I argue that the contralife argument, which new natural law theorists have proposed as an argument against contraception, also would rule out altered nuclear transfer, which has been proposed as a way of procuring human stem cells without destroying human embryos.

A remarkable event occurred at the December 3, 2004, meeting of the U. S. President’s Council on Bioethics. Council member William Hurlbut, a physician and Consulting Professor in the Program in Human Biology at Stanford University, formally unveiled a proposal that he claimed would solve the ethical problems surrounding the extraction of stem cells from human embryos. The proposal would involve the creation of genetically defective embryos that “never rise to the level of integrated organismal existence essential to be designated (...) human life with potential,” and therefore could be used as morally acceptable sources of stem cells for research and therapy. The aim of this essay is to show that Hurlbut’s proposal does not solve the ethical problems associated with human embryonic stem cell research. Two major reasons are presented. First, the proposal, which involves modification of a somatic cell nucleus, suffers from an ethical problem that is common to all types of human genetic engineering: since the procedure is not foolproof, there will be failures. In the case of the procedure Hurlbut proposes, some normal (albeit cloned) embryos will be produced. Second, the embryo engineered in the manner described is, at least in the early stages of its development, fully human despite its genetic defect. This essay also will show how a reasonable person might mistakenly view the proposal as legitimate if he or she makes the error of conflating genetic determinism with Aristotelian teleology. Finally, it will argue that ethical clarity can be achieved by seeing the embryo as a holistic entity possessing emergent properties that cannot simply be spelled out by genes. (shrink)

Ford, Norman Once therapies using embryonic stem cells enter clinical practice, pressure will increase to find pluripotent stem cells for therapeutic purposes that are not derived from human embryos. This article explores several likely sources of such pluripotent cells.

This essay aims to tell the story of the “altered nuclear transfer-oocyte assisted reprogramming,” or ANT-OAR, proposal—from its conception by Professor William Hurlbut of the President’s Council on Bioethics—to its adoption and promotion by a group of conservative, mostly Catholic philosophers, theologians and scientists—to its eventual demise in Congress. It also will give some reflections on how ANT-OAR promotes a genetically deterministic view of the human organism and can lead down a slippery slope into a future in (...) which human cloning and human genetic engineering are more acceptable. For these reasons, it will be argued, ANT-OAR should be opposed by all who are against human genetic modification regardless of their political orientation. (shrink)

I argue that contraception is morally wrong but that periodic abstinence (or natural family planning) is not. Further, I argue that altered nuclear transfer—a proposed technique for creating human stem cells without destroying human embryos—is morally wrong for the same reason that contraception is. Contrary to what readers might expect, my argument assumes nothing about the morality of cloning or abortion and requires no premises about God or natural teleology. Instead, I argue that contraception and altered (...) nuclear transfer are morally wrong because they fail to treat humanity as an inviolable end. (shrink)

First put forth in June 2005, the altered nuclear transfer-oocyte assisted reprogramming (ANT-OAR) proposal has been promoted as an ethically-acceptable alternative to the embryo-destructive methods now used to obtain embryonic stem cells. According to its proponents, the goal of ANT-OAR is to use the cloning process to create a pluripotent stem cell. This would be achieved through overexpression of the transcription factor Nanog (or a hypothetical substitute) both in the enucleated egg cell and in the somatic cell (...) prior to transfer of its nucleus. Although the ethical acceptability of ANT-OAR has been publicly debated, its scientific feasibility has not. This paper aims to help rectify this situation. It argues that ANT-OAR, as currently conceived, cannot realistically work. It presents evidence from the scientific literature showing that Nanog cannot single-handedly establish pluripotency in cells, but rather works together with a network of other transcription factors to maintain pluripotency. It argues that ANT-OAR is based on a flawed understanding of stem cell biology, and emphasizes that, in this debate about embryonic stem cells, scientists must strive to accurately and realistically assess the feasibility of the embryo research strategies they propose. (shrink)

