ABSTRACT This paper investigates the concept of wrongful disability. That concept suggests that parents are morally obligated to prevent the genetic transmission of certain conditions and so, if they do not, any resulting disability is ‘wrongful’. In their book From Chance to Choice, Buchanan, Brock, Daniels and Wikler defend the concept of wrongful disability using the principle of avoidability via substitution. That principle is scrutinised here. It is argued that the idea of avoidability via substitution is (...) both conceptually problematic and rather insensitive. Instead, it is suggested that the question of whether or not bringing a particular disability about is wrongful does not simply hinge on whether or not substitution takes place. Rather, it involves an evaluation of parental aspirations and responsibilities. It is argued that the desire not to be responsible for creating challenges for others that lie outside what is perceived to be an acceptable range provides a justification for termination of pregnancy on the grounds of projected disability that neither commits one to a wrongful life claim, nor requires that one substitute a non‐disabled child instead. The ramifications of such an approach are explored. The paper concludes by suggesting that the question of what is considered to be an acceptable range of human capability is an increasingly important one. It is argued that, when addressing that question, we should be acutely aware of the social context that may go some way to define what we consider to be an acceptable range. (shrink)

Being a substitute in sport appears to contradict the rationale behind being involved in that sport, especially in those sports whereby substitutes frequently remain unused or are brought on to the field of play for the final moments of that game. For the coach or manager, substitutes function as a way to improve the team achieving a particular end, namely to win the game; whether to replace an injured or tired player, to change a team’s structure or tactics, to complete (...) a specialised manoeuvre (such as goal kicking in American football or a short corner in hockey), or to run down the clock. Whether a substitute is afforded an opportunity of playing the game appears to be directed by others; arguably if one had a choice in the matter one would chose to be on the field of play rather than off it. Nevertheless, the Existentialist position is that our situation is always inexorably one that is freely chosen. To argue that one has not freely chosen one’s position is to be ‘inauthentic’. Furthermore, to conceptualise one’s manifestation and to be treated by others as a thing ‘in-itself’ – such as a substitute - is to fall into ‘bad faith’. Culbertson (1) has already argued that elite competitive sport is an arena which promotes rather than avoids bad faith due to its constituent factors. Culbertson’s frame of reference primarily applied to sporting events that involve individuals competing in co-active, parallel competition - such as athletics, swimming or weightlifting - whereby bad faith is generated via a tacit acceptance of ever improving and quantifiable performance. The purpose of this paper is a continuation of such an enquiry but with a redirection of focus away from parallel competition byindividuals, towards team competitions which are, by nature, less concerned with an unremitting contest against time, distance or some other measurable concept. This paper sets out to examine the nature of the substitute in sport, who appears to be equally liable to find herself being ‘inauthentic’ and/or in ‘bad-faith’. It attempts to consider the nature of these concepts and offer direction as to how substitutes can attempt to realize the Existential ideal. (shrink)

We present the system SUBSEXPL used for simulating and comparing explicit substitutions calculi. The system allows the manipulation of expressions of the λ-calculus and of three different styles of explicit substitutions: the λσ, the λse and the suspension calculus. A variation of the suspension calculus, which allows for combination of steps of β-contraction is included too. Implementations of the η-reduction are provided for each style. Other explicit substitutions calculi can be easily incorporated into the system due to its modular structure. (...) The uses of the system include: the visualization of the contractions of the λ-calculus in de Bruijn notation, and of guided one-step reductions as well as normalization via each of the associated substitution calculi. Many useful facilities are included: reductions can be easily recorded as text files, LATEX outputs can be generated and several examples for dealing with arithmetic operations and computational operators such as conditionals and repetitions in the λ-calculus are available. The system can be executed over Emacs using the x-symbol mode in such a way that λ-terms and terms of the explicit substitutions calculi are represented in its natural syntax avoiding the necessity of repeatedly generating LATEX outputs. The system has been of great help for systematically comparing explicit substitutions calculi, as well as for understanding properties of explicit substitutions such as the Preservation of Strong Normalization. In addition, it has been used for teaching basic properties of the λ-calculus such as: computational adequacy, the usefulness of de Bruijn's notation and of making explicit substitutions in real implementations. (shrink)

ABSTRACTAvoidance towards innocuous cues is a key diagnostic criterion across anxiety-related disorders. Importantly, the most effective intervention for anxiety-related disorders, exposure therapy with response prevention, sometimes does not prevent the relapse of anxiety's symptomatology. We tested whether extinction effects, the experimental proxy of exposure, are enhanced by increasing the discrepancy between the prediction of an unpleasant event happening, and the actual event. Forty-eight individuals first saw pictures of three stimuli. Two pictures were followed by a shock and one was not. (...) Next, participants learned to avoid the US by pressing a computer key. An extinction and response prevention procedure followed. In the first part of it, participants saw unreinforced presentations of all CSs. In the second part, the single group saw unreinforced presentations of the CSA and CS-. The compound group encountered compound unreinforced prese... (shrink)

There is an increased interest in how excessive avoidance can diminish. Avoidance reduction is typically tested by using Extinction with Response Prevention protocols, where feared stimuli a...

The \-substitution method is a technique for giving consistency proofs for theories of arithmetic. We use this technique to give a proof of the consistency of the impredicative theory \ using a variant of the cut-elimination formalism introduced by Mints.

Introductory students regularly endorse naïve skepticism—unsupported or uncritical doubt about the existence and universality of truth—for a variety of reasons. Though some of the reasons for students’ skepticism can be traced back to the student—for example, a desire to avoid engaging with controversial material or a desire to avoid offense—naïve skepticism is also the result of how introductory courses are taught, deemphasizing truth to promote students’ abilities to develop basic disciplinary skills. While this strategy has a number of pedagogical benefits, (...) it prevents students in early stages of intellectual development from understanding truth as a threshold concept. Using philosophy as a case study, I argue that we can make progress against naïve skepticism by clearly discussing how metadisciplinary aims differ at the disciplinary and course levels in a way that is meaningful, reinforced, and accessible. (shrink)

The potential of using personalized Large Language Models (LLMs) or “generative AI” (GenAI) to enhance productivity in academic research, as highlighted by Porsdam Mann and colleagues (Porsdam Mann...

