Search results for 'agent-relative' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Douglas W. Portmore (2001). McNaughton and Rawling on the Agent-Relative/Agent-Neutral Distinction. Utilitas 13 (03):350-356.score: 240.0
    In this paper, I criticize David McNaughton and Piers Rawling's formalization of the agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction. I argue that their formalization is unable to accommodate an important ethical distinction between two types of conditional obligations. I then suggest a way of revising their formalization so as to fix the problem.
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  2. Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (2009). Kamm on Inviolability and Agent-Relative Restrictions. Res Publica 15 (2):165-178.score: 240.0
    Agent-relative restrictions prohibit minimizing violations: that is, they require us not to minimize the total number of their violations by violating them ourselves. Frances Kamm has explained this prohibition in terms of the moral worth of persons, which, in turn, she explains in terms of persons’ high moral status as inviolable beings. I press the following criticism of this account: even if minimizing violations are permissible, we need not have a lower moral status provided other determinants thereof boost it. (...)
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  3. Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (2009). Normative Reasons and the Agent-Neutral/Relative Dichotomy. Philosophia 37 (2):227-243.score: 210.0
    The distinction between the agent-relative and the agent-neutral plays a prominent role in recent attempts to taxonomize normative theories. Its importance extends to most areas in practical philosophy, though. Despite its popularity, the distinction remains difficult to get a good grip on. In part this has to do with the fact that there is no consensus concerning the sort of objects to which we should apply the distinction. Thomas Nagel distinguishes between agent-neutral and agent-relative values, reasons, and principles; (...)
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  4. Theo Van Willigenburg (2005). Reason and Love: A Non-Reductive Analysis of the Normativity of Agent-Relative Reasons. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (1-2):45-62.score: 208.0
    Why do agent-relative reasons have authority over us, reflective creatures? Reductive accounts base the normativity of agent-relative reasons on agent-neutral considerations like having parents caring especially for their own children serves best the interests of all children. Such accounts, however, beg the question about the source of normativity of agent-relative ways of reason-giving. In this paper, I argue for a non-reductive account of the reflective necessity of agent-relative concerns. Such an account will reveal an important structural (...)
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  5. Mark Schroeder (2007). Teleology, Agent‐Relative Value, and 'Good'. Ethics 117 (2):265-000.score: 180.0
    It is now generally understood that constraints play an important role in commonsense moral thinking and generally accepted that they cannot be accommodated by ordinary, traditional consequentialism. Some have seen this as the most conclusive evidence that consequentialism is hopelessly wrong,1 while others have seen it as the most conclusive evidence that moral common sense is hopelessly paradoxical.2 Fortunately, or so it is widely thought, in the last twenty-five years a new research program, that of Agent-Relative Teleology, has come (...)
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  6. Douglas W. Portmore (forthcoming). Agent-Neutral and Agent-Relative. In J. E. Crimmins & D. C. Long (eds.), Encyclopedia of Utilitarianism.score: 180.0
    This is an introduction to the agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction as it pertains to utilitarianism.
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  7. Douglas W. Portmore (2001). Can an Act-Consequentialist Theory Be Agent Relative? American Philosophical Quarterly 38 (4):363-77.score: 180.0
    A theory is agent neutral if it gives every agent the same set of aims and agent relative otherwise. Most philosophers take act-consequentialism to be agent-neutral, but I argue that at the heart of consequentialism is the idea that all acts are morally permissible in virtue of their propensity to promote value and that, given this, it is possible to have a theory that is both agent-relative and act-consequentialist. Furthermore, I demonstrate that agent-relative act-consequentialism can avoid the counterintuitive (...)
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  8. Michael Smith (2011). Deontological Moral Obligations and Non-Welfarist Agent-Relative Values. Ratio 24 (4):351-363.score: 180.0
    Many claim that a plausible moral theory would have to include a principle of beneficence, a principle telling us to produce goods that are both welfarist and agent-neutral. But when we think carefully about the necessary connection between moral obligations and reasons for action, we see that agents have two reasons for action, and two moral obligations: they must not interfere with any agent's exercise of his rational capacities and they must do what they can to make sure that agents (...)