Harvesting human embryonic stem (hES) cells is a highly controversial field of research because it rests on the destruction of human embryos. Altering the procedure of nuclear transfer (NT) is suggested to generate hES cell lines without ethical obstacles by claiming that no embryo would be involved. While discussing the nature of an embryo and related central questions concerning their moral status and the respect they deserve, this paper argues that the entity created by somatic cell nuclear (...) transfer (SCNT) or altered nuclear transfer (ANT) is an embryo and has the same moral status as a natural embryo. Respect for the embryo is expressed by the ethical principles of proportionality, probability and subsidiarity. This paper argues that the human embryo should only be taken for research with high ranking goals, which are proven in animal experimentation and for which there are no alternatives. This makes ANT obsolete and shows that SCNT to produce hES cells is premature at the present time. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Direct Nuclear Reprogramming: Response to Condic, Lee, and GeorgeGerard Magill, Ph.D. and William B. NeavesWe read with great interest the response of Maureen Condic, Patrick Lee, and Robert George (2009) to our essay, “Ontological and Ethical Implications of Direct Nuclear Reprogramming” in the March 2009 issue of the Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal (Magill and Neaves 2009). Much of their response addressed issues that are not in (...) dispute: somatic cells are not zygotes, neurons and hepatocytes are different, growth-factor signals from the trophoblast influence development of the inner cell mass, membranes derived from the trophectoderm are critically required for embryonic survival, and stem cells cannot produce a fetus “on their own.”The crucial point of disagreement deals with the fact that iPS cells are not totipotent but zygotes are. Zygotes can generate their own placental structures while iPS cells must be given them through tetraploid complementation. Condic, Lee, and George consider totipotency to be crucial to natural potentiality. We present an alternative view in our essay (Magill and Neaves 2009, pp. 28–29). Placental structures make no lasting contribution to the postnatal organism, and the equivalency of iPS cells with the inner cell mass of the blastocyst is apparent from tetraploid complementation experiments.The respondents acknowledge the following:... somatic cells can be “converted” into zygotes by the process of somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT) or direct reprogramming in combination with tetraploid complementation—just as sperm and egg cells can be “converted” into a zygote by the process of natural fertilization—....(Condic, Lee, and George 2009, p. 35)As the respondents recognize, different ways of manipulating cells can lead to embryogenesis: sperm and egg cells in the process of natural fertilization, the enucleated egg and an ordinary body cell in the process of somatic cell nuclear transfer, and reprogrammed skin cells and a tetraploid blastocyst in the case of induced pluripotent stem (iPS) cells. In each case, different cells are manipulated—or “converted” in the respondents’ terminology—in a process that alters their biological fate within a supportive environment facilitating embryogenesis.The developmental potential that resides in the human genome does not unfold in isolation, not even in a zygote. In all cases, whether involving a zygote or an iPS cell, interaction with a supportive environment is required to express the developmental program residing in the genome. [End Page 201]This biological reality supports what we have described as “early cellular development along the continuum of natural potentiality that can result in the formation of a fetus” (Magill and Neaves 2009, p. 30), and it presents a significant challenge to the natural potentiality argument.Gerard MagillVernon F. Gallagher Chair for the Integration of Science, Theology, Philosophy, and Law, and Professor, Center for Healthcare Ethics Duquesne University Pittsburgh, PA.William B. NeavesPresident and CEO Stowers Institute for Medical Research and Professor of Basic Medical Science University of Missouri at Kansas City School of Medicine Kansas City, MOReferencesCondic, Maureen L.; Lee, Patrick; and George, Robert P. 2008. Ontological and Ethical Implications of Direct Nuclear Reprogramming: Response to Magill and Neaves. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 19: 33–40. Google ScholarMagill, Gerard, and Neaves William B. 2009. Ontological and Ethical Implications of Direct Nuclear Reprogramming. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 19: 23–32. Google ScholarCopyright © 2009 The Johns Hopkins University Press... (shrink)

