Search results for 'alethic' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  12
    Marc Champagne (2016). On Alethic Functionalism’s (Absurdly?) Wide Applicability. Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 35 (2):29-39.
    Alethic functionalism, as propounded by Michael Lynch, is the view that there are different ways to be true, but that these differences nevertheless contain enough unity to forestall outright pluralism. This view has many virtues. Yet, since one could conceivably apply Lynch’s “one and many” strategy to other debates, I try to show how his argumentative steps can be used to solve — not just the controversy pertaining to truth — but any controversy that surrounds a “What is X?” (...)
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  2.  13
    Jay Newhard (forthcoming). Plain Truth and the Incoherence of Alethic Functionalism. Synthese:1-21.
    According to alethic functionalism, truth is a generic alethic property related to lower level alethic properties through the manifestation relation. The manifestation relation is reflexive; thus, a proposition’s truth-manifesting property may be a lower level property or truth itself, depending on the subject matter properties of the proposition. A true proposition whose truth-manifesting property is truth itself, rather than a lower level alethic property, is plainly true. Alethic functionalism relies on plain truth to account for (...)
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  3.  22
    Jay Newhard (2014). Alethic Functionalism, Manifestation, and the Nature of Truth. Acta Analytica 29 (3):349-361.
    Michael Lynch has recently proposed an updated version of alethic functionalism according to which the relation between truth per se and lower-level truth properties is not the realization relation, as might be expected, and as Lynch himself formerly held, but the manifestation relation. I argue that the manifestation relation is merely a resemblance relation and is inadequate to properly relate truth per se to lower-level truth properties. I also argue that alethic functionalism does not justify the claim that (...)
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  4.  46
    Stefano Caputo (2012). Three Dilemmas For Alethic Functionalism. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 62 (249):853-861.
    According to Lynch’s aletich functionalism truth is manifested by/immanent in different properties in different domains of discourse; so a core concept of Alethic Functionalism is the concept of the relation of manifestation holding between truth and other properties. The claim I’m going to defend is that Lynch makes too many theoretical demands on the manifestation relation and this makes it a metaphysical monster, that is to say a relation with mutually inconsistent features. In order to make manifestation a coherent (...)
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  5.  37
    Timothy J. Nulty (2010). The Metaphysics of Mixed Inferences: Problems with Functionalist Accounts of Alethic Pluralism. [REVIEW] Metaphysica 11 (2):153-162.
    Alethic pluralists argue truth is a metaphysically robust higher-order property that is multiply realized by a set of diverse and domain-specific subvening alethic properties. The higher-order truth property legitimizes mixed inferences and accounts for a univocal truth predicate. Absent of this higher-order property, pluralists lack an account of the validity of mixed inferences and an adequate semantics for the truth predicate and thereby appear forced to abandon the central tenets of alethic pluralism. I argue the use of (...)
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  6.  5
    Daisuke Kachi (2007). Partial Logic as a Logic of Extensional Alethic Modality. Journal of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 34 (2):61-70.
    In my paper 'Validity in Simple Partial Logic'(2002) I made comparison between several definitions of validity in Simple Partial Logic(SPL) and adopted two of them as most appropriate. In this paper, after elaborating more on these two definitions than in my previous paper and considering the characteristics of Partial Semantics, in which these definitions are given, I construct a tableau proof system and prove its soundness and completeness. Then, based on the characterization of Partial Semantics, I will show that we (...)
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  7.  3
    Nicola Grana (2011). Non-Alethic Meinongian Logic. Principia 14 (1):99-110.
    O propósito deste trabalho é fornecer uma resposta a duas questões fundamentais: 1) pode uma lógica não alética ser uma lógica meinongiana? E consequentemente 2) pode uma lógica não alética ser uma lógica adequada a uma teoria meinongiana dos objetos? Usando os resultados de da Costa (1989) e da Costa & Marconi (1986) e além disso de da Costa (1986 e 1993), proponho uma lógica minimal não alética de primeira ordem com identidade e o símblo " de Hilbert (da Costa (...)
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  8.  80
    Mark Jago (forthcoming). Alethic Undecidability Doesn’T Solve the Liar. Analysis:anw033.
    Stephen Barker (2014) presents a novel approach to solving semantic paradoxes, including the Liar and its variants and Curry’s paradox. His approach is based around the concept of alethic undecidability. His approach, if successful, renders futile all attempts to assign semantic properties (truth, falsity, gap or glut) to the paradoxical sentences, whilst leaving classical logic fully intact. And, according to Barker, even the T-scheme remains valid, for validity is not undermined by undecidable instances. Barker’s approach is innovative and worthy (...)
