Search results for 'amoralism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Matthew S. Bedke (2009). Moral Judgment Purposivism: Saving Internalism From Amoralism. Philosophical Studies 144 (2):189 - 209.
    Consider orthodox motivational judgment internalism: necessarily, A’s sincere moral judgment that he or she ought to φ motivates A to φ. Such principles fail because they cannot accommodate the amoralist, or one who renders moral judgments without any corresponding motivation. The orthodox alternative, externalism, posits only contingent relations between moral judgment and motivation. In response I first revive conceptual internalism by offering some modifications on the amoralist case to show that certain community-wide motivational failures are not conceptually possible. Second, I (...)
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  2. Terence Rajivan Edward (2013). Joseph Raz on the Problem of the Amoralist. Abstracta 7 (1):85-93.
    Joseph Raz has argued that the problem of the amoralist is misconceived. In this paper, I present three interpretations of what his argument is. None of these interpretations yields an argument that we are in a position to accept.
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  3. Danielle Bromwich (2016). Motivational Internalism and the Challenge of Amoralism. European Journal of Philosophy 24 (2):452-471.
    Motivational internalism is the thesis that captures the commonplace thought that moral judgements are necessarily motivationally efficacious. But this thesis appears to be in tension with another aspect of our ordinary moral experience. Proponents of the contrast thesis, motivational externalism, cite everyday examples of amoralism to demonstrate that it is conceptually possible to be completely unmoved by what seem to be sincere first-person moral judgements. This paper argues that the challenge of amoralism gives us no reason to reject (...)
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  4.  9
    Zohar Lederman (2014). Amoralist Rationalism? A Response to Joel Marks. Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 11 (2):115-116.
    In a recent article, Joel Marks presents the amoralist argument against vivisection, or animal laboratory experimentation. He argues that ethical theories that seek to uncover some universal morality are in fact useless and unnecessary for ethical deliberations meant to determine what constitutes an appropriate action in a specific circumstance. I agree with Marks’ conclusion. I too believe that vivisection is indefensible, both from a scientific and philosophical perspective. I also believe that we should become vegan (unfortunately, like the two philosophers (...)
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  5. Mark van Roojen (2010). Moral Rationalism and Rational Amoralism. Ethics 120 (3):495–525.
  6.  30
    Brook Jenkins Sadler (2000). Can the Amoralist Only Be 'Right'?: A Closer Look at the Inverted-Commas Argument. Southwest Philosophy Review 17 (1):113-122.
  7.  10
    Danielle Bromwich (2016). Motivational Internalism and the Challenge of Amoralism. European Journal of Philosophy 24 (2):452-471.
    Motivational internalism is the thesis that captures the commonplace thought that moral judgements are necessarily motivationally efficacious. But this thesis appears to be in tension with another aspect of our ordinary moral experience. Proponents of the contrast thesis, motivational externalism, cite everyday examples of amoralism to demonstrate that it is conceptually possible to be completely unmoved by what seem to be sincere first-person moral judgements. This paper argues that the challenge of amoralism gives us no reason to reject (...)
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  8.  3
    Kenneth Shields (forthcoming). Moral Internalism, Amoralist Skepticism and the Factivity Effect. Philosophical Psychology:1-17.
    Philosophers are divided over moral internalism, the claim that moral judgement entails some motivation to comply with that judgement. Against moral internalism, externalists defend the conceptual coherence of scenarios in which an individual makes genuine moral judgements but is entirely unmoved by them. This is amoralist skepticism and these scenarios can be called amoralist scenarios. While the coherence of amoralist scenarios is disputed, philosophers seem to agree that the coherence of amoralist scenarios is not affected by whether the amoralist is (...)
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  9.  17
    Christopher Cowie (forthcoming). Revisionist Responses to the Amoralism Objection: A Reply to Julia Markovits. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-13.
    Some subjectivist views of practical reasons entail that some people, in some cases, lack sufficient reasons to act as morality requires of them. This is often thought to form the basis of an objection to these subjectivist views: ‘the amoralism objection’. This objection has been developed at length by Julia Markovits in her recent book Moral Reason. But Markovits—alongside many other proponents of this objection—does not explicitly consider that her objection is premised on a claim that her opponents deny (...)
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  10.  94
    Brook J. Sadler (2003). The Possibility of Amoralism: A Defence Against Internalism. Philosophy 78 (1):63-78.
    A defence of the possibility of amoralism is important to discussions about the foundations of ethics and the justification of morality. I argue against Michael Smith's attempt to show, through a defence of internalism, that amoralism is incoherent. I argue first, that a de dicto reading of the externalist's explanation of changes in motivation which are pursuant upon changes in judgement is not objectionable or implausible as Smith contends; and second, that internalism cannot account for the effort of (...)