The momentum of advances in biology is evident in the history of patents on life forms. As we proceed forward with greater understanding and technological control of developmental biology there will be many new and challenging dilemmas related to patenting of human parts and partial trajectories of human development. These dilemmas are already evident in the current conflict over the moral status of the early human embryo. In this essay, recent evidence from embryological studies is considered and the unbroken continuity (...) of organismal development initiated at fertilization is asserted as clear and reasonable grounds for moral standing. Within this frame of analysis, it is proposed that through a technique of Altered Nuclear Transfer, non-organismal entities might be created from which embryonic stem cells could be morally procured. Criteria for patenting of such non-organismal entities are considered. (shrink)

I argue against the view that modern biology has undermined traditional moral rules, including the prohibition of abortion and restrictions on human embryonic stem cell research, by blurring the distinction between humans and other animals. I argue that this view depends on the false premise that an organism can be wronged only if the organism has conscious interests. I then defend a rule against harvesting stem cells in a way that kills an organism with a rational nature. Finally, I apply (...) this rule to proposals about altered nuclear transfer and animal-human chimeras. (shrink)

Mitochondrial/nuclear transfer (M/NT) to avoid the transmission of serious mitochondrial disease raises complex and challenging ethical, legal and social issues (ELSI). In February 2015, the United Kingdom became the first country in the world to legalize M/NT, making the heated debate surrounding this technology even more relevant. This critical interpretive review identified 95 relevant papers discussing the ELSI of M/NT, including original research articles, government-commissioned reports, editorials, letters to editors and research news. The review presents and synthesizes the (...) arguments present in the literature in relation to the most commonly raised themes: terminology; identity, relationships and parenthood; potential harm; reproductive autonomy; available alternatives; consent; impact on specific interest groups; resources; “slippery slope”; creation, use and destruction of human embryos; and beneficence. The review concludes by identifying those ELSI that are specific to M/NT and by calling for follow-up longitudinal clinical and psychosocial research in order to equip future ELSI debate with empirical evidence. (shrink)

The February 1997 announcement of the birth of Dolly, the sheep cloned from a mammary cell of an adult ewe, has drawn attention to the growing ability to select, alter, or otherwise manipulate the genome of offspring. Prior to Dolly, ethical discussion of genes in reproduction had focused on negative selection: carrier screening, prenatal diagnosis, and abortion or embryo discard. After Dolly, ethical debate will have to consider the direct or positive use of genetic selection or alteration technology.The principal use (...) of genetic selection techniques in human reproduction likely will be to treat or prevent disease in offspring. In the future, however, such techniques might also be used to enhance or even diminish expected characteristics of progeny. Techniques to accomplish these goals are likely to include: selection of the nuclear genome, as occurs in somatic cell cloning; chromosomal transplants; or direct insertion or deletion of specific genes. (shrink)

The February 1997 announcement of the birth of Dolly, the sheep cloned from a mammary cell of an adult ewe, has drawn attention to the growing ability to select, alter, or otherwise manipulate the genome of offspring. Prior to Dolly, ethical discussion of genes in reproduction had focused on negative selection: carrier screening, prenatal diagnosis, and abortion or embryo discard. After Dolly, ethical debate will have to consider the direct or positive use of genetic selection or alteration technology.The principal use (...) of genetic selection techniques in human reproduction likely will be to treat or prevent disease in offspring. In the future, however, such techniques might also be used to enhance or even diminish expected characteristics of progeny. Techniques to accomplish these goals are likely to include: selection of the nuclear genome, as occurs in somatic cell cloning; chromosomal transplants; or direct insertion or deletion of specific genes. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Recent developments allow for the creation of human stem cells without the creation of human embryos, a process called alternate nuclear transfer (‘ANT’). Pursuing this method of stem cell research makes sense for pro‐lifers if arguments for the sanctity of the human embryo do not apply to ANT. However, the technology that makes ANT possible undermines the erstwhile technical barrier between human embryos and somatic cell DNA. These advances bring home the force of hypothetical arguments about the (...) potential of the DNA in somatic cells, showing that there is not a morally relevant difference between the potential of an embryo and the potential of the DNA in a somatic cell. Therefore, the supposed distinction between entities that are potential human life and entities that are human life does not give any support to arguments for the sanctity of the human embryo because those arguments extend value to too many entities. (shrink)

