Search results for 'alethic functionalism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Stefano Caputo (2012). Three Dilemmas For Alethic Functionalism. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 62 (249):853-861.score: 240.0
    According to Lynch’s aletich functionalism truth is manifested by/immanent in different properties in different domains of discourse; so a core concept of Alethic Functionalism is the concept of the relation of manifestation holding between truth and other properties. The claim I’m going to defend is that Lynch makes too many theoretical demands on the manifestation relation and this makes it a metaphysical monster, that is to say a relation with mutually inconsistent features. In order to make manifestation (...)
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  2. Jay Newhard (2014). Alethic Functionalism, Manifestation, and the Nature of Truth. Acta Analytica 29 (3):349-361.score: 240.0
    Michael Lynch has recently proposed an updated version of alethic functionalism according to which the relation between truth per se and lower-level truth properties is not the realization relation, as might be expected, and as Lynch himself formerly held, but the manifestation relation. I argue that the manifestation relation is merely a resemblance relation and is inadequate to properly relate truth per se to lower-level truth properties. I also argue that alethic functionalism does not justify the (...)
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  3. Timothy J. Nulty (2010). The Metaphysics of Mixed Inferences: Problems with Functionalist Accounts of Alethic Pluralism. [REVIEW] Metaphysica 11 (2):153-162.score: 186.0
    <span class='Hi'>Alethic</span> pluralists argue truth is a metaphysically robust higher-order property that is multiply realized by a set of diverse and domain-specific subvening <span class='Hi'>alethic</span> properties. The higher-order truth property legitimizes mixed inferences and accounts for a univocal truth predicate. Absent of this higher-order property, pluralists lack an account of the validity of mixed inferences and an adequate semantics for the truth predicate and thereby appear forced to abandon the central tenets of <span class='Hi'>alethic</span> pluralism. I argue (...)
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  4. M. P. Lynch (2005). Alethic Functionalism and Our Folk Theory of Truth. Synthese 145 (1):29 - 43.score: 180.0
    According to alethic functionalism, truth is a higher-order multiply realizable property of propositions. After briefly presenting the views main principles and motivations, I defend alethic functionalism from recent criticisms raised against it by Cory Wright. Wright argues that alethic functionalism will collapse either into deflationism or into a view that takes true as simply ambiguous. I reject both claims.
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  5. Jay Newhard (2013). Four Objections to Alethic Functionalism. Journal of Philosophical Research 38:69-87.score: 180.0
    Alethic functionalism is a sophisticated version of alethic pluralism according to which truth per se is a functional property supervening on lower level truth properties. After presenting alethic functionalism, I discuss four objections to it. I raise a new objection to alethic functionalism that if Objectivity, Norm of Belief, and End of Inquiry are the three truisms, correspondence is necessary and sufficient to satisfy the truisms, so that alethic functionalism capitulates to (...)
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  6. Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (2012). True Alethic Functionalism? International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (1):125-133.score: 150.0
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies, Volume 20, Issue 1, Page 125-133, February 2012.
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  7. Pascal Engel (2013). Alethic Functionalism and the Norm of Belief. In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates. Oxford University Press. 69.score: 150.0
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  8. Dan Zeman (2007). Relativism and Alethic Functionalism. Organon F 14 (1):53-71.score: 150.0
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  9. Douglas Edwards (2012). Alethic Vs Deflationary Functionalism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (1):115-124.score: 120.0
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies, Volume 20, Issue 1, Page 115-124, February 2012.
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  10. Michael P. Lynch (2000). Alethic Pluralism and the Functionalist Theory of Truth. Acta Analytica 24:195--214.score: 120.0
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  11. Cory D. Wright (2005). On the Functionalization of Pluralist Approaches to Truth. Synthese 145 (1):1-28.score: 90.0
    Traditional inflationary approaches that specify the nature of truth are attractive in certain ways; yet, while many of these theories successfully explain why propositions in certain domains of discourse are true, they fail to adequately specify the nature of truth because they run up against counterexamples when attempting to generalize across all domains. One popular consequence is skepticism about the efficaciousness of inflationary approaches altogether. Yet, by recognizing that the failure to explain the truth of disparate propositions often stems from (...)
