Search results for 'agent-neutral' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Tom Dougherty (2013). Agent-Neutral Deontology. Philosophical Studies 163 (2):527-537.score: 240.0
    According to the “Textbook View,” there is an extensional dispute between consequentialists and deontologists, in virtue of the fact that only the latter defend “agent-relative” principles—principles that require an agent to have a special concern with making sure that she does not perform certain types of action. I argue that, contra the Textbook View, there are agent-neutral versions of deontology. I also argue that there need be no extensional disagreement between the deontologist and consequentialist, as characterized by the Textbook (...)
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  2. Douglas W. Portmore (2001). McNaughton and Rawling on the Agent-Relative/Agent-Neutral Distinction. Utilitas 13 (03):350-356.score: 240.0
    In this paper, I criticize David McNaughton and Piers Rawling's formalization of the agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction. I argue that their formalization is unable to accommodate an important ethical distinction between two types of conditional obligations. I then suggest a way of revising their formalization so as to fix the problem.
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  3. Vaughn E. Huckfeldt (2007). Categorical and Agent-Neutral Reasons in Kantian Justifications of Morality. Philosophia 35 (1):23-41.score: 240.0
    The dispute between Kantians and Humeans over whether practical reason can justify moral reasons for all agents is often characterized as a debate over whether reasons are hypothetical or categorical. Instead, this debate must be understood in terms of the distinction between agent-neutral and agent-relative reasons. This paper considers Alan Gewirth’s Reason and Morality as a case study of a Kantian justification of morality focused on deriving categorical reasons from hypothetical reasons. The case study demonstrates first, the possibility of (...)
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  4. Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (2009). Normative Reasons and the Agent-Neutral/Relative Dichotomy. Philosophia 37 (2):227-243.score: 240.0
    The distinction between the agent-relative and the agent-neutral plays a prominent role in recent attempts to taxonomize normative theories. Its importance extends to most areas in practical philosophy, though. Despite its popularity, the distinction remains difficult to get a good grip on. In part this has to do with the fact that there is no consensus concerning the sort of objects to which we should apply the distinction. Thomas Nagel distinguishes between agent-neutral and agent-relative values, reasons, and principles; (...)
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  5. Daan Evers (2009). Humean Agent-Neutral Reasons? Philosophical Explorations 12 (1):55 – 67.score: 180.0
    In his recent book Slaves of the Passions , Mark Schroeder defends a Humean account of practical reasons ( hypotheticalism ). He argues that it is compatible with 'genuinely agent-neutral reasons'. These are reasons that any agent whatsoever has. According to Schroeder, they may well include moral reasons. Furthermore, he proposes a novel account of a reason's weight, which is supposed to vindicate the claim that agent-neutral reasons ( if they exist), would be weighty irrespective of anyone's desires. (...)
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  6. Douglas W. Portmore (forthcoming). Agent-Neutral and Agent-Relative. In J. E. Crimmins & D. C. Long (eds.), Encyclopedia of Utilitarianism.score: 180.0
    This is an introduction to the agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction as it pertains to utilitarianism.
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  7. Douglas W. Portmore (forthcoming). Agent-Relative Vs. Agent-Neutral. In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley Blackwell.score: 180.0
    This is a general introduction to the agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction.
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  8. Michael Ridge (2001). Agent-Neutral Consequentialism From the Inside-Out: Concern for Integrity Without Self-Indulgence. Utilitas 13 (02):236-.score: 180.0
    Is there a justification of concern for one's own integrity that agent-neutral consequentialism cannot explain? In addressing this question, it is important to be clear about what is meant by 'agent-neutral', 'consequentialism', and 'integrity'. Let 'consequentialism' be constituted by the following two theses.
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  9. Michael Ridge, Reasons for Action: Agent-Neutral Vs. Agent-Relative. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 180.0
    The agent-relative/agent-neutral distintion is widely and rightly regarded as a philosophically important one. Unfortunately, the distinction is often drawn in different and mutually incompatible ways. The agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction has historically been drawn three main ways: the ‘principle-based distinction’, the ‘reason-statement-based distinction’ and the ‘perspective-based distinction’. Each of these approaches has its own distinctive vices (Sections 1-3). However, a slightly modified version of the historically influential principle-based approach seems to avoid most if not all of these vices (Section 4). (...)