The altered nuclear transfer-oocyte assisted reprogramming (ANT-OAR) proposal has serious scientific and philosophical flaws, and it is not a morally acceptable means of obtaining embryonic stem cells. Note that this is the final preprint of an article that was published in the newspaper Science and Theology News in June 2006.

ABSTRACT William Hurlbut, a Stanford University bioethicist and member of the President's Council on Bioethics, recently proposed a solution to the current impasse over human embryonic stem cell research in the United States. He suggested that researchers could use genetic engineering and somatic cell nuclear transfer (i.e. cloning) to develop human ‘pseudo‐embryos’ that have no potential to develop fully into human persons. According to Hurlbut, even thinkers who typically ascribe high moral status to human embryos could approve of (...) destroying these ‘pseudo‐embryos’ for the sake of harvesting human embryonic stem cells. This essay argues, first, that an argument based on the ‘paradox of the heap’ (an argument that many ‘pro‐life’ thinkers employ in order to defend the notion that human embryos have high moral value from the moment of conception) challenges the ethical legitimacy of Hurlbut's proposal. Second, the paper argues that this conflict may illustrate a reductio ad absurdum for this ‘pro‐life’ argument itself rather than being a problem for Hurlbut's proposal. As a result, the paper challenges the ‘pro‐life’ strategy of arguing that one should respond to uncertainty about the moral status of developing embryos by being morally ‘cautious’ and granting all human embryos full moral status from the moment of conception. It appears that one is faced with a complex series of choices (about where to draw the moral line between entities that are human persons and entities that are not), and a strict moral ‘cautiousness’ about this series of choices may ultimately lead to absurdity. (shrink)

Somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT) remains a controversial technique, one that has elicited a variety of regulatory responses throughout the world. On March 29, 2005, Canada's Assisted Human Reproduction Act came into force. This law prohibits a number of research activities, including SCNT. Given the pluralistic nature of Canadian society, the creation of this law stands as an interesting case study of the policy-making process and how and why a liberal democracy ends up making the relatively rare decision (...) to use a statutory prohibition, backed by severe penalties, to stop a particular scientific activity. In this article, we provide a comprehensive and systematic legal analysis of the legislative process and parliamentary debates associated with the passage of this law. (shrink)

We examine whether the current regulatory regime instituted in South Korea and the United States would have prevented Hwang’s potential transgressions in oocyte procurement for somatic cell nuclear transfer, we compare the general aspects and oversight framework of the Bioethics and Biosafety Act in South Korea and the US National Academies’ Guidelines for Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research, and apply the relevant provisions and recommendations to each transgression. We conclude that the Act would institute centralized oversight under governmental (...) auspices while the Guidelines recommend politically-independent, decentralized oversight bodies including a special review body for human embryonic stem cell research at an institutional level and that the Guidelines would have provided more vigorous protection for the women who had undergone oocyte procurement for Hwang’s research than the Act. We also suggest additional regulations to protect those who provide oocytes for research in South Korea. (shrink)

It is argued that the use of induced pluripotent stem cells for regenerative therapy may soon be ethically practicable and could sidestep the various objections pertaining to other types of stem cell (human embryonic stem cells, and stem cells obtained by altered nuclear transfer or somatic cell nuclear transfer).