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  12. Michael Horton & Ted Poston (2012). Functionalism About Truth and the Metaphysics of Reduction. Acta Analytica 27 (1):13-27.score: 72.0
    Functionalism about truth is the view that truth is an explanatorily significant but multiply-realizable property. According to this view the properties that realize truth vary from domain to domain, but the property of truth is a single, higher-order, domain insensitive property. We argue that this view faces a challenge similar to the one that Jaegwon Kim laid out for the multiple realization thesis. The challenge is that the higher-order property of truth is equivalent to an explanatorily idle disjunction of (...)
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  13. Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (forthcoming). Varieties of Alethic Pluralism (and Why Alethic Disjunctivism is Relatively Compelling)∗. In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (eds.), Truth Pluralism: Current Debates. Oxford University Press.score: 54.0
    The aim of this paper is to provide an overview of various forms of alethic pluralism. Along the way we will draw a number of distinctions that, hopefully, will be useful in mapping the pluralist landscape. Finally, we will argue that a commitment to alethic disjunctivism, a certain brand of pluralism, might be difficult to avoid for adherents of the other pluralist views to be discussed. We will proceed as follows: Section 1 introduces alethic monism and (...) pluralism. Section 2 presents a distinction between strong and moderate versions of monism and pluralism, understood as theses about the existence of truth properties. Section 3 introduces four pluralist positions: strong alethic pluralism, alethic disjunctivism, second-order functionalism and manifestation functionalism. These positions are classified using the basic framework from Section 2, and a further distinction between pure and mixed versions of pluralism is drawn. Interestingly, alethic disjunctivism and the two kinds of functionalism—i.e. three out of four positions— have a mixed character. They incorporate a monist thesis. The only pure form of pluralism is strong alethic pluralism. Section 4 adds another distinction to the stock: one-level and two-level views. Each of the mixed positions operates with two levels, locating certain “alethically potent”—or grounding—properties at a lower level and others at a higher level. We briefly discuss the nature of grounding. In Section 5, we answer a question about mixed, two-level views, viz. whether they are as much monist as pluralist in nature, or more. They are not. Section 6 is devoted to the task of arguing that the strong pluralist, the second-order functionalist, and the manifestation functionalist will find it hard to deny a commitment to alethic disjunctivism. (shrink)
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  14. Patrick J. Reider, Normative Functionalism in the Pittsburgh School. Normative Functionalism and the Pittsburgh School.score: 27.0
    Sellars, Brandom, and McDowell (whom Maher aptly calls the “Pittsburgh School”) have tremendous influence on the current shape of the analytic tradition. Despite their differing views on philosophy of language, the philosophy of mind, philosophy of action, and epistemology, their shared application of ‘normative functionalism’ highlights important similarities in their approaches to the aforementioned disciplines. Normative functionalism interprets the ability to form judgments, possess concepts, rationally defend or be critical of judgments, and consequently act as an agent, as (...)
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  15. Ned Block (1980). Functionalism. In , Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology.score: 24.0
    What is Functionalism? Functionalism is one of the major proposals that have been offered as solutions to the mind/body problem. Solutions to the mind/body problem usually try to answer questions such as: What is the ultimate nature of the mental? At the most general level, what makes a mental state mental? Or more specifically, What do thoughts have in common in virtue of which they are thoughts? That is, what makes a thought a thought? What makes a pain (...)
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  16. Nicholas Agar (2003). Functionalism and Personal Identity. Noûs 37 (1):52-70.score: 24.0
    Sydney Shoemaker has claimed that functionalism, a theory\nabout mental states, implies a certain theory about the\nidentity over time of persons, the entities that have\nmental states. He also claims that persons can survive a\n"Brain-State-Transfer" procedure. My examination of these\nclaims includes description and analysis of imaginary\ncases, but--notably--not appeals to our "intuitions"\nconcerning them. It turns out that Shoemaker's basic\ninsight is correct. But there is no implication that it is\nnecessary. (edited).
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  17. Darren Bradley (2013). Functionalism and The Independence Problems. Noûs 47 (1):545-557.score: 24.0
    The independence problems for functionalism stem from the worry that if functional properties are defined in terms of their causes and effects then such functional properties seem to be too intimately connected to these purported causes and effects. I distinguish three different ways the independence problems can be filled out – in terms of necessary connections, analytic connections and vacuous explanations. I argue that none of these present serious problems. Instead, they bring out some important and over-looked features of (...)