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  10. Tristram McPherson (2012). Mark Schroeder's Hypotheticalism: Agent-Neutrality, Moral Epistemology, and Methodology. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 157 (3):445-453.score: 160.0
    Symposium contribution on Mark Schroeder's Slaves of the Passions. Argues that Schroeder's account of agent-neutral reasons cannot be made to work, that the limited scope of his distinctive proposal in the epistemology of reasons undermines its plausibility, and that Schroeder faces an uncomfortable tension between the initial motivation for his view and the details of the view he develops.
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  11. Desheng Zong (2000). Agent Neutrality is the Exclusive Feature of Consequentialism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (4):676-693.score: 160.0
    An idea that has attracted a lot of attention lately is the thought that consequentialism is a theory characterized basically by its agent neutrality.1 The idea, however, has also met with skepticism. In particular, it has been argued that agent neutrality cannot be what separates consequentialism from other types of theories of reasons for action, since there can be agent-neutral non-consequentialist theories as well as agent-relative consequentialist theories. I will argue in this paper that this last claim is false. (...)
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  12. B. C. Postow (1997). Agent-Neutral Reasons: Are They for Everyone? Utilitas 9 (02):249-.score: 152.0
    According to both deontologists and consequentialists, if there is a reason to promote the general happiness then the reason must apply to everyone. This view seems almost self-evident; to challenge it is to challenge the way we think of moral reasons. I contend, however, that the view depends on the unwarranted assumption that the only way to restrict the application scope of a reason for action is by restricting it to those agents whose interests or projects are involved in the (...)
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  13. George R. Carlson (1990). Pain and the Quantum Leap to Agent-Neutral Value. Ethics 100 (2):363-367.score: 150.0
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  14. David Alm (2007). An Argument for Agent-Neutral Value. Ratio 20 (3):249–263.score: 150.0
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  15. Michael J. Almeida (1999). Too Much (and Not Enough) of a Good Thing: How Agent Neutral Principles Fail in Prisoner's Dilemmas. Philosophical Studies 94 (3):309-328.score: 150.0
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  16. Christine M. Korsgaard (1993). The Reasons We Can Share: An Attack on the Distinction Between Agent-Relative and Agent-Neutral Values. Social Philosophy and Policy 10 (1):24-51.score: 150.0
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  17. C. D. Meyers (2007). Transferability of Duty and the Agent-Relative / Agent-Neutral Distinction. Southwest Philosophy Review 23 (1):199-206.score: 150.0
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  18. Jessica Lerm (2013). The Agent-Relative/Agent-Neutral Distinction: My Two Sense (S). South African Journal of Philosophy 32 (2):137-148.score: 150.0
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  19. I. Definitions (1997). Agent-Neutral Reasons: Are They for Everyone? Utilitas 9 (2).score: 150.0
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  20. Michael Ridge (forthcoming). Agent-Neutral Vs. Agent-Relative Reasons. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 150.0
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  21. Steven D. Hales (2009). Moral Relativism and Evolutionary Psychology. Synthese 166 (2):431 - 447.score: 90.0
    I argue that evolutionary strategies of kin selection and game-theoretic reciprocity are apt to generate agent-centered and agent- neutral moral intuitions, respectively. Such intuitions are the building blocks of moral theories, resulting in a fundamental schism between agent-centered theories on the one hand and agent-neutral theories on the other. An agent-neutral moral theory is one according to which everyone has the same duties and moral aims, no matter what their personal interests or interpersonal relationships. Agent-centered moral theories deny (...)
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  22. Larry S. Temkin (2004). Thinking About the Needy, Justice, and International Organizations. Journal of Ethics 8 (4):349 - 395.score: 90.0
    This article has three main parts, Section 2 considers the nature and extent to which individuals who are well-off have a moral obligation to aid the worlds needy. Drawing on a pluralistic approach to morality, which includes consequentialist, virtue-based, and deontological elements, it is contended that most who are well-off should do much more than they do to aid the needy, and that they are open to serious moral criticism if they simply ignore the needy. Part one also focuses on (...)
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  23. Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (2011). Reasons and Two Kinds of Fact. In Sliwinski Rysiek & Svensson Frans (eds.), Neither/Nor - Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Erik Carlson on the Occasion of His Fiftieth Birthday. Uppsala Philosophical Studies. 95 - 113.score: 90.0
    Reasons are facts, i.e., they are constituted by facts. Given a popular view that conceives of facts as thin abstract rather than thick concrete entities, the dichotomy between agent-neutral and agent-relative reasons is not particularly problematic. It is argued that it would be preferable if we could understand the dichotomy even if we had a thick noton of fact in mind. It would be preferable because it is better if our notion of a reason is consistent with a wider (...)