The author argues that an action is morally wrong if any of its steps serves no purpose apart from preventing the existence of a human being. This principle entails that contraception and some proposed techniques for altered nuclear transfer are morally wrong, but it does not preclude producing stem cells through parthenogenesis. His argument depends on the premise that human life always is a good, including human life produced through immoral actions. The immoral action, not the life (...) caused by the action, is the evil that should be prevented. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 10.2 : 257–264. (shrink)

As America's debate over federal funding of embryonic stem cell research continues to deepen, it is increasingly characterized as a conflict between the objectivity of secular science and the cultural variability of traditional religion. Yet science alone, by the very limitations of its naturalistic methodology and domain of knowledge, is unable to draw its own moral boundaries. Through a careful consideration of the relationship between scientific knowledge and our most fundamental assumptions concerning the moral value of developing life, we may (...) discern the terms of a possible resolution to our current conflict. In May 2005, the President's Council on Bioethics issued a report "Alternative Sources of Human Pluripotent Stem Cells," that discusses four proposals for a technological means of obtaining pluripotent stem cells without the destruction of human embryos. Drawing on the principles laid out in this report we discuss one of these proposals, Altered Nuclear Transfer, as a way forward that can sustain social consensus while opening avenues for scientific advance. (shrink)

Despite the progress achieved over the last decade after the birth of the first cloned mammal, the efficiency of reproductive cloning remains invariably low. However, research aiming at the use of nuclear transfer for the production of patient‐tailored stem cells for cell/tissue therapy is progressing rapidly. Yet, reproductive cloning has many potential implications for animal breeding, transgenic research and the conservation of endangered species. In this article we suggest that the changes in the epi‐/genotype observed in cloned embryos (...) arise from unbalanced nuclear reprogramming between parental chromosomes. It is probable that the oocyte reprogramming machinery, devised for resident chromosomes, cannot target the paternal alleles of somatic cells. We, therefore, suggest that a reasonable approach to balance this asymmetry in nuclear reprogramming might involve the transient expression in donor cells of chromatin remodelling proteins, which are physiologically expressed during spermatogenesis, in order to induce a male‐specific chromatin organisation in the somatic cells before nuclear transfer. BioEssays 30:66–74, 2008. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

The Chief Medical Officer of Health of the United Kingdom has recommended that the 1990 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act should be amended to allow cloning in humans for research purposes only. He also recommended that: “The transfer of an embryo created by cell nuclear replacement into the uterus of a woman (so called ‘reproductive cloning’) should remain a criminal offence” (recommendation 7, Ref. 1). This recommendation implies that nuclear replacement and cloning are the same. They are (...) not. Nuclear transfer constitutes reproductive cloning only when the individual created is genetically identical to the nuclear donor. In this paper, we describe a possible future use of nuclear transfer for the treatment of infertile individuals. The treatment yields an individual that receives approximately equal genetic contributions from each parent. We use this example to illustrate how semantic confusion might lead to plausibly moral and justifiable treatments being legally banned. In doing so, we hope to encourage a more accurate and informed use of language in science, law and politics, so that legislation is properly informed by science and achieves what it intends. BioEssays 23:359–364, 2001. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (shrink)

We discuss in this essay the alternative techniques proposed for the isolation of human embryonic stem cells (hESCs) that attempt to satisfy moral issues surrounding killing embryos but show that these techniques are either redundant or do not achieve their intended aim. We discuss the difficulties associated with defining a human embryo and how the lack of clarity on this issue antagonises the ethical debate and impedes hESC research. We present scientific evidence showing that isolation of hESCs does not necessarily (...) "kill" human embryos. In addition, we argue that even those who accord inviolable moral status to the embryo should agree that hESC research is morally obligatory, as it is beneficial to the developmental potential of the embryo and society as a whole. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that there is no compelling therapeutic ‘need’ for human nuclear genome transfer to prevent mitochondrial diseases caused by mtDNA mutations. At most there is a strong interest in this technology on the part of some women and couples at risk of having children with mitochondrial disease, and perhaps also a ‘want’ on the part of some researchers who see the technology as a useful precedent – one that provides them with ‘a quiet way (...) station’ in which to refine the micromanipulations techniques essential for other human germline interventions and human cloning. In advance of this argument, I review basic information about mitochondrial disease and novel genetic strategies to prevent the transmission of mutated mitochondria. Next, I address common features of contemporary debates and discussions about so-called mitochondrial replacement. First, I contest the cliché that science-and-technology is fast outpacing ethics. Second, I dispute the accuracy of the term ‘mitochondrial replacement’. Third, I provide a sustained critique of the purported ‘need’ for genetically-related children. In closing, I call into question the mainly liberal defense of human nuclear genome transfer. I suggest an alternative frame of reference that pays particular attention to issues of social justice. I conclude that our limited resources should be carefully expended in pursuit of the common good, which does not include pandering to acquired desires. (shrink)