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  9. Douglas W. Portmore (forthcoming). Agent-Relative Vs. Agent-Neutral. In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley Blackwell.score: 180.0
    This is a general introduction to the agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction.
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  10. Michael Ridge, Reasons for Action: Agent-Neutral Vs. Agent-Relative. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 180.0
    The agent-relative/agent-neutral distintion is widely and rightly regarded as a philosophically important one. Unfortunately, the distinction is often drawn in different and mutually incompatible ways. The agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction has historically been drawn three main ways: the ‘principle-based distinction’, the ‘reason-statement-based distinction’ and the ‘perspective-based distinction’. Each of these approaches has its own distinctive vices (Sections 1-3). However, a slightly modified version of the historically influential principle-based approach seems to avoid most if not all of these vices (Section 4). (...)
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  11. Kenneth Shockley (2011). NIMBY, Agent-Relative Reasons and Public Reason: An Open Peer Commentary on Simon Feldman and Derek Turner's 'Why Not NIMBY?'. Ethics, Policy and Environment 13 (3):329-332.score: 180.0
    NIMBY claims have certainly been vilified. But, as Feldman and Turner point out, one cannot condemn all NIMBY claims without condemning all appeals to partiality. This suggests that any moral problem with NIMBY claims stems not from their status as NIMBY claims but from an underlying illegitimate appeal to partiality. I suggest that if we are to distinguish illegitimate from legitimate appeals to partiality we should look to what might morally justify the sort of agent-relative reasons that can be (...)
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  12. Bekka Williams (2013). The Agent-Relative Probability Threshold of Hope. Ratio 26 (2):179-195.score: 180.0
    Nearly all contributors to the philosophical analysis of hope agree that if an agent hopes that p, she both desires that p and assigns to p a probability which is greater than zero, but less than one. According to the widely-endorsed Standard Account, these two conditions are also (jointly) sufficient for ‘hoping that’. Ariel Meirav has recently argued, however, that the Standard Account fails to distinguish hoping for a prospect from despairing of it – due to cases where two agents (...)
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  13. Troy A. Jollimore (2001). Friendship and Agent-Relative Morality. Garland Pub..score: 162.0
    "This book looks at the connections between personal relationships and theories of ethical behavior, arguing that many such theories simply cannot account for relationships such as friendship, and that such theories should therefore be ...
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  14. Michael S. Moore (2008). Patrolling the Borders of Consequentialist Justifications: The Scope of Agent-Relative Restrictions. [REVIEW] Law and Philosophy 27 (1):35 - 96.score: 150.0
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  15. David McNaughton & Piers Rawling (1995). Value and Agent-Relative Reasons. Utilitas 7 (01):31-.score: 150.0
  16. Krister Bykvist (1996). Utilitarian Deontologies? On Preference Utilitarianism and Agent-Relative Value. Theoria 62 (1-2):124-143.score: 150.0
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  17. Eric Mack (1998). Deontic Restrictions Are Not Agent-Relative Restrictions. Social Philosophy and Policy 15 (02):61-.score: 150.0
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  18. Eric Mack (2002). Equality, Benevolence, and Responsiveness to Agent-Relative Value. Social Philosophy and Policy 19 (1):314-341.score: 150.0
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  19. Christine M. Korsgaard (1993). The Reasons We Can Share: An Attack on the Distinction Between Agent-Relative and Agent-Neutral Values. Social Philosophy and Policy 10 (1):24-51.score: 150.0
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  20. C. D. Meyers (2007). Transferability of Duty and the Agent-Relative / Agent-Neutral Distinction. Southwest Philosophy Review 23 (1):199-206.score: 150.0
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  21. Dale Dorsey (2005). Moral Failure and Agent-Relative Prerogatives. Journal of Philosophical Research 30 (Supplement):309-319.score: 150.0
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  22. Jessica Lerm (2013). The Agent-Relative/Agent-Neutral Distinction: My Two Sense (S). South African Journal of Philosophy 32 (2):137-148.score: 150.0
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  23. Fred Feldman (2001). Can an Act-Consequentialist Theory Be Agent Relative? DOUGLAS W. PORTMORE. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (2).score: 150.0
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  24. Wai-Ying Wong (2012). Ren, Empathy and the Agent-Relative Approach in Confucian Ethics. Asian Philosophy 22 (2):133-141.score: 150.0
    The recent debate on whether Confucian Ethics should be viewed as a type of virtue ethics inevitably touches on the issue of the meaning of virtues such as ren ?, yi ?, and li ?. However, the argument would be over-simplified to claim that since Confucianism puts significant weight on virtues then it is virtue ethics. The conclusion would mainly depend on how we understand the key concepts such as ren, yi and the roles they play in the ethical life (...)
