Search results for 'anti-realism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. K. Brad Wray (2013). Success and Truth in the Realism/Anti-Realism Debate. Synthese 190 (9):1719-1729.
    I aim to clarify the relationship between the success of a theory and the truth of that theory. This has been a central issue in the debates between realists and anti-realists. Realists assume that success is a reliable indicator of truth, but the details about the respects in which success is a reliable indicator or test of truth have been largely left to our intuitions. Lewis (Synthese 129:371–380, 2001) provides a clear proposal of how success and truth might be connected, (...)
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  2.  72
    Stephen Biggs & Jessica M. Wilson (forthcoming). Carnap, the Necessary a Priori, and Metaphysical Anti-Realism. In Stephen Blatti & Sandra Lapointe (eds.), Ontology after Carnap.
    (August 2015 final pre-publication version!) In Meaning and Necessity (1947/1950), Carnap advances an intensional semantic framework on which modal claims are true in virtue of semantical rules alone, and so are a priori. In 'Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology' (1950), Carnap advances an epistemic-ontological framework on which metaphysical claims are either trivial or meaningless, since lacking any means of substantive confirmation. Carnap carried out these projects two decades before Kripke influentially argued, in Naming and Necessity (1972/1980), that some modal claims are (...)
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  3.  15
    Otávio Bueno (forthcoming). An Anti-Realist Account of the Application of Mathematics. Philosophical Studies:1-14.
    Mathematical concepts play at least three roles in the application of mathematics: an inferential role, a representational role, and an expressive role. In this paper, I argue that, despite what has often been alleged, platonists do not fully accommodate these features of the application of mathematics. At best, platonism provides partial ways of handling the issues. I then sketch an alternative, anti-realist account of the application of mathematics, and argue that this account manages to accommodate these features of the application (...)
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  4. Eric Dietrich & Julietta Rose (2009). The Paradox of Consciousness and the Realism/Anti-Realism Debate. Logos Architekton 3 (1):7-37.
    Beginning with the paradoxes of zombie twins, we present an argument that dualism is both true and false. We show that avoiding this contradiction is impossible. Our diagnosis is that consciousness itself engenders this contradiction by producing contradictory points of view. This result has a large effect on the realism/anti-realism debate, namely, it suggests that this debate is intractable, and furthermore, it explains why this debate is intractable. We close with some comments on what our results mean for metaphysics (...)
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  5. Feng Ye (2010). What Anti-Realism in Philosophy of Mathematics Must Offer. Synthese 175 (1):13 - 31.
    This article attempts to motivate a new approach to anti-realism (or nominalism) in the philosophy of mathematics. I will explore the strongest challenges to anti-realism, based on sympathetic interpretations of our intuitions that appear to support realism. I will argue that the current anti-realistic philosophies have not yet met these challenges, and that is why they cannot convince realists. Then, I will introduce a research project for a new, truly naturalistic, and completely scientific approach to philosophy of mathematics. (...)
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  6. Imogen Dickie (2010). Negation, Anti-Realism, and the Denial Defence. Philosophical Studies 150 (2):161 - 185.
    Here is one argument against realism. (1) Realists are committed to the classical rules for negation. But (2) legitimate rules of inference must conserve evidence. And (3) the classical rules for negation do not conserve evidence. So (4) realism is wrong. Most realists reject 2. But it has recently been argued that if we allow denied sentences as premisses and conclusions in inferences we will be able to reject 3. And this new argument against 3 generates a new response to (...)
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  7.  88
    Jesse M. Mulder (2012). What Generates the Realism/Anti-Realism Dichotomy? Philosophica 84 (1):53-84.
    The most basic divide amongst analytic metaphysicians separates realists from anti-realists. By examining certain characteristic and problematic features of these two families of views, we uncover their underlying metametaphysicalorientations, which turn out to coincide. This shared philosophical picture that underlies both the realist and the anti-realist project we call the Modern Picture. It rests on a crucial distinction between reality as it is for us and reality as it is in itself. It is argued that this distinction indeed generates the (...)
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  8.  85
    Antti Keskinen (2012). Quine on Objects: Realism or Anti-Realism? Theoria 78 (2):128-145.
    W. V. Quine describes himself as a “robust realist” about physical objects in the external world. This realism about objects is due to Quine's naturalism. On the other hand, Quine's naturalistic epistemology involves a conception of objects as posits that we introduce in our theories about the world. This conception of objects can be seen as anti-realist rather than realist. In this article, I discuss the questions whether there is a tension between Quine's realism and his epistemological conception of objects, (...)