We apply Mints’ technique for proving the termination of the epsilon substitution method via cut-elimination to the system of Peano Arithmetic with Transfinite Induction given by Arai.

A primary goal of clinical practice is to respect patient autonomy. To promote this goal for patients who have lost the ability to make their own decisions, commentators recommend that surrogates make their treatment decisions based on the substituted judgment standard. This standard is commonly interpreted as directing surrogates to make the decision the patient would have made in the circumstances, if the patient were competent. However, recent commentators have argued that this approach—attempting to make the decision the patient would (...) have made if competent—is theoretically problematic, practically infeasible, and ignores the interests of the patient9s family and loved ones. These commentators conclude that the substituted judgment standard should be revised significantly, or abandoned altogether. While this response would avoid the cited problems, it also would require substantial changes to clinical practice and would raise significant problems of its own. The present paper thus considers the possibility that the criticisms do not point to problems with the substituted judgment standard itself; instead, they point to problems with the way it is most commonly interpreted. This analysis suggests that the substituted judgment standard need not be dramatically revised or abandoned. Instead, it should be interpreted in a way that effectively promotes respect for the autonomy of incompetent patients. The ‘endorsed life’ interpretation described here helps clinicians and surrogates to achieve this important goal. To clarify this approach, we explain how it differs from three other recently proposed alternatives to the standard interpretation of the substituted judgment standard. (shrink)

Substituted judgment has increasingly become the accepted standard for rendering decisions for incapacitated adults in the USA. A broad exception exists with regard to patients with diminished capacity secondary to depressive disorders, as such patients’ previous wishes are generally not honoured when seeking to turn down life-preserving care or pursue aid-in-dying. The result is that physicians often force involuntary treatment on patients with poor medical prognoses and/or low quality of life as a result of their depressive symptoms when similarly situated (...) incapacitated patients without such depressive symptoms would have their previous wishes honoured via substituted judgment. This commentary argues for reconsidering this approach and for using a substituted judgment standard for a subset of EMP/LQL patients seeking death. (shrink)

In this essay we argue for the possibility to describe the co-presence of species in a community as a consortium built by acoustic codes, using mainly the examples of bird choruses. In this particular case, the consortium is maintained via the sound-tope that different bird species create by singing in a chorus. More generally, the formation of acoustic codes as well as cohesive communicative systems (the consortia) can be seen as a result of plastic adaptational behaviour of the specimen who (...) can solve and avoid conflicts both with conspecifics and with other species in the vicinity. Thus, sign-relations appear to resolve potential conflicts, and as a foundation for symbiotic aggregations. The spatio-temporal configuration of consortia—their chronotope—includes several eco-fields as respective to different functions of the participating organisms. Biological study is combined with a semiotic approach that, as we suggest, should be more often used together to effectively describe ecological processes. (shrink)

The task of this paper is to clarify the status and implications of Levinas's insistence on the necessity of subjectivity to the ethical relation. Focusing in particular on the discussion of substitution in Otherwise than Being, it is argued that the description of subjectivity as substitution enables Levinas to articulate the necessity of the subject to the approach of the other in a manner which avoids the transcendental character which such claims to necessity usually embody. This argument proceeds (...) from an initial characterization of substitution within the constellation of themes pursued by Levinas in Otherwise than Being to a detailed examination of the first four sections of the Substitution chapter. The essay concludes by noting the unity of the ethical exceeding of the transcendental character of subjectivity with the project which animates Levinas's work from its beginnings: the exceeding of the ontological by the ethical. (shrink)

Philosophers of language traditionally take it that anti-substitution intuitions teach us about the content of belief reports. Jennifer Saul [1997, 2002 (with David Braun), 2007] challenges this lesson. Here I offer a response to Saul’s challenge. In the first two sections of the article, I present a common sense justification for drawing conclusions about content from anti-substitution intuitions. Then, in Sect. 3, I outline Saul’s challenge—what she calls ‘the Enlightenment Problem’. Finally, in Sect. 4, I argue that Saul’s (...) challenge does not undermine the common sense justification presented in Sects. 1 and 2. I avoid the challenge by arguing that anti-substitution intuitions are not directly sensitive to the content of the sentences that produce them, but rather to the possibility that one could have distinct ways of thinking about an object. (shrink)

Holistic accounts of the natural environment in environmental ethics fail to stress the distinction between the concepts of comnlunity and organism. Aldo Leopold’s “Land Ethic” adds to this confusion, for it can be interpreted as promoting either a community or an organic model of nature. The difference between the two concepts lies in the degree of autonomy possessed by constituent entities within the holistic system. Members within a community are autonomous, while the parts of an organism are not. Different moral (...) conclusions and environmental policies may result from this theoretical distinction. Treating natural entities as parts of an organism downgrades their intrinsic value as individual natural beings, since the only relevant moral criterion in an organic environmental ethic is the instrumental value that each natural entity has for the system. This ethic allows instances of the “substitution problem”-the replacement of one entity in an ecosystem by another provided that the overall functioning of the system is notharmed. However, since substitution violates environmentalist principles, for example, calling for respect for the integrity of the entities in a natural system, an organic environmental ethic must be rejected. A community model focuses on both the functional value and the autonomous intrinsie value of natural entities in a system. A community environmental ethic thus avoids the substitution problem. (shrink)