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  18. Eric T. Olson (2002). What Does Functionalism Tell Us About Personal Identity? Noûs 36 (4):682-698.score: 24.0
    Sydney Shoemaker argues that the functionalist theory of mind entails a psychological-continuity view of personal identity, as well as providing a defense of that view against a crucial objection. I show that his view has surprising consequences, e.g. that no organism could have mental properties and that a thing's mental properties fail to supervene even weakly on its microstructure and surroundings. I then argue that the view founders on "fission" cases and rules out our being material things. Functionalism tells (...)
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  19. Brian P. Mclaughlin (2006). Is Role-Functionalism Committed to Epiphenomenalism? Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):39-66.score: 24.0
    Role-functionalism for mental events attempts to avoid epiphenomenalism without psychophysical identities. The paper addresses the question of whether it can succeed. It is argued that there is considerable reason to believe it cannot avoid epiphenomenalism, and that if it cannot, then it is untenable. It is pointed out, however, that even if role- functionalism is indeed an untenable theory of mental events, a role-functionalism account of mental dispositions has some intuitive plausibility.
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  20. Sydney Shoemaker (1981). Some Varieties of Functionalism. Philosophical Topics 12 (1):93-119.score: 24.0
    Fleshing out Ramsey-sentence functionalism; against Lewis's "mad pain" mixed theory; relating functionalism to the causal theory of properties. Empirical functionalism is chauvinistic so probably false. A terrific, in-depth paper.
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  21. Michael V. Antony (1994). Against Functionalist Theories of Consciousness. Mind and Language 9 (2):105-23.score: 24.0
    The paper contains an argument against functionalist theories of consciousness. The argument exploits an intuition to the effect that parts of an individual's brain (or of whatever else might realize the individual's mental states, processes, etc.) that are not in use at a time t, can have no bearing on whether that individual is conscious at t. After presenting the argument, I defend it against two possible objections, and then distinguish it from two arguments to which it appears, on the (...)
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  22. Steinvör Thöll Árnadóttir (2010). Functionalism and Thinking Animals. Philosophical Studies 147 (3):347 - 354.score: 24.0
    Lockean accounts of personal identity face a problem of too many thinkers arising from their denial that we are identical to our animals and the assumption that our animals can think. Sydney Shoemaker has responded to this problem by arguing that it is a consequence of functionalism that only things with psychological persistence conditions can have mental properties, and thus that animals cannot think. I discuss Shoemaker’s argument and demonstrate two ways in which it fails. Functionalism does not (...)
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  23. Richard Gray (2004). What Synaesthesia Really Tells Us About Functionalism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (9):64-69.score: 24.0
    J. A. Gray et al. have recently argued that synaesthesia can be used as a counterexample to functionalism. They provide empirical evidence which they hold supports two anti-functionalist claims: disparate functions share the same types of qualia and the effects of synaesthetic qualia are, contrary to what one would expect from evolutionary considerations, adverse to those functions with which those types of qualia are normally linked. I argue that the empirical evidence they cite does not rule out functionalism, (...)
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  24. Aaron Sloman, Virtual Machine Functionalism: The Only Form of Functionalism Worth Taking Seriously in Philosophy of Mind.score: 24.0
    Most philosophers appear to have ignored the distinction between the broad concept of Virtual Machine Functionalism (VMF) described in Sloman&Chrisley (2003) and the better known version of functionalism referred to there as Atomic State Functionalism (ASF), which is often given as an explanation of what Functionalism is, e.g. in Block (1995). -/- One of the main differences is that ASF encourages talk of supervenience of states and properties, whereas VMF requires supervenience of machines that are arbitrarily (...)
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  25. Chris Tucker (2014). On What Inferentially Justifies What: The Vices of Reliabilism and Proper Functionalism. Synthese 191:3311-3328.score: 24.0
    We commonly say that some evidence supports a hypothesis or that some premise evidentially supports a conclusion. Both internalists and externalists attempt to analyze this notion of evidential support, and the primary purpose of this paper is to argue that reliabilist and proper functionalist accounts of this relation fail. Since evidential support is one component of inferential justification, the upshot of this failure is that their accounts of inferential justification also fail. In Sect. 2, I clarify the evidential support relation. (...)
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  26. Darren Bradley (2011). Functionalist Response-Dependence Avoids Missing Explanations. Analysis 71 (2):297-300.score: 24.0
    I argue that there is a flaw in the way that response-dependence has been formulated in the literature, and this flawed formulation has been correctly attacked by Mark Johnston’s Missing Explanation Argument. Moving to a better formulation, which is analogous to the move from behaviourism to functionalism, avoids the Missing Explanation Argument.