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  9.  76
    W. J. Mander (2013). On Arguing for the Existence of God as a Synthesis Between Realism and Anti-Realism. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 74 (1):99-115.
    This article examines a somewhat neglected argument for the existence of God which appeals to the divine perspective as a way of reconciling the conflicting claims of realism and anti-realism. Six representative examples are set out (Berkeley, Ferrier, T. H. Green, Josiah Royce, Gordon Clark and Michael Dummett), reasons are considered why this argument has received less attention than it might, and a brief sketch given of the most promising way in which it might be developed.
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  10.  42
    Panu Raatikainen (2010). The Semantic Realism/Anti-Realism Dispute and Knowledge of Meanings. The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 5 (1):1-13.
    Here the relationship between understanding and knowledge of meaning is discussed from two different perspectives: that of Dummettian semantic anti-realism and that of the semantic externalism of Putnam and others. The question addressed is whether or not the truth of semantic externalism would undermine a central premise in one of Dummetts key arguments for anti-realism, insofar as Dummetts premise involves an assumption about the transparency of meaning and semantic externalism is often taken to undermine such transparency. Several notions (...)
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  11.  2
    Christoforos Bouzanis (forthcoming). Ontogenesis Versus Morphogenesis Towards an Anti-Realist Model of the Constitution of Society. Human Studies:1-31.
    This article firstly criticizes Margaret Archer’s Morphogenetic Approach for being indecisive about the realist notion of emergence it proposes as well as for her inadequate account of structural conditioning. It is argued that critical realists’ conceptualizations of emergence cannot but lead to inconsistencies about the adequate placement of agents as parts of emergent entities. The inconsistencies to which these conceptualizations lead necessitate an anti-realist model of the constitution of societies which takes into account that social structures are existentially dependent upon (...)
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  12.  62
    Mathieu Marion (2009). Radical Anti-Realism, Wittgenstein and the Length of Proofs. Synthese 171 (3):419 - 432.
    After sketching an argument for radical anti-realism that does not appeal to human limitations but polynomial-time computability in its definition of feasibility, I revisit an argument by Wittgenstein on the surveyability of proofs, and then examine the consequences of its application to the notion of canonical proof in contemporary proof-theoretical-semantics.
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  13.  50
    Robert G. Hudson (2009). Faint-Hearted Anti-Realism and Knowability. Philosophia 37 (3):511-523.
    It is often claimed that anti-realists are compelled to reject the inference of the knowability paradox, that there are no unknown truths. I call those anti-realists who feel so compelled ‘faint-hearted’, and argue in turn that anti-realists should affirm this inference, if it is to be consistent. A major part of my strategy in defending anti-realism is to formulate an anti-realist definition of truth according to which a statement is true only if it is verified by someone, at some (...)
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  14.  58
    Daniel Kodaj (2013). Open Future and Modal Anti-Realism. Philosophical Studies 168 (2):1-22.
    Open future is incompatible with realism about possible worlds. Since realistically conceived (concrete or abstract) possible worlds are maximal in the sense that they contain/represent the full history of a possible spacetime, past and future included, if such a world is actual now, the future is fully settled now, which rules out openness. The kind of metaphysical indeterminacy required for open future is incompatible with the kind of maximality which is built into the concept of possible worlds. The paper discusses (...)
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  15.  41
    Feng Ye (2007). Indispensability Argument and Anti-Realism in Philosophy of Mathematics. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 2 (4):614-628.
    The indispensability argument for abstract mathematical entities has been an important issue in the philosophy of mathematics. The argument relies on several assumptions. Some objections have been made against these assumptions, but there are several serious defects in these objections. Ameliorating these defects leads to a new anti-realistic philosophy of mathematics, mainly: first, in mathematical applications, what really exist and can be used as tools are not abstract mathematical entities, but our inner representations that we create in imagining abstract mathematical (...)
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  16.  56
    Karen Green (2005). The Context Principle and Dummett's Argument for Anti-Realism. Theoria 71 (2):92-117.
  17.  25
    Gabriele Usberti (2012). Anti-Realist Truth and Truth-Recognition. Topoi 31 (1):37-45.
    I will be concerned with the following question: are there compelling arguments for postulating a distinction between the truth of a statement and the recognition of its truth, when truth is conceived along the lines of a suitable generalization of the intuitionistic idea that it should be characterized as the existence of a proof? I will argue that the distinction is not necessary within the conceptual framework of intuitionism by replying to two arguments to the contrary, one based on the (...)