The major goal of this paper is to argue that a well known argument to overturn the principle that coextensive predicates substitute in any statement without alteration of truth value can be avoided - even in the simplest of languages. Apparently this can be done nonartificially only by expanding the universe with nonexisting objects. It is not proved that the principle of substitution salva veritate holds in Meinongian model structures, but in fact it does - as any completeness proof (...) of free logics based on inner domain-outer domain semantics will show. I f - as some have suggested - Meinong's views are compatible with the attitudes of a complete extensionalist, and he subscribed to the outlined modern theory of predication, there is no escape from Außersein. That may seem terribly obvious, but in the light of the development of free logics, more than mere conviction is needed. This dogmatic intuition is supplanted with some strong inclining reasons. (shrink)

The major goal of this paper is to argue that a well known argument to overturn the principle that coextensive predicates substitute in any statement without alteration of truth value can be avoided - even in the simplest of languages. Apparently this can be done nonartificially only by expanding the universe with nonexisting objects. It is not proved that the principle of substitution salva veritate holds in Meinongian model structures, but in fact it does - as any completeness proof (...) of free logics based on inner domain-outer domain semantics will show. I f - as some have suggested - Meinong's views are compatible with the attitudes of a complete extensionalist, and he subscribed to the outlined modern theory of predication, there is no escape from Außersein. That may seem terribly obvious, but in the light of the development of free logics, more than mere conviction is needed. This dogmatic intuition is supplanted with some strong inclining reasons. (shrink)

Once upon a time, coherentism was the dominant response to the regress problem in epistemology, but in recent decades the view has fallen into disrepute: now almost everyone is a foundationalist (with a few infinitists sprinkled here and there). In this paper, I sketch a new way of thinking about coherentism, and show how it avoids many of the problems often thought fatal for the view, including the isolation objection, worries over circularity, and concerns that the concept of coherence is (...) too vague or metaphorical for serious theoretical use. The key to my approach is to take a familiar tool from discussions of the regress problem -- namely, directed graphs depicting the support relations between beliefs -- and to use that tool in a more sophisticated manner than it is standardly employed. (shrink)

We report on progress and an unsolved problem in our attempt to obtain a clear rationale for relevance logic via semantic decomposition trees. Suitable decomposition rules, constrained by a natural parity condition, generate a set of directly acceptable formulae that contains all axioms of the well-known system R, is closed under substitution and conjunction, satisfies the letter-sharing condition, but is not closed under detachment. To extend it, a natural recursion is built into the procedure for constructing decomposition trees. The (...) resulting set of acceptable formulae has many attractive features, but it remains an open question whether it continues to satisfy the crucial letter-sharing condition. (shrink)

Holistic accounts of the natural environment in environmental ethics fail to stress the distinction between the concepts of comnlunity and organism. Aldo Leopold’s “Land Ethic” adds to this confusion, for it can be interpreted as promoting either a community or an organic model of nature. The difference between the two concepts lies in the degree of autonomy possessed by constituent entities within the holistic system. Members within a community are autonomous, while the parts of an organism are not. Different moral (...) conclusions and environmental policies may result from this theoretical distinction. Treating natural entities as parts of an organism downgrades their intrinsic value as individual natural beings, since the only relevant moral criterion in an organic environmental ethic is the instrumental value that each natural entity has for the system. This ethic allows instances of the “substitution problem”-the replacement of one entity in an ecosystem by another provided that the overall functioning of the system is notharmed. However, since substitution violates environmentalist principles, for example, calling for respect for the integrity of the entities in a natural system, an organic environmental ethic must be rejected. A community model focuses on both the functional value and the autonomous intrinsie value of natural entities in a system. A community environmental ethic thus avoids the substitution problem. (shrink)

Sensory substitution devices (SSDs) aim to compensate for the loss of a sensory modality, typically vision, by converting information from the lost modality into stimuli in a remaining modality. “The vOICe” is a visual-to-auditory SSD which encodes images taken by a camera worn by the user into “soundscapes” such that experienced users can extract information about their surroundings. Here we investigated how much detail was resolvable during the early induction stages by testing the acuity of blindfolded sighted, naïve vOICe (...) users. Initial performance was well above chance. Participants who took the test twice as a form of minimal training showed a marked improvement on the second test. Acuity was slightly but not significantly impaired when participants wore a camera and judged letter orientations “live”. A positive correlation was found between participants' musical training and their acuity. The relationship between auditory expertise via musical training and the lack of a relationship with visual imagery, suggests that early use of a SSD draws primarily on the mechanisms of the sensory modality being used rather than the one being substituted. If vision is lost, audition represents the sensory channel of highest bandwidth of those remaining. The level of acuity found here, and the fact it was achieved with very little experience in sensory substitution by naïve users is promising. (shrink)

It is often loosely said that Ramsey The foundations of mathematics and other logical essays, Routledge and Kegan Paul, Abingdon, pp 156–198, 1931) and de Finetti Studies in subjective probability, Kreiger Publishing, Huntington, 1937) proved that if your credences are inconsistent, then you will be willing to accept a Dutch Book, a wager portfolio that is sure to result in a loss. Of course, their theorems are true, but the claim about acceptance of Dutch Books assumes a particular method of (...) calculating expected utilities given the inconsistent credences. I will argue that there are better ways of calculating expected utilities given a potentially inconsistent credence assignment, and that for a large class of credences—a class that includes many inconsistent examples—these ways are immune to Dutch Books and single-shot domination failures. The crucial move is to replace Finite Additivity with Monotonicity, then \\le P\)) and then calculate expected utilities for positive U via the formula \\, dy\). This shows that Dutch Book arguments for probabilism, the thesis that one’s credences should be consistent, do not establish their conclusion. Finally, I will consider a modified argument based on multi-step domination failure that does better, but nonetheless is not as compelling as the Dutch Book arguments appeared to be. (shrink)