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  25. Dean Moyar (2010). Hegel and Agent-Relative Reasons. In Arto Laitinen & Constantine Sandis (eds.), Hegel on Action. Palgrave Macmillan.score: 150.0
     
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  26. Michael Ridge (forthcoming). Agent-Neutral Vs. Agent-Relative Reasons. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 150.0
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  27. Denis Sullivan (2008). Moral Truth, Moral Disagreement, and the Agent-Relative Conception of Moral Value. In Aeon J. Skoble (ed.), Reading Rasmussen and Den Uyl: Critical Essays on Norms of Liberty. Lexington Books.score: 150.0
     
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  28. Douglas W. Portmore (2003). Position‐Relative Consequentialism, Agent‐Centered Options, and Supererogation. Ethics 113 (2):303-332.score: 126.0
    In this paper, I argue that maximizing act-consequentialism (MAC)—the theory that holds that agents ought always to act so as to produce the best available state of affairs—can accommodate both agent-centered options and supererogatory acts. Thus I will show that MAC can accommodate the view that agents often have the moral option of either pursuing their own personal interests or sacrificing those interests for the sake of the impersonal good. And I will show that MAC can accommodate the idea that (...)
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  29. Tom Dougherty (2013). Agent-Neutral Deontology. Philosophical Studies 163 (2):527-537.score: 120.0
    According to the “Textbook View,” there is an extensional dispute between consequentialists and deontologists, in virtue of the fact that only the latter defend “agent-relative” principles—principles that require an agent to have a special concern with making sure that she does not perform certain types of action. I argue that, contra the Textbook View, there are agent-neutral versions of deontology. I also argue that there need be no extensional disagreement between the deontologist and consequentialist, as characterized by the Textbook (...)
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  30. Desheng Zong (2000). Agent Neutrality is the Exclusive Feature of Consequentialism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (4):676-693.score: 120.0
    An idea that has attracted a lot of attention lately is the thought that consequentialism is a theory characterized basically by its agent neutrality.1 The idea, however, has also met with skepticism. In particular, it has been argued that agent neutrality cannot be what separates consequentialism from other types of theories of reasons for action, since there can be agent-neutral non-consequentialist theories as well as agent-relative consequentialist theories. I will argue in this paper that this last claim is false. (...)
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  31. Gianluca Manzo (2011). 13 Relative Deprivation in Silico: Agent-Based Models and Causality in Analytical Sociology. In Pierre Demeulenaere (ed.), Analytical Sociology and Social Mechanisms. Cambridge University Press. 266.score: 120.0
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  32. Kenneth Shockley (2008). The Agent Relativity of Directed Reasons. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 10:391-400.score: 100.0
    Directed reasons are reasons that rely for their normative significance on the authority one individual has with respect to another. Acts such as promising seem to generate such reasons. These reasons seem paradigmatically agent relative: they do not hold for all agents. This paper provides a defense of the claim that theform of agent relativism seemingly required by directed reasons is innocuous, and poses no general problem for a practice dependent account of directed reasons, and, therefore, for consequentialism. While the (...)
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  33. Larry S. Temkin (2004). Thinking About the Needy, Justice, and International Organizations. Journal of Ethics 8 (4):349 - 395.score: 90.0
    This article has three main parts, Section 2 considers the nature and extent to which individuals who are well-off have a moral obligation to aid the worlds needy. Drawing on a pluralistic approach to morality, which includes consequentialist, virtue-based, and deontological elements, it is contended that most who are well-off should do much more than they do to aid the needy, and that they are open to serious moral criticism if they simply ignore the needy. Part one also focuses on (...)