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  18.  10
    Y. E. Feng (2007). Indispensability Argument and Anti-Realism in Philosophy of Mathematics. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 2 (4):614-628.
  19. Thomas Pölzler (2015). Moral Disagreement, Anti-Realism, and the Worry About Overgeneralization. In Christian Kanzian, Josef Mitterer & Katharina Neges (eds.), Contributions to the 38th International Wittgenstein Symposium. 245-247.
    According to the classical argument from moral disagreement, the existence of widespread or persistent moral disagreement is best explained by, and thus inductively supports the view that there are no objective moral facts. One of the most common charges against this argument is that it “overgeneralizes”: it implausibly forces its proponents to deny the existence of objective facts about certain matters of physics, history, philosophy, etc. as well (companions in guilt), or even about its own conclusion or its own soundness (...)
     
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  20. Neil Tennant (1987). Anti-Realism and Logic: Truth as Eternal. Oxford University Press.
    Anti-realism is a doctrine about logic, language, and meaning that is based on the work of Wittgenstein and Frege. In this book, Professor Tennant clarifies and develops Dummett's arguments for anti-realism and ultimately advocates a radical reform of our logical practices.
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  21. Lee Braver (2007). A Thing of This World: A History of Continental Anti-Realism. Northwestern University Press.
    At a time when the analytic/continental split dominates contemporary philosophy, this ambitious work offers a careful and clear-minded way to bridge that divide. Combining conceptual rigor and clarity of prose with historical erudition, A Thing of This World shows how one of the standard issues of analytic philosophy—realism and anti-realism—has also been at the heart of continental philosophy. Using a framework derived from prominent analytic thinkers, Lee Braver traces the roots of anti-realism to Kant's idea that the mind (...)
     
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  22. Barry Maund (2006). The Illusory Theory of Colours: An Anti-Realist Theory. Dialectica 60 (3):245-268.
    Despite the fact about colour, that it is one of the most obvious and conspicuous features of the world, there is a vast number of different theories about colour, theories which seem to be proliferating rather than decreasing. How is it possible that there can be so much disagreement about what colours are? Is it possible that these different theorists are not talking about the same thing? Could it be that more than one of them is right? Indeed some theorists, (...)
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  23.  67
    Abraham Graber (2012). Medusa's Gaze Reflected: A Darwinian Dilemma for Anti-Realist Theories of Value. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (5):589-601.
    Abstract Street has argued that the meta-ethical realist is faced with a dilemma. Either evolutionary forces have had a distorting influenced on our ability to track moral properties or evolutionary forces influenced our beliefs in the direction of tracking moral properties. Street argues that if the realist accepts the first horn of the dilemma, the realist must accept implausible skepticism regarding moral beliefs. If the realist accepts the second horn of the dilemma, the realist owes an explanation of the fitness (...)
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  24. Jordan Dodd (2014). Realism and Anti-Realism About Experiences of Understanding. Philosophical Studies 168 (3):745-767.
    Strawson (1994) and Peacocke (1992) introduced thought experiments that show that it seems intuitive that there is, in some way, an experiential character to mental events of understanding. Some (e.g., Siewert 1998, 2011; Pitt 2004) try to explain these intuitions by saying that just as we have, say, headache experiences and visual experiences of blueness, so too we have experiences of understanding. Others (e.g., Prinz 2006, 2011; Tye 1996) propose that these intuitions can be explained without positing experiences of understanding. (...)
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  25. Jamin Asay (2012). A Truthmaking Account of Realism and Anti-Realism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (3):373-394.
    Realism and anti-realism about a domain of thought are metaphysical theses that involve the natures of the truthmakers in that domain and the truthmaking relation that is operant in the domain. Truthmaker theory is not exclusive territory for realists: anti-realist views are also best understood in terms of how they understand truthmakers and truthmaking. In particular, I explore the possibility of projectivist truthmaking, and show how it makes sense of quasi-realism. In addition to critically examining some extant accounts of (...)
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  26. David J. Chalmers (2009). Ontological Anti-Realism. In David John Chalmers, David Manley & Ryan Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford University Press
    The basic question of ontology is “What exists?”. The basic question of metaontology is: are there objective answers to the basic question of ontology? Here ontological realists say yes, and ontological anti-realists say no. (Compare: The basic question of ethics is “What is right?”. The basic question of metaethics is: are there objective answers to the basic question of ethics? Here moral realists say yes, and moral anti-realists say no.) For example, the ontologist may ask: Do numbers exist? The Platonist (...)