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  27. Peter Godfrey-Smith (2009). Triviality Arguments Against Functionalism. Philosophical Studies 145 (2):273 - 295.score: 24.0
    “Triviality arguments” against functionalism in the philosophy of mind hold that the claim that some complex physical system exhibits a given functional organization is either trivial or has much less content than is usually supposed. I survey several earlier arguments of this kind, and present a new one that overcomes some limitations in the earlier arguments. Resisting triviality arguments is possible, but requires functionalists to revise popular views about the “autonomy” of functional description.
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  28. Lawrence H. Davis (2001). Functionalism, the Brain, and Personal Identity. Philosophical Studies 102 (3):259-79.score: 24.0
    One might expect functionalism to imply that personal identity is preserved through various operations on the brain, including transplantation. I argue that this is not clearly so even where the whole brain is transplanted. It is definitely not so in cases where only the cerebrum is transplanted, a conceivable kind of hemispherectomy, and even certain cases in which the brain is "gradually" replaced by an inorganic substitute. These results distinguish functionalism from other accounts taking what Eric T. Olson (...)
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  29. David Pineda (2001). Functionalism and Nonreductive Physicalism. Theoria 16 (40):43-63.score: 24.0
    Most philosophers of mind nowadays espouse two metaphysical views: Nonreductive Physicalism and the causal efficacy of the mental. Throughout this work I will refer to the conjunction of both claims as the Causal Autonomy of the Mental. Nevertheless, this position is threatened by a number of difficulties which are far more serious than one would imagine given the broad consensus that it has generated during the last decades. This paper purports to offer a careful examination of some of these difficulties (...)
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  30. Robert D. Rupert (2006). Functionalism, Mental Causation, and the Problem of Metaphysically Necessary Effects. Noûs 40 (2):256-83.score: 24.0
    The recent literature on mental causation has not been kind to nonreductive, materialist functionalism (‘functionalism’, hereafter, except where that term is otherwise qualified). The exclusion problem2 has done much of the damage, but the epiphenomenalist threat has taken other forms. Functionalism also faces what I will call the ‘problem of metaphysically necessary effects’ (Block, 1990, pp. 157-60, Antony and Levine, 1997, pp. 91-92, Pereboom, 2002, p. 515, Millikan, 1999, p. 47, Jackson, 1998, pp. 660-61). Functionalist mental properties (...)
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  31. Marian David (1997). Kim's Functionalism. Philosophical Perspectives 11 (s11):133-48.score: 24.0
    In some recent articles, Jaegwon Kim has argued that non-reductive physicalism is a myth: when it comes to the mind-body problem, the only serious options are reductionism, eliminativism, and dualism.[1] And when it comes to reductionism, Kim is inclined to regard a functionalist theory of the mind as the best available option—mostly because it offers the best explanation of mind-body supervenience. In this paper, I will discuss Kim’s views about functionalism. They may be contended on two general grounds. First, (...)
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  32. Paul M. Livingston (2005). Functionalism and Logical Analysis. In David Woodruff Smith & Amie L. Thomasson (eds.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 19.score: 24.0
    After more than thirty-five years of debate and discussion, versions of the functionalist theory of mind originating in the work of Hilary Putnam, Jerry Fodor, and David Lewis still remain the most popular positions among philosophers of mind on the nature of mental states and processes. Functionalism has enjoyed such popularity owing, at least in part, to its claim to offer a plausible and compelling description of the nature of the mental that is also consistent with an underlying physicalist (...)
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  33. David J. Cole (1990). Functionalism and Inverted Spectra. Synthese 82 (2):207-22.score: 24.0
    Functionalism, a philosophical theory, has empirical consequences. Functionalism predicts that where systematic transformations of sensory input occur and are followed by behavioral accommodation in which normal function of the organism is restored such that the causes and effects of the subject's psychological states return to those of the period prior to the transformation, there will be a return of qualia or subjective experiences to those present prior to the transform. A transformation of this type that has long been (...)