This article argues that two forms of mitochondrial replacement therapy, maternal spindle transfer and pro-nuclear transfer, are not therapies at all because they do not treat children who are coming into existence. Rather, these technologies merely create healthy children where none was inevitable. Even if creating healthy lives has some value, it is not to be confused with the medical value of a cure or therapy. The article addresses a recent Bioethics article, ‘Mitochondrial Replacement: Ethics and Identity,’ (...) by Wrigley, Wilkinson, and Appleby, who argue that PNT is morally favorable to MST due to the Non-Identity Problem. Wrigley et al. claim that PNT, since it occurs post-conception, preserves the identity of the resulting child, whereas MST, since it occurs pre-conception, is an identity-altering technique. As such, a child born with mitochondrial disease could complain that her parents failed to use PNT, but not MST. The present article argues that the authors are mistaken: both MST and PNT are identity-affecting techniques. But this is of little matter, for we should be cautious in drawing any moral conclusions from the application of the Non-Identity Problem to cases. The article then argues that the authors are mistaken in inferring that PNT is a type of embryonic cure or therapy for children with mitochondrial disease. The article cautions against the mistaken life-saving rhetoric that is common in bioethics discussions of MRTs. (shrink)

Recent preclinical studies have shown the feasibility of specific variants of nuclear transfer to prevent mitochondrial DNA disorders. Nuclear transfer could be a valuable reproductive option for carriers of mitochondrial mutations. A clinical application of nuclear transfer, however, would entail germ-line modification, more specifically a germ-line modification of the mitochondrial genome. One of the most prominent objections against germ-line modification is the fear that it would become possible to alter ‘essential characteristics’ of a future (...) person, thereby possibly violating the child's right to an open future. As only the nuclear DNA would contain the ingredients for individual characteristics, modification of the mtDNA is often considered less controversial than modification of the nuclear DNA. This paper discusses the tenability of this dichotomy. After having clarified the concept of germ-line modification, it argues that modification of the mtDNA is not substantively different from modification of the nuclear DNA in terms of its effects on the identity of the future person. Subsequently the paper assesses how this conclusion affects the moral evaluation of nuclear transfer to prevent mtDNA disorders. It concludes that the moral acceptability of germ-line modification does not depend on whether it alters the identity of the future child—all germ-line modifications do—but on whether it safeguards the child's right to an open future. If nuclear transfer to prevent mtDNA disorders becomes safe and effective, then dismissing it because it involves germ-line modification is unjustified. (shrink)

Giulia Cavaliere and César Palacios-González argue that lesbian couples should have access to human nuclear genome transfer so that both members of the couple can have a genetic link to the child they intend to parent. Their argument is grounded in an appeal to reproductive freedom. In this Response, I address a number of concerns with their argument. These concerns relate to nomenclature, treating like cases alike, genetic-relatedness and the limits of reproductive rights. On this last point, I (...) insist that we should not mistake ‘wants’ for ‘needs’ or ‘rights’. I maintain that there is no right to biological parenthood, there is no compelling need for human nuclear genome transfer to satisfy a so-called need for genetically-related children, and we ought not to pander to an acquired desire for genetic filiation. (shrink)