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  27.  98
    K. Brad Wray (2008). The Argument From Underconsideration as Grounds for Anti-Realism: A Defence. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 22 (3):317 – 326.
    The anti-realist argument from underconsideration focuses on the fact that, when scientists evaluate theories, they only ever consider a subset of the theories that can account for the available data. As a result, when scientists judge one theory to be superior to competitor theories, they are not warranted in drawing the conclusion that the superior theory is likely true with respect to what it says about unobservable entities and processes. I defend the argument from underconsideration from the objections of Peter (...)
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  28. Richard Joyce, Moral Anti-Realism.
    It might be expected that it would suffice for the entry for “ moral anti-realism” to contain only some links to other entries in this encyclopedia. It could contain a link to “ moral realism” and stipulate the negation of the view there described. Alternatively, it could have links to the entries “anti-realism” and “morality” and could stipulate the conjunction of the materials contained therein. The fact that neither of these approaches would be adequate—and, more strikingly, that following (...)
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  29.  22
    Jesús P. Zamora Bonilla (forthcoming). Realism Versus Anti-Realism: Philosophical Problem or Scientific Concern? Synthese:1-17.
    The decision whether to have a realist or an anti-realist attitude towards scientific hypotheses is interpreted in this paper as a choice that scientists themselves have to face in their work as scientists, rather than as a ‘philosophical’ problem. Scientists’ choices between realism and instrumentalism are interpreted in this paper with the help of two different conceptual tools: a deflationary semantics grounded in the inferentialist approach to linguistic practices developed by some authors, and an epistemic utility function that tries to (...)
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  30. Harald A. Wiltsche (2012). What is Wrong with Husserl's Scientific Anti-Realism? Inquiry 55 (2):105-130.
    Abstract Not much scholarly work is needed in order to stumble across many passages where Edmund Husserl seems to advocate an anti-realist attitude towards the natural sciences. This tendency, however, is not well-received within the secondary literature. While some commentators criticize Husserl for his alleged scientific anti-realism, others argue that Husserl's position is much more realist than the first impression indicates. It is against this background that I want to argue for the following theses: a) The basic outlook of (...)
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  31. Lucy Allais (2003). Kant's Transcendental Idealism and Contemporary Anti-Realism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 11 (4):369 – 392.
    This paper compares Kant's transcendental idealism with three main groups of contemporary anti-realism, associated with Wittgenstein, Putnam, and Dummett, respectively. The kind of anti-realism associated with Wittgenstein has it that there is no deep sense in which our concepts are answerable to reality. Associated with Putnam is the rejection of four main ideas: theory-independent reality, the idea of a uniquely true theory, a correspondence theory of truth, and bivalence. While there are superficial similarities between both views and Kant's, (...)
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  32. Greg Frost-Arnold (2014). Can the Pessimistic Induction Be Saved From Semantic Anti-Realism About Scientific Theory? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 65 (3):521-548.
    Scientific anti-realists who appeal to the pessimistic induction (PI) claim that the theoretical terms of past scientific theories often fail to refer to anything. But on standard views in philosophy of language, such reference failures prima facie lead to certain sentences being neither true nor false. Thus, if these standard views are correct, then the conclusion of the PI should be that significant chunks of current theories are truth-valueless. But that is semantic anti-realism about scientific discourse—a position most philosophers (...)
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  33.  17
    Hans Johann Glock, Wittgensteinian Anti-Anti Realism.
    Wittgenstein attached overarching personal importance to questions of moral value. Yet his written treatments of ethics are brief and obscure, while his views on language have had a strong, albeit intermittent and diffuse, influence on analytic moral philosophy. His remarks on ethics seem to be totally at odds with realist and cognitivist accounts. Both the Tractatus and 'A Lecture on Ethics' maintain that ethics transcends linguistic expression, and later remarks seem to point in the direction of a communal variant of (...)
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  34. Stuart Brock & Edwin Mares (2006). Realism and Anti-Realism. Routledge.
    There are a bewildering variety of ways the terms "realism" and "anti-realism" have been used in philosophy and furthermore the different uses of these terms are only loosely connected with one another. Rather than give a piecemeal map of this very diverse landscape, the authors focus on what they see as the core concept: realism about a particular domain is the view that there are facts or entities distinctive of that domain, and their existence and nature is in some (...)