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  11.  55
    J. Fischer, Moral Opposites - An Examination of Intuitions Concerning the Amoralist and the Moral Saint.
    In this thesis I want to take a look at the extreme ends of the moral spectrum. Specifically, I am going to examine the very extremes of the moral spectrum, namely the amoralist and the moral saint. I want to take a look at the justifications we have for the intuitions people commonly hold about these two opposites; the intuition being that both an amoralist and a moral saint are undesirable ideals. In examining both cases, I aim to answer the (...)
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  12.  4
    Danielle Bromwich (2016). Motivational Internalism and the Challenge of Amoralism. European Journal of Philosophy 24 (2):452-471.
    Motivational internalism is the thesis that captures the commonplace thought that moral judgements are necessarily motivationally efficacious. But this thesis appears to be in tension with another aspect of our ordinary moral experience. Proponents of the contrast thesis, motivational externalism, cite everyday examples of amoralism to demonstrate that it is conceptually possible to be completely unmoved by what seem to be sincere first-person moral judgements. This paper argues that the challenge of amoralism gives us no reason to reject (...)
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  13.  23
    Matej Sušnik (2009). The Amoralist Objection and the Method of Moral Reasoning. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 9 (1):91-100.
    In his book Moralna spoznaja Baccarini argues that, with respect to the individual reasoning about morality, the method of reflective equilibrium is the appropriate method of moral reasoning. The starting point of my argument is Baccarini’s refutation of Hare’s view. As I see it, one of Baccarini’s central arguments against Hare consists in claiming that Hare’s approach to the amoralist objection weakens the deductive model of moral reasoning. I argue that the amoralist objection also posses a threat to the method (...)
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  14. Brook Jenkins Sadler (2001). Amoralism and the Justification of Morality. Dissertation, Duke University
    Some have argued that specifically moral demands or norms are justified by the constraints of rationality. On this view, any agent who comes to doubt, challenge, or reject the authority of moral demands does so on penalty of irrationality. According to this view, the agent who asks the question Why be moral? can be given a rational justification for the demands that morality makes on her, regardless of her individual reasons and motives. ;I consider amoralism as a test case. (...)
     
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  15. James Lenman (1999). The Externalist and the Amoralist. Philosophia 27 (3-4):441-457.
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  16.  48
    Joshua Gert & Alfred Mele (2005). Lenman on Externalism and Amoralism: An Interplanetary Exploration. Philosophia 32 (1-4):275-283.
  17. John J. Tilley (2006). Is "Why Be Moral?" A Pseudo-Question?: Hospers and Thornton on the Amoralist's Challenge. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (4):549-66.
    Many arguments have been advanced for the view that "Why be moral?" is a pseudo-question. In this paper I address one of the most widely known and influential of them, one that comes from John Hospers and J. C. Thornton. I do so partly because, strangely, an important phase of that argument has escaped close attention. It warrants such attention because, firstly, not only is it important to the argument in which it appears, it is important in wider respects. For (...)
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  18.  1
    M. S. Bedke (2009). Moral Judgment Purposivism: Saving Internalism From Amoralism. Philosophical Studies 144 (2):189-209.
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  19.  10
    Wm David Solomon (1988). Moral Realism and the Amoralist. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 12 (1):377-393.
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  20. James Lenman (1999). 'The Amoralist and the Externalist'. Philosophia 27:451.
     
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  21.  47
    Gerald Beaulieu (2007). Meta-Ethical Rationalism and the Amoralist Challenge: An Externalist Response to Michael Smith's Reliability Argument. Dialogue 46 (4):751-760.
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  22.  31
    R. M. Hare (1989). Amoralism: Reply to Peter Sandøe. Theoria 55 (3):205-210.
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  23.  21
    Kai Nielsen (1980). On the Coherence of Classist Amoralism. Philosophical Studies 27:84-93.
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  24. Charles Pigden (1988). Stavrogin: A Critical Study of an Amoralist. Critical Philosophy 4:28.
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  25.  19
    Peter Sandøe (1989). Amoralism-on the Limits of Moral Thinking. Theoria 55 (3):191-204.
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  26.  7
    Kai Nielsen (1977). Rawls and Classist Amoralism. Mind 86 (341):19-30.
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  27. Kai Nielsen (1986). On Reading Marx as a Non- Cognitivist and Amoralist. Indian Philosophical Quarterly 13 (3-4):239.
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  28. Kai Nielsen (1978). Rawls' Defense of Morality: Rationality, Amoralism and the Problem of Congruence. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 59 (1):93.
     
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  29.  70
    Alex Worsnip (forthcoming). Cryptonormative Judgments. European Journal of Philosophy.
    A cryptonormative judgment, roughly speaking, is a judgment which is presented by the agent who makes it as non-normative (either generally or in some particular respect), but which is in fact normative (either generally or in that particular respect). The idea of cryptonormativity is familiar from debates in social theory, social psychology, and continental political philosophy, but it has to my knowledge never been treated in analytic metaethics, moral psychology or epistemology except in passing. In this paper, I argue, first, (...)
