrasia. With respect to explanation, Levy argues that an adequate theory of moral responsibility (...)
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  21.  34
    Jonathan D. Jacobs & Timothy O'Connor (2013). Agent Causation in a Neo-Aristotelian Metaphysics. In Sophie C. Gibb & Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.), Mental Causation and Ontology. Oxford University Press
  22. Robert F. Allen, Agent Causation and Ultimate Responsibility.
    Positions taken in the current debate over free will can be seen as responses to the following conditional: If every action is caused solely by another event and a cause necessitates its effect, then there is no action to which there is an alternative. The Libertarian, who believes that alternatives are a requirement of free will, responds by denying the right conjunct of C’s antecedent, maintaining that some actions are caused, either mediately or immediately, by events whose effects could be (...)
     
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  23.  23
    Rebekah L. H. Rice (2011). Agent Causation and Acting for Reasons. American Philosophical Quarterly 48 (4):333-346.
    The Agent-Causal Theory of Action claims that an event counts as an action when, and only when, it is caused by an agent. The central difference between the Causal Theory of Action (CTA) and the Agent-Causal view comes down to a disagreement about what sort of item (or items) occupies the left-hand position in the causal relation. For CTA, the left-hand position is occupied by mental items within the agent, typically construed in terms of mental events (...)
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  24.  4
    Stefaan E. Cuypers (1998). Robust Activity, Event-Causation, and Agent-Causation. In J. A. M. Bransen & S. E. Cuypers (eds.), Human Action, Deliberation and Causation. Dordrecht: Kluwer 271--294.
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  25. Derk Pereboom (2004). Is Our Conception of Agent-Causation Coherent? Philosophical Topics 32 (1/2):275-286.
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  26. John D. Bishop (1983). Agent-Causation. Mind 92 (January):61-79.
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  27.  78
    Randolph Clarke (1996). Agent Causation and Event Causation in the Production of Free Action. Philosophical Topics 24 (2):19-48.
  28. Paul Van Rooy (2013). Review of James Swindal, Action and Existence: A Case for Agent Causation. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Social Criticism 39 (7):717-722.
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  29.  9
    John Martin Fischer (2003). Responsibility and Agent-Causation. In David Widerker & Michael McKenna (eds.), Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Ashgate
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  30. Timothy O'Connor (1996). Why Agent Causation? Philosophical Topics 24 (2):143-58.
    I Introduction The question of this paper is, what would it be to act with freedom of the will? What kind of control is inchoately in view when we speak, pretheoretically, of being ‘self- determining’ beings, of ‘freely making choices in view of consciously considered reasons’ (pro and con) - of its being ‘up to us’ how we shall act? My question here is not whether we have (or have any reason to think we have) such freedom, or what is (...)
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  31.  18
    John Lemos (2006). Critical Notice Flanagan and Cartesian Free Will: A Defense of Agent Causation. Disputatio 2 (21).
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  32.  7
    Uwe Meixner (2014). The Case for Agent-Causation. In Marek Rosiak & Miroslaw Szatkowski (eds.), Substantiality and Causality. De Gruyter 113-128.
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  33.  48
    Michael Bergmann (2003). Agent Causation and Responsibility. Faith and Philosophy 20 (2):229-235.
  34.  57
    Laurence BonJour (1976). Deeterminism, Libertarianism, and Agent Causation. Southern Journal of Philosophy 14 (2):145-56.
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  35.  10
    David Widerker (2005). Agent-Causation and Control. Faith and Philosophy 22 (1):87-98.
  36.  8
    Sigrid Sarnoff (1985). A Bergsonian View of Agent-Causation. International Philosophical Quarterly 25 (2):185-196.
  37.  23
    John Lemos (2006). Flanagan and Cartesian Free Will: A Defense of Agent Causation. Disputatio 2 (21):1 - 22.
  38.  36
    William L. Rowe (1991). Responsibility, Agent-Causation, and Freedom: An Eighteenth-Century View. Ethics 101 (2):237-257.
  39.  47
    G. E. Zuriff (2004). Conscious Will and Agent Causation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):678-679.
    Wegner (2002) fails to (1) distinguish conscious will and voluntariness; (2) account for everyday willed acts; and (3) individuate thoughts and acts. Wegner incorrectly implies that (4) we experience acts as willed only when they are caused by unwilled thoughts; (5) thoughts are never true causes of actions; and (6) we experience ourselves as first performing mental acts which then cause our intentional actions.
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  40. E. J. Lowe (2006). Agent Causation. In D. M. Borchert (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2nd Edition). Macmillan
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  41. William Rowe (2003). Responsibility and Agent-Causation. In David Widerker & Michael McKenna (eds.), Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Ashgate 235.
     
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  42.  23
    Timothy O'Connor (1996). Why Agent Causation? Philosophical Topics 24 (2):143-158.
  43.  14
    Daniel von Wachter (2003). Agent Causation: Before and After the Ontological Turn. In C. Kanzian, J. Quitterer & E. Runggaldier (eds.), Persons: An Interdisciplinary Approach. öBvhpt 276-278.
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  44.  7
    R. D. Ellis (1983). Agent Causation, Chance, and Determinism. Philosophical Inquiry 5 (1):29-42.
  45.  7
    William L. Rowe (2003). Alternate Possibilities and Reid's Theory of Agent-Causation. In David Widerker & Michael McKenna (eds.), Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Ashgate 219.
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  46. Ned Markosian (2012). Agent Causation as the Solution to All the Compatibilist’s Problems. Philosophical Studies 157 (3):383-398.
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  47. James Swindal (2012). Action and Existence: A Case for Agent Causation. Palgrave Macmillan.
    Introduction : action, thought, pragmatism -- Neo-pragmatism and its critics -- Methodology : reconstructive dialectics -- A history of action theory -- Defining actions -- The explanation of action -- A material explication of agency -- Agency and existence.
     
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  48. Daniel von Wachter, Agent Causation: Before and After the Ontological Turn.
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  49. Terry Horgan (2007). Mental Causation and the Agent-Exclusion Problem. Erkenntnis 67 (2):183-200.
    The hypothesis of the mental state-causation of behavior asserts that the behaviors we classify as actions are caused by certain mental states. A principal reason often given for trying to secure the truth of the MSC hypothesis is that doing so is allegedly required to vindicate our belief in our own agency. I argue that the project of vindicating agency needs to be seriously reconceived, as does the relation between this project and the MSC hypothesis. Vindication requires addressing what (...)
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  50. Meghan Griffith (2007). Freedom and Trying: Understanding Agent-Causal Exertions. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 22 (1):16-28.
    In this paper, I argue that trying is the locus of freedom and moral responsibility. Thus, any plausible view of free and responsible action must accommodate and account for free tryings. I then consider a version of agent causation whereby the agent directly causes her tryings. On this view, the agent is afforded direct control over her efforts and there is no need to posit—as other agent-causal theorists do—an uncaused event. I discuss the potential advantages (...)
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