Search results for 'amoralism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Matthew S. Bedke (2009). Moral Judgment Purposivism: Saving Internalism From Amoralism. Philosophical Studies 144 (2):189 - 209.score: 18.0
    Consider orthodox motivational judgment internalism: necessarily, A’s sincere moral judgment that he or she ought to φ motivates A to φ. Such principles fail because they cannot accommodate the amoralist, or one who renders moral judgments without any corresponding motivation. The orthodox alternative, externalism, posits only contingent relations between moral judgment and motivation. In response I first revive conceptual internalism by offering some modifications on the amoralist case to show that certain community-wide motivational failures are not conceptually possible. Second, I (...)
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  2. Terence Rajivan Edward (2013). Joseph Raz on the Problem of the Amoralist. Abstracta 7 (1):85-93.score: 18.0
    Joseph Raz has argued that the problem of the amoralist is misconceived. In this paper, I present three interpretations of what his argument is. None of these interpretations yields an argument that we are in a position to accept.
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  3. Danielle Bromwich (2013). Motivational Internalism and the Challenge of Amoralism. European Journal of Philosophy 22 (1).score: 18.0
    Motivational internalism is the thesis that captures the commonplace thought that moral judgements are necessarily motivationally efficacious. But this thesis appears to be in tension with another aspect of our ordinary moral experience. Proponents of the contrast thesis, motivational externalism, cite everyday examples of amoralism to demonstrate that it is conceptually possible to be completely unmoved by what seem to be sincere first-person moral judgements. This paper argues that the challenge of amoralism gives us no reason to reject (...)
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  4. Zohar Lederman (2014). Amoralist Rationalism? A Response to Joel Marks. Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 11 (2):115-116.score: 18.0
    In a recent article, Joel Marks presents the amoralist argument against vivisection, or animal laboratory experimentation. He argues that ethical theories that seek to uncover some universal morality are in fact useless and unnecessary for ethical deliberations meant to determine what constitutes an appropriate action in a specific circumstance. I agree with Marks’ conclusion. I too believe that vivisection is indefensible, both from a scientific and philosophical perspective. I also believe that we should become vegan (unfortunately, like the two philosophers (...)
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  5. Mark van Roojen (2010). Moral Rationalism and Rational Amoralism. Ethics 120 (3):495–525.score: 15.0
  6. Brook Jenkins Sadler (2000). Can the Amoralist Only Be 'Right'?: A Closer Look at the Inverted-Commas Argument. Southwest Philosophy Review 17 (1):113-122.score: 15.0
  7. Brook J. Sadler (2003). The Possibility of Amoralism: A Defence Against Internalism. Philosophy 78 (1):63-78.score: 12.0
    A defence of the possibility of amoralism is important to discussions about the foundations of ethics and the justification of morality. I argue against Michael Smith's attempt to show, through a defence of internalism, that amoralism is incoherent. I argue first, that a de dicto reading of the externalist's explanation of changes in motivation which are pursuant upon changes in judgement is not objectionable or implausible as Smith contends; and second, that internalism cannot account for the effort of (...)
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  8. J. Fischer, Moral Opposites - An Examination of Intuitions Concerning the Amoralist and the Moral Saint.score: 12.0
    In this thesis I want to take a look at the extreme ends of the moral spectrum. Specifically, I am going to examine the very extremes of the moral spectrum, namely the amoralist and the moral saint. I want to take a look at the justifications we have for the intuitions people commonly hold about these two opposites; the intuition being that both an amoralist and a moral saint are undesirable ideals. In examining both cases, I aim to answer the (...)
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  9. Matej Sušnik (2009). The Amoralist Objection and the Method of Moral Reasoning. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 9 (1):91-100.score: 12.0
    In his book Moralna spoznaja Baccarini argues that, with respect to the individual reasoning about morality, the method of reflective equilibrium is the appropriate method of moral reasoning. The starting point of my argument is Baccarini’s refutation of Hare’s view. As I see it, one of Baccarini’s central arguments against Hare consists in claiming that Hare’s approach to the amoralist objection weakens the deductive model of moral reasoning. I argue that the amoralist objection also posses a threat to the method (...)