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  24. Charles Goodman (2008). Consequentialism, Agent-Neutrality, and Mahāyāna Ethics. Philosophy East and West 58 (1):17-35.score: 72.0
    : What kinds of comparisons can legitimately be made between Mahāyāna Buddhism and Western ethical theories? Mahāyānists aspire to alleviate the suffering, promote the happiness, and advance the moral perfection of all sentient beings. This aspiration is best understood as expressing a form of universalist consequentialism. Many Indian Mahāyāna texts seem committed to claims about agent-neutrality that imply consequentialism and are not compatible with virtue ethics. Within the Mahāyāna tradition, there is some diversity of views: Asaṅga seems to hold a (...)
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  25. Theo Van Willigenburg (2005). Reason and Love: A Non-Reductive Analysis of the Normativity of Agent-Relative Reasons. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (1-2):45-62.score: 72.0
    Why do agent-relative reasons have authority over us, reflective creatures? Reductive accounts base the normativity of agent-relative reasons on agent-neutral considerations like having parents caring especially for their own children serves best the interests of all children. Such accounts, however, beg the question about the source of normativity of agent-relative ways of reason-giving. In this paper, I argue for a non-reductive account of the reflective necessity of agent-relative concerns. Such an account will reveal an important structural complexity of practical (...)
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  26. Larry S. Temkin (2005). Thinking About the Needy: A Reprise. [REVIEW] Journal of Ethics 8 (4):409 - 458.score: 66.0
    This article discusses Jan Narvesons Welfare and Wealth, Poverty and Justice in Todays World, and Is World Poverty a Moral Problem for the Wealthy? and their relation to my Thinking about the Needy, Justice, and International Organizations. Section 2 points out that Narvesons concerns differ from mine, so that often his claims and mine fail to engage each other. For example, his focus is on the poor, mine the needy, and while many poor are needy, and vice versa, our obligations (...)
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  27. Eze Paez (2014). Six Ways Something Can Be Valuable. Telos 19 (1-2):61-74.score: 66.0
    En este artículo argumento sobre cuatro categorías diferentes de razones prácticas y las posibles combinaciones que admiten. Se explican apelando a las cuatro formas diferentes en las que la obtención de un estado de cosas puede ser valiosa. En primer lugar, explico la diferencia entre valores agencialmente-neutrales y agencialmente-relativos. En segundo lugar, distingo entre valores relativos-a-la-persona e impersonales. La combinación de estas categorías produce seis maneras posibles en las que la obtención de un estado de cosas puede ser valiosa -cuatro (...)
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  28. Michael Smith (2011). Deontological Moral Obligations and Non-Welfarist Agent-Relative Values. Ratio 24 (4):351-363.score: 60.0
    Many claim that a plausible moral theory would have to include a principle of beneficence, a principle telling us to produce goods that are both welfarist and agent-neutral. But when we think carefully about the necessary connection between moral obligations and reasons for action, we see that agents have two reasons for action, and two moral obligations: they must not interfere with any agent's exercise of his rational capacities and they must do what they can to make sure that (...)
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  29. Douglas W. Portmore (2001). Can an Act-Consequentialist Theory Be Agent Relative? American Philosophical Quarterly 38 (4):363-77.score: 60.0
    A theory is agent neutral if it gives every agent the same set of aims and agent relative otherwise. Most philosophers take act-consequentialism to be agent-neutral, but I argue that at the heart of consequentialism is the idea that all acts are morally permissible in virtue of their propensity to promote value and that, given this, it is possible to have a theory that is both agent-relative and act-consequentialist. Furthermore, I demonstrate that agent-relative act-consequentialism can avoid the counterintuitive implications (...)
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  30. Mark Schroeder (2007). Reasons and Agent-Neutrality. Philosophical Studies 135 (2):279 - 306.score: 60.0
    This paper considers the connection between the three-place relation, R is a reason for X to do A and the two-place relation, R is a reason to do A. I consider three views on which the former is to be analyzed in terms of the latter. I argue that these views are widely held, and explain the role that they play in motivating interesting substantive ethical theories. But I reject them in favor of a more obvious analysis, which goes the (...)
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  31. Andrew Reisner (2008). Does Friendship Give Us Non-Derivative Partial Reasons. Les Ateliers de l'Éthique / the Ethics Forum 3 (1):70-78.score: 60.0
    One way to approach the question of whether there are non-derivative partial reasons of any kind is to give an account of what partial reasons are, and then to consider whether there are such reasons. If there are, then it is at least possible that there are partial reasons of friendship. It is this approach that will be taken here, and it produces several interesting results. The first is a point about the structure of partial reasons. It is at least (...)