     
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  35.  31
    N. Tennant (2000). Anti-Realist Aporias. Mind 109 (436):825--854.
    Using a quantified propositional logic involving the operators it is known that and it is possible to know that, we formalize various interesting philosophical claims involved in the realism debate. We set out inferential rules for the epistemic modalities, ranging from ones that are obviously analytic, to ones that are epistemologically more substantive or even controversial. Then we investigate various aporias for the realism debate. These are constructively inconsistent triads of claims from our list: a claim expressing some sort of (...)
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  36.  86
    Michael Dummett (1993). Realism and Anti-Realism. In ¸ Itedummett:Sl. 462--78.
    In this article the contemporary debate between realism and anti-realism in analytical philosophy is analyzed and discussed. It is claimed that the nature of the reference relation which holds between language and the world is central in this discussion which has both logical, semantical, and epistemological aspects. In a firstpart, A Tarski's (semantic) theory of truth is explained and it is shown how, amongst several theories of truth, Tarski's may be called a realist one. However, a Tarski-style semantics need (...)
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  37. Michael Devitt (1983). Dummett's Anti-Realism. Journal of Philosophy 80 (2):73-99.
    Devitt (1983) "Dummett's Anti-Realism".
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  38. Jeffrey Bell (2011). Between Realism and Anti-Realism: Deleuze and the Spinozist Tradition in Philosophy. Deleuze Studies 5 (1):1-17.
    In 1967, after a talk Deleuze gave to the Society of French Philosophy, Ferdinand Alquiéé expressed concern during the question and answer session that perhaps Deleuze was relying too heavily upon science and not giving adequate attention to questions and problems that Alquiéé took to be distinctively philosophical. Deleuze responded by agreeing with Alquiéé; moreover, he argued that his primary interest was precisely in the metaphysics science needs rather than in the science philosophy needs. This metaphysics, Deleuze argues, is to (...)
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  39.  40
    Roy T. Cook (2014). Should Anti-Realists Be Anti-Realists About Anti-Realism? Erkenntnis 79 (2):233-258.
    On the Dummettian understanding, anti-realism regarding a particular discourse amounts to (or at the very least, involves) a refusal to accept the determinacy of the subject matter of that discourse and a corresponding refusal to assert at least some instances of excluded middle (which can be understood as expressing this determinacy of subject matter). In short: one is an anti-realist about a discourse if and only if one accepts intuitionistic logic as correct for that discourse. On careful examination, the (...)
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  40.  70
    Patrick Kain (2006). Realism and Anti-Realism in Kant's Second Critique. Philosophy Compass 1 (5):449–465.
    This critical survey of recent work on Kant's doctrine of the fact of reason and his doctrine of the practical postulates (of freedom, God, and immortality) assesses the implications of these doctrines for the debate about realism and antirealism in Kant's moral philosophy. Section 1 briefly surveys some salient considerations from the first Critique and Groundwork. In section 2, I argue that recent work on the role, content, "factual" nature, and epistemic status of the fact of reason does not support (...)
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  41. Ruben Berrios, Anti-Realism and Aesthetic Cognition.
    Ruben Berrios Queen’s University Belfast Anti-realism and Aesthetic Cognition Abstract At the core of the debate between scientific realism and anti-realism is the question of the relation between scientific theory and the world. The realist possesses a mimetic conception of the relation between theory and reality. For the realist, scientific theories represent reality. The anti-realist, in contrast, seeks to understand the relations between theory and world in non-mimetic terms. We will examine Cartwright’s simulacrum account of explanation in order (...)
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  42. Christopher Norris (2001). 'Courage Not Under Fire': Realism, Anti-Realism, and the Epistemological Virtues. Inquiry 44 (3):269 – 290.
    This article offers a critical perspective on two lines of thought in recent epistemology and philosophy of science, namely Michael Dummett?s anti-realist approach to issues of truth, meaning, and knowledge and Bas van Fraassen?s influential programme of?constructive empiricism?. While not denying the salient differences between them it shows how they converge on a sceptical outlook concerning the realist claim that truth might always transcend the restrictions of some given state of knowledge. The author puts the case that such sceptical arguments, (...)
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  43.  39
    Wolfram Hinzen (2000). Anti-Realist Semantics. Erkenntnis 52 (3):281-311.