The technique of nuclear transplantation – popularly known as cloning – has been integrated into several different histories of twentieth century biology. Historians and science scholars have situated nuclear transplantation within narratives of scientific practice, biotechnology, bioethics, biomedicine, and changing views of life. However, nuclear transplantation has never been the focus of analysis. In this article, I examine the development of nuclear transplantation techniques, focusing on the people, motivations, and institutions associated with the first successful (...) class='Hi'>nuclear transfer in metazoans in 1952. The conflict between embryologists and geneticists over the mechanisms of differentiation motivated Robert Briggs to pursue nuclear transplantation experiments as a way to resolve the debate. Briggs worked at the Lankenau Hospital Research Institute, a research facility devoted to the study of cancer. The goal of understanding cancer would play a role in the development of the technique, and the story of nuclear transplantation sheds light on the role that biomedical contexts play in biological research in the second half of the twentieth century. (shrink)

Technical, ethical, and social questions of germ-line gene interventions have been widely discussed in the literature. The majority of these discussions focus on planned interventions executed on the nuclear DNA (nDNA). However, human cells also contain another set of genes that is the mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA). As the characteristics of the mtDNA grossly differ from those of nDNA, so do the social, ethical, psychological, and safety considerations of possible interventions on this part of the genetic substance.

Reproductive techniques and practices, ranging from ordinary birth-control measures and artificial insemination to embryo transfer and surrogate motherhood, have greatly enhanced our range of reproductive choices. As a consequence, they pose a number of difficult moral and legal questions with regard to the formation of a family and our conception of parenthood. A view that is becoming increasingly common is that parental rights and responsibilities should not be based on genetic relationships but should instead be seen as arising from (...) agreements or contracts between individuals. Accordingly, a man who consents to his wife's artificial insemination by donor (AID) and not the sperm donor, is the legal father of the child; in surrogacy agreements, the intending mother, and not the surrogate, has the right to raise the resulting child. While agreeing that biology should not form the basis for assigning legal parenthood, I argue that the theory of intentional parenthood, despite being put forward as a liberal theory, is geared toward or will have the function of protecting the nuclear family and inhibiting the formation of alternative family forms. (shrink)

If validated, diet‐derived foreign microRNA absorption and function in consuming vertebrates would drastically alter our understanding of nutrition and ecology. RNA interference (RNAi) mechanisms of Caenorhabditis elegans are enhanced by uptake of environmental RNA and amplification and systemic distribution of RNAi effectors. Therapeutic exploitation of RNAi in treating human disease is difficult because these accessory processes are absent or diminished in most animals. A recent report challenged multiple paradigms, suggesting that ingested microRNAs (miRNAs) are transferred to blood, accumulate in tissues, (...) and exert canonical regulation of endogenous transcripts. Independent replication of these findings has been elusive, and multiple disconfirmatory findings have been published. In the face of mounting negative results, any additional positive reports must provide the proverbial “extraordinary proof” to support such claims. In this article, we review the evidence for and against a significant role for dietary miRNAs in influencing gene expression, and make recommendations for future studies.Also watch the Video Abstract. (shrink)

Reproductive techniques and practices, ranging from ordinary birth-control measures and artificial insemination to embryo transfer and surrogate motherhood, have greatly enhanced our range of reproductive choices. As a consequence, they pose a number of difficult moral and legal questions with regard to the formation of a family and our conception of parenthood. A view that is becoming increasingly common is that parental rights and responsibilities should not be based on genetic relationships but should instead be seen as arising from (...) agreements or contracts between individuals. Accordingly, a man who consents to his wife's artificial insemination by donor (AID) and not the sperm donor, is the legal father of the child; in surrogacy agreements, the “intending mother,” and not the surrogate, has the right to raise the resulting child. While agreeing that biology should not form the basis for assigning legal parenthood, I argue that the theory of intentional parenthood, despite being put forward as a liberal theory, is geared toward or will have the function of protecting the nuclear family and inhibiting the formation of alternative family forms. (shrink)