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  10. Andrei G. Zavaliy (2012). On Rational Amoralists. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 42 (4):365-384.score: 10.0
    An influential tradition in moral philosophy attempts to explain an immoral action by reference to the defect in reasoning on the part of an immoral agent. On this view, the requirements of morality are not only sanctioned by the more general requirements of rationality, but the violations of the moral requirements would be indicative of a rational failure. In this article I argue that ascription of irrationality to amoral individuals (e.g., psychopaths) is either empirically false, or else, conceptually problematic. An (...)
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  11. John J. Tilley (2006). Is "Why Be Moral?&Quot; A Pseudo-Question?: Hospers and Thornton on the Amoralist's Challenge. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (4):549-66.score: 9.0
    Many arguments have been advanced for the view that "Why be moral?" is a pseudo-question. In this paper I address one of the most widely known and influential of them, one that comes from John Hospers and J. C. <span class='Hi'>Thornton</span>. I do so partly because, strangely, an important phase of that argument has escaped close attention. It warrants such attention because, firstly, not only is it important to the argument in which it appears, it is important in wider respects. (...)
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  12. James Lenman (1999). The Externalist and the Amoralist. Philosophia 27 (3-4):441-457.score: 9.0
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  13. Joshua Gert & Alfred Mele (2005). Lenman on Externalism and Amoralism: An Interplanetary Exploration. Philosophia 32 (1-4):275-283.score: 9.0
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  14. Gerald Beaulieu (2007). Meta-Ethical Rationalism and the Amoralist Challenge: An Externalist Response to Michael Smith's Reliability Argument. Dialogue 46 (4):751-760.score: 9.0
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  15. R. M. Hare (1989). Amoralism: Reply to Peter Sandøe. Theoria 55 (3):205-210.score: 9.0
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  16. Wm David Solomon (1988). Moral Realism and the Amoralist. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 12 (1):377-393.score: 9.0
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  17. Peter Sandøe (1989). Amoralism-on the Limits of Moral Thinking. Theoria 55 (3):191-204.score: 9.0
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  18. Kai Nielsen (1977). Rawls and Classist Amoralism. Mind 86 (341):19-30.score: 9.0
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  19. Kai Nielsen (1980). On the Coherence of Classist Amoralism. Philosophical Studies 27:84-93.score: 9.0
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  20. Andrew Sneddon (2001). Taking Empirically Minded Moral Philosophy Seriously. Dialogue 40 (03):603-.score: 9.0
    This is a critique of Wayne Fenske's attempt to provide an a posteriori defense of internalism and consequently an argument against the possibility of amoralism.
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  21. James Lenman (1999). 'The Amoralist and the Externalist. Philosophia 27:451.score: 9.0
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  22. Gunnar Björnsson, Caj Strandberg, Ragnar Francén Olinder, John Eriksson & Fredrik Björklund (eds.) (forthcoming). Motivational Internalism. Oxford University Press.score: 7.0
    Motivational internalism—the idea that there is an intrinsic or necessary connection between moral judgment and moral motivation—is a central thesis in a number of metaethical debates. In conjunction with a Humean picture of motivation, it provides a challenge for cognitivist theories that take moral judgments to concern objective aspects of reality. Versions of internalism have potential implications for moral absolutism, realism, non-naturalism, and rationalism. Being a constraint on more detailed conceptoins of moral motivation and moral judgment, it is also directly (...)
     
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  23. Joel Marks (2010). An Amoral Manifesto Part I. Philosophy Now (80):30-33.score: 6.0
  24. Gunnar Björnsson & Ragnar Francén Olinder (2013). Internalists Beware—We Might All Be Amoralists! Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (1):1 - 14.score: 6.0
    Standard motivational internalism is the claim that by a priori or conceptual necessity, a psychological state is a moral opinion only if it is suitably related to moral motivation. Many philosophers, the authors of this paper included, have assumed that this claim is supported by intuitions to the effect that amoralists?people not suitably related to such motivation?lack moral opinions proper. In this paper we argue that this assumption is mistaken, seeming plausible only because defenders of standard internalism have failed to (...)