Seidenfeld (Seidenfeld, T. [1988a], Decision theory without 'Independence' or without 'Ordering', Economics and Philosophy 4: 267-290) gave an argument for Independence based on a supposition that admissibility of a sequential option is preserved under substitution of indifferents at choice nodes (S). To avoid a natural complaint that (S) begs the question against a critic of Independence, he provided an independent proof of (S) in his (Seidenfeld, T. [1988b], Rejoinder [to Hammond and McClennen], Economics and Philosophy 4: 309-315). In reply (...) to my (Rabinowicz, W. [1995], To have one's cake and eat it too: Sequential choice and expected-utility violations, The Journal of Philosophy 92: 586-620), in which I argue that the proof is invalid, Seidenfeld (Seidenfeld, T. [2000], Substitution of indifferent options at choice nodes and admissibility: A reply to Rabinowicz, Theory and Decision 48: 305–310 this issue) submits that I fail to give due consideration to one of the underlying assumptions of his derivation: it is meant to apply only to those cases in which the agent's preferences are stable throughout the sequential decision process. The purpose of this note is to clarify the notion of preference stability so as meet this objection. (shrink)

Peter van Inwagen has long claimed that he doesn’t understand substitutional quantification and that the notion is, in fact, meaningless. Van Inwagen identifies the source of his bewilderment as an inability to understand the proposition expressed by a simple sentence like “,” where “$\Sigma$” is the existential quantifier understood substitutionally. I should think that the proposition expressed by this sentence is the same as that expressed by “.” So what’s the problem? The problem, I suggest, is that van Inwagen takes (...) traditional existential quantification to be ontologically committing and substitutional quantification to be ontologically noncommitting, which requires that the two quantifiers have different meanings—but no different meaning for the substitutional quantifier is forthcoming. What van Inwagen fails to appreciate is that substitutional quantification is directed at a criterion of ontological commitment, namely, W. V. O. Quine’s, which is quite different from van Inwagen’s criterion. Substitutional quantification successfully avoids the commitments Quine’s criterion would engender but has the same commitments as existential quantification given van Inwagen’s criterion. The question, then, is whether the existential quantifier is ontologically committing, as van Inwagen believes. The answer to that question will depend on whether the ordinary language “there is/are,” which is codified by the existential quantifier, is ontologically committing. There are good reasons to doubt that it is. (shrink)

The laws and ethical guidelines governing decision making for incompetent patients evolved from controversies in which family members refused life-sustaining interventions. These cases led to a consensus that advance directives to limit interventions should be respected and that a surrogate designated by the patient or specified by statute could refuse interventions, even when other relatives disagreed. Surrogate decision-making statutes and ethical principles about respect for delegated autonomy promote an active role for family members or other surrogates in medical decisions for (...) incompetent patients. Inviting surrogates to participate actively in medical decisions recognizes the importance of the patient's personal community and assures that decisions will reflect the patient's own preferences and values.The standard approach to decisions for incompetent adults gives advance directives priority over a surrogate's substituted judgment, which in turn has priority over assessments of the patient's best interest. A patient may express advance directives by appointing a proxy, stating specific preferences, or articulating general values. We use case examples to illustrate the limitations of all three types of advance directives. (shrink)

The laws and ethical guidelines governing decision making for incompetent patients evolved from controversies in which family members refused life-sustaining interventions. These cases led to a consensus that advance directives to limit interventions should be respected and that a surrogate designated by the patient or specified by statute could refuse interventions, even when other relatives disagreed. Surrogate decision-making statutes and ethical principles about respect for delegated autonomy promote an active role for family members or other surrogates in medical decisions for (...) incompetent patients. Inviting surrogates to participate actively in medical decisions recognizes the importance of the patient's personal community and assures that decisions will reflect the patient's own preferences and values.The standard approach to decisions for incompetent adults gives advance directives priority over a surrogate's substituted judgment, which in turn has priority over assessments of the patient's best interest. A patient may express advance directives by appointing a proxy, stating specific preferences, or articulating general values. We use case examples to illustrate the limitations of all three types of advance directives. (shrink)

SummaryThe recent atonement literature reveals a growing trend accepting the thesis that the Reformer’s doctrine just is the biblical doctrine of penal substitution. This is the claim of William Lane Craig in his recent works on the atonement. In the present article, we challenge these set of claims in Craig’s recent works and advance an alternative theory of the atonement that has some significant footing in the Reformed theological tradition, most notably reflected in the theologian, William Ames. Finally, we (...) lay out several reasons why Craig’s doctrine of the atonement fails to capture the biblical data on the atonement and fails to avoid the legal fiction problem parasitic on most, if not all, accounts of penal substitution. (shrink)

In current philosophy of mind, there is lively debate over whether emotions, moods, and other affects can extend to comprise elements beyond one’s organismic boundaries. At the same time, there has been growing interest in the nature and significance of so-called existential feelings, which, as the term suggests, are feelings of one’s overall being in the world. In this article, I bring these two strands of investigation together to ask: Can the material underpinnings of existential feelings extend beyond one’s skull (...) and skin? To begin, I introduce and adopt a componential-systemic view of extended affectivity. In doing so, I specify the vehicle externalist criteria for extension employed in my analysis. I then define what existential feelings are and pinpoint several key issues in their potential extension. More specifically, I identify sensorimotor ‘know-how’ as a possibly extending component of existential feeling and posit it as the fulcrum of my argument. Finally, I move on to consider the extension of existential feeling via sensory substitution, especially through so-called Tactile Visual Sensory Substitution (TVSS) devices. Informed by both philosophical and empirical studies, I argue that, under certain conditions, (a) the agent’s implicit sensorimotor processing and a TVSS device can become coupled into a new systemic whole, which in turn (b) reconfigures the material underpinnings of the agent’s pre-intentional world-experience. This, I conclude, counts as a cogent case for extended existential feeling. (shrink)