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  32. Steven Hales (1996). More on Fathers' Rights. In Robert Almeder & James Humber (eds.), Biomedical Ethics Reviews: Reproduction, Technology, and Rights. 25-34.score: 60.0
    This paper is a rejoinder to Professor Jim Humber on the issue of fathers' rights. I reaffirm my position that if a woman's right to an abortion is a morally permissible way of avoiding future duties with respect to parenting, then fathers must have a similar moral right and ought to have a way to exercise this right. I consider and rebut Professor Humber's objections to this view.
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  33. John Skorupski (1995). Agent-Neutrality, Consequentialism, Utilitarianism … A Terminological Note. Utilitas 7 (01):49-.score: 60.0
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  34. John Broome (1995). Skorupski on Agent-Neutrality. Utilitas 7 (02):315-.score: 60.0
  35. Michael DePaul (2013). Agent Centeredness, Agent Neutrality, Disagreement, and Truth Conduciveness. In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. Oup Usa. 202.score: 60.0
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  36. Eze Paez (2014). Seis formas en las que algo puede ser valioso. Telos 19 (1-2):61-74.score: 60.0
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  37. Francis Heylighen, Life is an Adventure! An Agent-Based Reconciliation of Narrative and Scientific Worldviews.score: 54.0
    The scientific worldview is based on laws, which are supposed to be certain, objective, and independent of time and context. The narrative worldview found in literature, myth and religion, is based on stories, which relate the events experienced by a subject in a particular context with an uncertain outcome. This paper argues that the concept of “agent”, supported by the theories of evolution, cybernetics and complex adaptive systems, allows us to reconcile scientific and narrative perspectives. An agent follows a course (...)
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  38. Mark Andrew Schroeder (2007). Slaves of the Passions. Oxford University Press.score: 42.0
    Long claimed to be the dominant conception of practical reason, the Humean theory that reasons for action are instrumental, or explained by desires, is the basis for a range of worries about the objective prescriptivity of morality. As a result, it has come under intense attack in recent decades. A wide variety of arguments have been advanced which purport to show that it is false, or surprisingly, even that it is incoherent. Slaves of the Passions aims to set the record (...)
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  39. Alan Thomas (2003). Nagel's `Paradox' of Equality and Partiality. Res Publica 9 (3):257-284.score: 42.0
    Nagel' s pessimistic conclusion that current welfare state arrangements approximate to the most pragmatically effective way of reconciling the demands of morality and of an egalitarian liberalism, while not removing a deep seated incoherence between these view, can be resisted. The objective/subjective dichotomy, in this case applied via the agent-neutral/agent-relative distinction, is identified as his problematic assumption: understood in Hegelian terms as the "placing" of different categories of reason, even a minimal realism makes it difficult to understand how embedding (...)
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  40. Timothy Williamson (2005). Knowledge, Context, and the Agent's Point of View. In Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peter (eds.), Contextualism in Philosophy: Knowledge, Meaning, and Truth. Oxford University Press. 91--114.score: 36.0
    Contextualism is relativism tamed. Relativism about truth is usually motivated by the idea of no-fault disagreement. Imagine two parties: one (she) says ‘P’; the other (he) says ‘Not P’.1 Apparently, if P then ‘P’ is true and ‘Not P’ false, so she is right and he is wrong; if not P then ‘P’ is false and ‘Not P’ true, so he is right and she is wrong. In both cases, there is an asymmetry between the two parties. Since P or (...)
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  41. Alfred R. Mele (1995). Autonomous Agents: From Self-Control to Autonomy. Oxford University Press.score: 34.0
    This book addresses two related topics: self-control and individual autonomy. In approaching these issues, Mele develops a conception of an ideally self-controlled person, and argues that even such a person can fall short of personal autonomy. He then examines what needs to be added to such a person to yield an autonomous agent and develops two overlapping answers: one for compatibilist believers in human autonomy and one for incompatibilists. While remaining neutral between those who hold that autonomy is compatible with (...)
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  42. Martin Peterson (2011). Can Technological Artefacts Be Moral Agents? Science and Engineering Ethics 17 (3):411-424.score: 34.0
    In this paper we discuss the hypothesis that, ‘moral agency is distributed over both humans and technological artefacts’, recently proposed by Peter-Paul Verbeek. We present some arguments for thinking that Verbeek is mistaken. We argue that artefacts such as bridges, word processors, or bombs can never be (part of) moral agents. After having discussed some possible responses, as well as a moderate view proposed by Illies and Meijers, we conclude that technological artefacts are neutral tools that are at most bearers (...)