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  25. Joel Marks (2010). An Amoral Manifesto Part II. Philosophy Now (81):23-26.score: 6.0
  26. Gunnar Björnsson, John Eriksson, Caj Strandberg, Ragnar Francén Olinder & Fredrik Björklund (forthcoming). Motivational Internalism and Folk Intuitions. Philosophical Psychology.score: 6.0
    Motivational internalism postulates a necessary connection between moral judgments and motivation. In arguing for and against internalism, metaethicists traditionally appeal to intuitions about cases, but crucial cases often yield conflicting intuitions. One way to try to make progress, possibly uncovering theoretical bias and revealing whether people have conceptions of moral judgments required for noncognitivist accounts of moral thinking, is to investigate non-philosophers' willingness to attribute moral judgments. A pioneering study by Shaun Nichols seemed to undermine internalism, as a large majority (...)
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  27. James McBain (2013). Ethics Without Morals: A Defense of Amorality, by Joel Marks. Teaching Philosophy 36 (3):306-310.score: 6.0
  28. Yitzhak Y. Melamed (2011). Spinoza's Anti-Humanism: An Outline. In. In Smith Justin & Fraenkel Carlos (eds.), The Rationalists. Springer/Synthese. 147--166.score: 6.0
  29. Jeanette Kennett (2002). Autism, Empathy and Moral Agency. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (208):340-357.score: 3.0
    Psychopaths have long been of interest to moral philosophers, since a careful examination of their peculiar deficiencies may reveal what features are normally critical to the development of moral agency. What underlies the psychopath's amoralism? A common and plausible answer to this question is that the psychopath lacks empathy. Lack of empathy is also claimed to be a critical impairment in autism, yet it is not at all clear that autistic individuals share the psychopath's amoralism. How is empathy (...)
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  30. David McNaughton (1988). Moral Vision: An Introduction to Ethics. B. Blackwell.score: 3.0
    This book introduces the reader to ethics by examining a current and important debate. During the last fifty years the orthodox position in ethics has been a broadly non-cognitivist one: since there are no moral facts, moral remarks are best understood, not as attempting to describe the world, but as having some other function - such as expressing the attitudes or preferences of the speaker. In recent years this position has been increasingly challenged by moral realists who maintain that there (...)
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  31. Alejandro Bárcenas (2013). Han Fei's Enlightened Ruler. Asian Philosophy 23 (3):236-259.score: 3.0
    In this essay I revise, based on the notion of the ‘enlightened ruler’ or mingzhu and his critique of the literati of his time, the common belief that Han Fei was an amoralist and an advocate of tyranny. Instead, I will argue that his writings are dedicated to advising those who ought to rule in order to achieve the goal of a peaceful and stable society framed by laws in accordance with the dao.
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  32. Gunnar Björnsson & Tristram McPherson (2014). Moral Attitudes for Non-Cognitivists: Solving the Specification Problem. Mind 123 (489):1-38.score: 3.0
    Moral non-cognitivists hope to explain the nature of moral agreement and disagreement as agreement and disagreement in non-cognitive attitudes. In doing so, they take on the task of identifying the relevant attitudes, distinguishing the non-cognitive attitudes corresponding to judgements of moral wrongness, for example, from attitudes involved in aesthetic disapproval or the sports fan’s disapproval of her team’s performance. We begin this paper by showing that there is a simple recipe for generating apparent counterexamples to any informative specification of the (...)
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  33. Philip Clark (2004). Kantian Morals and Humean Motives. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):109–126.score: 3.0
    The idea that moral imperatives are categorical is commonly used to support internalist claims about moral judgment. I argue that the categorical quality of moral requirements shows at most that moral motivation need not flow from a background desire to be moral. It does not show that moral judgments can motivate by themselves, or that amoralism is impossible.
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  34. Ragnar Francén Olinder (2012). Svavarsdóttir's Burden. Philosophia 40 (3):577-589.score: 3.0
    It is sometimes observed that the debate between internalists and externalists about moral motivation seems to have reached a deadlock. There are those who do, and those who don’t, recognize the intuitive possibility of amoralists: i.e. people having moral opinions without being motivated to act accordingly. This makes Sigrun Svavarsdóttir’s methodological objection to internalism especially interesting, since it promises to break the deadlock through building a case against internalism (construed as a conceptual thesis), not on such intuitions, but on a (...)
