Search results for 'anomalous monism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Julie Yoo (2009). Anomalous Monism. In Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. OUP Oxford
    This is an overview of Davidson's theory of anomalous monism. Objections and replies are also detailed.
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  2. M. de Pinedo (2006). Anomalous Monism: Oscillating Between Dogmas. Synthese 148 (1):79-97.
    Davidson’s anomalous monism, his argument for the identity between mental and physical event tokens, has been frequently attacked, usually demanding a higher degree of physicalist commitment. My objection runs in the opposite direction: the identities inferred by Davidson from mental causation, the nomological character of causality and the anomaly of the mental are philosophically problematic and, more dramatically, incompatible with his famous argument against the third dogma of empiricism, the separation of content from conceptual scheme. Given the anomaly (...)
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  3.  72
    Mark Silcox, Mind and Anomalous Monism. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Anomalous Monism is a type of property dualism in the philosophy of mind. Property dualism combines the thesis that mental phenomena are strictly irreducible to physical phenomena with the denial that mind and body are discrete substances. For the anomalous monist, the plausibility of property dualism derives from the fact that although mental states, events and processes have genuine causal powers, the causal relationships that they enter into with physical entities cannot be explained by appeal to fundamental (...)
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  4.  14
    Jacopo Tagliabue (2014). Anomalous Monism in a Digital Universe. Minds and Machines 24 (4):377-388.
    Bermúdez identifies the “Interface Problem” as the central problem in the philosophy of psychology: how commonsensical psychological explanations can be integrated with lower-level explanations? In particular, since folk psychology is meant to provide causal explanations on a par with, say, neurobiological explanations, the question of how to understand the relation between the two layers arises naturally. Donald Davidson claimed that the interface problem is actually ill-posed and put forward his version of the “Autonomy Picture”, the view known as anomalous (...)
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  5. Anomalous Monism & Argument From Realization (2003). As a Problem for Physicalism, 168 Systematic; Denial of, 140, 141. In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic 359.
     
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  6. Anomalous Monism (1980). Colin McGinn. In Ned Block (ed.), Readings in Philosophy of Psychology. Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1--156.
     
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  7.  59
    Mehdi Nasrin (2004). Anomalous Monism in Carnap's Aufbau. Erkenntnis 60 (3):283-293.
    The Logical Reconstruction of the World (Aufbau) is oneof the major works of Rudolf Carnap in which he attempts to put an end to some of the traditional disputes in epistemology by using what he calls 'construction theory'. According to this theory, one or more constructional systems can be designed in which all the scientific and pre-scientific objects are logically made out of a limited number of basic elements. Carnap introduces some options for the basis of this system and chooses (...)
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  8. Ted Honderich (1982). The Argument for Anomalous Monism. Analysis 42 (January):59-64.
  9. Nancy Hancock Slonneger (2001). Anomalous Monism and Physical Closure. Journal of Philosophical Research 26 (January):175-185.
     
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  10.  67
    Neil Campbell (1998). Anomalous Monism and the Charge of Epiphenomenalism. Dialectica 52 (1):23-39.
    I begin with the view that the usual property‐based epiphenomenalist challenges to anomalous monism are unconvincing in light of Davidson's reluctance to analyze causation in terms of properties. I argue, however, that the challenges against Davidson do hold in the weaker sense that although mental events have causal efficacy the identification of an agent's reasons does not causally explain behaviour. I then show that in light of Davidson's commitment to psychophysical supervenience this does not constitute a serious problem (...)
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  11.  54
    Nick Zangwill (1993). Supervenience and Anomalous Monism: Blackburn on Davidson. Philosophical Studies 71 (1):59-79.
    In his paper "Supervenience Revisisted", Simon Blackburn redeployed his novel modal argument against moral realism as an argument against Donald Davidson's position of 'anomalous monism' in the philosophy of mind (Blackburn 1985).' I shall assess this redeployment. In the first part of this paper, I shall lay out Blackburn's argument. In the second and longer part I shall examine Davidson's denial of psychophysical laws in the light of this argument.
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  12.  90
    Rex Welshon (1999). Anomalous Monism and Epiphenomenalism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (1):103-120.
    I argue that, on plausible assumptions, anomalous entails monism epiphenomenalism of the mental. The plausible assumptions are (1) events are particulars; (2) causal relations are extensional; (3) mental properties are epiphrastic. A principle defender of anomalous monism, Donald Davidson, acknowledges that anomalous monism is committed to (1) and (2). I argue that it is committed to (3) as well. Given (1), (2), and (3), epiphenomenalism of the mental falls out immediately. Three attempts to salvage (...)
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  13.  16
    W. L. Stanton (1983). Supervenience and Psychophysical Law in Anomalous Monism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 (January):72-9.
    Supervenience entails psychophysical principles, but this is compatible with anomalous monism. On what constitutes a strict psychophysical law.
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  14. Louise M. Antony (1989). Anomalous Monism and the Problem of Explanatory Force. Philosophical Review 98 (April):153-87.
    Concern about two problems runs through the work of davidson: the problem of accounting for the "explanatory force" of rational explanations, and the problem posed for materialism by the apparent anomalousness of psychological events. davidson believes that his view of mental causation, imbedded in his theory of "anomalous monism," can provide satisfactory answers to both questions. however, it is argued in this paper that davidson's program contains a fundamental inconsistency; that his metaphysics, while grounding the doctrine of (...) monism, makes impossible a successful response to the problem of explanatory force in terms of a causal theory of action. (shrink)
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  15.  19
    Nancy Slonneger Hancock (2001). Anomalous Monism and Physical Closure. Journal of Philosophical Research 26:175-185.
    The principle of the anomalousness of the mental (PAM) is one of the most controversial principles in Donald Davidson’s argument for anomalous monism (AM). It states that there cannot be any laws (psychophysical or psychological) on the basis of which mental events can be predicted and explained. The argument against such psychological laws rests on the claim that psychology is not a comprehensive closed system (though physics is). Here I sketch the argument for AM, focusing on the role (...)
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  16.  24
    Andrea Zhok (2011). A Phenomenological Reading of Anomalous Monism. Husserl Studies 27 (3):227-256.
    The essay discusses Donald Davidson’s concept of anomalous monism in the framework of Husserlian phenomenology. It develops in four stages. Section 1 is devoted to a critical presentation of the argument for anomalous monism. Section 2 succinctly examines those Husserlian notions that best provide the ground for a discussion parallel to Davidson’s. In Sect. 3, the aporetic status of “mental causation” is analyzed by providing a genetic-phenomenological account of efficient causation. Section 4 draws some general conclusions (...)
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  17. Jim Edwards (1990). Explanation in Psychology: Functional Support for Anomalous Monism: Jim Edwards. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 27:45-64.
    Donald Davidson finds folk-psychological explanations anomalous due to the open-ended and constitutive conception of rationality which they employ, and yet monist because they invoke an ontology of only physical events. An eliminative materialist who thinks that the beliefs and desires of folk-psychology are mere pre-scientific fictions cannot accept these claims, but he could accept anomalous monism construed as an analysis , merely, of the ideological and ontological presumptions of folk-psychology. Of course, eliminative materialism is itself only a (...)
     