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  9.  38
    Filippo Ferrari (2016). Disagreement About Taste and Alethic Suberogation. Philosophical Quarterly 67 (263):pqv116.
    I present a novel strategy to account for two thoughts concerning disagreements about taste: that they need not involve any substantive fault ; that the faultlessness of a contrary opinion can be coherently appreciated from within a committed perspective. Under the assumption that judgments of taste are truth-apt and governed by the truth-norm, I argue that understanding how exactly truth is normative offers a strategy for accounting for both thoughts. I distinguish between different ways in which truth governs judgment to (...)
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  10. Stephen Barker (2014). Semantic Paradox and Alethic Undecidability. Analysis 74 (2):201-209.
    I use the principle of truth-maker maximalism to provide a new solution to the semantic paradoxes. According to the solution, AUS, its undecidable whether paradoxical sentences are grounded or ungrounded. From this it follows that their alethic status is undecidable. We cannot assert, in principle, whether paradoxical sentences are true, false, either true or false, neither true nor false, both true and false, and so on. AUS involves no ad hoc modification of logic, denial of the T-schema's validity, or (...)
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  11.  75
    Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (2010). Stabilizing Alethic Pluralism. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (238):92-108.
    Alethic pluralism is the view that the nature of truth is not uniform across domains. There are several ways of bang true $(T_1 ...\,T_n )$ A simple argument, the 'instability challenge', purports to show that this view is inherently unstable. One can simply say that something is uniformly true if and only if it is T₁ or ... or $\,T_n $ . Being uniformly true is a single truth property that applies across the board, and so the nature of (...)
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  12.  63
    Jiri Benovsky (2015). Alethic Modalities, Temporal Modalities, and Representation. Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 29:18-34.
    In this article, I am interested in four versions of what is often referred to as "the Humphrey objection". This objection was initially raised by Kripke against Lewis's modal counterpart theory, so this is where I will start the discussion. As we will see, there is a perfectly good answer to the objection. I will then examine other places where a similar objection can be raised: it can arise in the case of temporal counterpart theory (in fact, it can arise (...)
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  13. Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (2012). Recent Work on Alethic Pluralism. Analysis 72 (3):588-607.
    While historically prominent theories of truth such as the correspondence theory, coherentism, pragmatism, verificationism, and instrumentalism diverge in many ways, they converge in at least one fundamental respect. They are all monist theories of truth. They incorporate the thesis that there is one property—and one property only—in virtue of which propositions can be true. The truth pluralist, on the other hand, rejects this idea. There are several properties in virtue of which propositions can be true. This article offers a survey (...)
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  14.  74
    Douglas Edwards (2011). Simplifying Alethic Pluralism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):28-48.
    What is truth? What precisely is it that truths have that falsehoods lack? Pluralists about truth (or “alethic pluralists”) tend to answer these questions by saying that there is more than one way for a proposition, sentence, belief—or any chosen truth-bearer—to be true. In this paper, I argue that two of the most influential formations of alethic pluralism, those of Wright (1992, 2003a) and Lynch (2009), are subject to serious problems. I outline a new formulation, which I call (...)
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  15.  18
    Filippo Ferrari (forthcoming). Disagreement About Taste and Alethic Suberogation. Philosophical Quarterly:pqv116.
    I present a novel strategy to account for two thoughts concerning disagreements about taste: (i) that they need not involve any substantive fault (faultlessness); (ii) that the faultlessness of a contrary opinion can be coherently appreciated from within a committed perspective (parity). Under the assumption that judgments of taste are truth-apt and governed by the truth-norm, I argue that understanding how exactly truth is normative offers a strategy for accounting for both thoughts. I distinguish between different ways in which truth (...)
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  16.  10
    Lenny Clapp (2015). A Non‐Alethic Approach to Faultless Disagreement. Dialectica 69 (4):517-550.
    This paper motivates and describes a non-alethic approach to faultless disagreement involving predicates of personal taste. In section 1 I describe problems faced by Sundell's indexicalist approach, and MacFarlane's relativist approach. In section 2 I develop an alternative, non-alethic, approach. The non-alethic approach is broadly expressivist in that it endorses both the negative semantic thesis that simple sentences containing PPTs do not semantically encode complete propositions and the positive pragmatic thesis that such sentences are used to express (...)