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  34. Larry S. Temkin (2005). Thinking About the Needy: A Reprise. [REVIEW] Journal of Ethics 8 (4):409 - 458.score: 90.0
    This article discusses Jan Narvesons Welfare and Wealth, Poverty and Justice in Todays World, and Is World Poverty a Moral Problem for the Wealthy? and their relation to my Thinking about the Needy, Justice, and International Organizations. Section 2 points out that Narvesons concerns differ from mine, so that often his claims and mine fail to engage each other. For example, his focus is on the poor, mine the needy, and while many poor are needy, and vice versa, our obligations (...)
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  35. Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (2011). Reasons and Two Kinds of Fact. In Sliwinski Rysiek & Svensson Frans (eds.), Neither/Nor - Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Erik Carlson on the Occasion of His Fiftieth Birthday. Uppsala Philosophical Studies. 95 - 113.score: 90.0
    Reasons are facts, i.e., they are constituted by facts. Given a popular view that conceives of facts as thin abstract rather than thick concrete entities, the dichotomy between agent-neutral and agent-relative reasons is not particularly problematic. It is argued that it would be preferable if we could understand the dichotomy even if we had a thick noton of fact in mind. It would be preferable because it is better if our notion of a reason is consistent with a wider (...)
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  36. R. Jay Wallace (2010). Reasons, Values and Agent-Relativity. Dialectica 64 (4):503-528.score: 72.0
    According to T. M. Scanlon's buck-passing account, the normative realm of reasons is in some sense prior to the domain of value. Intrinsic value is not itself a property that provides us with reasons; rather, to be good is to have some other reason-giving property, so that facts about intrinsic value amount to facts about how we have reason to act and to respond. The paper offers an interpretation and defense of this approach to the relation between reasons and values. (...)
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  37. Vaughn E. Huckfeldt (2007). Categorical and Agent-Neutral Reasons in Kantian Justifications of Morality. Philosophia 35 (1):23-41.score: 72.0
    The dispute between Kantians and Humeans over whether practical reason can justify moral reasons for all agents is often characterized as a debate over whether reasons are hypothetical or categorical. Instead, this debate must be understood in terms of the distinction between agent-neutral and agent-relative reasons. This paper considers Alan Gewirth’s Reason and Morality as a case study of a Kantian justification of morality focused on deriving categorical reasons from hypothetical reasons. The case study demonstrates first, the possibility of (...)
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  38. Chandra Sekhar Sripada & Jason Stanley (2012). Empirical tests of interest-relative invariantism. Episteme 9 (1):3-26.score: 66.0
    According to Interest-Relative Invariantism, whether an agent knows that p, or possesses other sorts of epistemic properties or relations, is in part determined by the practical costs of being wrong about p. Recent studies in experimental philosophy have tested the claims of IRI. After critically discussing prior studies, we present the results of our own experiments that provide strong support for IRI. We discuss our results in light of complementary findings by other theorists, and address the challenge posed by a (...)
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  39. Steven D. Hales (2009). Moral Relativism and Evolutionary Psychology. Synthese 166 (2):431 - 447.score: 66.0
    I argue that evolutionary strategies of kin selection and game-theoretic reciprocity are apt to generate agent-centered and agent- neutral moral intuitions, respectively. Such intuitions are the building blocks of moral theories, resulting in a fundamental schism between agent-centered theories on the one hand and agent-neutral theories on the other. An agent-neutral moral theory is one according to which everyone has the same duties and moral aims, no matter what their personal interests or interpersonal relationships. Agent-centered moral theories deny this and (...)
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  40. Friederike Moltmann (2010). Relative Truth and the First Person. Philosophical Studies 150 (2):187-220..score: 66.0
    In recent work on context­dependency, it has been argued that certain types of sentences give rise to a notion of relative truth. In particular, sentences containing predicates of personal taste and moral or aesthetic evaluation as well as epistemic modals are held to express a proposition (relative to a context of use) which is true or false not only relative to a world of evaluation, but other parameters as well, such as standards of taste or knowledge or an agent. Thus, (...)