Highlights: -/- • Breastfeeding and breastfeeding support can contribute to mitigating climate change. • Achieving global nutrition targets will save more emissions than fuel-switching. • Breastfeeding support programmes support a just transition. • This work can support the expansion of mitigation options in energy system models. -/- Abstract: -/- Renewable gas has been proposed as a solution to decarbonise industrial processes, specifically heat demand. As part of this effort, the breast-milk substitutes industry is proposing to use renewable gas as a (...) substitute for fossil natural gas. However, decarbonising the industrial processing of breast-milk substitutes can increase social license for these products, potentially undermining breastfeeding. World Health Organisation nutrition targets aim to increase exclusive breastfeeding to at least 50% globally by 2025 to improve maternal, infant, and young child health and nutrition. This target will have implications for the energy transition. A weakness of existing energy models is that demands for end-use products such as breast-milk substitutes are typically not considered explicitly. This paper develops an analytical framework for explicitly representing infant feeding methods in energy systems models. We compare the emissions saved in Ireland from decarbonising the industrial processing of breast-milk substitutes with renewable gas with the emissions saved by an increase in exclusive breastfeeding to 50% in both Ireland and a key export market, China. We demonstrate that the emissions saved from achieving the minimum global breastfeeding target are greater than when renewable gas is used to displace natural gas in the production of breast-milk substitutes in Ireland. We discuss the decarbonisation of breast-milk substitutes in relation to the principle of justice as non-maleficence, a principle based on the commitment to avoid harm, a novel application of a principle of justice. We conclude that breastfeeding support can be considered a demand-side measure for mitigating climate change by reducing the demand for energy services to produce breast-milk substitutes. A key recommendation is to position breastfeeding support as both a public health and a climate justice issue that is relevant for a just transition. The framework developed for this paper could be applied to support the inclusion of a wider range of mitigation options with social justice outcomes in energy system models. [Open access]. (shrink)

Mark Wilson argues that the standard categorizations of "Theory T thinking"— logic-centered conceptions of scientific organization (canonized via logical empiricists in the mid-twentieth century)—dampens the understanding and appreciation of those strategic subtleties working within science. By "Theory T thinking," we mean to describe the simplistic methodology in which mathematical science allegedly supplies ‘processes’ that parallel nature's own in a tidily isomorphic fashion, wherein "Theory T’s" feigned rigor and methodological dogmas advance inadequate discrimination that fails to distinguish between explanatory structures that (...) are architecturally distinct. One of Wilson's main goals is to reverse such premature exclusions and, thus, early on Wilson returns to John Locke's original physical concerns regarding material science and the congeries of descriptive concern insofar as capturing varied phenomena (i.e., cohesion, elasticity, fracture, and the transmission of coherent work) encountered amongst ordinary solids like wood and steel are concerned. Of course, Wilson methodologically updates such a purview by appealing to multiscalar techniques of modern computing, drawing from Robert Batterman's work on the greediness of scales and Jim Woodward's insights on causation. (shrink)

This paper takes up Richard Kearney's work The God Who May Be, specifically in the context of postmodern debates concerning epistemological claims regarding the other. Kearney's hermeneutics of religion attempts to forge a middle path between ontotheological philosophies of religion and various quasi-religious manifestations of postmodernism; however, my main concern is to address certain points of disagreement between Kearney and proponents of a deconstructive "religion without religion" principally Jacques Derrida and John D. Caputo. The main issue at stake is just (...) how other God is, which is itself a specific case of a broader question concerning otherness per se. Caputo et al. claim that religious assertions about God are fundamentally undecidable, which means that they are "infinitely translatable" and "substitutable," that we can never tell what is a translation of what, but the ultimate point is that it "does not matter" The undecidable nature of religious claims includes the very claim that religion is a discourse about God, which is why deconstructive religion without religion is a messianic hope for "the impossible" devoid of any content. Kearney objects that such radical undecidability leaves us lost in the desert ofkhora with no way to distinguish, even imperfectly and provisionally, between God and Satan, good and evil, the widow and the terrorist. In this paper I claim that Kearney succeeds in finding this via tertia between the Scylla of dogmatism and the Charybdis of complete indeterminacy by thinking God in two important ways: as persona-prosopon (which avoids confusing God with khora or monstrosity) and as posse (which keeps us from dogmatism). /// O presente artigo toma em particular consideração a obra de Richard Kearney The God Who May Be, especificamente no contexto dos debates pós-modernos acerca do estatuto epistemológico da alteridade. A abordagem hermeneutica que Kearney faz da religião procura estabelecer um caminho médio entre as filosofias ontoteológicas da religião e várias manifestações quase-religiosas do pós-modernismo. O autor do artigo, contudo, pretende estabelecer alguns pontos de desacordo entre Kearney e os defensores da "religião sem religião" típica do movimento da desconstrução, tendo em vista, sobretudo, as aportações de Jacques Derrida e de John D. Caputo. Em questão está especificamente a alteridade de Deus, ou seja, um caso específico da questão mais alargada acerca da alteridade em si mesma. Caputo, por exemplo, defende que as asserções religiosas sobre Deus são fundamentalmente indecidíveis, o que significa que elas são "infinitamente traduzíveis "e "substituíveis ", enfim, que nós nunca sabemos o que pwpriamente é tradução de quê, sendo que, no fundo, a questão em si mesma "não importa". O carácter indecidível das propostas religiosas inclui a ideia de que a religião constitui um discurso sobre Deus, razão pela qual a desconstrutora "religião sem religião "constitui uma esperança messiânica pelo "impossível" desprovida de qualquer conteúdo. Kearney objecta que uma tal indecidibilidade radical nos deixa perdidos no meio do deserto da Chora sem capacidade de distinguir, ainda que imperfeita e provisoriamente, entre Deus e Satanás, entre o bem e o mal, entre a viúva e o terrorista. Assim, o autor do artigo defende que Richard Kearney é bem sucedido em sua busca de uma via tertia entre a Cila do dogmatismo e a Caríbdis da completa indeterminação graças ao seu modo de pensar Deus por dois caminhos distintos: como pessoa-prosopon (o que impede confundir Deus com Chora ou monstruosidade) e como posse (o que nos resguarda do dogmantismo). (shrink)