    I argue that the implementation of theDummettian program of an ``anti-realist'' semanticsrequires quite different conceptions of the technicalmeaning-theoretic terms used than those presupposed byDummett. Starting from obvious incoherences in anattempt to conceive truth conditions as assertibilityconditions, I argue that for anti-realist purposesnon-epistemic semantic notions are more usefully kept apart from epistemic ones rather than beingreduced to them. Embedding an anti-realist theory ofmeaning in Martin-Löf's Intuitionistic Type Theory(ITT) takes care, however, of many notorious problemsthat have arisen in trying to specify suitableintuitionistic (...)
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  44. Paul Livingston (2012). Lee Braver: A Thing of This World: A History of Continental Anti-Realism. [REVIEW] Continental Philosophy Review 45 (1):161-170.
    Lee Braver: A thing of this world: A history of continental anti-realism Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-10 DOI 10.1007/s11007-011-9210-9 Authors Paul Livingston, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM, USA Journal Continental Philosophy Review Online ISSN 1573-1103 Print ISSN 1387-2842.
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  45.  56
    Arthur Fine (1984). And Not Anti-Realism Either. Noûs 18 (1):51-65.
    This paper develops lines of criticism directed at two currently popular versions of anti-realism: the putnam-rorty-kuhn version that is centered on an acceptance theory of truth, and the van fraassen version that is centered on empiricist strictures over warranted beliefs. the paper continues by elaborating and extending a stance, called "the natural ontological attitude", that is neither realist nor anti-realist.
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  46. Martin Seel (2008). Realism and Anti-Realism in Film Theory. Critical Horizons 9 (2):157-175.
    This essay argues that film as a medium breaks through the clearly delineated boundaries between realism and anti-realism that have been established by film theory. Film itself is basically indifferent to each. As an alternative to both, I put forward a thesis of indeterminism, which argues that films engender a unique event of sight and sound that does not have to be perceived to be a real event or an illusion of such an event.
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  47.  4
    Caroline Schaffalitzky de Muckadell (2016). Wittgenstein’s Critique of Frazer and Realism/Anti-Realism Concerning Religion. In Aidan Seery, Josef G. F. Rothhaupt & Lars Albinus (eds.), Wittgenstein’s Remarks on Frazer: The Text and the Matter. De Gruyter 403-420.
    This article addresses the impact the reception of Wittgenstein’s works has had on philosophy of religion and the study of religion. Wittgenstein’s critique of Frazer has inspired the current fundamental dichotomy between two views on religious belief: a cognitivist, realist interpretation and an expressivist, anti-realist interpretation. Wittgenstein’s account provides an interpretation of religious language that makes sense of existential and non-literal meaning of religious practices and cognitive content, and his account has become a stepping stone for a tradition in philosophy (...)
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  48.  88
    Brian Lightbody (2010). Nietzsche, Perspectivism, Anti-Realism: An Inconsistent Triad. The European Legacy 15 (4):425-438.
    “Philosophical perspectivism” is surely one of Nietzsche's most important insights regarding the limits of human knowledge. However, the perspectivist thesis combined with a minimal realist metaphysical position produces what Brian Leiter calls the 'Received View': an epistemologically incoherent misinterpretation of Nietzsche which pervades the secondary literature. In order to salvage the thesis of perspectivism, Leiter argues that we must commit Nietzsche to an anti-realist metaphysical position. I argue that Leiter's proposed solution is (1) epistemically weak, and (2) inconsistent with much (...)
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    Vasilis Politis (2001). Anti-Realist Interpretations of Plato: Paul Natorp. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 9 (1):47 – 62.
    The paper considers Paul Natorp's Kantian reading of Plato's theory of ideas, as developed in his monumental work, Platos Ideenlehre, eine Einführung in den Idealismus (1903, 1921). Central to Natrop's reading are, I argue, the following two claims: (1) Plato's ideas are laws, not things; and (2) Plato's theory of ideas in the first instance a theory about the possibility and nature of thought - in particular cognitive and indeed scientific or explanatory thought - and only as a consequence is (...)
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    Raymond D. Bradley, How to Lose Your Grip On Reality? An Attack On Anti-Realism in Quantum Theory.
    [Abstract: Anti-realism – the denial that reality exists apart from our conceptions of it – is rampant, not just among Postmodernists and other literati, but also among many of the leading spokesmen of orthodox quantum theory – from Born, Bohr, and Heisenberg to Wheeler and Wigner. Undoubtedly they've done good physics. Why, then, do they indulge in bad metaphysics? This paper offers some answers.].
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