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  18.  7
    David Widerker (1992). Cartesian Intuitions and Anomalous Monism. Grazer Philosophische Studien 43:95-100.
    Recently, Colin McGinn has argued that Kripke's Cartesian argument against the mind-body identity thesis is not effective against anomalous monism. This paper attempts to show that the Cartesian has at his disposal an argument that is stronger than that formulated by Kripke, and one that cannot be rebutted by the anomalous monist in the way suggested by McGinn. The paper concludes with a suggestion as to the sort of identity theory one would have to subscribe to in (...)
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  19.  5
    Mehdi Nasrin (2004). Anomalous Monism in Carnap's. Erkenntnis:283-293.
    _The Logical Reconstruction of the World (Aufbau) is one of the major works of Rudolf Carnap in which he attempts to put an end to some of the traditional disputes in epistemology by using what he calls 'construction theory'. In this paper, I shall try to show that the traditional dualist-monist debates are among those disputes that the construction theory aims to get rid of. I will show that Carnap's position on the mind-body problem is really close to what Davidson (...)
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  20.  7
    M. De Pinedo (2006). Anomalous Monism: Oscillating Between Dogmas. Synthese 148 (1):79 - 97.
    Davidson's anomalous monism, his argument for the identity between mental and physical event tokens, has been frequently attacked, usually demanding a higher degree of physicalist commitment. My objection runs in the opposite direction: the identities inferred by Davidson from mental causation, the nomological character of causality and the anomaly of the mental are philosophically problematic and, more dramatically, incompatible with his famous argument against the third dogma of empiricism, the separation of content from conceptual scheme. Given the anomaly (...)
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  21.  4
    Paolo Leonardi (1999). Anomalous Monism. In M. De Caro (ed.), Interpretations and Causes. New Perspectives on Donald Davidson's Philosophy. Kluwer 285--117.
    In "The Measure of the Mental" (Davidson 1990), replying to a series of criticisms, that grow out of inadvertence or misunderstanding, Davidson has revisited his thesis concerning the physical and the mental, which he called "anomalous monism" (henceforth, AM). The thesis is subtle and elusive, as it is most often the case with Davidson: there is only one kind of event and state, which has a physical description (i.e., a description in physical terms) and may have a mental (...)
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  22. Jaegwon Kim (1993). Can Supervenience and "Non-Strict Laws" Save Anomalous Monism? In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press 19--26.
     