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  17.  15
    Filippo Ferrari (forthcoming). Disagreement About Taste and Alethic Suberogation. Philosophical Quarterly:pqv116.
    I present a novel strategy to account for two thoughts concerning disagreements about taste: (i) that they need not involve any substantive fault (faultlessness); (ii) that the faultlessness of a contrary opinion can be coherently appreciated from within a committed perspective (parity). Under the assumption that judgments of taste are truth-apt and governed by the truth-norm, I argue that understanding how exactly truth is normative offers a strategy for accounting for both thoughts. I distinguish between different ways in which truth (...)
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  18.  31
    M. P. Lynch (2005). Alethic Functionalism and Our Folk Theory of Truth. Synthese 145 (1):29 - 43.
    According to alethic functionalism, truth is a higher-order multiply realizable property of propositions. After briefly presenting the views main principles and motivations, I defend alethic functionalism from recent criticisms raised against it by Cory Wright. Wright argues that alethic functionalism will collapse either into deflationism or into a view that takes true as simply ambiguous. I reject both claims.
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  19.  84
    Scott A. Shalkowski (1994). The Ontological Ground of the Alethic Modality. Philosophical Review 103 (4):669-688.
    This paper is concerned with the wholly metaphysical question of whether necessity and possibility rest on nonmodal foundations—whether the truth conditions for modal statements are, in the final analysis, nonmodal. It is argued that Lewis’s modal realism is either arbitrary and stipulative or else it is circular. Even if there were Lewisean possible worlds, they could not provide the grounds for modality. D. M. Armstrong’s combinatorial approach to possibility suffers from similar defects. Since more traditional reductions to cognitive or linguistic (...)
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  20.  78
    Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Douglas Edwards (2011). Truth as One(s) and Many: On Lynch's Alethic Functionalism1. Analytic Philosophy 52 (3):213-230.
    Advocates of traditional views on truth such as the correspondence and coherence theories converge on two theses about truth: substantivism and monism. According to the former thesis, truth consists in some substantive property or relation F. According to the latter thesis, there is exactly one property or relation (whether substantive or not) in terms of which truth is to be accounted for across all truth-apt domains of discourse. The correspondence theorist thus has it that a proposition is true just in (...)
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  21.  56
    Roy T. Cook (2011). Alethic Pluralism, Generic Truth and Mixed Conjunctions. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (244):624-629.
    A difficulty for alethic pluralism has been the idea that semantic evaluation of conjunctions whose conjuncts come from discourses with distinct truth properties requires a third notion of truth which applies to both of the original discourses. But this line of reasoning does not entail that there exists a single generic truth property that applies to all statements and all discourses, unless it is supplemented with additional, controversial, premises. So the problem of mixed conjunctions, while highlighting other aspects of (...)
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  22.  17
    Jay Newhard (2013). Four Objections to Alethic Functionalism. Journal of Philosophical Research 38:69-87.
    Alethic functionalism is a sophisticated version of alethic pluralism according to which truth per se is a functional property supervening on lower level truth properties. After presenting alethic functionalism, I discuss four objections to it. I raise a new objection to alethic functionalism that if Objectivity, Norm of Belief, and End of Inquiry are the three truisms, correspondence is necessary and sufficient to satisfy the truisms, so that alethic functionalism capitulates to a correspondence theory of (...)
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  23.  72
    Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (2013). Draft, Pluralism About Truth as Alethic Disjunctivism. In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (eds.), Truth Pluralism: Current Debates. Oxford University Press
    The aim of this paper is to provide an overview of various forms of alethic pluralism. Along the way we will draw a number of distinctions that, hopefully, will be useful in mapping the pluralist landscape. Finally, we will argue that a commitment to alethic disjunctivism, a certain brand of pluralism, might be difficult to avoid for adherents of the other pluralist views to be discussed. We will proceed as follows: Section 1 introduces alethic monism and (...) pluralism. Section 2 presents a distinction between strong and moderate versions of monism and pluralism, understood as theses about the existence of truth properties. Section 3 introduces four pluralist positions: strong alethic pluralism, alethic disjunctivism, second-order functionalism and manifestation functionalism. These positions are classified using the basic framework from Section 2, and a further distinction between pure and mixed versions of pluralism is drawn. Interestingly, alethic disjunctivism and the two kinds of functionalism—i.e. three out of four positions— have a mixed character. They incorporate a monist thesis. The only pure form of pluralism is strong alethic pluralism. Section 4 adds another distinction to the stock: one-level and two-level views. Each of the mixed positions operates with two levels, locating certain “alethically potent”—or grounding—properties at a lower level and others at a higher level. We briefly discuss the nature of grounding. In Section 5, we answer a question about mixed, two-level views, viz. whether they are as much monist as pluralist in nature, or more. They are not. Section 6 is devoted to the task of arguing that the strong pluralist, the second-order functionalist, and the manifestation functionalist will find it hard to deny a commitment to alethic disjunctivism. (shrink)
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  24.  50
    Murat Baç & Renée Elio (2004). Scheme-Based Alethic Realism: Agency, the Environment, and Truthmaking. Minds and Machines 14 (2):173-196.