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  34. Eric Hiddleston (2011). Second-Order Properties and Three Varieties of Functionalism. Philosophical Studies 153 (3):397 - 415.score: 24.0
    This paper investigates whether there is an acceptable version of Functionalism that avoids commitment to second-order properties. I argue that the answer is "no". I consider two reductionist versions of Functionalism, and argue that both are compatible with multiple realization as such. There is a more specific type of multiple realization that poses difficulties for these views, however. The only apparent Functionalist solution is to accept second-order properties.
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  35. Lawrence H. Davis (1998). Functionalism and Personal Identity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):781-804.score: 24.0
    Sydney Shoemaker has claimed that functionalism, a theory about mental states, implies a certain theory about the identity over time of persons, the entities that have mental states. He also claims that persons can survive a "Brain-State-Transfer" procedure. My examination of these claims includes description and analysis of imaginary cases, but-notably-not appeals to our "intuitions" concerning them. It turns out that Shoemaker's basic insight is correct: there is a connection between the two theories. Specifically, functionalism implies that "non-branching (...)
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  36. Edward P. Stabler (1987). Kripke on Functionalism and Automata. Synthese 70 (January):1-22.score: 24.0
    Saul Kripke has proposed an argument to show that there is a serious problem with many computational accounts of physical systems and with functionalist theories in the philosophy of mind. The problem with computational accounts is roughly that they provide no noncircular way to maintain that any particular function with an infinite domain is realized by any physical system, and functionalism has the similar problem because of the character of the functional systems that are supposed to be realized by (...)
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  37. Alan Weir (2001). More Trouble for Functionalism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101 (3):267-293.score: 24.0
    In this paper I highlight certain logical and metaphysical issues which arise in the characterisation of functionalism-in particular its ready coherence with a physicalist ontology, its structuralism and the impredicativity of functionalist specifications. I then utilise these points in an attempt to demonstrate fatal flaws in the functionalist programme. I argue that the brand of functionalism inspired by David Lewis fails to accommodate multiple realisability though such accommodation was vaunted as a key improvement over the identity theory. More (...)
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  38. Vadim Batitsky (1998). A Formal Rebuttal of the Central Argument for Functionalism. Erkenntnis 49 (2):201-20.score: 24.0
    The central argument for functionalism is the so-called argument from multiple realizations. According to this argument, because a functionally characterized system admits a potential infinity of structurally diverse physical realizations, the functional organization of such systems cannot be captured in a law-like manner at the level of physical description (and, thus, must be treated as a principally autonomous domain of inquiry). I offer a rebuttal of this argument based on formal modeling of its premises in the framework of automata (...)
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  39. Mark McCullagh (2000). Functionalism and Self-Consciousness. Mind and Language 15 (5):481-499.score: 24.0
    I offer a philosophically well-motivated solution to a problem that George Bealer has identified, which he claims is fatal to functionalism. The problem is that there seems to be no way to generate a satisfactory Ramsey sentence of a psychological theory in which mental-state predicates occur within the scopes of mental-state predicates. My central claim is that the functional roles in terms of which a creature capable of self-consciousness identifies her own mental states must be roles that items could (...)
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  40. Charles Nussbaum (2003). Another Look at Functionalism and the Emotions. Brain and Mind 4 (3):353-383.score: 24.0
    Two chronic problems have plagued functionalism in the philosophy of mind. The first is the chauvinism/liberalism dilemma, the second the absent qualia problem. The first problem is addressed by blocking excessively liberal counterexamples at a level of functional abstraction that is high enough to avoid chauvinism. This argument introduces the notion of emotional functional organization (EFO). The second problem is addressed by granting Block's skeptical conclusions with respect to mentality as such, while arguing that qualitative experience is a concomitant (...)
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  41. George Bealer (1978). An Inconsistency in Functionalism. Synthese 38 (July):333-372.score: 24.0
    This paper demonstrates that there is an inconsistency in functionalism in psychology and philosophy of mind. Analogous inconsistencies can be expected in functionalisms in biology and social theory. (edited).
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  42. Gualtiero Piccinini (2004). Functionalism, Computationalism, & Mental States. Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 35 (4):811-833.score: 24.0
    Some philosophers have conflated functionalism and computationalism. I reconstruct how this came about and uncover two assumptions that made the conflation possible. They are the assumptions that (i) psychological functional analyses are computational descriptions and (ii) everything may be described as performing computations. I argue that, if we want to improve our understanding of both the metaphysics of mental states and the functional relations between them, we should reject these assumptions.