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  23. Colin McGinn (1977). Anomalous Monism and Kripke's Cartesian Intuitions. Analysis 2 (January):78-80.
    It is argued that kripke's objections to the identity theory can be met by token theories. the crucial point is that the existence of the required qualitative counterparts is consistent with the absence of psychophysical correlations.
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  24.  92
    Steven Yalowitz (1997). Rationality and the Argument for Anomalous Monism. Philosophical Studies 87 (3):235-58.
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  25.  87
    Neil Campbell (1997). The Standard Objection to Anomalous Monism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (3):373-82.
  26. Stephen J. Noren (1979). Anomalous Monism, Events, and 'the Mental'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 40 (September):64-74.
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  27. Peter Smith (1982). Bad News for Anomalous Monism? Analysis 42 (October):220-4.
  28.  85
    Ted Honderich (1983). Anomalous Monism: Reply to Smith. Analysis 43 (June):147-149.
  29.  87
    Peter Smith (1984). Anomalous Monism and Epiphenomenalism: A Reply to Honderich. Analysis 44 (2):83-86.
  30.  29
    Steven Yalowitz (1998). Causation in the Argument for Anomalous Monism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 28 (2):183-226.
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  31.  83
    Louise M. Antony (1994). The Inadequacy of Anomalous Monism as a Realist Theory of Mind. In Gerhard Preyer, F. Siebelt & A. Ulfig (eds.), Language, Mind, and Epistemology: On Donald Davidson's Philosophy. Dordrecht: Kluwer
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  32.  43
    Jaap van Brakel (2005). Supervenience and Anomalous Monism. Dialectica 53 (1):3-24.
    In this paper I argue that the intuitions which made Davidson and Hare use the word "supervenience," were not the same as those which underlie current supervenience discussions. There are crucial differences between, on the one hand, the concerns of Davidson and Hare, as I interpret them, and "received" theories of supervenience on the other. I suggest the use of the term by Davidson and Hare lends support to turning the concept upside down by giving priority to the Manifest Image (...)
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  33.  66
    Robert Klee (1992). Anomalous Monism, Ceteris Paribus, and Psychological Explanation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 43 (3):389-403.
    Davidson has argued that there can be no laws linking psychological states with physical states. I stress that this argument depends crucially on there being no purely psychological laws. All of this has to do with the holism and indeterminacy of the psychological domain. I criticize this claim by showing how Davidson misconstrues the role of ceteris paribus clauses in psychological explanation. Using a model of how ceteris paribus clauses operate derived from Lakatos, I argue that if Davidson is correct, (...)
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  34.  38
    Bruce Goldberg (1977). A Problem with Anomalous Monism. Philosophical Studies 32 (August):175-80.
    Davidson's argument equivocates on the term "physical": the physical events that mental events cause might not be subsumed under laws.
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  35.  33
    Walter Glannon (1997). Semicompatibilism and Anomalous Monism. Philosophical Papers 26 (3):211-231.
  36.  40
    Norman P. Melchert (1986). What's Wrong with Anomalous Monism. Journal of Philosophy 83 (May):265-74.
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  37.  38
    G. C. Goddu (1999). Is Anomalous Monism Inconsistent After All? Philosophia 27 (3-4):509-519.
  38.  21
    Pierfrancesco Basile (2005). Whitehead's Ontology and Davidson's Anomalous Monism. Process Studies 34 (1):3-9.
  39.  26
    Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (1992). Mental Events Again--Or What is Wrong with Anomalous Monism? Erkenntnis 36 (3):345-373.
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  40. Hagit Benbaji (2005). The Nomological Principle and the Argument for Anomalous Monism. Iyyun 54 (January):90-108.
     
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  41. Yunusa K. Salami (1991). Anomalous Monism and the Mind-Body Problem. Quest 5 (2):106-114.
     
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  42.  81
    Steven Yalowitz, Anomalous Monism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  43. Neil Campbell, Anomalous Monism.
    identity theory , usually attributed to J.J.C. Smart (Smart, 1959) and U.T. Place (Place, 1956), claimed that kinds of mental states are identical to kinds of brain states. Sensations of pain, for instance, were said to be identical to the firing of C-fibres or some such type of neurological state. According to this view, then, pain, conceived as a _kind_ of mental state, is said to be _reduced_ to a certain kind of neurological state. The reduction envisaged here was modelled (...)
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  44.  8
    J. Brakel (1999). Supervenience and Anomalous Monism. Dialectica 53 (1):3-24.
    SummaryIn this paper I argue that the intuitions which made Davidson and Hare use the word “supervenience,” were not the same as those which underlie current supervenience discussions. There are crucial differences between, on the one hand, the concerns of Davidson and Hare, as I interpret them, and “received” theories of supervenience on the other. I suggest the use of the term by Davidson and Hare lends support to turning the concept upside down by giving priority to the Manifest Image (...)
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  45. John McDowell (1985). Functionalism and Anomalous Monism. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Ernest LePore (eds.), Action and Events. Blackwell
  46. Brian P. McLaughlin (1985). Anomalous Monism and the Irreducibility of the Mental. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Ernest LePore (eds.), Action and Events. Blackwell
     
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  47.  11
    John Heil, Anomalous Monism.
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  48.  41
    Ted Honderich (1984). Donald Davidson's Anomalous Monism and the Champion of Mauve. Analysis 44.
  49. Dwayne Moore (2010). Reconciling Anomalous Monism with Scheme-Content Dualism: A Reply to Manuel de Pinedo. Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 29 (1):51-62.
     
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  50.  19
    Catherine Z. Elgin (1980). Indeterminacy, Underdetermination and the Anomalous Monism. Synthese 45:233-55.
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