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  30.  3
    Andrew Sneddon (2001). Taking Empirically Minded Moral Philosophy Seriously. Dialogue 40 (03):603-.
    This is a critique of Wayne Fenske's attempt to provide an a posteriori defense of internalism and consequently an argument against the possibility of amoralism.
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  31. Gunnar Björnsson, John Eriksson, Caj Strandberg, Ragnar Francén Olinder & Fredrik Björklund (2014). Motivational Internalism and Folk Intuitions. Philosophical Psychology 28 (5):715-734.
    Motivational internalism postulates a necessary connection between moral judgments and motivation. In arguing for and against internalism, metaethicists traditionally appeal to intuitions about cases, but crucial cases often yield conflicting intuitions. One way to try to make progress, possibly uncovering theoretical bias and revealing whether people have conceptions of moral judgments required for noncognitivist accounts of moral disagreement, is to investigate non-philosophers' willingness to attribute moral judgments. A pioneering study by Shaun Nichols seemed to undermine internalism, as a large majority (...)
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  32.  15
    Gunnar Björnsson, Caj Strandberg, Ragnar Francén Olinder, John Eriksson & Fredrik Björklund (2015). Motivational Internalism: Contemporary Debates. In Gunnar Björnsson, Caj Strandberg, Ragnar Francén Olinder, John Eriksson & Fredrik Björklund (eds.), Motivational Internalism. Oxford University Press 1–20.
    Motivational internalism—the idea that moral judgments are intrinsically or necessarily connected to motivation—has played a central role in metaethical debates. In conjunction with a Humean picture of motivation, internalism has provided a challenge for theories that take moral judgments to concern objective aspects of reality, and versions of internalism have been seen as having implications for moral absolutism, realism, and rationalism. But internalism is a controversial thesis, and the apparent possibility of amoralists and the rejection of strong forms of internalism (...)
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  33.  25
    Yitzhak Y. Melamed (2011). Spinoza's Anti-Humanism: An Outline. In Smith Justin & Fraenkel Carlos (eds.), The Rationalists. Springer/Synthese 147--166.
  34. Joel Marks (2010). An Amoral Manifesto Part I. Philosophy Now (80):30-33.
  35.  36
    James McBain (2013). Ethics Without Morals: A Defense of Amorality, by Joel Marks. Teaching Philosophy 36 (3):306-310.
  36.  64
    Joel Marks (2010). An Amoral Manifesto Part II. Philosophy Now (81):23-26.
  37.  35
    Andrei G. Zavaliy (2012). On Rational Amoralists. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 42 (4):365-384.
    An influential tradition in moral philosophy attempts to explain an immoral action by reference to the defect in reasoning on the part of an immoral agent. On this view, the requirements of morality are not only sanctioned by the more general requirements of rationality, but the violations of the moral requirements would be indicative of a rational failure. In this article I argue that ascription of irrationality to amoral individuals (e.g., psychopaths) is either empirically false, or else, conceptually problematic. An (...)
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  38.  12
    Bill Meacham (2014). Ethics Without Morals by Joel Marks. [REVIEW] Philosophy Now 103:42-44.
    Book review. The author incisively defends moral anti-realism. He advises that one should act only on one's considered desires, not on moral absolutes. But he fails to give guidance about what is important or advisable to desire.
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  39.  45
    Gunnar Björnsson, Caj Strandberg, Ragnar Francén Olinder, John Eriksson & Fredrik Björklund (eds.) (2015). Motivational Internalism. Oxford University Press.
    Motivational internalism—the idea that there is an intrinsic or necessary connection between moral judgment and moral motivation—is a central thesis in a number of metaethical debates. In conjunction with a Humean picture of motivation, it provides a challenge for cognitivist theories that take moral judgments to concern objective aspects of reality. Versions of internalism have potential implications for moral absolutism, realism, non-naturalism, and rationalism. Being a constraint on more detailed conceptoins of moral motivation and moral judgment, it is also directly (...)
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  40. David McNaughton (1988). Moral Vision: An Introduction to Ethics. B. Blackwell.
    This book introduces the reader to ethics by examining a current and important debate. During the last fifty years the orthodox position in ethics has been a broadly non-cognitivist one: since there are no moral facts, moral remarks are best understood, not as attempting to describe the world, but as having some other function - such as expressing the attitudes or preferences of the speaker. In recent years this position has been increasingly challenged by moral realists who maintain that there (...)
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  41. Jeanette Kennett (2002). Autism, Empathy and Moral Agency. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (208):340-357.