In the first chapter I have introduced Carnapian intensional logic against the background of Frege's and Quine's puzzles. The main body of the dissertation consists of two parts. In the first part I discussed Carnapian modal logic and arithmetic with descriptions. In the second chapter, I have described three Carnapian theories, CCL, CFL, and CNL. All three theories have three things in common. First, they are formulated in languages containing description terms. Second, they contain a system of modal logic. Third, (...) they do not contain the unrestricted classical substitution principle, but they do contain the classical substitution principle restricted to non-modal formulas and the Carnapian substitution principle, which says that two terms can be substituted salva veritate if they are necessarily coreferential. There are two major differences between the three theories. First, CCL and CFL allow universal instantiation with description terms, whereas CNL does not. Moreover, the quantificational theory of the CCL is classical, whereas the quantificational theory of CFL is a free logic. Another difference is that CCL and CFL contain different description principles. Most importantly, the description principle of CCL ensures that even improper descriptions have a denotation, whereas the description principle of CFL does not guarantee this. CNL does not have a description principle. In the third chapter, I have studied collapse arguments for CCL, CFL, and CNL. A collapse argument is an argument for the following statement: if p is true, then it is necessarily true. A crucial role in the proofs of these collapse results was played by so-called self-predication principles, which say that under certain conditions the predicate that expresses the descriptive condition can be combined by the description term formed out of that predicate with the result being a true sentence. In this chapter I have discussed a collapse argument for the extension of CCL with a self-predication principle, I have given a collapse argument for a similarly extended CFL, and most importantly, I have given a collapse argument for the extension of CNL with a self- predication principle. Finally, I have argued that the relevant self-predication principles are unsound under a Carnapian interpretation. In the fourth chapter, I have studied the extension of Peano Arithmetic with a Carnapian modal logic C, which is a dummy letter standing for either CCL or CFL. One can prove that the principle of the necessity of identity is a theorem of CPA. This implies that one gets a collapse result for CPA. The standard principle of weak induction was crucial for the proof. One can also prove that, if one assumes a particular self-predication principle, and if one assumes the principle of strong induction or, equivalently, the least-number principle, then one gets a partial collapse of de re modal truths in de dicto modal truths. I have argued that, if the box operator is interpreted as a metaphysical necessity operator, then Platonists would not be inimical to the collapse result. But if CPA is extended with a physical theory, then there is a threat that physical truths become physical necessiti es. It was shown that, under a Carnapian interpretation, the standard principle of weak induction is unsound, and that it can be replaced by a Carnapian principle of weak induction that is sound. The problem of logical and mathematical omniscience prevents ordinary Carnapian intensional logic from being taken seriously as a logic adequate for describing the principles of demonstrability. Yet many of the proof-theoretic results of the first part carry over to the part on Carnapian epistemic arithmetic with descriptions, since proof-theoretic results are independent of the informal reading of the operators. In the fifth chapter, I looked at extensions of arithmetic with a modal logic in which the box operator is interpreted as a demonstrability operator. A first extension in that sense is Shapiro s Epistemic Arithmetic. Shapiro himself offered the problem of mathematical omniscience as a reason why it is difficult to find a model theory for EA. Horsten attempted to provide a model theory via the detour of Modal-Epistemic Arithmetic. The attention of the reader was drawn to an incoherence in the model theory of. Two alternative solutions were presented and, after a short discussion of the problem of de re demonstrability one of those alternatives was chosen. The discussion of the problem of de re demonstrability made it clear that it would be interesting to study the epistemic properties of notation systems. Horsten himself provided a framework for this, viz. Carnapian Epistemic Arithmetic, and he started a systematic study of the epistemic properties of notation systems within that framework. However, he did not provide non-trivial but adequate models. To make a start with solving the problem of finding good models for CEA, I introduced Carnapian Modal-Epistemic Arithmetic In constructing CMEA I incorporated the lesson about the principle of weak induction learnt in the fourth chapter. In the sixth chapter, I gave a critical assessment of an argument concerning the limits of de re demonstrability about the natural numbers. The conclusion of the Description Argument is that it is undemonstrable that there is a natural number that has a certain property but of which it is undemonstrable that it has that property. A crucial step in the Description Argument involved a self-predication principle. Making good use of one of the results obtained in the third chapter, I proved a collapse result for the background theory against which the Description Argument was formulated. I concluded that either the either the Description Argument is sound but its conclusion is trivial, o r the Description Argument is unsound, or it is a cheapshot. As an appendix I included an article co-authored by prof. dr. Leon Horsten and me. The topic of the article is indirectly related to some other topics investigated in my dissertation. Also, it backs up one of the addition al theses I might be asked to publicly defend during my doctoral exam. T he topic of the appendix is the set of the so-called paradoxes of strict implication. Jonathan Lowe has argued that a particular variation on C.I. Lewis notion of strict implication avoids the paradoxes of strict implication. Pace Lowe, it is argued that Lowe s notion of implication does not achieve this aim. Moreover, a general argument is offered to the effect that no other variation on Lewis notion of constantly strict implication describes the logical behaviour of natural language conditional s in a satisfactory way. (shrink)

Recent research argues that the use of information and communication technology has created a new channel through which transnational mothers can fulfill their maternal duties from afar. However, the literature pays little attention to the diversity of mothering practices via telecommunication. To fill this gap, our qualitative research on Filipina domestic workers in Hong Kong elaborates on the complexity and diversity of transnational mothering via mobile communication by demonstrating three patterns for the performance of maternal duties: intensive, collaborative, and passive (...) mothering. We argue that transnational mothering via telecommunication is shaped by the intersection of mothers’ agency, children’s responses, and substitute caregivers’ role in child care. (shrink)