    This paper presents a position called Scheme-based Alethic Realism, which reconciles a realist position on the nature of truth with a pluralistic Kantian perspective that allows for multiple environments in which truthmaking relationships are established. We argue that truthmaking functions are constrained by a stable phenomenal world and a stable cognitive architecture. This account takes truth as normatively distinct from epistemic justification while relativizing the truth conditions of our statements to what we call Frameworks. The pluralistic aspect allows that (...)
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  25.  41
    Nikolaj Jang Pedersen (2008). From Metaphysical Pluralism to Alethic Pluralism? Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 39:201-208.
    Traditional theories of truth – such as the correspondence theory – are monist in character. All propositions, regardless of subject-matter, are true in the same way (if true). Recently, this view has been called into question by alethic pluralists (most notably Crispin Wright and Michael Lynch). According to the pluralist, the nature of truth varies across domains. Pluralists try to motivate their position by appealing to the following principle: for any domains D1 and D2, if the metaphysical constitutions of (...)
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  26.  19
    Patrice Bailhache (1998). How to Mix Alethic, Deontic, Temporal, Individual Modalities. Logica Trianguli 2:3-16.
    Deontic logic handles not only deontic modalities, but also alethic and temporal ones. In addition, individuals like authorities and addressees play an important role. R5-D5 is a system handling alethic, deontic and temporal modalities, whose adequacy has been proved in an earlier paper. Similarly for KD*UXY with sets of individuals . The present article is an attempt to construct a general system mixing R5-D5 and KD*UXY.
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  27.  28
    Douglas Edwards (2012). On Alethic Disjunctivism. Dialectica 66 (1):200-214.
    Alethic pluralism is the view that truth requires different treatment in different domains of discourse. The basic idea is that different properties play important roles in the analysis of truth in different domains of discourse, such as discourse about the material world, moral discourse, and mathematical discourse, to take three examples. Alethic disjunctivism is a kind of alethic pluralism, and is the view that truth is to be identified with the disjunctive property that is formed using each (...)
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  28.  31
    Ari Maunu (2006). Alethic Statements Are Not Intensional. Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 25 (3):53-61.
    According to the standard view, alethic (or modal) statements are intensional in that the Principle of Substitution (PS) fails for them -- e.g. substituting 'nine' in "Necessarily, nine is composite" with the co-referring 'the number of planets' turns this statement from true to false. It is argued in the paper that we could avoid ascribing intensionality to alethic statements altogether by separating between singular and functional uses of definite descriptions: on the singular use the description given above amounts (...)
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  29.  7
    Dan Zeman (2007). Relativism and Alethic Functionalism. Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 14 (1):53-71.
    The essay is an attempt to offer a version of conceptual relativism that escapes Donald Davidson’s decisive criticisms of the notion of “conceptual scheme”. Two variants of relativism are distinguished, a weaker and a stronger one, and a clear formulation of what a strong version amounts to is put forward. The concrete proposal involves accepting a version of alethic pluralism. After discussing alethic pluralism in general, and after exploring both strong and weak versions of it, a suitable version (...)
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  30.  13
    John Chidgey (1979). On the Non-Availability of Dawson-Modeling Into Certain Relevance Alethic Modal Logics. Studia Logica 38 (2):89 - 94.
    This paper shows that the Dawson technique of modelling deontic logics into alethic modal logics to gain insight into deontic formulas is not available for modelling a normal (in the spirit of Anderson) relevance deontic modal logic into either of the normal relevance alethic modal logics R S4or R M. The technique is to construct an extension of the well known entailment matrix set M 0and show that the model of the deontic formula P (A v B). PA (...)
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  31.  10
    Michael Thune (2006). Naturalism, Hope, and Alethic Rationality. Philo 9 (1):5-11.