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  35. Stephanie Patridge (2011). The Incorrigible Social Meaning of Video Game Imagery. Ethics and Information Technology 13 (4):303-312.score: 3.0
    In this paper, I consider a particular amoralist challenge against those who would morally criticize our single-player video play, viz., “come on, it’s only a game!” The amoralist challenge with which I engage gains strength from two facts: the activities to which the amoralist lays claim are only those that do not involve interactions with other rational or sentient creatures, and the amoralist concedes that there may be extrinsic, consequentialist considerations that support legitimate moral criticisms. I argue that the amoralist (...)
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  36. Anita M. Superson (2009). The Moral Skeptic. Oxford University Press.score: 3.0
    Introduction -- The self-interest based contractarian response to the skeptic -- A feminist ethics response to the skeptic -- Deformed desires -- Self-interest versus morality -- The amoralist -- The motive skeptic -- The interdependency thesis.
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  37. P. S. Greenspan (1998). Moral Responses and Moral Theory: Socially-Based Externalist Ethics. [REVIEW] Journal of Ethics 2 (2):103-122.score: 3.0
    The paper outlines a view called social (or two-level) response-dependency as an addition to standard alternatives in metaethics that allows for a position intermediate between standard versions of internalism and externalism on the question of motivational force. Instead of taking psychological responses as either directly supplying the content of ethics (as on emotivist or sentimentalist accounts) or as irrelevant to its content (as in classical versions of Kantian or utilitarian ethics), the view allows them an indirect role, as motivational props (...)
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  38. Philip Clark, Mackie's Motivational Argument Philip Clark.score: 3.0
    Mackie doubted anything objective could have the motivational properties of a value. In thinking we are morally required to act in a certain way, he said, we attribute objective value to the action. Since nothing has objective value, these moral judgments are all false. As to whether Mackie proved his error theory, opinions vary. But there is broad agreement on one issue. A litany of examples, ranging from amoralism to depression to downright evil, has everyone convinced that Mackie vastly (...)
     
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  39. Phillip Cole (2000). Embracing the “Nation”. Res Publica 6 (3):237-257.score: 3.0
    The idea of the “nation” has played only a small role in modern political philosophy because of its apparent irrationalism and amoralism. David Miller, however, sets out to show that these charges can be overcome: nationality is a rational element of one’s cultural identity, and nations are genuinely ethical communities. In this paper I argue that his project fails. The defence against the charge of irrationalism fails because Miller works within a framework of ethical particularism which leads to a (...)
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  40. Krzysztof Saja (2007). Internalizm motywacyjny Richarda M. Hare'a. Analiza I Egzystencja 5:179-202.score: 3.0
    Ethics of Richard M. Hare is widely considered as a classical example of the strong internalistic theory of motivation: he is thought to believe that having a moral motive is a sufficient condition to act accordingly. However, strong internalism has difficulties with explaining the phenomenon of acrasia and amoralism. For this reason some critics charge him with developing a false theory of moral motivation. In the article I present Hare's answer to these questions by dividing the discussion about motivation (...)
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  41. Gunnar Björnsson (1998). Moral Internalism: An Essay in Moral Psychology. Dissertation, Stockholm Universityscore: 3.0
    An ancient but central divide in moral philosophy concerns the nature of opinions about what is morally wrong or what our moralduties are. Some philosophers argue that moral motivation is internal to moral opinions: that moral opinions consist of motivationalstates such as desires or emotions. This has often been seen as athreat to the possibility of rational argument and justification inmorals. Other philosophers argue that moral motivation is external to moral opinion: moral opinions should be seen as beliefs about moral (...)
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  42. Robert Black (1989). Moral Scepticism and Inductive Scepticism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 90:65 - 82.score: 3.0
    Viewing moral scepticism as the rejection of objective desirabilities, inductive scepticism may be seen as the rejection of objective believabilities. Moral scepticism leads naturally to amoralism rather than subjectivism, and inductive scepticism undermines not our practices of induction but only a view about justification. The two scepticisms together amount to the adoption of a defensibly narrow, formal view of reason.