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  41. Chris Dobbyn & Susan A. J. Stuart (2003). The Self as an Embedded Agent. Minds and Machines 13 (2):187-201.score: 66.0
    In this paper we consider the concept of a self-aware agent. In cognitive science agents are seen as embodied and interactively situated in worlds. We analyse the meanings attached to these terms in cognitive science and robotics, proposing a set of conditions for situatedness and embodiment, and examine the claim that internal representational schemas are largely unnecessary for intelligent behaviour in animats. We maintain that current situated and embodied animats cannot be ascribed even minimal self-awareness, and offer a six point (...)
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  42. Massimo Durante (2010). What Is the Model of Trust for Multi-Agent Systems? Whether or Not E-Trust Applies to Autonomous Agents. Knowledge, Technology and Policy 23 (3-4):347-366.score: 66.0
    A socio-cognitive approach to trust can help us envisage a notion of networked trust for multi-agent systems (MAS) based on different interacting agents. In this framework, the issue is to evaluate whether or not a socio-cognitive analysis of trust can apply to the interactions between human and autonomous agents. Two main arguments support two alternative hypothesis; one suggests that only reliance applies to artificial agents, because predictability of agents’ digital interaction is viewed as an absolute value and human relation is (...)
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  43. Adina Preda (2011). Rights Enforcement, Trade-Offs, and Pluralism. Res Publica 17 (3):227-243.score: 62.0
    This paper asks whether (human) rights enforcement is permissible given that it may entail infringing on the rights of innocent bystanders. I consider two strategies that adopt a rights-sensitive consequentialist framework and offer a positive answer to this question, namely Amartya Sen’s and Hillel Steiner’s. Against Sen, I argue that trade-offs between rights are problematic since they contradict the purpose of rights, which is to provide a pluralist solution to disagreement about values, i.e. to allow agents to act in accordance (...)
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  44. Thomas Nagel, Agent-Relativity and Deontology.score: 60.0
    In this chapter I want to take up some of the problems that must be faced by any defender of the objectivity of ethics who wishes to make sense of the actual complexity of the subject. The treatment will be general and very incomplete. Essentially I shall discuss some examples in order to suggest that the enterprise is not hopeless.
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  45. Steven D. Hales (2010). No Time Travel for Presentists. Logos and Episteme 1 (2):353-360.score: 60.0
    In the present paper, I offer a new argument to show that presentism about time is incompatible with time travel. Time travel requires leaving the present, which, under presentism, contains all of reality. Therefore to leave the present moment is to leave reality entirely; i.e. to go out of existence. Presentist “time travel” is therefore best seen as a form of suicide, not as a mode of transportation. Eternalists about time do not face the same difficulty, and time travel is (...)
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  46. Ryan Preston-Roedder (2014). A Better World. Philosophical Studies 168 (3):629-644.score: 60.0
    A number of moral philosophers have endorsed instances of the following curious argument: it would be better if a certain moral theory were true; therefore, we have reason to believe that the theory is true. In other words, the mere truth of the theory—quite apart from the results of our believing it or acting in accord with it—would make for a better world than the truth of its rivals, and this fact provides evidence of the theory’s truth. This form of (...)
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  47. Douglas W. Portmore, Consequentializing Commonsense Morality.score: 60.0
    This is Chapter 4 of my Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality. In this chapter, I argue that that any plausible nonconsequentialist theory can be consequentialized, which is to say that, for any plausible nonconsequentialist theory, we can construct a consequentialist theory that yields the exact same set of deontic verdicts that it yields.
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  48. Jussi Suikkanen (2009). Consequentialism, Constraints and The Good-Relative-To: A Reply to Mark Schroeder. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (March 2009):1-9.score: 60.0
    Recently, it has been a part of the so-called consequentializing project to attempt to construct versions of consequentialism that can support agent-relative moral constraints. Mark Schroeder has argued that such views are bound to fail because they cannot make sense of the agent relative value on which they need to rely. In this paper, I provide a fitting-attitude account of both agent-relative and agent-neutral values that can together be used to consequentialize agent-relative constraints.
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  49. Michael Ridge (2001). Saving Scanlon: Contractualism and Agent-Relativity. Journal of Political Philosophy 9 (4):472–481.score: 60.0
  50. David McNaughton & Piers Rawling (1991). Agent-Relativity and the Doing-Happening Distinction. Philosophical Studies 63 (2):167 - 185.score: 60.0
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