There is increasing evidence that dynamic changes to chromatin, chromosomes and nuclear architecture are regulated by RNA signalling. Although the precise molecular mechanisms are not well understood, they appear to involve the differential recruitment of a hierarchy of generic chromatin modifying complexes and DNA methyltransferases to specific loci by RNAs during differentiation and development. A significant fraction of the genome-wide transcription of non-protein coding RNAs may be involved in this process, comprising a previously hidden layer of intermediary genetic information (...) that underpins developmental ontogeny and the differences between species, ecotypes and individuals. It is also evident that RNA editing is a primary means by which hardwired genetic information in animals can be altered by environmental signals, especially in the brain, indicating a dynamic RNA-mediated interplay between the transcriptome, the environment and the epigenome. Moreover, RNA-directed regulatory processes may also transfer epigenetic information not only within cells but also between cells and organ systems, as well as across generations. (shrink)

The canonical genetic code ubiquitously translates nucleotide into peptide sequence with several alterations known in viruses, bacteria, mitochondria, plastids, and single‐celled eukaryotes. A new hypothesis to explain genetic code changes, termed tRNA loss driven codon reassignment, has been proposed recently when the polyphyly of the yeast codon reassignment events has been uncovered. According to this hypothesis, the driving force for genetic code changes are tRNA or translation termination factor loss‐of‐function mutations or loss‐of‐gene events. The free codon can subsequently be captured (...) by all tRNAs that have an appropriately mutated anticodon and are efficiently charged. Thus, codon capture most likely happens by near‐cognate tRNAs and tRNAs whose anticodons are not part of the recognition sites of the respective aminoacyl‐tRNA‐synthetases. This hypothesis comprehensively explains the CTG codon translation as alanine in Pachysolen yeast together with the long known translation of the same codon as serine in Candida albicans and related species, and can also be applied to most other known. (shrink)

During evolution, the genomes of eukaryotic cells have undergone major restructuring to meet the new regulatory challenges associated with compartmentalization of the genetic material in the nucleus and the organelles acquired by endosymbiosis (mitochondria and plastids). Restructuring involved the loss of dispensable or redundant genes and the massive translocation of genes from the ancestral organelles to the nucleus. Genomics and bioinformatic data suggest that the process of DNA transfer from organelles to the nucleus still continues, providing raw material for (...) evolutionary tinkering in the nuclear genome. Recent reconstruction of these events in the laboratory has provided a unique tool to observe genome evolution in real time and to study the molecular mechanisms by which plastid genes are converted into functional nuclear genes. Here, we summarize current knowledge about plastid‐to‐nuclear gene transfer in the context of genome evolution and discuss new insights gained from experiments that recapitulate endosymbiotic gene transfer in the laboratory. BioEssays 30:556–566, 2008. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

Information and communication technologies , with their increasing and widespread utilization in daily life, may exert an important impact on brain performances. The development of their use for improving several cerebral processes, by abolishing the brain/machine interface, is envisaged and is subject to debate. The scientific research on brain implants and brain gene transfer aiming to restore central nervous system functions, altered by disease or trauma, may contribute to this debate. Indeed, the advances that are enabling non drug-mediated (...) approaches for direct interventions on the brain are raising the possibility not only of restoring neural functions for therapeutic purposes, but also of monitoring, controlling and ultimately modifying from the outside these functions for enhancement. This paper gives an overview of the state of the art of brain implants and brain gene transfer for neurological diseases with a particular emphasis on Parkinson’s disease and a forecast on their possible application for other conditions. In doing so, the authors, who are neuroscientists working in the field of gene transfer for neuropsychiatric diseases, aim to establish a scientifically, medically and technically realistic framework to open up discussion on relevant ethical issues in this domain. (shrink)