    Psychopaths have long been of interest to moral philosophers, since a careful examination of their peculiar deficiencies may reveal what features are normally critical to the development of moral agency. What underlies the psychopath's amoralism? A common and plausible answer to this question is that the psychopath lacks empathy. Lack of empathy is also claimed to be a critical impairment in autism, yet it is not at all clear that autistic individuals share the psychopath's amoralism. How is empathy (...)
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  42. Alfred Archer (2016). Motivational Judgement Internalism and The Problem of Supererogation. Journal of Philosophical Research 41:601-621.
    Motivational judgement internalists hold that there is a necessary connection between moral judgments and motivation. There is, though, an important lack of clarity in the literature about the types of moral evaluation the theory is supposed to cover. It is rarely made clear whether the theory is intended to cover all moral judgements or whether the claim covers only a subset of such judgements. In this paper I will investigate which moral judgements internalists should hold their theory to apply to. (...)
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  43. Gunnar Björnsson & Ragnar Francén Olinder (2013). Internalists Beware—We Might All Be Amoralists! Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (1):1 - 14.
    Standard motivational internalism is the claim that by a priori or conceptual necessity, a psychological state is a moral opinion only if it is suitably related to moral motivation. Many philosophers, the authors of this paper included, have assumed that this claim is supported by intuitions to the effect that amoralists?people not suitably related to such motivation?lack moral opinions proper. In this paper we argue that this assumption is mistaken, seeming plausible only because defenders of standard internalism have failed to (...)
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  44.  52
    Stephanie Patridge (2011). The Incorrigible Social Meaning of Video Game Imagery. Ethics and Information Technology 13 (4):303-312.
    In this paper, I consider a particular amoralist challenge against those who would morally criticize our single-player video play, viz., “come on, it’s only a game!” The amoralist challenge with which I engage gains strength from two facts: the activities to which the amoralist lays claim are only those that do not involve interactions with other rational or sentient creatures, and the amoralist concedes that there may be extrinsic, consequentialist considerations that support legitimate moral criticisms. I argue that the amoralist (...)
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  45.  53
    Noël Carroll (2014). Ethics and Comic Amusement. British Journal of Aesthetics 54 (2):241-253.
    This article explores several views on the relation of humour, especially tendentious humour, to morality, including comic amoralism, comic ethicism, comic immoralism, and moderate comic moralism. The essay concludes by defending moderate comic moralism.
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  46. Krzysztof Saja (2007). Internalizm motywacyjny Richarda M. Hare'a. Analiza I Egzystencja 5:179-202.
    Ethics of Richard M. Hare is widely considered as a classical example of the strong internalistic theory of motivation: he is thought to believe that having a moral motive is a sufficient condition to act accordingly. However, strong internalism has difficulties with explaining the phenomenon of acrasia and amoralism. For this reason some critics charge him with developing a false theory of moral motivation. In the article I present Hare's answer to these questions by dividing the discussion about motivation (...)
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  47. Terry L. Price (2008). Leadership Ethics: An Introduction. Cambridge University Press.
    Are leaders morally special? Is there something ethically distinctive about the relationship between leaders and followers? Should leaders do whatever it takes to achieve group goals? Leadership Ethics uses moral theory, as well as empirical research in psychology, to evaluate the reasons everyday leaders give to justify breaking the rules. Written for people without a background in philosophy, it introduces readers to the moral theories that are relevant to leadership ethics: relativism, amoralism, egoism, virtue ethics, social contract theory, situation (...)
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  48.  23
    Anita M. Superson (2009). The Moral Skeptic. Oxford University Press.
    Introduction -- The self-interest based contractarian response to the skeptic -- A feminist ethics response to the skeptic -- Deformed desires -- Self-interest versus morality -- The amoralist -- The motive skeptic -- The interdependency thesis.
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  49.  85
    Alejandro Bárcenas (2013). Han Fei's Enlightened Ruler. Asian Philosophy 23 (3):236-259.
    In this essay I revise, based on the notion of the ‘enlightened ruler’ or mingzhu and his critique of the literati of his time, the common belief that Han Fei was an amoralist and an advocate of tyranny. Instead, I will argue that his writings are dedicated to advising those who ought to rule in order to achieve the goal of a peaceful and stable society framed by laws in accordance with the dao.
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  50.  26
    Ping-Cheung Lo (2012). Warfare Ethics in Sunzi'sart of War?Historical Controversies and Contemporary Perspectives. Journal of Military Ethics 11 (2):114-135.
    Abstract Contemporary English and Chinese scholars alike have interpreted Sunzi's Art of War as advocating amoralism in warfare. That charge has a long history in pre-modern China and has not been fully refuted. This essay argues that the alleged amoral Machiavellianism is more appropriate for ancient Qin military thought than for Sunzi. The third chapter of Sunzi's treatise contains a distinctive moral perspective that cannot be found in the military thought of the state of Qin, which succeeded in defeating (...)
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