Every pregroup grammar is shown to be strongly equivalent to one which uses basic types and left and right adjoints of basic types only. Therefore, a semantical interpretation is independent of the order of the associated logic. Lexical entries are read as expressions in a two sorted predicate logic with ∈ and functional symbols. The parsing of a sentence defines a substitution that combines the expressions associated to the individual words. The resulting variable free formula is the translation of (...) the sentence. It can be computed in time proportional to the parsing structure. Non-logical axioms are associated to certain words (relative pronouns, indefinite article, comparative determiners). Sample sentences are used to derive the characterizing formula of the DRS corresponding to the translation. (shrink)

Kuhn claimed that several algorithms can be defended to select the best theory based on epistemic values such as simplicity, accuracy, and fruitfulness. In a recent paper, Okasha :83–115, 2011) argued that no theory choice algorithm exists which satisfies a set of intuitively compelling conditions that Arrow had proposed for a consistent aggregation of individual preference orderings. In this paper, we put forward a solution to avoid this impossibility result. Based on previous work by Gaertner and Xu, we suggest to (...) view the theory choice problem in a cardinal context and to use a general scoring function defined over a set of qualitative verdicts for every epistemic value. This aggregation method yields a complete and transitive ranking and the rule satisfies all Arrovian conditions appropriately reformulated within a cardinal setting. We also propose methods that capture the aggregation across different scientists. (shrink)

Sellars’s critics sometimes contend that his proposed via media between Cartesian mentalism and logical behaviorism entials a correlative via media between a mentalist and a behaviorist analysis of meaning. They then argue that mentalism and behaviorism about meaning are exhaustive alternatives and any attempt to spell out a third semantic view fails. Hence, Sellars’s via media also fails. Sellars tries to avoid this line of argument by maintaining that meaning is not an analyzable concept, that is, it cannot be defined (...) in terms of mentalistic or behavioristic facts; nevertheless meaning can be explicated. Thus, no philosophy of mind will entail an analysis of meaning, although one can indeed be compatible with an explication of meaning and this is true of his “third way.” Commentators such as Chisholm and Young respond to this move by arguing that Sellars’s theory of meaning is successful only if it smuggles in a mentalist analysis of meaning and hence, Sellars’s revisionist semantics fail along with his revisionist philosophy of mind. (shrink)

Sellars’s critics sometimes contend that his proposed via media between Cartesian mentalism and logical behaviorism entials a correlative via media between a mentalist and a behaviorist analysis of meaning. They then argue that mentalism and behaviorism about meaning are exhaustive alternatives and any attempt to spell out a third semantic view fails. Hence, Sellars’s via media also fails. Sellars tries to avoid this line of argument by maintaining that meaning is not an analyzable concept, that is, it cannot be defined (...) in terms of mentalistic or behavioristic facts; nevertheless meaning can be explicated. Thus, no philosophy of mind will entail an analysis of meaning, although one can indeed be compatible with an explication of meaning and this is true of his “third way.” Commentators such as Chisholm and Young respond to this move by arguing that Sellars’s theory of meaning is successful only if it smuggles in a mentalist analysis of meaning and hence, Sellars’s revisionist semantics fail along with his revisionist philosophy of mind. (shrink)

The frame model, originating in artificial intelligence and cognitive psychology, has recently been applied to change-phenomena traditionally studied within history and philosophy of science. Its application purpose is to account for episodes of conceptual dynamics in the empirical sciences suggestive of incommensurability as evidenced by “ruptures” in the symbolic forms of historically successive empirical theories with similar classes of applications. This article reviews the frame model and traces its development from the feature list model. Drawing on extant literature, examples of (...) frame-reconstructed taxonomic change are presented. This occurs for purposes of comparison with an alternative tool, conceptual spaces. The main claim is that conceptual spaces save the merits of the frame model and provide a powerful model for conceptual change in scientific knowledge, since distinctions arising in measurement theory are native to the model. It is suggested how incommensurability as incomparability of theoretical frameworks might be avoided. Moreover, as nontranslatability of worldviews, it need not to be treated as a genuine problem of conceptual representation. The status of laws vis à vis their dimensional bases as well as diachronic similarity measures are discussed. (shrink)

The frame model, originating in artificial intelligence and cognitive psychology, has recently been applied to change-phenomena traditionally studied within history and philosophy of science. Its application purpose is to account for episodes of conceptual dynamics in the empirical sciences suggestive of incommensurability as evidenced by “ruptures” in the symbolic forms of historically successive empirical theories with similar classes of applications. This article reviews the frame model and traces its development from the feature list model. Drawing on extant literature, examples of (...) frame-reconstructed taxonomic change are presented. This occurs for purposes of comparison with an alternative tool, conceptual spaces. The main claim is that conceptual spaces save the merits of the frame model and provide a powerful model for conceptual change in scientific knowledge, since distinctions arising in measurement theory are native to the model. It is suggested how incommensurability as incomparability of theoretical frameworks might be avoided. Moreover, as nontranslatability of worldviews, it need not to be treated as a genuine problem of conceptual representation. The status of laws vis à vis their dimensional bases as well as diachronic similarity measures are discussed. (shrink)

This is a study of the way in which Levinas approaches the experience of human expression from two perspectives: firstly, as a pre-thematic or pre-cognitive “experience,” which requires that he revisit Husserl's pre-objective intentionality and explore the relationship between the upsurge of sensation and its “intentionalization” as consciousness self-temporalizing. Thereafter, Levinas must contend with the implications of his own writing, which includes his claims for the face. This implies that he must grapple with criticism to the effect that he is (...) providing a hermeneutics of face-to-face encounters. Levinas acknowledges that his writing is a “dramatique des phénomènes” and not a phenomenology of actions. How, then, to avoid charges of arbitrary description? How to step outside the primordiality of “the phrase” or the conceptualization that threatens claims to “pure” phenomenology? This is really what is at stake in Levinas's second great work. In this essay, I explore the role that “substitution” plays in weaving together conceptuality and phenomenality. I contrast this with other forms of “dramatization,” from narrative witnessing, to minimalist sculpture. (shrink)