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  43. Sven Walter (2010). Cognitive Extension: The Parity Argument, Functionalism, and the Mark of the Cognitive. Synthese 177 (2):285-300.score: 24.0
    During the past decade, the so-called “hypothesis of cognitive extension,” according to which the material vehicles of some cognitive processes are spatially distributed over the brain and the extracranial parts of the body and the world, has received lots of attention, both favourable and unfavourable. The debate has largely focussed on three related issues: (1) the role of parity considerations, (2) the role of functionalism, and (3) the importance of a mark of the cognitive. This paper critically assesses these (...)
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  44. Mark Phelan & Wesley Buckwalter (forthcoming). Analytic Functionalism and Mental State Attribution. Philosophical Topics.score: 24.0
    We argue that the causal account offered by analytic functionalism provides the best account of the folk psychological theory of mind, and that people ordinarily define mental states relative to the causal roles these states occupy in relation to environmental impingements, external behaviors, and other mental states. We present new empirical evidence, as well as review several key studies on mental state ascription to diverse types of entities such as robots, cyborgs, corporations and God, and explain how this evidence (...)
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  45. Derk Pereboom (1991). Why a Scientific Realist Cannot Be a Functionalist. Synthese 88 (September):341-58.score: 24.0
    According to functionalism, mental state types consist solely in relations to inputs, outputs, and other mental states. I argue that two central claims of a prominent and plausible type of scientific realism conflict with the functionalist position. These claims are that natural kinds in a mature science are not reducible to natural kinds in any other, and that all dispositional features of natural kinds can be explained at the type-level. These claims, when applied to psychology, have the consequence that (...)
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  46. Dwayne Moore (2011). Role Functionalism and Epiphenomenalism. Philosophia 39 (3):511-525.score: 24.0
    The type-type reductive identity of the mental to the physical was once the dominant position in the mental causation debate. In time this consensus was overturned, largely due to its inability to handle the problem of multiple realizability. In its place a nonreductive position emerged which often included an adherence to functionalism. Functionalism construes mental properties as functional states of an organism, which in turn have specific physical realizers. This nonreductive form of functionalism, henceforth called role (...), has faced a number of criticisms itself. Chief among these is the concern that the realizer of the functional role is causally sufficient, so the role property does not make a contribution of its own. In this paper I argue that there is a way for unreduced functional properties to play a role after all. This is done by conceiving of functional properties as higher level functional properties of a macro system which determine that its realizers will play the roles that they play. (shrink)
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  47. H. Jacoby (1990). Empirical Functionalism and Conceivability Arguments. Philosophical Psychology 2 (3):271-82.score: 24.0
    Functionalism, the philosophical theory that defines mental states in terms of their causal relations to stimuli, overt behaviour, and other inner mental states, has often been accused of being unable to account for the qualitative character of our experimential states. Many times such objections to functionalism take the form of conceivability arguments. One is asked to imagine situations where organisms who are in a functional state that is claimed to be a particular experience either have the qualitative character (...)
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  48. Justin Tiehen (forthcoming). The Role Functionalist Theory of Absences. Erkenntnis.score: 24.0
    Functionalist theories have been proposed for just about everything: mental states, dispositions, moral properties, truth, causation, and much else. The time has come for a functionalist theory of nothing. Or, more accurately, a role functionalist theory of those absences (omissions, negative events) that are causes and effects.
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  49. Paul Schweizer (1996). Physicalism, Functionalism, and Conscious Thought. Minds and Machines 6 (1):61-87.score: 24.0
    In this paper, I provide further elaboration of my theory of conscious experience, in response to the criticisms made by David Cole, and I directly address a number of the issues he raises. In particular, I examine Cole's claim that functionalism rather than neurophysiology is the theoretical key to consciousness. I argue that weak type-physicalism provides an analysis which is more fine grained, makes weaker assumptions, and allows more scope for empirical methods.
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  50. Paul Noordhof (1997). Making the Change: The Functionalist's Way. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (2):233-50.score: 24.0
    The paper defends Functionalism against the charge that it would make mental properties inefficacious. It outlines two ways of formulating the doctrine that mental properties are Functional properties and shows that both allow mental properties to be efficacious. The first (Lewis) approach takes functional properties to be the occupants of causal roles. Block [1990] has argued that mental properties should not be characterized in this way because it would make them properties of the ?implementing science?, e. g. neuroscience. I (...)
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