    In my “Plantinga Untouched,” I argued that James Beilby’s recent objection to Plantinga’s EAAN was unsuccessful. Beilby has sincereplied that a naturalist can grant the Inscrutability Thesis and yet be alethically rational in hoping for a high P(R/N and future developments of E) and, therefore, needn’t accept the alethic defeater for R. I argue that this is impossible, since a naturalist cannot consistently grant that thesis and meet Beilby’s own criteria for alethic hope. Consequently, Plantinga is (still) right (...)
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  32.  46
    James Joyce (2009). Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief. In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Synthese 263-297.
  33. Timothy J. Nulty (2008). Empirical Considerations Against Alethic Deflationism. Facta Philosophica 10 (1):105-123.
  34.  7
    Mark Jago (2016). Alethic Undecidability Doesn’T Solve the Liar. Analysis 76 (3):278-283.
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  35. Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (2006). What Can the Problem of Mixed Inferences Teach Us About Alethic Pluralism? The Monist 89 (1):103-117.
    Here is a well-known thought about truth: Truth consists in correspondence with reality. A sentence is true just in case what it says corresponds with how the world is. Theories of truth that incorporate this thought are naturally regarded as robust or “heavyweight”. Truth is to be understood in a realist fashion. The world decides what is true and what is not. A recent incarnation of the correspondence view is found in truth-maker theories, whose adherents maintain that truths are true (...)
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  36.  8
    Njll Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (2013). Pluralism About Truth as Alethic Disjunctivism. In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates. Oxford University Press
  37.  30
    Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (2012). True Alethic Functionalism? International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (1):125-133.
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies, Volume 20, Issue 1, Page 125-133, February 2012.
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  38.  90
    Alan Ross Anderson (1958). A Reduction of Deontic Logic to Alethic Modal Logic. Mind 67 (265):100-103.
  39. Kevin Scharp (2007). Alethic Vengeance. In J. C. Beall (ed.), Revenge of the Liar: New Essays on the Paradox. Oxford University Press
    Thinking about truth can be more dangerous than it looks. Of course, our concept of truth is the source of one of the most frustrating and impenetrable paradoxes humans have ever contemplated, the liar paradox, but that is just the beginning of its treachery. In an effort to understand why one of the most beloved and revered members of our conceptual repertoire could cause us so much trouble, philosophers have for centuries proposed “solutions” to the liar paradox. However, it seems (...)
     
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  40.  66
    Michael P. Lynch (2008). Alethic Pluralism, Logical Consequence and the Universality of Reason. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):122-140.
  41. Michael P. Lynch (2000). Alethic Pluralism and the Functionalist Theory of Truth. Acta Analytica 24:195--214.
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  42.  8
    Douglas Edwards (2012). Alethic Vs Deflationary Functionalism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (1):115-124.
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies, Volume 20, Issue 1, Page 115-124, February 2012.
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  43.  9
    Nicola Ciprotti & Tommaso Piazza (2013). Alethic Determinism. Or: How to Make Free Will Inconsistent with Timeless Truth. Logique and Analyse 56 (221):85-99.
    The paper purports to show that truth-atemporalism, the thesis that truth is timeless, is incompatible with power to do otherwise. Since a parallel and simpler argument can be run to the effect that truth-omnitemporalism, the thesis that truth is sempiternal, is incompatible with power to do otherwise, our conclusion achieves greater generality, and the possible shift from the claim that truth is omnitemporal to the claim that it is atemporal becomes useless for the purpose to resist it. On the other (...)
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  44.  11
    M. Grana (1990). On a Minimal Non% Alethic Logic. Bulletin of the Section of Logic 19 (1):25-28.
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  45.  58
    Ruth Groff (2000). The Truth of the Matter: Roy Bhaskar's Critical Realism and the Concept of Alethic Truth. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 30 (3):407-435.
  46.  23
    Stephen Barker (2012). Truth-Making and the Alethic Undecidability of the Liar. Discusiones Filosóficas 13 (21):13 - 31.
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  47.  53
    Mark Fisher (1962). A System of Deontic-Alethic Modal Logic. Mind 71 (282):231-236.
  48.  1
    Jeremy Wanderer (2014). Alethic Holdings. Philosophical Topics 42 (1):63-84.
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  49.  11
    Pascal Engel (2013). Alethic Functionalism and the Norm of Belief. In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates. Oxford University Press 69.
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  50.  3
    Daniel Rönnedal (2014). Quantified Temporal Alethic-Deontic Logic. Logic and Logical Philosophy.
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