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  43. Ping-Cheung Lo (2012). Warfare Ethics in Sunzi'sart of War?Historical Controversies and Contemporary Perspectives. Journal of Military Ethics 11 (2):114-135.score: 3.0
    Abstract Contemporary English and Chinese scholars alike have interpreted Sunzi's Art of War as advocating amoralism in warfare. That charge has a long history in pre-modern China and has not been fully refuted. This essay argues that the alleged amoral Machiavellianism is more appropriate for ancient Qin military thought than for Sunzi. The third chapter of Sunzi's treatise contains a distinctive moral perspective that cannot be found in the military thought of the state of Qin, which succeeded in defeating (...)
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  44. Michael Wreen (2008). Three Related Objections to Relativism. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 10:453-457.score: 3.0
    The most frequent charges brought against moral relativism are probably that it is inconsistent, that it has morally repugnant implications, and that it leads to amoralism, or the breakdown of morality altogether. A less frequent but still common objection is more conceptual in nature: relativism cannot make any sense of a certain species of comparative moral judgment, namely those that morally compare two moral codes. The general form of this kind of judgment is: ‘Moral code A is morally superior (...)
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  45. Gerald H. Paske (1989). Magic and Morality: Remarks on Gewirth and Hare. [REVIEW] Journal of Value Inquiry 23 (1):51-58.score: 3.0
    Gewirth and hare claim amoralism is contrary to reason. Gewirth believes amoralism to be logically inconsistent. Hare believes amoralism to be imprudent and hence irrational. By defining the problem as one of amoralism rather than 'non'moralism, Gewirth and hare assume illegitimate moral presuppositions. I show their arguments fail by comparing their arguments to the arguments given by someone who accepts the language and presuppositions of magic. I suggest that what is wrong with amoralism is that (...)
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  46. David Boonin (1994). Thomas Hobbes and the Science of Moral Virtue. Cambridge University Press.score: 3.0
    In Leviathan Thomas Hobbes defines moral philosophy as 'the science of Virtue and Vice', yet few modern readers take this description seriously. Moreover, it is typically assumed that Hobbes' ethical views are unrelated to his views of science. Influential modern interpreters have portrayed Hobbes as either an amoralist, or a moral contractarian, or a rule egoist, or a divine command theorist. David Boonin-Vail challenges all these assumptions and presents a new, and very unorthodox, interpretation of Hobbes's ethics. He shows that (...)
     
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  47. Ragnar Francén Olinder (2012). Svavarsdóttir's Burden. Philosophia 40 (3):577-589.score: 3.0
    It is sometimes observed that the debate between internalists and externalists about moral motivation seems to have reached a deadlock. There are those who do, and those who don’t, recognize the intuitive possibility of amoralists: i.e. people having moral opinions without being motivated to act accordingly. This makes Sigrun Svavarsdóttir’s methodological objection to internalism especially interesting, since it promises to break the deadlock through building a case against internalism (construed as a conceptual thesis), not on such intuitions, but on a (...)
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  48. J. van Niekerk (2008). In Defence of an Autocentric Account of Ubuntu. South African Journal of Philosophy 26 (4):364-368.score: 3.0
    This response to Thaddeus Metz's “Toward an African Moral Theory” engages with his discussion of an autocentric, or “self-development” account of ubuntu as a morally normative theory. It is argued that an autocentric ubuntu, sharing certain strategies available to eudaimonist ethics, is both more plausible and more attractive than Metz suggests, particularly in that it engages directly with the immoralist (amoralist). South African Journal of Philosophy Vol. 26 (4) 2007: pp. 364-368.
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  49. Anthony Woodward (1991). Santayana and Goethe. Overheard in Seville 9 (9):1-7.score: 3.0
    Santayana, whose early writings are hostile to the Faustian spirit, used a quotation from IFaust, Part IID as epigraph to IThe Realm of SpiritD. This suggest a possible affinity of late Santayana, and aspects of Goethe. The speech of the Earth-Spirit in IFaustD has an amoralism similar to passages in IThe Realm of MattesD. A certain ironical, detached spirituality links the poet-sages as well. Each uses some of the symbolism of Christian dogma (e.g., the last chapter of IThe Realm (...)
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  50. Y. Cloutier (1989). La Prétention Amoraliste in Egalitarian Ethics. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 43 (170):342-351.score: 3.0
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