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  43. Michael Huemer (2011). Epistemological Egoism and Agent-Centered Norms. In Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press. 17.score: 32.0
    Agent-centered epistemic norms direct thinkers to attach different significance to their own epistemically relevant states than they attach to the similar states of others. Thus, if S and T both know, for certain, that S has the intuition that P, this might justify S in believing that P, yet fail to justify T in believing that P. I defend agent-centeredness and explain how an agent-centered theory can accommodate intuitions that seem to favor agent-neutrality.
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  44. Peter Olsthoorn (2011). Intentions and Consequences in Military Ethics. Journal of Military Ethics 10 (2):81-93.score: 30.0
    Utilitarianism is the strand of moral philosophy that holds that judgment of whether an act is morally right or wrong, hence whether it ought to be done or not, is primarily based upon the foreseen consequences of the act in question. It has a bad reputation in military ethics because it would supposedly make military expedience override all other concerns. Given that the utilitarian credo of the greatest happiness for the greatest number is in fact agent-neutral, meaning that the (...)
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  45. Benjamin Bayer, Metaethical Problems for Ethical Egoism, Reconsidered.score: 30.0
    Until recently it has been conventional to assume that ethical egoism is "ethical" is name, alone, and that no account that considers one's own interests as the standard of moral obligation could count as seriously "ethical." In recent years, however, philosophers have shown increasing respect for more sophisticated forms of ethical egoism which attempt to define self-interest in enriched terms characterizing self-interest as human flourishing in both material and psychological dimensions. But philosophers are still skeptical that any conception of self-interest (...)
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  46. Jussi Suikkanen (2009). Consequentialism, Constraints and The Good-Relative-To: A Reply to Mark Schroeder. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (March 2009):1-9.score: 30.0
    Recently, it has been a part of the so-called consequentializing project to attempt to construct versions of consequentialism that can support agent-relative moral constraints. Mark Schroeder has argued that such views are bound to fail because they cannot make sense of the agent relative value on which they need to rely. In this paper, I provide a fitting-attitude account of both agent-relative and agent-neutral values that can together be used to consequentialize agent-relative constraints.
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  47. Connie S. Rosati (2008). Objectivism and Relational Good. Social Philosophy and Policy 25 (1):314-349.score: 30.0
    In his critique of egoism as a doctrine of ends, G. E. Moore famously challenges the idea that something can be someone. Donald Regan has recently revived and developed the Moorean challenge, making explicit its implications for the very idea of individual welfare. If the Moorean is right, there is no distinct, normative property good for, and so no plausible objectivism about ethics could be welfarist. In this essay, I undertake to address the Moorean challenge, clarifying our theoretical alternatives so (...)
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  48. Michael Cholbi (1999). Egoism and the Publicity of Reason: A Reply to Korsgaard. Social Theory and Practice 25 (3):491-517.score: 30.0
    Christine Korsgaard has argued recently that the thesis that reasons are "essentially public" undermines the distinction between agent-neutral and agent-relative reasons, thus refuting egoism by rejecting its commitment to the universal availability of agent-relative reasons. I conclude that Korsgaard's invocation of the essential publicity of reasons trades on ambiguities concerning the "sharing" of reasons and so does not refute egoism and does not ground moral normativity. Her account of the publicity of reasons shows that solipsism is incoherent, but the (...)
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  49. Jussi Suikkanen (2012). Reason-Statements As Non-Extensional Contexts. Philosophical Quarterly 62 (248):592-613.score: 30.0
    Many believe that, if true, reason-statements of the form ‘that X is F is a reason to φ’ describe a ‘favouring-relation’ between the fact that X is F and the act of φing. This favouring-relation has been assumed to share many features of other, more concrete relations. This combination of views leads to immediate problems. Firstly, unlike statements about many other relations, reason-statements can be true even when the relata do not exist, i.e., when the relevant facts do not obtain (...)
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  50. Aaron Quinn (2007). Moral Virtues for Journalists. Journal of Mass Media Ethics 22 (2 & 3):168 – 186.score: 30.0
    This essay outlines an account of virtue ethics applied to the profession of journalism. Virtue ethics emphasizes character before consequences, requires the "good" prior to the "right," and allows for agent-relative as well as agent-neutral values. This essay offers an exploration of the internal characteristics of a good journalist by focusing on moral virtues crucial to journalism. First, the essay outlines the general tenets of Aristotelian virtue ethics. Second, it offers arguments touting virtue ethics in comparison with other popular (...)
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