Collapse models predict the spontaneous collapse of the wave function, in order to avoid the emergence of macroscopic superpositions. In their mass-dependent formulation, they claim that the collapse of any system’s wave function depends on its mass. Neutral K, D, B mesons are oscillating systems that are given by Nature as superposition of two distinct mass eigenstates. Thus they are unique laboratory for testing collapse models that are sensitive to the mass. In this paper we derive—for the single mesons and (...) bipartite entangled mesons—the effect of the mass-proportional CSL (Continuous Spontaneous Localization) collapse model on the dynamics on neutral mesons. We compare the theoretical prediction with experimental data from different accelerator facilities. (shrink)

To avoid exorbitant and extensive laboratory experiments, QSPR analysis, based on topological descriptors, is a very constructive statistical approach for analyzing the numerous physical and chemical properties of compounds. Therefore, we presented some new entropy measures which are based on the sum of the neighborhood degree of the vertices. Firstly, we made the partition of the edges of benzene derivatives which are based on the degree sum of neighboring vertices and then computed the neighborhood version of entropies. Secondly, we made (...) use of the software SPSS for developing a correlation between newly introduced entropies and the physicochemical properties of benzene derivatives. Our obtained results demonstrated that the critical temperature C T, critical pressure C P, and critical volume C V can be predicted through fifth geometric arithmetic entropy, second S K entropy, and fifth N D entropy, respectively. Other remaining physical characteristics include Gibb’s energy qℰ, log P, molar refractivity ℳℛ, and Henry’s law ℋℒ that can be predicted by using sixth N D entropy. (shrink)

Twenty-four U.S. states have enacted HIV exposure laws that prohibit HIV-positive persons from engaging in sexual activities with partners to whom they have not disclosed their HIV-status. From a public health perspective, HIV serostatus exposure laws can be viewed as structural interventions that seek to limit the spread of HIV by acting at the policy level. A central premise of these laws is that informed partners are more likely to protect themselves by declining sex, by substituting less risky activities for (...) higher-risk ones, or by using condoms, than are uninformed partners. However, the effectiveness of these laws at preventing HIV transmission is not known.There is little standardization among existing HIV exposure laws, which vary substantially with respect to the sexual activities that are prohibited without prior serostatus disclosure. Among the strictest laws are those in Arkansas, Michigan, New Jersey, and Ohio which mandate disclosure prior to almost any type of sexual contact. (shrink)

Some of the most well known figures in three main cultures, Islam, Christianity and Judaism, defend negative theology. They believe that God doesn’t have any positive attribute and that no positive knowledge of Him is possible. Others, who are in majority, are anxious of agnosticism. Maimonides the great Jewish philosopher tries to relive this anxiety. He proposes negative knowledge arguing that in terms of negation we become closer to some knowledge of Him, though His nature still remains out of access. (...) In this way he tries to avoid agnosticism and at the same time justify the extreme differences among believers in knowledge of Him. But it seems that, if we rely on reason alone, Maimonides' arguments are not convincing. This paper tries to criticize his examples and arguments. It seems clear that any negative knowledge should be based on a kind of positive one. No one by mere negation can receive any understanding of Him especially when the realm of negation expands upon the predicate of being too. In that case if someone like Maimonides insists to preserve his faith on God he should seek ways other than reason, like fideism or Gnosticism. And as a philosopher he cannot hold his position anymore. (shrink)

In order to know what a belief is, we need to know when it is appropriate to say that two subjects (or the same subject at two different times) believe(s) the same or entertain the same thought. This is not entirely straightforward. Consider for instance1. Tom thinks that he himself is the smartest and Tim believes the same2. In 2001, Bill believed that some action had to be taken to save the rain forest and today he believes the same.What does (...) Tim think? That he, Tim, is the smartest, or that Tom is? And what does Bill believe today? That action had to be taken in 2001 or that it has to be taken now? Both answers are intuitively acceptable. This has to be accounted for somehow.Building on Mark Richard's work on tense, Scott Soames 1 claims that the substitutional interpretation of the quantifiers is unable to account for the intended meaning of such statements as (2) and the validity of some inferences involving them. I will show that his argument is not convincing. Not only does the substitutional interpretation fare no worse than the objectual one, but it seems to be able to avoid a problem which could be seriously damaging for any account of the sameness of thoughts based on the notion of structured proposition. In the first section, I state the problem allegedly raised by tensed belief ascriptions to the substitutional interpretation of the quantifiers. In the second, Soames's argument is shown to be flawed. I also show that the content of the that-clause in (2) is not faithfully represented by any kind of structured proposition. Finally, I show how the substitutional interpretation can handle all such statements as (1) and (2) and the inferences involving them. (shrink)

One of the primary, if not most critical, difficulties in the design and implementation of autonomous systems is the black-boxed nature of the decision-making structures and logical pathways. How human values are embodied and actualised in situ may ultimately prove to be harmful if not outright recalcitrant. For this reason, the values of stakeholders become of particular significance given the risks posed by opaque structures of intelligent agents (IAs). This paper explores how decision matrix algorithms, via the belief-desire-intention model for (...) autonomous vehicles, can be designed to minimize the risks of opaque architectures. Primarily through an explicit orientation towards designing for the values of explainability and verifiability. In doing so, this research adopts the Value Sensitive Design (VSD) approach as a principled framework for the incorporation of such values within design. VSD is recognized as a potential starting point that offers a systematic way for engineering teams to formally incorporate existing technical solutions within ethical design, while simultaneously remaining pliable to emerging issues and needs. It is concluded that the VSD methodology offers at least a strong enough foundation from which designers can begin to anticipate design needs and formulate salient design flows that can be adapted to the changing ethical landscapes required for utilisation in autonomous vehicles. (shrink)